That's your ineptitude then. The aptitude to create a universe in this context. I read a lot of posts it's not like I'm unhealthy, I watched the video.

Energy is god if someone powerful enough wants it to be but is not God, it's a lot more.

Belief in God resembles fixating on God as the answer to it all and it's wrong.

Not a man at the top but true driving force.

Can you try harder to contribute? Think before you post please. You don't even have to be correct, just on topic.

Quite frankly, Dingo, I don't understand half of what you say, and I have not been arguing in bad faith. I did indeed address you because you failed to understand the simple point that just because god commands something doesn't mean that it is not arbitrary. — Aleph Numbers

If you do not understand half of what I say, how can you make the claim I didnt understand your simple point? I think you are the one lacking understanding here, by your own admission. Ill keep it as simple as possible.
If gods moral commands are defined as non-arbitrary, as they are in Divine Command theory, then your argument fall completely flat.
Your only option then is to attack the premiss of gods definition under DCT. You have only done this by referencing your own standards of morality based on reason. It should end there, with a choice between which of the two moral foundations seems more plausible, but you keep trying to muscle in your argument against DCT which as I pointed put, fails.
Now, if there is anything in there you do not understand, we should elucidate it before you reject it. If you understand and disagree, then directly address where Ive gone wrong.

If gods moral commands are defined as non-arbitrary — DingoJones

:rofl:

What? Thats how gods are defined in DCT. Its NOT my theory Im just repeating it.

Consider what we mean when we say "x is good". Does this characterization of x allow the possibility that x could be immoral/bad in any way? No, "x is good" automatically precludes the possibility of x being immoral, right?

Similarly, god defined as omnibenevolent is incompatible with god issuing immoral commands.

Euthyphro's dilemma: (1) is something good just because god commands it OR (2) does god command it because it's good?

If one affirms 1 then we're left to conclude that, for instance, if god should command us to murder then murder would be good; a position even our vague moral intuitions rise up against. This choice is unacceptable and so, we must default to 2 which then leads us to conclude god has a set of moral guidelines he must adhere to; god then becomes nothing more than an intermediary between us and these moral guidelines and once we realize that, god, since he's essentially about morality, becomes redundant, dispensable.

However, notice that the reason we rejected 1 was that we entertained the scenario of god issuing immoral commands but that's impossible if god is good and he's supposed to be omnibenevolent. This however is insufficient to conclude the nonexistence of moral guidelines god refers to. In other words option 2 (god commands something because it's good) can't be negated. However, Euthyphro's dilemma doesn't achieve it's intended purpose because option 1 (something is good because god commands it) is still viable and can't be negated.

Yes but even if one takes the first horn god's commands are arbitrary. This is just a fact. If you say that these commands are made good by the properties of god you open yourself up to another dilemma: are properties that are associated with goodness good because God possesses them or does God possess them because they are good?

If you take the first horn then another argument applies:

One might ground moral values in god's nature without making the claim that god is the definition of the word good. One might say that divine command theory is an ontological argument. But an issue arises. Under this view both god and the presupposition of his commands hold the property of being good, even if they are not semantically related. This, however, means that god's nature is identical to the source of his commands. This appears to rob god of moral agency; he is a tool for relaying his own arbitrarily defined nature.

This god might as well not exist.

One could, however, drop the goodness property but then you subject yourself to Euthyphro's dilemma again.

Totally not calling you an apologist TheMadFool, btw. You seem honest and interested in the truth.

I define myself as the ultimate moral arbiter and everything I command is objective because I say so. Now kneel.

Lol, now youre getting it. The big hint is in the title of the theory: Divine Command Theory...not Divine Command if the Commands Seem Reasonable Theory.
Like I said to Streetlight, its not MY theory. All Im saying is your argument is already accounted for in DCT, your criticism doesn't follow logically from the main DCT premiss. Thats why DCT is so widely respected (as with Craig, its main mouthpiece) among theistic apologists, they already firmly, desperately believe the premiss. Also why its do unimpressive to everyone else.

Read my latest post and tell me what's wrong with it. Please.

Why would I do that? So you can ignore what I said and restate your position?
This is what I mean by not arguing in good faith. You aren’t engaging with what Im saying, Im not sure you’ve really answered anything Ive posed to you. This time, you ignored my post and instead posed a new line of argument. (By trying to use DCT, with you as the divine commander). Can you see how thats going to come across as disingenuous?
I stated why I thought your argument falls flat, cuz it ignores a premiss of DCT, and you didnt respond to it. If you think Im wrong about that, then show me how, or why.

If god's moral commands are entirely dependent upon his will then they are arbitrary by definition. If its arbitrary for me then its arbitrary for god.

Lol, i heard you the first time. We’re done here.

There's actually some interesting overlap with the classic objection to what is traditionally called the 'ontological argument' for existance God here, which argues that because God is the greatest possible being, and that existence is greater than non-existence, God must exist. The objection being that existence is not a predicate (Kant), and that one can't merely define the existence of something into being. With respect to DCT, it's perfectly obvious to anyone with an iota of sense that declaring something to be non-arbitrary is the very height of arbitrariness, so one is tempted to say, along with the objection to the ontological argument, that arbitrariness is not, and cannot be a predicate either.

What do you mean by predicate? I looked it up but it has a few definitions.

Or maybe I should put in more work. nvm.

A logical property, roughly. To use your example, one can predicate "prudence" to the subject "Grandma".

ok that makes sense. Thanks.

I define myself as the ultimate moral arbiter and everything I command is objective because I say so. Now kneel. — Aleph Numbers

Read my latest post and tell me what's wrong with it. Please. — Aleph Numbers

The only thing wrong with it is that not all others are going to buy your definition. If they bought it, they would kneel.

Directly the same applies to religions and their god's arbitrary moral authority. If you believe in that god, it's gospel to you. If not, then it's completely ignorable.

If DCT means Divine Command Theory, then your objection of Aleph Numbers' not answering your proposition is false. Because all one needs to do to destroy your DCT is to not believe in the divine. Then the DCT falls apart immediately.

That's A.

B. is that even the DCT is not objective. It was designed by someone, or thought up, or invented, to the faithful, by god. So it does not rest on some general, a priori unassailable logic or truth, it is arbitrary. Arbitrary, by god, for sure, (to the religious), but still arbitrary.

If DCT means Divine Command Theory, then your objection of Aleph Numbers' not answering your proposition is false. Because all one needs to do to destroy your DCT is to not believe in the divine. Then the DCT falls apart immediately. — god must be atheist

That IS my objection to his argument, thats what I’ve been saying. DCT defines and then assumes a god as one of its premises. Thats why someone like Craig has to combine it with Kalams Cosmological argument.
And again, its not MY DCT. Im just explaining it because Aleph doesnt get it (and therefore doesnt understand how his argument fails) and neither do you as evidenced by your next quote here:

B. is that even the DCT is not objective. It was designed by someone, or thought up, or invented, to the faithful, by god. So it does not rest on some general, a priori unassailable logic or truth, it is arbitrary. Arbitrary, by god, for sure, (to the religious), but still arbitrary. — god must be atheist

DCT defines moral perfection as part of gods “essential nature”. Its not something god came up with its something that he is, perfectly good. Its not arbitrary because it never changes, it would be like saying a human having legs is arbitrary. Which isnt a problem really, as you so cleverly and originally pointed out in “A” above. It doesnt matter because there is no good reason to believe such a god exists.

Its not arbitrary because it never changes, — DingoJones

Arbitrary can easily be permanent

If morals are part of god's essential nature, it is not arbitrary then, as long as god was not created. However, we, humans, are at a loss of using that definition as our moral guidance. What IS god's essential nature? Books and books and books have been written about it by people who never met god, and whohad never met anyone who had met god. God may or may not exist, it's true; but we, humans, are not in a position to learn about the nature of god. Heck, we don't even know for sure he exists.

So, while DCT is a good starting point at defining morals as an objective quality, it stops its ufefulness at the very inception of it, as it gives no guidance about the nature of morals beyond the fact that it's god's essential nature, who, by any theological magnifier, is inscrutable. And we have consensus on that.

Yes, that is another valid criticism of DCT. Even if it were true, we have no reliable means of knowing. A DCT proponent would probably say we do, through divine revelation, but that puts them in the same boat as before with “A” imo. Divine revelation must be shown to be reliable first, and it hasnt.

right on.

A key defining quality of God is omnibenevolence. Therefore, it's impossible that an immoral command would issue from Him. Some may argue that this doesn't imply that God doesn't have a set of principles, and I agree with that. But the point is that God, being defined as omnibenevolent, only has to consult himself for moral decisions. In other words, God is morality itself, morality is not a set of principles separate from God according to DCT.
However, one could argue that if God is omnibenevolent and all that is considered good, then his moral commands would be defined as good as well. However, this would result in the statement "God commands good", turning into "God commands God". This makes no sense and is not a valid command.