Whether it is wrong or not is not in fact my prerogative. So long as idealism is even possible, it shows that your misinterpretations of conceivability and possibility are unwarranted.

Whether it is wrong or not is not in fact my prerogative. — maplestreet

It's not your prerogative, it's a fact that's independent of you. You're asking for definitions that work under any ontological interpretation, but there's no reason to ask for that if what possibility versus conceivability is is something about the factual, realist world and not a fictional, idealist world.

It's possible that Trump will make a good president, but it's not really conceivable.

If what possibility and conceivability turn out to be is something that indeed something that requires minds to be separate from what appears in the world, then this is a matter to be shown. It is not permissible to assert such a conclusion from defining them in the beginning. So no, I'm not asking for definitions that work under any ontological interpretation. Specifically, I don't want question begging definitions that assume an ontology in which there are facts independent of people (and hence, are not conceivable). Such as what you claimed:

"The former (at least when we're talking about metaphysical possibility) is limited by facts in the world independent of persons."

What would be acceptable example is if you claimed that
1. 'what is possible is the set of what can manifest in the world' matches our ordinary conceptions of 'possibility' / is a good candidate for a definition of 'possibility'
and
2. this understanding of possibility requires that there are facts that manifest in the world that are independent of people.


Btw, I'm still waiting for your reply to my second point from 2 posts ago

If this isn't a troll answer, it's a very poor one.

More importantly, how can you prove that one cannot have a conception of a square circle? — maplestreet

How you prove such things is to demonstrate that they are contradictory. So you would need to define "circle", and "square" in such a way that the two conceptions would exclude one being attributed to the other, by virtue of contradiction. Those who would say that a square circle is possible would be defining these terms in another way to ensure that there is no contradiction.

So we produce impossibilities by definition, and maintaining the fundamental principle that contradiction is unacceptable. Thus what is signified by the contradiction cannot be conceived of, and is said to be impossible. This is what is inconceivable, contradiction.

What you ask in the op, is if there could be something in reality, existing, which could not be described in any way other than in a contradictory way, this would make that thing inconceivable. I don't think that this is possible. If something appears to us as if it cannot be described except through contradiction (and this might be the case with what is referred to as "becoming"), then we have to keep on looking for a different way to describe it, until we determine the way which is non-contradictory.

I believe that from the point of view of the philosophical mind-set, which is the desire to know, it is necessary that we maintain this position. If we allow the possibility that there is an actuality which cannot be conceived, then anything which appears as if it cannot be described in any way other than a contradictory way, would appear to be such a thing. We would give up trying to know that thing because we would assume that it is the existing thing which is inconceivable. Therefore the true philosopher, who maintains the desire to know everything, would never admit to such a possibility.

The more I read of your own contributions the more I think it was a troll question to begin with. Clearly you have your own answer to every objection already so I can see no other motivation for this thread than to anger everybody.

Good explanation, but I don't see anything fundamental or forceful about that principle. How can you prove to me that I can't have a conception of something contradictory?
Personally, I can convince myself of this, since I have had such a conception before. Of course, I cannot reasonably persuade you this, but this is still irrelevant; how can you prove that no one can conceive of something contradictory?

If I wanted to anger other people, there are much more efficient ways to do that than by providing reasoned responses, irrespective of whether or not these responses turn out to be persuasive.

How can you prove to me that I can't have a conception of something contradictory? — maplestreet

Then it would not be a conception, it would be a misconception. A supposed conception, which contains a contradiction is really a misconception. That's the point here, we control these things through definition. I follow a definition which separates a conception from a misconception. So if you claim to have a conception which consists of a contradiction, then to me this is not a conception at all, so I dismiss it as a misconception. If you continue to insist that it is a conception, then either we give up our attempts to communicate, or you describe to me your definition of conception which allows you to say that what I call misconception, you may call a conception.

OK, you are being very fair. I respect your definitions and simply therefore request that you proceed to answer my question using the following definition for conception:

x is conceivable=x can be thought of/is percievable

On this definition, I maintain that something logically contradictory is conceivable, and while I do not expect you to accept this assertion, I would request any proof if you continue to maintain that "if x is contradictory, then x cannot be thought of"

On this definition, I maintain that something logically contradictory is conceivable, and while I do not expect you to accept this assertion, I would request any proof if you continue to maintain that "if x is contradictory, then x cannot be thought of" — maplestreet

That a contradiction is conceivable is to say we can conceive of what - for reason of contradiction - can't possibly exist. So not sure how this helps with any issue regarding inconceivable existences.

The issue is that Metaphysician Undercover claimed that a square circle possibly exists: Depending on how one defines 'square' and 'circle', this concept need not be impossible. In other words, it would be possible. And he claims that a square circle is not conceivable. Of course, one might rightly wonder whether or not if the definitions changed that this change could also make a square circle now be conceivable. So yeah, I am inclined to agree with you that this looks like a moot point.

Granted. I can't turn out Pulitzer Prize content all the time. Sorry.

I do appreciate the humor though :D

OK, you are being very fair. I respect your definitions and simply therefore request that you proceed to answer my question using the following definition for conception:

x is conceivable=x can be thought of/is percievable — maplestreet

I would not equate conceiving with thinking of, or perceiving. If this were the case, then other creatures which think and perceive would have conceptions. I think conception requires some judgement of consent by the thinker, a judgement that the thinking is correct thinking.

What's wrong with saying other creatures can have conceptions or judgements of consent? Either way, it really doesn't matter if you think it's a good definition or not. I am requesting that definition be used for the sake of my question. If you want, simply don't answer the question. Alternatively, answer my original question as 'Does there exist something that is possible but cannot be thought of/perceived?'

Well, I already said that I don't think it's wise to even believe that there is anything in existence which cannot be conceived. And as I defined conceiving, it is a specialized form of thinking, so clearly I don't think there is anything in actual existence which cannot be thought of, in any absolute sense.

ok, this simply answers my original question directly. this is sufficient to me and similar to my own thoughts.

I guess I like stating everything in the most convoluted way possible. But here's the thing, it's just an opinion, an attitude, a belief that it would be unphilosophical to think otherwise. So it can't really be proven, it can just be explained.

If what possibility and conceivability turn out to be is something that indeed something that requires minds to be separate from what appears in the world, then this is a matter to be shown. — maplestreet

The problem with this approach is that there is no default "foundational" stance that everyone accepts for us to start at. The answer to a lot of questions will stem from particular other stances that someone might not share. We can't start from the beginning all the time, even if we'd want to, because of that lack of some shared, default, "foundational" stance. And Lord knows I don't want to turn yet another thread into an idealism vs. realism discussion--sometimes it seems like that's all we do here. It's like some sort of OCDish obsession.

Aside from that, my comment isn't at all question-begging. Question-begging specifically refers to an argument where the conclusion is one if the premises.

On this definition, I maintain that something logically contradictory is conceivable, — maplestreet

"Something logically contradictory being instantiated materially" that should be, as anyone who understands what logical contradictions are finds them conceivable--otherwise one would not understand what logical contradictions are in the first place. "Conceiving logical contradictions to be true" wouldn't really work, either, as everyone who can grasp the basics of paraconsistent logic, at least as a formal construction, can conceive of that.

Conceivability should specify a coherency requirement. Otherwise, people often say they can conceive of something if they can roughly imagine it while avoiding thinking about details/how it would work, where the details often don't make much sense to them. However, coherence is typically defined with respect to logical contradictions, so one would have to give an account of what coherence is amounting to when one says that one can conceive of something logically contradictory being instantiated materially.

4. Most importantly of all, I'd like you to give me some sort of justification for thinking "1 makes more sense to me." — maplestreet

It's purely intuition. I suspect most people would agree. If someone doesn't agree, then they would have to make an argument in defense of the assertions I mentioned.

A. in order for something to exist, it must be conceivable. B.We haven't conceived of it, therefore, it can't exist.

There has already been an example. Before we conceived of the idea of a planet that rained jemstones, that planet did exist. I suppose we could quibble about whether or not that planet Could have been conceived of, Before it was actually discovered.

I interpret the OP to be asking, "Could there exist something that could never have been conceived of(prior to its discovery)?"

It seems to me that you are making the assertion, "If something Is discovered, Then it Was conceivable." I'm saying that just because something was discovered, it doesn't follow that anyone would have ever conceived of said thing, before it was discovered.

It's almost as if you are suggesting that no one has ever been surprised. What is surprise, if not the feeling "holy cow! I had no idea! "?

2. No. This implies the assertions A. that in order for something to exist, it must be conceivable, and of course.. B. We haven't conceived of it, therefore, it can't exist. — anonymous66

There's a difference between being conceivable and being conceived, and so B. doesn't follow.

There's a difference between being conceivable and being conceived, and so B. doesn't follow. — Michael

This suggests that you agree that there could be things that exist, which haven't yet been conceived of (but Could eventually be conceived of).

This suggests that you agree that there could be things that exist, which haven't yet been conceived of (but Could eventually be conceived of). — anonymous66

It only suggests that I disagree with your inference.

This suggests that you agree that there could be things that exist, which haven't yet been conceived of (but Could eventually be conceived of). — anonymous66

I don't see how anyone could disagree with that. After all, all sorts of films, music, etc. will be made--and just next couple years, say, that no one has conceived of yet.

But you're talking about the future, in the case of the examples you used. I thought the OP was about things already in existence.

But, even then. There probably do exist film scripts, music, etc.. that I couldn't conceive of, and yet they do exist.

Another thing to consider: in the instances above, the things were conceived of before they were created (I think). I may not have conceived of unknown film scripts, etc before I was aware of their existence... but Someone did conceive of them, and Then created them.

When we talk about whether something is conceivable, we do not usually mean whether a particular person is capable of conceiving it at a particular time; we usually mean whether any person could ever be capable of conceiving it.

Well yes, hence my original question. I am looking for a proof or serious argument that would give me a good reason to believe that "the universe is more strange than we are even able to comprehend". — maplestreet

Since it seems obvious that a five year old cannot comprehend the simplest of things (like how a light bulb works) and many fairly intelligent people cannot comprehend complex things (like how a car engine works) and even other very intelligent people cannot comprehend very complex things (like how quantum mechanics works), it seems finally very obvious that the most intelligent people cannot comprehend the most complicated things.