Experience is a synthetic virtual representation of the physical state of the body. This simulation processing takes time, so it is only natural that physical reaction comes first and mental re-imagination of it second. — Zelebg
The China Nation Argument : — StarsFromMemory
The inverted qualia argument — StarsFromMemory
I would recommend reading the pdf if you are not already familiar with Nida-Rümelin argument that I have highlighted in bold above. — StarsFromMemory
However, what happens when you see a sad movie. You obviously don't start crying before processing its content and experiencing the mental state of 'sadness'.
Also, I never said I believe in panpyschism. But it is worth considering.
Nope. Try again. Perhaps you are misinterpreting WebMD or is that your own philosophy? That doesn't line up with reality
You try again, you forgot to say what exactly do you believe doesn't line up with reality. In the meantime I will repeat what I sad. Experience is a synthetic virtual representation of the physical state of the body. This simulation processing takes time, so it is only natural that physical reaction comes first and mental re-imagination of it second. — Zelebg
Do you have an article?
what keywords do i google?
The problem is you have drawn conclusions that cannot be drawn from the Libet experiment. Humans may not have a say in their future decisions based on billiards table effect of the universe, but your interpretation of the "bear" example is not found in the Libet experiment.
Libet finds that conscious volition is exercised in the form of 'the power of veto' (sometimes called "free won't"[10][11]); the idea that conscious acquiescence is required to allow the unconscious buildup of the readiness potential to be actualized as a movement. While consciousness plays no part in the instigation of volitional acts, Libet suggested that it may still have a part to play in suppressing or withholding certain acts instigated by the unconscious. Libet noted that everyone has experienced the withholding from performing an unconscious urge. Since the subjective experience of the conscious will to act preceded the action by only 200 milliseconds, this leaves consciousness only 100-150 milliseconds to veto an action (this is because the final 20 milliseconds prior to an act are occupied by the activation of the spinal motor neurones by the primary motor cortex, and the margin of error indicated by tests utilizing the oscillator must also be considered).
This doesn't support the "bear" example the way you like but it does point towards determinism or scientific determinism. The latter i would agree with.
I realize that these claims will sound utterly outlandish to most people. But the reason I believe them is that I find this to be the simplest explanation for what we know and observe. — Daz
IOW simpler to assume consciousness is a facet of matter in general rather than an emergent property of some matter. We lack, currently a direct measure of consciousness, though we do have measures for behaviors and functions. We have assumed, for example, within the scientific community in Western culture that only humans, then grudgingly only perhaps primates, then slowly other mammals were conscious. Only in recent years has it been accepted that perhaps many animals more distantly related to us have consciousness in some way and the boundary is now hovering around plants in that community where there is some acceptance that they may be conscious. Before this of course other parts of Western culture just (and I would argue correctly) assumed that animals were conscious: animal trainers, pet owners, indigenous members of Western societies, children and more. There the presumption of consciousness at least with animals worked extremely well and was a better axiom than the one held by the scientific community. IOW there are a few default positions, all matter, all life, only very complicated organisms with nervous systems like us. I think the last is based on bias. Right now however we do not have a way to reconcile the issue. It is very hard to falsify any of these positions, though I would not say any of them are unfalsifiable, since technology may change that over time. We can test for memory in some things - which is a cognitive function that may or may not be hinged to conscoiusness. We can test for behavior. But we cannot directly test for consciousness in anything we cannot communicate with, problem of other minds and all that. Right now in the epistemologically scientific community with its default (and not demonstrated default) position that complex neural networks are must for consciousness, the set of organisms that are considered conscious has been expanding for decades. And as I said now even the possibility that plants are conscious is being taken seriously despite their not fitting that default. So, even in a group that has a very rigid a priori, the set has been expanding. Even up to the early 70s asserting in professional contexts as a scientist that animals were conscious was a position potentially damaging to one's career. I sometimes wonder if the influx of women scientists was part of what shifted the extremely rigid default agnosticism present before that, when science was actually behind and clearly almost solipsistically behind the positions of a number of other groups in Western society and then also beyond.than to suppose that some magical wholly new metaphysical thing starts happening when otherwise inert matter gets arranged in just the right way (or else than even we humans somehow don’t even have the first person experience we think we do — Pfhorrest
I was not aware of those scientific findings, but as I started reading that PDF's description of them my immediate reaction was the same one that that author came to by the end: the conclusion that inverted qualia have been shown possible by those results hinges on a bunch of philosophical presuppositions. — Pfhorrest
so too on my account there would be slightly different phenomenal experience going on within the functionally different sub-components of the person with inverted color cone pigments, but the phenomenal experience of the whole person, who remains functionally the same on that whole-person level, would remain the same. — Pfhorrest
I realize that these claims will sound utterly outlandish to most people. But the reason I believe them is that I find this to be the simplest explanation for what we know and observe.
I thought it was settled that not all experience comes with some sorta delay. Most are caused by mental states or a combination of mental states. Only in certain primitive reflex responses, where the brain is not involved in decision making, does the experience come later.
I'm only talking about response / reaction, any reaction, as opposed to contemplation / imagination. — Zelebg
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