Some, like Dennett, just don't accord "phenomenal consciousness" the kind of autonomous metaphysical status that philosophers like Searle, Nagel and Chalmers think it ought to have. — SophistiCat
MUH is not incompatible with physicalism (it just reframes what physical things are), — Pfhorrest
then phenomenal experience is just the input into our function of signals from other functions of that structure, which in turn have their own inputs that constitute their own phenomenal experiences, and outputs that constitute their behaviors, which constitute all of their observable, empirical, physical properties. To do is to be perceived, to perceive is to be done unto, and to do or perceive or be perceived or be done unto is to be. — Pfhorrest
It's certainly incompatible with materialism. A mathematical ontology isn't compatible with there being stuff, so I don't see how it's physical. But I guess if we're allowed to redefine the meaning of "physical" to be whatever is consistent with physical models. — Marchesk
I don't see where the functional turns into the phenomenal. You have every bit as much a hard problem with functionalism as you do with materialism. — Marchesk
But physicalism is understood in the realist sense of materialism. There is some kind of mind-independent stuff making up the world. — Marchesk
On this, he and Chalmers do agree. For Dennett we're conscious in the functional sense, which can cause a cognitive illusion that we experience more than that.
It's certainly incompatible with materialism. A mathematical ontology isn't compatible with there being stuff, so I don't see how it's physical. But I guess if we're allowed to redefine the meaning of "physical" to be whatever is consistent with physical models. — Marchesk
There is nothing to redefine here, because there aren't any commonly established definitions for physicalism or materialism.
Physical just means as you say, observable. Empirical. Often times colloquially "materialism" is used synonymously, sure, but there is also a long philosophical history at least from Aritstotle to Locke of treating "material" objects as having some kind of "material substance" that "underlies" their observable properties, or in which those properties "inhere". A non-materialist physicalist considers that nonsense: if you stripped away in your mind all the observable properties of a thing you're imagining, down to just the bare substance, you'd be left imagining nothing, so the notion of a "material substance" apart from its observable properties is incoherent. Physical things are just bundles of their properties, the observable properties are the whole of the thing, there's no unobservable "real thing in itself" to which those properties are stuck. People like Hume and Berkeley argued strongly against that kind of materialism in the Modern era.What's the difference? — Zelebg
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