In that case we wouldn't think we are thinking of truth but would be to an outsider

...and/or (truth) to ourselves. It is therefore wise to embrace such things, no doubt.

I thought you would enjoy this Einstein Quote that speaks to, in part, Schop's transcendence or denial of Will.

"A human being is a part of the whole, called by us “Universe”, a part limited in time and space. He experiences himself, his thoughts and feelings as something separated from the rest — a kind of optical delusion of his consciousness. This delusion is a kind of prison for us, restricting us to our personal desires and to affection for a few persons nearest to us.

Our task must be to free ourselves from this prison by widening our circle of compassion to embrace all living creatures and the whole of nature in its beauty. Nobody is able to achieve this completely, but the striving for such achievement is in itself a part of the liberation and a foundation for inner peace."

The original handwritten version by Einstein can be found here (along with interpretation/translations/commentary):

https://www.thymindoman.com/einsteins-misquote-on-the-illusion-of-feeling-separate-from-the-whole/

I enjoyed this commentary from the aforementioned quote:

"Through “liberation,” which religions call by many different names, we free ourselves from this limited nature of our perceptions, of our consciousness, to see the greater whole directly. The inquisitive, thinking, intellectual, rational, thoughtful, conceptual, inner chatterbox, monkey mind, of our brains can become quiet in certain times of spiritual reflection, contemplation, meditation, walks in nature, extreme activities, near death experiences, etc. Our consciousness actually shifts to a different mode of perception, like in sleep or in dreams, where the “I” falls away, the ego is dislodged, the psychological self seems to dissolve, and we perceive reality much differently. It can seem like a kind of death (death of ego-self), but it is also a liberating realization that we are not fundamentally this ego construction, and all that goes along with it."


"Our experience of being separate is an illusion of consciousness, just as much as space-time is an illusion of consciousness. But our consciousness itself is ultimately an inseparable “part of the whole” that we call the “Universe,” the One, the Absolute, Reality, Nature, or what many refer to as God. Our brains and bodies, and consequently our minds and consciousness, emerge from out of Nature, from the Universe, while still being absolutely a part of that Nature and Universe. We are not separate from Nature looking out onto Nature, but we are Nature looking at itself."

Enjoy!

but his conclusions might imply it. — Snakes Alive

Great answers, want to get back to many comments when time permits.
But just, in relation to the above- I thought his conclusion was that we can (not by force) transcend will?

Thanks so much, I have more comments coming soon!

In my opinion, Schopenhauer's denial of the Will-to-Live is an Affirmation of the Will-to-Extinction. It constitutes salvation for sick, weak, enfeebled individuals who turn away from life's challenges, hardships, and sufferings opting, instead, for NOTHING as a desirable alternative to life. Why should it not be preferable, instead, to vigorously affirm the Will-to-Live; but then the individual doing so, by definition, would represent a healthy, rather than a sickly, version of humanity. Which types are there more of today?

In my opinion, Schopenhauer's denial of the Will-to-Live is an Affirmation of the Will-to-Extinction. It constitutes salvation for sick, weak, enfeebled individuals who turn away from life's challenges, hardships, and sufferings opting, — charles ferraro

It's hard to judge a conscience

What does my complete statement have to do with conscience? Please explain.

What does my complete statement have to do with conscience? Please explain. — charles ferraro

It's like the Catholic Church condemning Quietism. How can anyone judge another's spirituality? Schopenhauer's might be as good as Nietzsche. You suggested otherwise, right?

First of all, I am not attempting to judge another's spirituality; that's their business. Technically, I am also not attempting to judge the "truth" or "falsehood" of certain sets of ideas; I'll leave that to the logicians. I am, instead, attempting to judge the value of certain sets of nihilistic ideas in terms of how beneficial, or harmful, I think they are to the continued health and well-being of humanity. If this constitutes a preference for certain of Nietzsche's ideas over those of Schopenhauer, then so be it! I proudly stand accused!

Honesty is often better than naivety. Schopenhauer said art and seeing the world as the Forms was the way to relieve the pain of life. Is there virtue is "actions" with which there is little action? Quietism says non-action is the best action. Is that just another choice though? It's hard to say

According to Nietzsche, the philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer, whom he greatly admired, had already successfully demolished and discredited the notion of the Christian God. Schopenhauer had shown the notion of the Christian God to be a contradiction, since it was totally incompatible with the true nature of reality as it expressed itself in nature and in humanity; viz., as a blind, endlessly striving will-to-live which was constantly at war with itself.

For Nietzsche, Schopenhauer had, for all intents and purposes, "killed" the idea of the Christian God and all possibility of continued belief in him among the intellectually honest. Thus, Nietzsche simply asserted, quite bluntly and sensationally, what he thought Schopenhauer had already demonstrated in his philosophy; viz., that "God is dead." But, to Nietzsche, Schopenhauer had not gone far enough in his thinking. Schopenhauer had "killed" the Christian god and had asserted the sole reality to be the will-to-live, but then, paradoxically, he continued to extoll the virtues of the Christian "herd-morality" and its will-to-nothingness. Schopenhauer had not thought through to the bitter end the full consequences the "death" of the Christian God ought to have had for the values of the Christian "herd-morality"; be it the strictly religious, or secularized, versions of the "herd morality."

Since the only basic reality expressing itself in nature and in humanity was a blind, endlessly striving will-to-live, Schopenhauer should have bravely accepted this inescapable fact of life. He should have not recommended that humanity try to deny the will-to-live or try escape from it by pursuing an ascetic will-to-nothingness. Instead, asserted Nietzsche, he should have encouraged strong, superior humans to actively and deliberately embrace the will-to-live, as being synonymous with their own nature, and to give it conscious direction. Thus, claimed Nietzsche, would Schopenhauer's will-to-live be transformed into humanity's conscious, deliberate will-to-power. The will-to-power is, according to Nietzsche, a universal drive, found in all of humanity. It prompts the slave who dreams of a heaven from which he hopes to behold his master in hell no less than it prompts the master. Both resentment and brutality are expressions of it. As Nietzsche proclaimed: "This world is the Will-to-Power -- and nothing else! And you yourselves, too, are this Will-to-Power -- and nothing else!"

According to Nietzsche, the Christian God had not only served to sanction and legitimate the values of the Christian "herd morality," but had also provided the inspirational ideal or goal toward which the adherents of those values strove. Now, with the "death" of the Christian God, the Christian value system was no longer tenable in any form, be it religious or secular, and a new value system could take its place.

Unlike the atheism of the extreme political left, which relinquished allegiance to the values of the Christian "herd morality," in their religious form, but preserved allegiance to the values of the Christian "herd morality" in their secularized form, the atheism of the extreme political right (a more rigorous, consistent, and honest form of atheism according to Nietzsche) relinquished allegiance to the values of the Christian "herd morality" in both their religious and secularized forms.

Thus, by extending and correcting Schopenhauer's thought, Nietzsche created the atheism of the extreme political right -- an atheism that he thought would ultimately require the creation of a new inspirational goal and a new, neo-aristocratic value system for select Europeans.

Instead, asserted Nietzsche, he should have encouraged strong, superior humans to actively and deliberately embrace the will-to-live, as being synonymous with their own nature, and to give it conscious direction. Thus, claimed Nietzsche, would Schopenhauer's will-to-live be transformed into humanity's conscious, deliberate will-to-power. The will-to-power is, according to Nietzsche, a universal drive, found in all of humanity. It prompts the slave who dreams of a heaven from which he hopes to behold his master in hell no less than it prompts the master. Both resentment and brutality are expressions of it. As Nietzsche proclaimed: "This world is the Will-to-Power -- and nothing else! And you yourselves, too, are this Will-to-Power -- and nothing else!" — charles ferraro

Schopenhauer's prime concern was the suffering enacted upon the individual wills of humans. The quietude was meant to quiescent the Will and eliminate it for the individual. Nietzsche is not a step forward just because he came after Schopenhauer. Nor is his idea of embracing the will-to-live (Will-to-Power) a better recommendation. Rather Nietzsche unwittingly, in his recommendation to embrace the Will, was actually recommending the status quo (to give in to will's dictates). Schopenhauer's philosophy becomes the true rebellion against ALL (Will), and Nietzsche is just another choice into ACCEPTING the will.

Thus, by extending and correcting Schopenhauer's thought, Nietzsche created the atheism of the extreme political right -- an atheism that he thought would ultimately require the creation of a new inspirational goal and a new, neo-aristocratic value system for select Europeans. — charles ferraro

Nietzsche, the original Ayn Rand :lol:.

Suffering is not "enacted"? upon individual wills by someone or something, suffering is inherent in, an integral characteristic of, individual wills, their very essence or nature. The quietude, or quiescent? is an ascetic means, or practice, that would enable the individual to commit a non-physical suicide.

Regardless of who comes before or who comes after, he who personally loves life and vigorously wills life is definitely a healthy specimen over the sickly specimen who personally hates life and wills, instead of life, the advent of nothingness (emotional and psychological suicide). Nietzsche was recommending physiological health and strength over physiological sickness, weakness, and retrogressive degeneracy.

Schopenhauer's philosophy is, essentially, an unhealthy rebellion against life itself in favor of death, nothingness, and non-being, while, by contrast, Nietzsche values and vigorously affirms and accepts life with all of its concomitant sufferings, trials, and hardships. Nietzsche espoused nothing unwittingly, he knew exactly what he stood for and why he stood for it!

Suffering is not "enacted"? upon individual wills by someone or something, suffering is inherent in, an integral characteristic of, individual wills, their very essence or nature. — charles ferraro

That's what I meant, but this is immaterial to the argument I presented. I understand that even when I wrote it but I let it go because I wasn't trying to be exacting in Schop's metaphysics, though we can get into that if you want. Via the Sufficient of Principle of Sufficient Reason, Will becomes "will-to-live" in a specific subjective point of view. It is mediated by time, space, causality (hence Representation), whose flip-side is (Will).

he quietude, or quiescent? is an ascetic means, or practice, that would enable the individual to commit a non-physical suicide. — charles ferraro

The quietude, or quiescent? is an ascetic means, or practice, that would enable the individual to commit a non-physical suicide. — charles ferraro

Yep, that's what I was trying to convey. More term-mongering but has the rhetoric of disagreement. But yes, this is what I meant.

Regardless of who comes before or who comes after, he who personally loves life and vigorously wills life is definitely a healthy specimen over the sickly specimen who personally hates life and wills, instead of life, the advent of nothingness (emotional and psychological suicide). Nietzsche was recommending physiological health and strength over physiological sickness, weakness, and retrogressive degeneracy. — charles ferraro

That almost sounds like 19th century quackery "retrogressive degeneracy". Throw in "hysterical" in there too while you're (he's) at it. Who determines what is a "healthy specimen"? If you mean physiologically doesn't have health issues, what makes that any better than anything else, besides mere utilitarian issues of it is more painful? But surely Nietzsche wasn't just reiterating common man pain/pleasure as his ethics? So where is his justification outside of that besides that he thought he was Zarathustra? At least Schopenhauer's idea of detachment, nothingness, and quieting of the Will, had a metaphysics behind it that led to that conclusion. Whether you agree with the metaphysics or not, A leads to Z here. It isn't just merely stated and ya know, "Thus spoke Zarathustra!" makes it the correct view.

I guess you can say the "Eternal Return" is something like a metaphysics (if he believed it really) for Nietzsche. However, it still doesn't seem apparent that embracing life is a logical conclusion from that. How about each lived life is quietly dissipated over and over again? But this we cannot prove either way. We know that birth is a physiological thing, and identity is wrapped in an individual. The idea then is simply a thought-experiment at best.

Schopenhauer's philosophy is, essentially, an unhealthy rebellion against life itself in favor of death, nothingness, and non-being, while, by contrast, Nietzsche values and vigorously affirms and accepts life with all of its concomitant sufferings, trials, and hardships. Nietzsche espoused nothing unwittingly, he knew exactly what he stood for and why he stood for it! — charles ferraro

Interesting, but I think this fails based on what I said previously. Just showing the contrast between the two doesn't give weight to Nietzsche's ideas. As I stated, Nietzsche's ideas, his "Death of God" is actually just rehashed old hat. Whether or not the Church or "life-denying religions" (the "herd" in his terminology) really stated as such, the common man has always been to embrace life, procreate, create more people, enculturate them to strive in a society, etc. etc. Schopenhauer's ideas in contrast, represent the ultimate rebellion against that. Nietzsche was trying to square the circle, and try to go beyond Schopenhauer (he should have just named his book Beyond Schopenhauer), but he couldn't.

Isn't Nietzsche just saying literally go down swinging? Humility is another feeling that I'm confused by. I'm ready to see the Forms when I die. 34 for now

Schopenhauer is trying to be an "atheistic saint." And Nietzsche is simply calling him out on this! Although Nietzsche admires Schopenhauer for his unvarnished characterization of the irrational, godless, "Will-to-Live," nevertheless, he is disappointed over his ethical hypocrisy. If Schopenhauer rejects the Judeo-Christian God, then, in good faith, how can he subscribe to the "saintly" Judeo-Christian system of values? If you reject a God, then you're obligated to reject that God's values, aren't you?

If Schopenhauer rejects the Judeo-Christian God, then, in good faith, how can he subscribe to the "saintly" Judeo-Christian system of values? If you reject a God, then you're obligated to reject that God's values, aren't you? — charles ferraro

Rejecting A (Judeo-Christian God) does not entail B (reject certain values). Schopenhauer thought that the kernel of truth or essence of the religions was in fact leading towards truth, it is just that these saintly "insights" were draped in what he thought to be needless theological and mystical ornamentations. Much of Schopenhauer's ideas are better represented in Eastern ideas of moksha and nirvana anyways, not Western. Gnosticism and Neoplatonism might also have some parallels. However, it had nothing to do with a teleological godhead who is directing, commanding, etc.

Nietzsche's Ubermensch is his own idea of a saint. Someone who is somehow individualized to absurdity. Yet, the "ubermensch" is just another human, embodied. We are social creatures, with the same needs of survival, maintenance, boredom. our striving, blind wills continue to thrash about in the everyday struggles for again, survival, maintenance, and fleeing boredom (anything that one can occupy or "hook" the mind with so it does not turn in on itself). One cannot escape their circumstances through ecstatic individualism either. One is what one is, an embodied beings with needs and wants that are mediated through one's personality and environment.

" … the essence of the religions (Hinduism, Buddhism, Marcionism, but not Judaism or Islam) was in fact leading towards truth,..."

What truth?

The "truth" that the world is Will and Representation? Or the "truth" that the existence of humans and their world are mistakes, or existences that ought not to have been? Or the "truth" that existence itself is the result of a fall, error, or mistake? Or the "truth" that human freedom is located in the "esse" and not in the "operari"? Or, the "truth" that humans were free to choose their characters only before they existed? Or the "truth" that humans, after they exist and have already chosen their individual characters, are not free to choose their actions. Or, the "truth" that the principle of individuation is illusory and that we are all really of the same essence (Will)? Or the "truth" that contemplating the Ideas can temporarily detach us from the Will? Or, the "truth" that the Principle of Sufficient Reason applies to everything but the Will? Or, the "truth" that personal non-existence (nothingness) is preferable to personal existence (being)?

The epitome of a truly nihilistic philosophy!

Selected readings from Schopenhauer's Religion: A Dialogue
Philalethes. But isn't it every bit as shallow and unjust to demand that there shall be no other system of metaphysics but this one, cut out as it is to suit the requirements and comprehension of the masses? that its doctrine shall be the limit of human speculation, the standard of all thought, so that the metaphysics of the few, the emancipated, as you call them, must be devoted only to confirming, strengthening, and explaining the metaphysics of the masses? that the highest powers of human intelligence shall remain unused and undeveloped, even be nipped in the bud, in order that their activity may not thwart the popular metaphysics? And isn't this just the very claim which religion sets up? Isn't it a little too much to have tolerance and delicate forbearance preached by what is intolerance and cruelty itself? Think of the heretical tribunals, inquisitions, religious wars, crusades, Socrates' cup of poison, Bruno's and Vanini's death in the flames! Is all this to-day quite a thing of the past? How can genuine philosophical effort, sincere search after truth, the noblest calling of the noblest men, be let and hindered more completely than by a conventional system of metaphysics enjoying a State monopoly, the principles of which are impressed into every head in earliest youth, so earnestly, so deeply, and so firmly, that, unless the mind is miraculously elastic, they remain indelible. In this way the groundwork of all healthy reason is once for all deranged; that is to say, the capacity for original thought and unbiased judgment, which is weak enough in itself, is, in regard to those subjects to which it might be applied, for ever paralyzed and ruined.

.............
Philalethes. A respect which will finally rest upon the principle that the end sanctifies the means. I don't feel in favor of a compromise on a basis like that. Religion may be an excellent means of training the perverse, obtuse and ill-disposed members of the biped race: in the eyes of the friend of truth every fraud, even though it be a pious one, is to be condemned. A system of deception, a pack of lies, would be a strange means of inculcating virtue. The flag to which I have taken the oath is truth; I shall remain faithful to it everywhere, and whether I succeed or not, I shall fight for light and truth! If I see religion on the wrong side—

............
Philalethes. It would be all right if religion were only at liberty to be true in a merely allegorical sense. But its contention is that it is downright true in the proper sense of the word. Herein lies the deception, and it is here that the friend of truth must take up a hostile position.

.............
When, for instance, at the beginning of this century, those inroads of French robbers under the leadership of Bonaparte, and the enormous efforts necessary for driving them out and punishing them, had brought about a temporary neglect of science and consequently a certain decline in the general increase of knowledge, the Church immediately began to raise her head again and Faith began to show fresh signs of life; which, to be sure, in keeping with the times, was partly poetical in its nature. On the other hand, in the more than thirty years of peace which followed, leisure and prosperity furthered the building up of science and the spread of knowledge in an extraordinary degree: the consequence of which is what I have indicated, the dissolution and threatened fall of religion. Perhaps the time is approaching which has so often been prophesied, when religion will take her departure from European humanity, like a nurse which the child has outgrown: the child will now be given over to the instructions of a tutor. For there is no doubt that religious doctrines which are founded merely on authority, miracles and revelations, are only suited to the childhood of humanity. Everyone will admit that a race, the past duration of which on the earth all accounts, physical and historical, agree in placing at not more than some hundred times the life of a man of sixty, is as yet only in its first childhood.

...................
There's so many good quips about religion here: https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Religion:_A_Dialogue

But here is his main point I think from World as Will and Representation:

Thus the will to live appears just as much in suicide (Siva) as in the satisfaction of self-preservation (Vishnu) and in the sensual pleasure of procreation (Brahma). This is the inner meaning of the unity of the Trimurtis, which is embodied in its entirety in every human being, though in time it raises now one, now another, of its three heads. Suicide stands in the same relation to the denial of the will as the individual thing does to the Idea. The suicide denies only the individual, not the species. We have already seen that as life is always assured to the will to live, and as sorrow is inseparable from life, suicide, the wilful destruction of the single phenomenal existence, is a vain and foolish act; for the thing-in-itself remains unaffected by it, even as the rainbow endures however fast the drops which support it for the moment may change. But, more than this, it is also the masterpiece of Maya, as the most

In this sense, then, the old philosophical doctrine of the freedom of the will, which has constantly been con tested and constantly maintained, is not without ground, and the dogma of the Church of the work of grace and the new birth is not without meaning and significance. But we now unexpectedly see both united in one, and we can also now understand in what sense the excellent Malebranche could say, " La liberte" est un mystcre," and was right. For precisely what the Christian mystics call the work of grace and the new birth, is for us the single direct expression of the freedom of the will. It only appears if the will, having attained to a knowledge of its own real nature, receives from this a quieter, by means of which the motives are deprived of their effect, which belongs to the province of another kind of know ledge, the objects of which are merely phenomena.

Now because, as we have seen, that self-suppression of the will proceeds from knowledge, and all knowledge is involuntary, that denial of will also, that entrance into freedom, cannot be forcibly attained to by intention or design, but proceeds from the inmost relation of knowing and volition in the man, and therefore comes suddenly, as if spontaneously from without. This is why the Church has called it the work of grace; and that it still regards it as independent of the acceptance of grace corresponds to the fact that the effect of the quieter is finally a free act of will. And because, in consequence of such a work of grace, the whole nature of man is changed and reversed from its foundation, so that he no longer wills anything of all that he previously willed so intensely, so that it is as if a new man actually took the place of the old, the Church has called this conse quence of the work of grace the new birth. For what it calls the natural man, to which it denies all capacity for good, is just the will to live, which must be denied if deliverance from an existence such as ours is to be attained. Behind our existence lies something else, which is only accessible to us if we have shaken off this world.

Having regard, not to the individuals according to the principle of sufficient reason, but to the Idea of man in its unity, Christian theology symbolises nature, the asser tion of the will to live in Adam, whose sin, inherited by us, i.e., our unity with him in the Idea, which is repre sented in time by the bond of procreation, makes us all partakers of suffering and eternal death. On the other hand, it symbolises grace, the denial of the will, salvation, in the incarnate God, who, as free from all sin, that is,

I have here introduced these dogmas of Christian theology, which in themselves are foreign to philosophy, merely for the purpose of showing that the ethical doc trine which proceeds from our whole investigation, and is in complete agreement and connection with all its parts, although new and unprecedented in its expression, is by no means so in its real nature, but fully agrees with the Christian dogmas properly so called, and indeed, as regards its essence, was contained and present in them. It also agrees quite as accurately with the doc trines and ethical teachings of the sacred books of India, which in their turn are presented in quite different forms. At the same time the calling to mind of the dogmas of the Christian Church serves to explain and illustrate

Certainly, however, the world does not exhibit itself to the knowledge of the individual as such, developed for the service of the will, as it finally reveals itself to the inquirer as the objectivity of the one and only will to live, which he himself is. But the sight of the uncultured individual is clouded, as the Hindus say, by the veil of Maya,. He sees not the thing-in-itself but the phenomenon in time and space, the principium indim- duationis, and in the other forms of the principle of sufficient reason. And in this form of his limited know ledge he sees not the inner nature of things, which is one, but its phenomena as separated, disunited, innumer able, very different, and indeed opposed. For to him pleasure appears as one thing and pain as quite another thing: one man as a tormentor and a murderer, another as a martyr and a victim; wickedness as one tiling and evil as another. He sees one man live in joy, abund ance, and pleasure, and even at his door another die miserably of want and cold. Then he asks, Where is the retribution? And he himself, in the vehement pressure of will which is his origin and his nature, seizes upon the pleasures and enjoyments of life, firmly

and this notwithstanding the fact that the Hindu nation has been broken up into so many parts. A religion which demands the greatest sacrifices, and which has yet remained so long in prac tice in a nation that embraces so many millions of persons, cannot be an arbitrarily invented superstition, but must have its foundation in the nature of man. But besides this, if we read the life of a Christian penitent or saint, and also that of a Hindu saint, we cannot sufficiently wonder at the harmony we find between them, In the case of such radically different dogmas, customs, and circumstances, the inward life and effort of both is the same. And the same harmony prevails in the maxims prescribed for both of them. For example, Tauler speaks of the absolute poverty which one ought to seek, and which consists in giving away and divesting oneself completely of everything from which one might draw comfort or worldly pleasure, clearly because all this constantly affords new nourish ment to the will

we must banish the dark impression oi that nothing ness which we discern behind all virtue and holiness as their final goal, and which we fear as children fear the dark; we must not even evade it like the Indians, through myths and meaningless words, such as reabsorption in Brahma or the Nirvana of the Buddhists. Kather do we freely acknowledge that what remains after the entire abolition of will is for all those who are still full of will certainly nothing; but, conversely, to those in whom the will has turned and has denied itself, this our world, which is so real, with all its suns and milky-ways is nothing

My conclusion:

First, Schopenhauer hated religion as an institution and for its frivolities of gods, goddesses, folklore, traditions, and doctrines. He was very much someone who wanted what he saw as the truth of certain ideas buried in the religion to be manifest itself, as pure philosophy (like the one he was writing) and not veiled in various stories and myths to be digested or reinterpreted and perverted. Basically, taking all this in, I see in Schopenhauer an interesting survey of aspects of Western and Eastern religions. His conclusion is that to diminish the power of Will, one must deny it. He saw in religions like Hinduism and Buddhism mostly, the advocacy of this, and thus commended these aspects. He liked the veil of maya and such. Grace seemed a proper concept as well, not in terms of grace from salvation with Jesus or anything, or a godhead, but grace as some aspect of seeing things as they truly are and then turning from the world. The way of "piercing the veil" (like nirvana), is some sort of revelatory thing, not obtained quite through knowledge directly I guess. Or that's maybe how I interpret his use of grace here.

So it is basically the life-denying aspects of religion he saw as conveying truths about how one can diminish the very thing for what he saw as the root cause of suffering, which was Will. To diminish it would be the ultimate "salvation" in a way. To embrace it in any way, and so brazenly like Nietzsche would be outright folly for Schopenhauer as just another attempt of one's will to try to embrace that which is causing the suffering in the first place.

I think in our culture now, "acceptance of that which one can't change" is the norm. Schopenhauer represents something a bit foreign to our understanding as it is an ultimate rebellion against accepting the fate of suffering through our will-to-live which characterizes our daily lives.

Very nice overview of Schopenhauer's philosophy. It's obvious to me that you really admire his philosophy.

If you are also familiar with Schopenhauer's "Critique of the Kantian Philosophy," you might enjoy reading, if you haven't already, the article I posted on this site a year ago entitled "Issues Not Addressed by Arthur Schopenhauer's Epistemology."