Can Consciousness really go all the way down to level of bacterias and virus?

StarsFromMemory

So I was reading theories and concepts related to consciousness when I came across this:

"Where do we draw the line? At vertebrates? The nervous systems of insects may not be as complex as ours, and they probably do not have as rich an experience of the world as we do. They also have very different senses, so the picture that is painted in their minds may be totally unlike ours. But I see no reason to doubt that insects have inner experiences of some kind.

How far down do we go? It seems probable to me that any organism that is sensitive in some way to its environment has a degree of interior experience. Many single-celled organisms are sensitive to physical vibration, light intensity, or heat. Who are we to say they do not have a corresponding degree of consciousness?

Would the same apply to viruses and DNA? Even to crystals and atoms? The philosopher Alfred North Whitehead argued that consciousness goes all the way down. He saw it as an intrinsic property of creation."

It seems that the writer is trying to imply that since many single-celled organisms respond to light, heat and vibrations, they must havee some corresponding degree of consciousness. (He doesn't claim so but also doesn't deny it)

However, since the stimulus of light, heat and electricity are purely physical and the response of the single-celled organism is based on chemical pathyways, which are often not very hard to study, we should also conclude that anything that reacts to a physical event, must be conscious.

Now if we consider a device that has photoreceptors attached to it and simply beeps everytime light strikes it, shouldn't we argue that this device too is conscious in some sense? It surely picks up stimulus and through physical mechanisms reacts to it similar to a single celled organism. Now is it false to say that complexity of the response does not determine the degree of consciousness ? I can see why the complexity and number of stimulus can affect the degree of consciousness, but surely how we react to it cannot (maybe how conscious we are can affect our response but not the other way around). Hence, our device must have the same level of consciousness that the primitive single celled organsim has since it reacts to the same stimulus, although in a the reaction is less complex.

If that is the case, then even electrical appliances which operate when they pick up electron flow, shoud be considered conscious in some sense.

Are those conclusions valid based on the criteria the writer uses to say that bacteria might be conscious?

Or can response to stimulus be an indicator of consciousness only in living organisms?

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CeleRate

It will be an issue of how to define consciousness. If consciousness is awareness (in the form of a thought) regarding internal/external stimulation. And if thinking is silent talking, and talking only comes about when there is a verbal community that can teach an individual how to talk, then that kind of consciousness seems limited to just those animals that have a verbal community that can differentially reinforce particular linguistic use. Contingencies of survival have selected instinctual sounds/calls/& otherwise in non-human species, but it appears that the only species with verbal communities that teach variation of responses within a lifetime is human.

If consciousness is defined as reflexive, operant, or instinctual responses to external stimuli, then the term could possibly be used with most animals.

When philosophers discuss the hard problem of consciousness, they cannot talk about the term without respect to verbal behavior. Verbal behavior is necessary in order to discuss mental states.

Zelebg

↪StarsFromMemory

can response to stimulus be an indicator of consciousness

No, because consciousness implies “mental content”, an infrastructure that can internally model or represent itself vs. everything else. There needs to be a virtual reality simulator built on top of the reactive system, but whether such a system can fit in an insect brain or a single cell is still a question.

Also, you don’t run from a bear because you’re scared. You get scared when your body starts to run. Reaction first, experience second, or it might be too late. It’s also why people often do or say things they don’t “really” mean.

Txastopher

The problem of other minds highlights the difficulty in being sure that other members of our own species are conscious. Panpsychism helps out of this problem by conferring consciousness on absolutely everything.

My own take is that consciousness is a term that humans use to refer to subjective experience. We assume that since we have it, other things must have it as well; possibly because we can't imagine what existence could be like without it.

Birds have feathers and fish can breathe underwater, but we can't. The qualities of subjective experience we have seem to me to be an evolutionary adaptation albeit on less observable than gills and feathers. But as we know from arguments on the existence of God, it's not possible to prove something doesn't exit. However, if panpsychists want to insist that virus are conscious then it is up to them to demonstrate their claim. This they haven't done.

bert1

However, if panpsychists want to insist that virus are conscious then it is up to them to demonstrate their claim. This they haven't done. — Txastopher

It's right to ask panpsychists for positive demonstrations of course. But it is also interesting to consider what the 'default' position actually is. It is arguably more parsimonious and reasonable to assume panpsychism on the grounds that the only body we know about for sure is conscious, namely my own (and similarly for each of us). So then we have to consider whether there are two kinds of bodies in the world, conscious and non-conscious, or just one, conscious. If all other things are equal, it seems to me that the default position is that there is one kind of body.

Echarmion

If that is the case, then even electrical appliances which operate when they pick up electron flow, shoud be considered conscious in some sense. — StarsFromMemory

The important part here is the qualifier "in some sense". We really only understand one kind of consciousness - our own. We infer from that understanding certain observable features that we consider evidence for similar consciousness.

Beyond that understanding, the term is meaningless. Yes you can muse about whether a computer, or even a specific program within is "in some sense conscious", but the phrase contains no information, it's empty. You have no idea how such a consciousness would feel like internally, or what it entails for your treatment of the device.

bongo fury

... so the picture that is painted in their minds... — Peter Russell

In their what, now??

We really only understand one kind of consciousness - our own. — Echarmion

Fewer, surely?

Can consciousness really go all the way down to the level of bacteria and virus? — StarsFromMemory

Good question. I find that admission of such a possibility usually indicates zero prospect of any interesting discussion on this topic, as it sets the bar far too low - in relation to the psychology, anyway: it shifts the discussion away from the fascinating psychology, into metaphysical woo. So thanks for asking it.

StarsFromMemory

No, because consciousness implies “mental content”, an infrastructure that can internally model or represent itself vs. everything else. There needs to be a virtual reality simulator built on top of the reactive system, but whether such a system can fit in an insect brain or a single cell is still a question. — Zelebg

Consciousness implies any basic level of the 'mental content'. As far I as I know, we talk about many forms of consciousness such as consciousness of inner mental state (such as awareness that we are experiencing happiness or sorrow), consciousness of the external world where we construct a world view using sensory input and consciousness about our inner state that is awareness that we exist.

If a single celled organism posseses any of these then so must a sophiscated man-made equipment because there is little difference in input-output mechansim of a single celled organism and a man made equipment.

StarsFromMemory

Beyond that understanding, the term is meaningless. Yes you can muse about whether a computer, or even a specific program within is "in some sense conscious", but the phrase contains no information, it's empty. You have no idea how such a consciousness would feel like internally, or what it entails for your treatment of the device. — Echarmion

That does make sense, but the question here is whether it is reasonable to think that a single celled is conscious even in the most basic sense, that is, whether it shares some aspects of consciousness, be it in a rudimentary form, with humans.

StarsFromMemory

So then we have to consider whether there are two kinds of bodies in the world, conscious and non-conscious, or just one, conscious. If all other things are equal, it seems to me that the default position is that there is one kind of body. — bert1

I disagree. All organisms are similar in the sense that all of them are subject to the same physical laws of nature. However, when subjected to those physical processes, they may come to posses certain traits and abilities that differentiates them from each other.

That would imply that consciousness is a result of evolution and can be explained by neuroscience. That is what I have come to believe.

I don't think consciousness is a some fundamental property of all creation. I think even the most rudimentary forms of consciousness are only in organisms that posses a nervous system and as the complexity of the system increases, it becomes more and more aware. (What it becomes more and more aware of depends on the part of the nervous system that has become more sophiscated)

StarsFromMemory

So then we have to consider whether there are two kinds of bodies in the world, conscious and non-conscious, or just one, conscious. If all other things are equal, it seems to me that the default position is that there is one kind of body. — bert1

I disagree. All organisms are similar in the sense that all of them are subject to the same physical laws of nature. However, when subjected to those physical processes, they may come to posses certain traits and abilities that differentiates them from each other.

That would imply that consciousness is a result of evolution and can be explained by neuroscience. That is what I have come to believe.

I don't think consciousness is a some fundamental property of all creation. I think even the most rudimentary forms of consciousness are only in organisms that posses a nervous system and as the complexity of the system increases, it becomes more and more aware. (What it becomes more and more aware of depends on the part of the nervous system that has become more sophiscated)

Pfhorrest

Access consciousness is a functional property that only applies to things with the requisite functionality.

Phenomenal consciousness is nothing more than the having of a first-person perspective, and applies to everything.

The phenomenal consciousness of something that is not access consciousness is as unremarkable as the behavior of that object, though, since both phenomenal consciousness and behavior are products of the object's function.

Access consciousness is the difference in function, the important thing that matters, that distinguishes humans from rocks.

But that function is built up from simpler functions that are built up from simpler functions so there's never a hard line where something suddenly becomes / ceases to be "consciousness" in either sense.

My complete thoughts on the topic.

bongo fury

I think even the most rudimentary forms of consciousness are only in organisms that possess a nervous system — StarsFromMemory

How far down, then, for you? Ants? Robotic AI ants? Smart phones?

Just curious, for the reason mentioned.

StarsFromMemory

Phenomenal consciousness is nothing more than the having of a first-person perspective, and applies to everything. — Pfhorrest

Everything living? Or everything that exists?

Pfhorrest

↪StarsFromMemory

Everything that exists.

deletedusercb

I disagree. All organisms are similar in the sense that all of them are subject to the same physical laws of nature. However, when subjected to those physical processes, they may come to posses certain traits and abilities that differentiates them from each other. — StarsFromMemory

And they do have traits and abilities that differentiate them. But consciousness may not be a trait in this sense, it may merely be a facet of what gets called matter. Since we can't detect consciousness, but we can detect behavior, and because we have a bias in granting consciousness to things like us, we tend to grant it to organisms and those like us, and always with great reluctance. Not long ago in science animals, even, were considered machines without consciousness or scientsts at least had to remain agnostic about it.

That would imply that consciousness is a result of evolution and can be explained by neuroscience. That is what I have come to believe. — StarsFromMemory

Actually nothing in what you wrote implies that consciousness is the result of evolution. Because certain things can be the result of evolution does not mean all things are.

I don't think consciousness is a some fundamental property of all creation. I think even the most rudimentary forms of consciousness are only in organisms that posses a nervous system and as the complexity of the system increases, it becomes more and more aware. — StarsFromMemory

Yes, this is what you think. And I can see the appeal of it and it might be true. Or it might not.

(What it becomes more and more aware of depends on the part of the nervous system that has become more sophiscated) — StarsFromMemory

The complexity of the nervous system may allow for more cognitive functions, but this may not be coupled at all to being conscious. For all we know a mussel has just as intense experiences as we do, but it does not have anything like our range of cognitive functions. And scientists, after long bias, are beginning to consider that plants are conscious, despite the lack of nervous systems. They have memory, react to pain, communicate, even across plant species, make choices (albeit much slower than we do in general, but not always), and have across whole plant reactions that look very much like nervous system reactions despite not having one. There is absolutely no reason to assume they are not conscious. Note my wording.

Txastopher

Everything that exists — Pfhorrest

If that were the case and consciousness were a property of matter rather than a large, functioning nervous system, then consciousness would persist post-mortem.

Zelebg

↪Pfhorrest

Everything that exists

What’s the purpose of the brain and sensory organs then? Leaf, branch, tree, forest… what is conscious there, and what makes the boundary between my consciousness and that of the chair I’m sitting at, or the house I’m in, for example?

BC

↪StarsFromMemory

Would the same apply to viruses and DNA? — StarsFromMemory

If one were to posit consciousness to both human beings and viruses, one would have to explain by what means molecules making up the virus (or DNA) could process consciousness. It's difficult enough to explain how humans process consciousness, and we have about 3 pounds of brain matter to do it. Conscious toasters?

If we go up the ladder of complexity a ways, to honey bees, we find that scout bees (the ones who go out looking for batches of flowers, come back, and report to the hive) engage in what might possibly be a private mental experience. I read that scout bees sometimes perform their dance at night when their audience is not paying attention. When bees swarm, scouts go out and look for potential hive locations and return. Then they perform a dance which communicates information

More scouts return to the swarm and do their own dances. Gradually, some of the scouts become convinced by others, and switch their choreography to match. Once every scout agrees, the swarm flies off to its new home. — New York Times, 3/2/2020

The caucusing scouts have to have some sort of mental process to evaluate the information they are exchanging.

If you want to believe that rocks have a fragment of consciousness, go ahead. But IF you want to convince me that rocks and mountains, trees and forests, etc. are inhabited by some sort of 'knowing' you'll have to come up with a mechanism for how this could be the case. (Maybe there is such a mechanism; trees, for instance, do communicate with other trees; they don't discuss Hegel, obviously, but they do send out relevant chemical messages.)

Pfhorrest

↪Txastopher

↪Zelebg

That’s all about access consciousness. Functionality. Phenomenal consciousness is something much less interesting.

deletedusercb

If that were the case and consciousness were a property of matter rather than a large, functioning nervous system, then consciousness would persist post-mortem. — Txastopher

The cognitive functions need not persist. This likes memory, or that this particular batch of atoms, all together, is conscious as a unit, end, but this need not mean that consciousness ends.

deletedusercb

What’s the purpose of the brain and sensory organs then? Leaf, branch, tree, forest… what is conscious there, and what makes the boundary between my consciousness and that of the chair I’m sitting at, or the house I’m in, for example? — Zelebg

Matter is interconnected in life forms, and perhaps other batches of matter. A body functions as a unity. Of course perhaps on another level it is connected to other or all matter, but Cognitive functions arise from the complexity of the interconnection inside the organism and also the sense organs. But this does not mean that consciousness is limited to such organizations. Functions are not the same thing as consciousness.

Txastopher

That’s all about access consciousness. Functionality. Phenomenal consciousness is something much less interesting. — Pfhorrest

Yes, I'm familiar with the distinction. But to me that sounds like unconscious consciousness which in turn sounds like nonsense.

bongo fury

But consciousness may not be a trait in this sense, it may merely be a facet of what gets called matter. — Coben

Woo.

there's never a hard line where something suddenly becomes / ceases to be "consciousness" — Pfhorrest

True, but it's arguable there is a very wide zone of uncertainty separating perfectly clear cases of consciousness from equally clear counter-cases.

Denial of this alleged clarity at either end, i.e. as proposed by the pan-psychists doubting unconsciousness of rocks at one end, and possibly by Dennett (at least as he dares to paint himself) doubting consciousness of adult humans at the other, may turn out to be the right conclusion. But it (denial of clarity, and embrace of a continuum) seems to me to be caused by slippery slope logic only, and unnecessarily.

So I like the thread question, and I hope that it ends up puncturing anthropomorphism about robots and insects more than inspiring it.

Zelebg

↪Pfhorrest

What differentiates one consciousness from another - leaf, branch, tree, forest... each grain of sand or the whole beach - what is conscious? Also, what is the point of a claim that can not be confirmed in principle and has no explanatory power?

bert1

If that were the case and consciousness were a property of matter rather than a large, functioning nervous system, then consciousness would persist post-mortem. — Txastopher

It would, but identity would not. The units would change.

bert1

What differentiates one consciousness from another - leaf, branch, tree, forest... each grain of sand or the whole beach - what is conscious? — Zelebg

Good question. Possibly Tononi's phi. I like to think of the IIT as a theory of identity rather than a theory of consciousness.

bert1

Also, what is the point of a claim that can not be confirmed in principle and has no explanatory power? — Zelebg

It explains why anything at all is conscious. It might also explain why anything at all happens, if everything that happens is a result of intention. Admittedly these are explanations at the very broadest level possible - you can't get any useful tech out of this, or solve practical moral problems with it.

Zelebg

↪bert1

Panpsychism must be true in some way because it’s maximally vague and ambiguous. Consider emergentism, the opposite of panpsychism, and yet if true, panpsychist could still say the possibility of emergence was built-in throughout the fabric of the universe all along, and that would be truth, but useless truth. Too general to the point of being meaningless, like stating “everything is universe”. It’s far more reasonable to say “consciousness is a program”, because, at least in some way, that’s what it is.

deletedusercb

Woo. — bongo fury

?

bongo fury

? — Coben

Metaphysics.

Can Consciousness really go all the way down to level of bacterias and virus?

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