How can you know what satisfies if you are not talking about an individual? Compensations that are actually unconvertible seem to work because the individual is content. The damage can’t be undone, but a million dollars sort of makes him happy, so he accepts. Another person would demand more a third person less.There is no correspondence between the original transgression and the presumed reimbursement.
— Congau
Yes there is, it corresponds to whatever satisfies as reimbursement. This would be true even if I was talking about the individual, which Im not. — DingoJones
Yes, people reach agreements, individuals, that is.people reach satisfaction over moral transgressions all the time. — DingoJones
If you are only talking about how we morally judge people, it’s a rather trivial point. Sure, I could say, this guy has done a lot of bad things but also a lot of good, so he’s moral worth is about medium.We dont judge someones moral worth on whether they’ve did 1 good thing or 1 bad thing, we take account of both and weigh them against one another. I dont think thats controversial. — DingoJones
What would satisfy the abstract mankind? — Congau
Yes, people reach agreements, individuals, that is. — Congau
If you are only talking about how we morally judge people, it’s a rather trivial point. Sure, I could say, this guy has done a lot of bad things but also a lot of good, so he’s moral worth is about medium. — Congau
Your original question was: “Can we pay off moral debt?” and I realize that the question is one of principle and not concerned with the exact measurement of each act of charity or transgression. The problem is not about subjective/objective, but that a debt to an unspecified collective doesn’t make sense. How could there be a debt to mankind? The idea of repayment necessitates some unity of feeling on the part of the creditor. Someone feels a loss and a repayment somehow relieves the pain. That unity of feeling obviously doesn’t exist in mankind. — Congau
If we still judge the moral value of a person according to how we think his good and bad deeds add up, that doesn’t include any notion of debt since we only assess the achievements and shortcoming of the moral agent. If a student gets some excellent grades and some lousy ones, we call him a medium level student, but there is no preconceived assumption that overall grades are always ok if they balance in the middle. Grades should be as good as possible and so should a person’s moral standing. There’s nothing inherently ok about being average. It’s just that we don’t find it fair to judge a person too hard if he’s no worse than most people. — Congau
No. No level is inherently ok or not ok. From a universal/moral perspective there is no such thing. People decide what they find acceptable for whatever reason. They make laws about what is acceptable behavior, but that’s only aimed at what would make the community work. Excellence would be too high a standard because it would make most people criminals and too much lenience would make society fall apart. Whatever the community decides, it is not to be confused with actual ethics (although by chance it may coincide with your ethical standards).Is there something inherently not ok about being average? — DingoJones
So people are judged morally in any given society by adding and subtracting good and bad actions according to the standards of their society. So what?Im asking about how the balance of moral/immoral works, regardless of what the individual standards that are in place may be. Its about how people are judged morally according to any given moral standard, not whether or not the standard is just or not. — DingoJones
So people are judged morally in any given society by adding and subtracting good and bad actions according to the standards of their society. So what? — Congau
Regardless of what those standards are, whether they are very strict or very lenient from our perspective, one would assume that the average member would have an average score, that is a balance between good and bad. It is pretty much a tautology: The standard of any society is determined by how the members generally behave, and how the members generally behave will be identical to the standard. Those who subscribe to the standard, the members in general and the average member, will naturally accept those who are like themselves, those who hit the balance. (They will condemn those below and praise those above.) — Congau
So people may tend to think that way and I conceded that I may instinctively do so myself. (“He has done some bad things and some good things, so I guess overall he’s an ok guy.”) but that doesn’t mean there’s any deeper truth to it. There is no logical reason why good and bad acts may cancel each other out. But you were not looking for a logical reason, were you, so why expect anything from the conclusion about the “heinous act”?If we can measure the moral balance in this way, I dont see any reason why even heinous acts of immorality couldnt be balanced out in the same way as my stick of gum example above. This is where Id like to be challenged, as Im not very comfortable with that conclusion. — DingoJones
ay of thinking has an absolute truth value (which makes it an ethical theory). Very good. Let’s test that. — Congau
I would say that a good person is one who is inclined to do good actions. He has a mental disposition that makes him do what is good when it’s time to act. This is what is called virtue. A person possesses a degree of virtue now at this moment - he is now a good or bad person.
People can change. He may have been a terrible person in his youth, a murderer even, but now he has grown virtuous and that depends on the mental disposition and habits that he has now acquired. It doesn’t depend on what he has actually done, he may not have had the chance, or the change may have come over him relatively recently, but if something came up now, he would do the right thing. — Congau
So, how can we tell that he is now a good person? We can’t. We don’t know what is going on inside him. We can only judge from what we see from outside. We acknowledge his good acts, subtract his bad ones and guess his inner state based on that, but we may be wrong. An extremely good deed, curing cancer or creating peace in the middle east, doesn’t make him a good person unless he did it for the right reason, that is a desire to do good. (Maybe he did it to make money) — Congau
I don’t quite believe you think it’s that relative. If a society/group considers that donating a chewing gum makes up for murder, they would be plain wrong, wouldn’t they?im not claiming absolute truth. Its relative to whatever standard of the society/group. — DingoJones
If by morality you mean moral character, that’s right. And I think that’s what you are trying to measure with your scheme. Isn’t it? The issue is the moral worth of the person and I don’t know what that would mean other than character.So your objection is essentially that morality isnt about taking moral measure of the past but only as the persons Moral disposition is currently? Is that right? — DingoJones
Right. The action is still good, and the actor is neither good nor bad based on this action.How do you separate the act from the intention? If a guy saves babies and cures cancer so he can pick up chicks easier, the act is clearly morally good and the intention not so much, but since the act is an act of good Im not sure it makes sense to say the actor is bad (or not good). — DingoJones
I don’t quite believe you think it’s that relative. If a society/group considers that donating a chewing gum makes up for murder, they would be plain wrong, wouldn’t they? — Congau
If by morality you mean moral character, that’s right. And I think that’s what you are trying to measure with your scheme. Isn’t it? The issue is the moral worth of the person and I don’t know what that would mean other than character. — Congau
Right. The action is still good, and the actor is neither good nor bad based on this action.
Of course it’s difficult or impossible for us, the observers, to know his intention. That’s why we make shortcut judgments based on his actions, and that’s why your scheme might seem to work on the surface. We can’t look inside a person’s head, so we assess him based on the circumstantial evidence we have.
That would be the way we actually judge character, but it’s highly inaccurate and often unjust. We look at the drunkard who neglects wife and kids for his booze, which of course is bad, but we don’t know what brought him there, what tragedies he may be fighting against. Therefore, we shouldn’t judge anyone, if we can refrain from it, and a system like yours is an invitation to superficial judgment. — Congau
Im interested in some thoughts concerning how moral/immoral actions balance out.
When we judge a person as moral or immoral, it seems to me that we are measuring his moral actions against his immoral ones. We consider the act, its consequences, collateral benefit or damage and how it all fits morally speaking. An ethical cost/benefit analysis if you will.
If a person commits theft but regrets in it for some reason and spends the rest of their life giving most of what they have to charity (not necessarily a formal one, could just be to people he meets who are in need or whatever) then he has worked off some kind of moral debt. We might even say the person has paid their moral debt and has a surplus, moral credit, if they ended up with a huge imbalance of moral acts over immoral ones. (For example, stole a pack of gum but saved millions of lives and donated billions of dollars to charity)
If we can measure the moral balance in this way, I dont see any reason why even heinous acts of immorality couldnt be balanced out in the same way as my stick of gum example above. This is where Id like to be challenged, as Im not very comfortable with that conclusion.
The most obvious objection to that line of reasoning is principal based, that breaking the rules is breaking the rules and no action can justifiably balance another. Thats a more fundamental issue, I dont really buy into principle based ethics. For every principal, its trivially easy to show an instance where adhering to that principal is the act of a moral monster. For example, its wrong to lie. Well, what if the lie saves a billion people? The person who refuses to lie in that instance, is a moral monster. The only way to get around that contradiction is to make yet another appeal to principal, or commit semantic fallacy where the acts are considered separately (the lie was still wrong, the saving was right).
Id most like to discuss the first bit, but I recognise that it relies on a non-principal based approach to ethics. Perhaps someone would be sporting enough to consider this thread in the context of a non-principal based approach, even if they do not normally do so.
Anyway, what Im not interested in discussing is the objectivity/subjectivity of morality. This discussion doesnt require it and if you think it does then Im sorry to say Im not talking to you. (By which I mean, ignore this thread as its not addressed to you.)
So, can we pay off moral debt? Are we moral simply by having our moral acts (and all the good they do) outweigh the immoral acts (and all the bad they do)?
(Also, I realise good acts can have bad results and vice versa, I think we can cross that bridge when we come to it, which we very well may not have to) — DingoJones
Thank you for the thoughtful reply.
I think the claims 1-3 are a fair assessment of what Ive offered in the OP.
Claim 4 was actually an example for some of the claims 1-3 and shouldn't be taken as a claim unto itself. Im not sure it adds anything claims 1-3 do not cover.
Im not sure what context claims 5-7 are for. What are the gaps you mention? If I understand those then perhaps claims 5-7 will make more sense to me.
Also, I take it you disagree with one or more of my premisses? — DingoJones
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