Physicalism is often dismissed based on the inability to answer some hard questions. I wanted to show there are also challenging questions for immaterialism.If the mind is immaterial:
— Relativist
.. it's not. — A Seagull
If the mind is immaterial:
— Relativist
.. it's not. — A SeagullPhysicalism is often dismissed based on the inability to answer some hard questions. I wanted to show there are also challenging questions for immaterialism.
I actually don't think "the mind" is a thing; rather, its an abstraction of all the processes that we categorize as mental. — Relativist
how can a brain (with all the various properties of material objects), be caused to do something by something that lacks all material properties (no mass, no energy, no charge, and no location in space)? — Relativist
• How does the brain deliver sights and sounds to the mind? For example, does every neuron connect to the mind, or only certain ones, or combinations? — Relativist
There is now overwhelming biological and behavioral evidence that the brain contains no stable, high-resolution, full field representation of a visual scene, even though that is what we subjectively experience
Philosohers conceptually "objectify the mind", and my questions are directed at those who believe the mind is an immaterial object.There are many other such conundrums suggested by your post, which I would sidestep or subvert by pointing out that the mind is never itself an object of perception (unlike the body and brain, which clearly are). The mind is not something which we can stand outside of, and therefore objectify. That's why eliminative materialists believe it must be eliminated. — Wayfarer
I don't understand how anyone can deny that, other than through blind faith.The mind is not independent of the body. — David Mo
Assuming you're referring to ontological emergence, not just epistemological, how can you justify believing this? Every conceivable case of ontological emergence is explainable as a function of previously unknown properties of the underlying substance.In my opinion it is a problem related to emergence. Different levels of matter cannot be explained by the "lower" ones.
The problem is certainly obvious between the macrophysical and microphysical (quantum mechanics) world, but this could simply be ascribed to our ignorance. We could just be missing a crucial piece of the puzzle (the role minds play?).The problem of the relationship between body (objective) and mind (subjective) does not authorize a strict dualism. The mind is not independent of the body. There is no evidence of such a thing. In my opinion it is a problem related to emergence. Different levels of matter cannot be explained by the "lower" ones. That pseudo problem exists even between the macrophysical and microphysical (quantum mechanics) world. And no one says that chrysanthemums are independent of atoms.
Mind dependence of body is well attested. There is no need to abandon materialism. — David Mo
What are these 'hard questions'? — A SeagullThe hard problrm of consciousness. — Relativist
my questions are directed at those who believe the mind is an immaterial object. — Relativist
The term "Idealism" came into vogue roughly during the time of Kant (though it was used earlier by others, such as Leibniz) to label one of two trends that had emerged in reaction to Cartesian philosophy. Descartes had argued that there were two basic yet separate substances in the universe: Extension (the material world of things in space) and Thought (the world of mind and ideas). Subsequently opposing camps took one or the other substance as their metaphysical foundation, treating it as the primary substance while reducing the remaining substance to derivative status.
Materialists argued that only matter was ultimately real, so that thought and consciousness derived from physical entities (chemistry, brain states, etc.). Idealists countered that the mind and its ideas were ultimately real, and that the physical world derived from mind (e.g., the mind of God, Berkeley's esse est percipi, or from ideal prototypes, etc.). Materialists gravitated toward mechanical, physical explanations for why and how things existed, while Idealists tended to look for purposes - moral as well as rational - to explain existence. Idealism meant "idea-ism," frequently in the sense Plato's notion of "ideas" (eidos) was understood at the time, namely ideal types that transcended the physical, sensory world and provided the form (eidos) that gave matter meaning and purpose. As materialism, buttressed by advances in materialistic science, gained wider acceptance, those inclined toward spiritual and theological aims turned increasingly toward idealism as a countermeasure. Before long there were many types of materialism and idealism.
Idealism, in its broadest sense, came to encompass everything that was not materialism, which included so many different types of positions that the term lost any hope of univocality. Most forms of theistic and theological thought were, by this definition, types of idealism, even if they accepted matter as real, since they also asserted something as more real than matter, either as the creator of matter (in monotheism) or as the reality behind matter (in pantheism). Extreme empiricists who only accepted their own experience and sensations as real were also idealists. Thus the term "idealism" united monotheists, pantheists and atheists. At one extreme were various forms of metaphysical idealism which posited a mind (or minds) as the only ultimate reality. The physical world was either an unreal illusion or not as real as the mind that created it. To avoid solipsism (which is a subjectivized version of metaphysical idealism) metaphysical idealists posited an overarching mind that envisions and creates the universe.
A more limited type of idealism is epistemological idealism, which argues that since knowledge of the world only exists in the mental realm, we cannot know actual physical objects as they truly are, but only as they appear in our mental representations of them. Epistemological idealists could be ontological materialists, accepting that matter exists substantially; they could even accept that mental states derived at least in part from material processes. What they denied was that matter could be known in itself directly, without the mediation of mental representations. Though unknowable in itself, matter's existence and properties could be known through inference based on certain consistencies in the way material things are represented in perception.
Transcendental idealism contends that not only matter but also the self remains transcendental in an act of cognition. Kant and Husserl, who were both transcendental idealists, defined "transcendental" as "that which constitutes experience but is not itself given in experience." A mundane example would be the eye, which is the condition for seeing even though the eye does not see itself. By applying vision and drawing inferences from it, one can come to know the role eyes play in seeing, even though one never sees one's own eyes. Similarly,things in themselves and the transcendental self could be known if the proper methods were applied for uncovering the conditions that constitute experience, even though such conditions do not themselves appear in experience [the paradigmatic example being Kant's Critiques.] — Dan Lusthaus
:up:If you've got three ducks, it's nice to get them in a row.
And then you've still got three ducks but now you've got a row as well. Assume the ducks are material.
Is the row material or immaterial?
Such is the apparatus for confounding philosophers. Solve this one first, before tackling mind, brain, self, and world. — unenlightened
By my reckoning, an actual row of 3 actual ducks is a material state of affairs (a thing). It is more than its parts (duck, duck, duck) because it includes the spatial relations among the ducks.If you've got three ducks, it's nice to get them in a row.
And then you've still got three ducks but now you've got a row as well. Assume the ducks are material. — unenlightened
I'm not convinced mind is a thing, an existent. There are mental activities, and the phenomenon of consciousness. What we lack is a pardigm for analyzing the phenomena.what the questions in the OP seek to do, is to ask what kind of 'thing' or object an 'immaterial mind' can be, presumably to argue that, as it can't be meaningfully defined, then it must be 'taken off the table'.
In my view, those questions cannot be answered, but that doesn't mean that mind is not real, nor that it's a product of matter or something that can be explained in materialist terms. However, if the question is posed in those terms, then that is the conclusion it seems to point inevitably towards. — Wayfarer
The problem is certainly obvious between the macrophysical and microphysical (quantum mechanics) world, but this could simply be ascribed to our ignorance. — Harry Hindu
it includes the spatial relations among the ducks. — Relativist
You're making a mereological error. Do you exist? Are you a thing? After all, you're just a collection of particles arranged a certain way (actually, a loose collection since particles come and go). A complex object is something in addition to its component parts.This is physicalim for dummies:
1. There is stuff.
2. Stuff is arranged.
3. Arrangements are not more stuff.
4. The ranges of arrangement include space and time, which are also not stuff. — unenlightened
Do you exist? — Relativist
Yes, but not as abstract objects. States of affairs (i.e. complex objects) exist that have the properties we associate with rows.Does a row exist? — unenlightened
Which line? — unenlightened
Assume that materialism is true (for the sake of discussion). This implies that every THING that exists is material. A row of ducks is a thing, and therefore it is a material object. It is a type of object distinct from a stack of ducks, or a row of goats. If things that exist are "stuff" than a row of ducks is stuff, and it's not identical to its constituent ducks; the internal relations between them is as much a part of the duck-row as the ducks themselves.a row of ducks is more than the ducks, but you haven't come out and said that the more is material, because it sounds odd to say that. — unenlightened
a row of ducks is stuff, and it's not identical to its constituent ducks; the internal relations between them is as much a part of the duck-row as the ducks themselves. — Relativist
If things that exist are "stuff" than a row of ducks is stuff, and it's not identical to its constituent ducks; the internal relations between them is as much a part of the duck-row as the ducks themselves. — Relativist
I consider materialism to be possibly true, or at least that it's the case to beat. A materialist can't countenance "forms" existing on their own, because they are not material. However, it's perfectly reasonable to note that everything that exists (every particular) has relations and properties. There are no propertyless particulars, and no properties (including relational properties) that exist uninstantiated in a particular. So the relations among the ducks are just as essential to a row of ducks as are the ducks.But each duck exists, and the relation between them exists. We agree about this. But the relation is not another material the way a duck is material - clay or flesh and feather. — unenlightened
It is a bit off topic, but it helps to have a common language. We have mental processes, but I think "mind" is just an abstraction. Treating it as a thing may be part of the paradigm problem with understanding mental activities.And in the case of the topic, here, I think we actually agree that there is no magic immaterial mind, but that mind is the relations and processes of a brain. Get the ducks in a row, and the mind and brain line up in parallel — unenlightened
I think "mind" is just an abstraction. Treating it as a thing may be part of the paradigm problem with understanding mental activities. — Relativist
I'm not policing, I'm giving you my perspective, just as you're giving me yours. I just happen to think abstract objects should not be considered existents in their own right. Ontologically speaking, they're excess baggage.Do you not see that this policing the language doesn't get you anywhere? "Row" is just an abstraction until you get your ducks lined up straight, and then you have realised it. Just an abstraction is what is just in your mind, and I can assure you that my mind is not in your mind but a real thing that writes posts — unenlightened
I just happen to think abstract objects should not be considered existents in their own right. Ontologically speaking, they're excess baggage. — Relativist
I actually agree with this. On that point:What I'd like to say about that, is that both mind and matter are idealisations or abstractions. There is neither mind as a 'substance' (in the philosophical sense), nor matter per se because all matter has particular attributes and characteristics which define its type.
So whilst I agree that there is no 'immaterial object', I'm also inclined to believe that there are no 'purely material' objects either. — Wayfarer
If the row isn't 'new stuff', then neither are the ducks, being themselves just more arrangement of stuff that was already there. At what point is there actually stuff? It seems the scientists have never found it, and hence the unstable foundation of what is typically exemplified as 'materialism'.And then you've still got three ducks but now you've got a row as well. Assume the ducks are material. — unenlightened
If the row isn't 'new stuff', then neither are the ducks, being themselves just more arrangement of stuff that was already there. At what point is there actually stuff? It seems the scientists have never found it, and hence the unstable foundation of what is typically exemplified as 'materialism'.
Anyway, I was hoping to see more discussion on this original intent of this thread. — noAxioms
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