Facing up to the Problem of Illusionism

Marchesk

The argument that consciousness is an illusion actually has some interesting subtlety to it that most people miss when hearing about it.

The claim is that our introspection misleads us into attributing phenomenal feels to experience. It seems like we have the ineffable, intrinsic, private and immediately apprehended qualia which is so hard to reconcile with any scientific account. But instead what we have is a quasi-phenomenal redness of red. The quasi part means a distortion of the actual biological mechanisms which create experience. It's a simplification of a complex process represented in a way that seems phenomenal.

This means that the philosophical zombie argument is mistaken, because there would be something it is like for a zombie, which is the illusion of having qualia. However, zombies are supposed to be "all dark" inside, so the zombie thought experiment is making a mistake which a better understanding of neuroscience would show to be impossible. If the zombie is physically the same us, it undergoes the same illusion about being conscious. The what it's like is introspection telling the zombie there is something it's like to see red or be in pain, and that introspection is itself a functional process. Thus, illusionism is not denying there is something it's like. That's the illusion.

This argument also has a good reason motivating it. If we do actually possess phenomenal consciousness, then how do we know about it? How is it represented in memory, and how do place it into language? Those are understood to be neurological functions. Which would mean the qualia is somehow being accessed by the brain. Wittgenstein's beetle-in-the-box deserves a shout out here as well.

The advantage of illusionism over outright eliminativism is that it acknowledges we do very much seem to have these rich phenomenal experiences, leading to the concept of qualia. But our introspection is unreliable. Colors, sounds, feels, etc. are useful fictions consolidating an overwhelming amount of information and processing into something an organism can easily act upon. And this is why consciousness seems to be so hard to explain.

The remaining difficulty for the illusionist is providing the mechanism for the introspective illusion of qualia. Which presumably neuroscience will uncover at some point, if the position is correct.

Harry Hindu

I'm loathe to use terms like "fiction" and "illusions" when it comes to consciousness. I don't understand how a "fiction" is useful for anything but entertainment, and a mirage would be an illusion within the "illusion" of consciousness, which doesn't make any sense. How does natural selection filter out or promote these introspective fictions and illusions? Are there "fictions" and "illusions" that are more useful than others? How and why? To say that one "illusion" is more useful for survival is saying that it is less of an illusion than some other concept. For something to be useful, it has to have some sort of connection with real states of affairs in the environment.

How does the brain introspect, and when a brain introspects, why doesn't it experience an arrangement of excited neurons rather than the qualia of colors, shapes, sounds, etc.,? Does it make sense to say that a brain can think about thinking? If it can do that, then is "thinking" (I think therefore I am) an illusion? How do you know where the illusions stop and reality begins to even say "I think, therefore I am"?

StarsFromMemory

Wittgenstein's beetle-in-the-box deserves a shout out here as well. — Marchesk

Good to know about this analogy. I had always thought of the subjectivity of experience, mostly of colour and that there was no way to deduce that my image of colour green is remotely similar to someone else's image of the colour green.

StarsFromMemory

The advantage of illusionism over outright eliminativism is that it acknowledges we do very much seem to have these rich phenomenal experiences, leading to the concept of qualia. But our introspection is unreliable. Colors, sounds, feels, etc. are useful fictions consolidating an overwhelming amount of information and processing into something an organism can easily act upon. And this is why consciousness seems to be so hard to explain. — Marchesk

This is what I would choose as an alternative to functionalism and panpsychism ; that consciousness arises from the processing of huge amounts of information in the brain. It is intuitive and won't lead us to conclude that everything has some essence of consciousness. The obvious problem however, is that we don't have the slightest of clue how such a process results in the experience of qualia

Echarmion

Thus, illusionism is not denying there is something it's like. That's the illusion. — Marchesk

I'll second

↪Harry Hindu

here. You'll have to first define illusion in a way that makes sense when inside the mind. What's the difference between experiencing the illusion of qualia and experiencing qualia themselves? What difference does it make in any practical capacity?

Marchesk

What's the difference between experiencing the illusion of qualia and experiencing qualia themselves? — Echarmion

One leads to a hard problem and one doesn't.

What difference does it make in any practical capacity? — Echarmion

An analogy used is that the illusion is like a computer desktop, which is a useful abstraction for users, while the underlying computer system is quite different from the visual interface.

Echarmion

One leads to a hard problem and one doesn't. — Marchesk

That strikes me as a bit circular. The hard problem is the reason we are even considering the approach.

An analogy used is that the illusion is like a computer desktop, which is a useful abstraction for users, while the underlying computer system is quite different from the visual interface. — Marchesk

But since, in that scenario, we are the computer desktop, it seems entirely irrelevant (much like the simulation hypothesis, incidentally).

Marchesk

How does the brain introspect, and when a brain introspects, why doesn't it experience an arrangement of excited neurons rather than the qualia of colors, shapes, sounds, etc.,? — Harry Hindu

Why would the brain produce a qualia of colors, shapes, sounds, etc.? Qualia aren't compatible with neuroscience. That's why it's called the hard problem.

For something to be useful, it has to have some sort of connection with real states of affairs in the environment. — Harry Hindu

Yes, but I take it this position is assuming indirect realism. It's certainly assuming that science has shown that the world is not colored in, doesn't sound or taste or feel like we experience it.

I don't understand how a "fiction" is useful for anything but entertainment, — Harry Hindu

A fiction would be useful for hiding the overwhelming complexity an organism is dealing with. But you raise some good question I don't know enough to answer.

Marchesk

That strikes me as a we bit circular. The hard problem is the reason we are even considering the approach. — Echarmion

Yes, but this is a rejection of the hard problem, while explaining why we mistakenly think there is one.

But since, in that scenario, we are the computer desktop, it seems entirely irrelevant (much like the simulation hypothesis, incidentally). — Echarmion

Yes, the brain is presenting an "interface" to itself. Some people have suggested this is for an greater ability to reflect instead of just automatic responses.

creativesoul

there would be something it is like — Marchesk

That's the entire problem...

Marchesk

That's the problem... — creativesoul

The what it's like is the illusion that we have qualia. So we are having an experience that seems to be what it's like in the sense of the hard problem. It's a powerful illusion.

I admit this isn't entirely convincing. The crux of the argument is whether one can present this in a way where the illusion isn't itself phenomenal.

But what it is doing is attacking the notion that we can just take our introspective judgement of consciousness at face value. What if we're wrong?

creativesoul

The very notion of "what it's like" to be a man, woman, trans, bat, baseball player, black person, or whatever... is fraught from the very beginning. There is no such thing.

That manner of talk is the problem.

Marchesk

↪creativesoul

But sensory modalities are a thing, and bat's utilize sonar which we don't, so they may have a kind of experience, or at least an illusion that we don't.

"What it's like" is just a way of saying that.

Echarmion

Yes, but this is a rejection of the hard problem, while explaining why we mistakenly think there is one. — Marchesk

But does it really explain, in the sense of giving additional information? What is it that Illusionism says beyond "the hard problem is an illusion?"

Yes, the brain is presenting an "interface" to itself. Some people have suggested this is for an greater ability to reflect instead of just automatic responses. — Marchesk

And what are the implications, other than that the hard problem doesn't exist?

Marchesk

And what are the implications, other than that the hard problem doesn't exist? — Echarmion

That's the point of the debate. If there's no hard problem, then it's just a matter of the easier problems amenable to neuroscience and psychology. Easier as in they don't cause a metaphysical or epistemological issue.

bongo fury

An analogy used is that the illusion is like a computer desktop, which is a useful abstraction for users, while the underlying computer system is quite different from the visual interface. — Marchesk

I hear this a lot. But I wonder how, and even whether, it is meant to deflate qualia talk and Cartesian theatre talk. A visual interface is pictures we look at, and locating them in the head implies a homunculus to view them, whether or not they are to be read as depicting realistically or figuratively.

Kind of an own goal.

Marchesk

↪bongo fury

True, but it's also being used as a metaphor. Illusionists aren't saying there's literally a computer-like graphical display in the brain. Also because vision is just one of the senses, and we should be mindful not to base too much philosophical argument based on vision alone, as that can be misleading.

However, to your point, I do wonder about dreams and day dreams, which very much seem like a theater or movie playing in the head. It's weird to me how the hard problem is super-focused on perception, when I think the hardest part is the non-perceptual experiences, because those aren't originating from outside. A dream is almost entirely a product of the brain (setting aside occasional external stimulus making their way into the dream). And that presents a problem.

bongo fury

True, but it's also being used as a metaphor. Illusionists aren't saying there's literally a computer-like graphical display in the brain. — Marchesk

Oh dear. Did I suggest that? I'll read what I wrote and see if I'm to blame... But your response was awfully quick. Not saying I expected you to meditate on it with any great reverence, but blimey.

Also because vision is just one of the senses, and we should be mindful not to base too much philosophical argument based on vision alone. — Marchesk

But I did say "read".

Btw, grateful for your links on this...

Marchesk

↪bongo fury

Maybe chill out while reading this:

https://nbviewer.jupyter.org/github/k0711/kf_articles/blob/master/Frankish_Illusionism%20as%20a%20theory%20of%20consciousness_eprint.pdf

https://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/dennett/papers/illusionism.pdf

Marchesk

and a mirage would be an illusion within the "illusion" of consciousness, — Harry Hindu

I'm not sure whether this is a pro or con. Maybe the fact that we're subject to illusions and hallucinations suggests that the entire thing is illusiory. Why would genuine qualia be subject to illusion?

Wayfarer

It seems like we have.... — Marchesk

If we do actually possess phenomenal consciousness, then how do we know about it? — Marchesk

we do very much seem... — Marchesk

Who or what is this 'we' to whom all of this occurs? And wouldn't anything occurring to anyone presume that there is a subject - we, or I - to whom it occurs? Could you frame any of these propositions without an implicit reference to 'we' or 'I'?

Which presumably neuroscience will uncover at some point, if the position is correct. — Marchesk

Neuroscience is an activity conducted by neuroscientists, who are also 'I' or 'we', even if they report in apparently impersonal, third-person terminology.

Marchesk

↪Wayfarer

The self is is itself a useful fiction. Don't Buddhists consider it to be an illusion?

Harry Hindu

How does the brain introspect, and when a brain introspects, why doesn't it experience an arrangement of excited neurons rather than the qualia of colors, shapes, sounds, etc.,?
— Harry Hindu

Why would the brain produce a qualia of colors, shapes, sounds, etc.? Qualia aren't compatible with neuroscience. That's why it's called the hard problem. — Marchesk

For something to be useful, it has to have some sort of connection with real states of affairs in the environment.
— Harry Hindu

Yes, but I take it this position is assuming indirect realism. It's certainly assuming that science has shown that the world is not colored in, doesn't sound or taste or feel like we experience it. — Marchesk

If the world isn't colored in, or sound or feel like we experience it, then how can you say that there are brains that produce qualia? It seems to me that minds produce brains - which is a 3-dimensional colored shape as we experience it. What is it really "out there" - brains or minds? How does a mind "fictionalize" other minds - as brains?

A fiction would be useful for hiding the overwhelming complexity an organism is dealing with. But you raise some good question I don't know enough to answer. — Marchesk

That's more of a model, or representation. I don't think "illusion" or "fiction" would be the proper terms to use here. The illusion would be to mistake the representation for reality, just as a mirage is to mistake the behavior of light over a heated surface for a pool of water.

and a mirage would be an illusion within the "illusion" of consciousness,
— Harry Hindu
I'm not sure whether this is a pro or con. Maybe the fact that we're subject to illusions and hallucinations suggests that the entire thing is illusiory. Why would genuine qualia be subject to illusion? — Marchesk

Illusions are a mistake in judgement, or the wrong interpretation. The qualia that create the mirage is real. It is what you would expect to see if we see light, not objects (just as we see bent straws in water - we see light, not the actual objects). The part of the mind that interprets the qualia uses past experiences to interpret current experiences. The mirage looks like a pool of water and is interpreted as such - hence the illusion. The illusion is broken when you realize that the pool of water moves and your past experience is that pools of water do not move. More observations make better interpretations. Visual illusions are usually based on the mind believing that it is seeing objects and not light.

Marchesk

If the world isn't colored in, or sound or feel like we experience it, then how can you say that there are brains that produce qualia? It seems to me that minds produce brains - which is a 3-dimensional colored shape as we experience it. What is it really "out there" - brains or minds? How does a mind "fictionalize" other minds - as brains? — Harry Hindu

Inference to the best explanation, given the overwhelming data from studies, experiments and various medical cases we have now.

Science is not compatible with the world being colored in, full of sound, feels, etc. But this was known to an extent in ancient philosophy. Full-blown naive realism just cannot be the case. Now maybe a sophisticated version of direct realism can work, but not one that places our perceptual sensations out there in the world.

Harry Hindu

Inference to the best explanation, given the overwhelming data from studies, experiments and various medical cases we have now.

Science is not compatible with the world being colored in, full of sound, feels, etc. But this was known to an extent in ancient philosophy. Full-blown naive realism is cannot be the case. Now maybe a sophisticated version of direct realism can work, but not one that places our perceptual sensations out there in the world. — Marchesk

This is a contradiction, as I was trying to point out before. If you're going to claim that our mind is an illusion and that naive realism cannot be the case, then how can you even claim that brains exist, as brains are concepts that stem from our experience with the world? You can't have your cake and eat it too.

How can you even claim that science has provided answers if we don't get at the real states-of-affairs of the universe in some way? Direct and indirect become meaningless if we get at the answers of the universe. Effects carry information about their causes - no matter how direct/indirect the causal relationship is. Each effect carries information about all subsequent causes - just as your visual experience (the effect) carries information about the ripeness of the apple, the amount of light in the environment and the state of your visual system. The eye doctor asks you to read a chart that is the constant where each patient is the variable. The eye doctor isn't testing the light or the chart when he asks you to read it. He's testing your visual system, as the light and the chart are the constants.

Why would the doctor reference your illusion to test your visual system?

Our perceptual sensations are out there in the world if there are other minds. If you were to call them other "illusions" wouldn't make much sense. Those "illusions" have causal power. Think of Beethoven and Picasso.

Wayfarer

The self is is itself a useful fiction. Don't Buddhists consider it to be an illusion? — Marchesk

The short answer is: when asked straight out or not if the self existed, the Buddha would not answer (ref). This is because, He said, to answer 'no' would be to side with nihilists (which would include any of today's physicalists.) To answer 'yes' would be to side with the eternalists (who believed there was an eternal self that could be reborn in perpetuity.) But the subtleties of Buddhist dialectic is well outside the scope of the discussion.

Look again at the question I asked - who is the 'I' or 'we' which any kind of illusionism posits is subject to illusion? Because, an illusion is a mistake, right? Illusion only exists in contrast to reality, it is something that only exists in a conscious mind; there are no illusions possible outside that domain. It implies a mistaken judgement.

And this is the contradiction at the basis of any such arguments: they want to say that what is real, is only the neural systems that give rise to 'the sense of being'. But the being that is the supposed 'illusion' is the only one who can make such a judgement!

I've probably already posted this Schopenhauer quote about it, but it can't hurt to say it again:

[Materialism] seeks the primary and most simple state of matter, and then tries to develop all the others from it; ascending from mere mechanism, to chemism, to polarity, to the vegetable and to the animal kingdom. And if we suppose this to have been done, the last link in the chain would be animal sensibility - that is knowledge - which would consequently now appear as a mere modification or state of matter produced by causality. Now if we had followed materialism thus far with clear ideas, when we reached its highest point we would suddenly be seized with a fit of the inextinguishable laughter of the Olympians. As if waking from a dream, we would all at once become aware that its final result - knowledge, which it reached so laboriously, was presupposed as the indispensable condition of its very starting-point, mere matter; and when we imagined that we thought matter, we really thought only the subject that perceives matter; the eye that sees it, the hand that feels it, the understanding that knows it. Thus the tremendous petitio principii reveals itself unexpectedly. — Schopenhauer

'Petito principi' is a fallacy in which a conclusion is taken for granted in the premises; begging the question.

This criticism applies to all such arguments; once you realise this, you will not be able to entertain them any further. It is a mistake, as the ancient aphorism says, 'like the hand trying to grasp itself or the eye trying to see itself'.

Marchesk

Our perceptual sensations are out there in the world if there are other minds. — Harry Hindu

"Out there in the world" is understood to be mind-independent. Naive realism assumes that objects have all the properties we perceive them to have, the way we perceive them. That has been shown to be wrong. The mind-independent world is not simply a reflection of our perceptions. Not unless you're a subjective idealist.

How can you even claim that science has provides answers if we don't get at the real states-of-affairs of the universe in some way. — Harry Hindu

Of course I'm assuming science is providing answers based on some correlation with the real world. But there is a long standing problem of perception. Which is why skepticism never completely goes away, and people come to different metaphysical conclusions about the nature of reality.

We've had 100+ page debates on this in the old forum before.

Marchesk

↪Wayfarer

I would take the self to be part of the experience we miscategorize as phenomenal, and not something separate from that. But I'm not saying illusionism is necessarily right. Only that it's more sophisticated than has been given credit.

I have no idea what consciousness is. I only know it presents a confounding puzzle.

Harry Hindu

"Out there in the world" is understood to be mind-independent. Naive realism assumes that objects have all the properties we perceive them to have, the way we perceive them. That has been shown to be wrong. The mind-independent world is not simply a reflection of our perceptions. Not unless you're a subjective idealist. — Marchesk

An indirect realist understands that objects have properties that our perceptions represent. If you understand causation, you understand that effects are not their causes. No, the apple isn't red, it is ripe. I get at it's ripeness (property of the apple) by experiencing redness (property of my mind). It doesn't make sense to talk about direct vs. indirect if I can get at the truth - which the state of ripeness of the apple. If you had direct access, and I had indirect access, but we both realized the apple is ripe, then what exactly is the meaningful difference?

Of course I'm assuming science is providing answers based on some correlation with the real world. But there is a long standing problem of perception. Which is why skepticism never completely goes away, and people come to different metaphysical conclusions about the nature of reality. — Marchesk

Science is based on making as many observations as possible from all perspectives. If science is based on observation and science wants to claim that those observations are illusions, then then scientists have pulled the rug out from under themselves.

Science is not compatible with the world being colored in, full of sound, feels, etc. — Marchesk

Science is based on observations, which entails colors, sounds and feelings representing the world as it is

Wayfarer

I would take the self to be part of the experience. — Marchesk

But, it's not part of experience; it's what is required for there to be experience.

Harry Hindu

Think about this:

How would camouflage evolve if visual experiences were merely illusions, or fictions, and didn't play a causal role in nature. Just as predators and prey have a causal relationship in each other's evolution, camouflage and visual experiences play a causal role in the evolution of better ways to avoid visual detection and better visual systems to detect hidden objects.

The mind and "physical" bodies play a causal role in each others' evolution. In this sense, "physical" and "mental" categories become meaningless. It is all information.

Facing up to the Problem of Illusionism

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