I think I am beginning to get old-school metaphysical again! Indeed there is a ground, but it is a relative ground: I am a ground relative to you, you to me, though that doesn't mean there's any space in which we interact. So there is no traditional ground, the world hangs upon nothing, yet in another sense everything hangs on everything else, because there is no world, just a bunch of blindness, relative grounding without any shared space or common world or interaction. Hence epistemological loneliness and the odd compulsion some have for solipsism, but coupled with the ultimate failure of all transcendental principles, so that nothing is 'grounded' in oneself either, everything comes from 'outside' oneself. but in such a way that there is no 'world' outside, either.

That is more pessimistic!

I think I am beginning to get old-school metaphysical again! Indeed there is a ground, but it is a relative ground: I am a ground relative to you, you to me, though that doesn't mean there's any space in which we interact. So there is no traditional ground, the world hangs upon nothing, yet in another sense everything hangs on everything else, because there is no world, just a bunch of blindness, relative grounding without any shared space or common world or interaction. — The Great Whatever

Interesting thoughts, thank you. Can you explain what you mean by relative grounding? I'm guessing it is the opposite of something like an objective/absolute grounding. Is that correct? Where does the relative groundings of the individual "reside"?

Hence epistemological loneliness and the odd compulsion some have for solipsism, but coupled with the ultimate failure of all transcendental principles, so that nothing is 'grounded' in oneself either, everything comes from 'outside' oneself. but in such a way that there is no 'world' outside, either. — The Great Whatever

How does this paradox of "everything comes from 'outside' oneself, but in such a way that there is no 'world' outside, either" exist in the first place?

That is more pessimistic! — The Great Whatever

I agree, a world lacking transcendental unity (e.g. Schopenhauer's Will being identified as noumena, and everyone is a manifestation of the Will, etc.), seems more isolated, absurd, and nihilistic than one with a ground of some sort. Even if Schop's Will is this force that goes nowhere and thus frustrates the phenomenal manifestation/animal/human with suffering, at least it is universal and all pervasive- a connecting principle with everything else.

I don't understand the question. Can it not be put more clearly?

Sure..but I won't be condescending about it:

Schopenhauer had the concept of Will. Will is a sort of metaphysical grounding. By that I mean that if we were to break down existence to its simplest principle it is Will. It is a force that manifests itself in phenomenal reality via the platform of space/time/causality. In other words, he posits a "thing-in-itself" (Kantian style), calls this noumena "Will". and then says that the flip side of this is our observable world of phenomena (or as he calls it, "appearances"). This all points to a "grounding" of reality in Will (some ultimate source of being). This grounding happens to be a monist one as well (everything is one, and it is Will- the striving force).

A philosophy without a metaphysical ground would say that there is no such thing as any "thing-in-itself". There is no unity, no "thing that lies behind all other things". Everything is its own internal universe and there is no "binding" of sorts on any level. Where something like a Will has necessity (this striving force that manifests into animals and suffering humans), a "nothing" behind existence has no necessity. We are isolated little solipsistic universes that have no necessity. There is no principle of any sort to reality, just collections of interactions that could have been otherwise from what it is doing right now.

As I replied to TGW: I agree, a world lacking transcendental unity (e.g. Schopenhauer's Will being identified as noumena, and everyone is a manifestation of the Will, etc.), seems more isolated, absurd, and nihilistic than one with a ground of some sort. Even if Schop's Will is this force that goes nowhere and thus frustrates the phenomenal manifestation/animal/human with suffering, at least it is universal and all pervasive- a connecting principle with everything else.

Sure..but I won't be condescending about it: — schopenhauer1

Let's try to keep the martyrdom at a minimum.

Let's try to keep the martyrdom at a minimum. — darthbarracuda

Wh

Thanks for the elaboration, although personally I think it could have done with a little condescension, just to give it a kick.

One more important question: what do you mean by asking which is more pessimistic?

As I replied to TGW: I agree, a world lacking transcendental unity (e.g. Schopenhauer's Will being identified as noumena, and everyone is a manifestation of the Will, etc.), seems more isolated, absurd, and nihilistic than one with a ground of some sort. Even if Schop's Will is this force that goes nowhere and thus frustrates the phenomenal manifestation/animal/human with suffering, at least it is universal and all pervasive- a connecting principle with everything else. — schopenhauer1

Does that mean that you think that the alternative of which you speak above, this metaphysical nihilism, is more pessimistic?

Thanks for the elaboration, although personally I think it could have done with a little condescension, just to give it a kick. — Sapientia

Fine..

One more important question: what do you mean by asking which is more pessimistic? — Sapientia

Do I have to explain everything :-} ?

I mean by this, aesthetically, which one seems worse, or for lack of a better word dreary to your sensibilities.. a world where there is a force that causes suffering behind the appearances of reality, or a world with no force, no binding principle at all.

Does that mean that you think this metaphysical nihilism is more pessimistic? — Sapientia

Yes.

That's better. :D

Thanks again. I'll give it some thought. Both positions seem quite alien to my worldview.

So meta.

How does this paradox of "everything comes from 'outside' oneself, but in such a way that there is no 'world' outside, either" exist in the first place? — schopenhauer1

I don't know. There are myths about the supposed 'world' actually being a fractured dream, where some deity broke apart due to its own loneliness or from some deficient emanation, but I don't think that's a good way of putting it.

Interesting, I haven't heard of this before.

Based on your explanations, I would say the latter world is the more frightening and absurd. The will qua will possesses the seeds of its own destruction and thus salvation. But the world conceived as a groundless end-in-itself would truly be a nightmare, for it would mean that no salvation is possible and that such a vicious, grotesque phantasmagoria can spring into existence from nothing at all. Thankfully, this is manifestly self-contradictory, but if it were true it would constitute a full blooded form of absurdism, not pessimism. Pessimism is true because the world is tragic rather than absurd.

Incidentally, I think the manga Berserk sketches an absurdist world admirably well.

It seems to me that the former is more pessimistic, but that the latter is preferable. Of course, I think the latter is true and the former false.

I don't find the radically contingent world to be dreary. Dreariness, isolation, suffering and other unpleasantness are part of the world (among other aspects some of which are pretty neat), not based on its metaphysical foundations. Talk of a striving will or any other metaphysical ground are just stories and abstractions. It wouldn't be any different if it was turtles all the way down.
I guess it would be dreary if in the search for foundations you negated the world itself. Our mental image of a foundationless world can be unpleasant but again that's just a story we are telling. The solipsistic story doesn't have trumps over the story I build about the world through my interaction with others. There's something very absurd about the thought of sitting down with a friend to discuss whether the lack of metaphysical grounding implies that in reality you are not connecting with each other at all.

I find it difficult to assess whether the striving will is more unpleasant because I can't relate to it.

Dreariness, isolation, suffering and other unpleasantness are part of the world (among other aspects some of which are pretty neat), not based on its metaphysical foundations. Talk of a striving will or any other metaphysical ground are just stories and abstractions. It wouldn't be any different if it was turtles all the way down. — shmik

Couldn't have said it better myself, shmik. Suffering is a part of the world, not the structure of the world.

It's too bad that 180 Proof doesn't hang around here often, I think he would agree with my statement that suffering is merely one of many incarnations that arises from the various forces of nature, namely, entropy.

As I see it, there can be no salvation at all beyond either mere indifference (in the sense of acceptance) or affirmation. Acceptance or affirmation of a groundless reality would certainly seem to be no more difficult (in fact arguably much less so) than acceptance or affirmation of a reality driven by a purposeless (or even a purposeful) will.

It seems to me that the former is more pessimistic, but that the latter is preferable. Of course, I think the latter is true and the former false. — Moliere

Why do you think that is so?

The solipsistic story doesn't have trumps over the story I build about the world through my interaction with others. — shmik

It is simply aesthetics. You don't have to think about metaphysics, but you are on a philosophy forum.

Partially just by the scenario -- if I compare a world where the basic constituent of said world is a force dedicated to a pessimistic existence then, unless by some fluke or chance in the groundless world, that world will be more pessimistic.

I think the latter is true because metaphysics is simultaneously necessary [for developing any knowledge whatsoever] and impossible [to resolve]. I think that we know, so I don't discount metaphysics, but there's a fault to all metaphysical thinking when one thinks that it is knowledge when it is not. That's a theoretical way of tackling the belief, anyways. From a more personal level I would say that a great deal of phenomena aren't explicable, either -- that there is the Absurd, and we can encounter it, and that I have encountered it.

I think that this is preferable, though I might argue the other way were the pessimistic world true [why fight what you can't change? We are, after all, talking about reality], because having both good and bad is prima facie better than just having bad. Even if we make our own goodness or badness, that doesn't negate having a mixture of both.

As I see it, there can be no salvation at all beyond either mere indifference (in the sense of acceptance) or affirmation. Acceptance or affirmation of a groundless reality would certainly seem to be no more difficult (in fact arguably much less so) than acceptance or affirmation of a reality driven by a purposeless (or even a purposeful) will. — John

In a sense, purpose is built into the pessimistic metaphysical ground model. We are striving beings- a manifestation of a monistic Will. Though it is pessimistic in the outcome of suffering, there is something there which everything else is a manifestation of.

However, in the non-pessimistic model- the one without a metaphysical ground, there is no purpose built into it. You are not a manifestation of a whole, but rather a completely contingent force (metaphysically that is- there are always "necessary" laws in science, etc.). There is no fundamental human nature, or any principle lying behind appearances. This is why the idea of the Absurd seems to be a natural fit with this view.

People who lean towards the groundless view, I would theorize, do not like generalizations on human nature. They would suggest ways to deal with human problems by atomizing our attention towards the details of life so that we are not constantly faced with the Absurd. For example, if you lay about in existential reflection, you will eventually think about thinks like meaninglessness, emptiness, and feelings of angst. They might say these are just thoughts that arise from man not focusing attention on any particular project or activity. Simply sharpen your focus so as not to think of life itself- it has no grand purpose or ground, therefore, there is no use dwelling on this as it only leads to mild depressive thoughts. Rather, go boldly into the night and push that boulder up the hill in whatever task you find yourself having to do (work) or choose to do (entertainment). Memorize a bunch of sports facts, learn a new game, exercise- whatever event keeps your attention focused on the particular and not the general.

People who lean towards the grounded metaphysical view, I would theorize, are more willing to make generalizations on human nature. For example, Schopenhauer's characterization is a pendulum of survival and boredom in a world of contingent forces that can add to the suffering of the internal pendulum. He would say that it is vital to look at the big picture and see the tragedy in this pessimistic nature of humans and how it is connected with a general Will. We cannot help being who we are. He would say that instead of being mired in the Will's directive to be enmeshed in desire/goals/craving/flux, we can turn away from this, rebel if you will, by denying our will-to-live, and living an ascetic lifestyle. At the least, if we cannot do this (as he did not do himself), we can live in the knowledge that we cannot help but suffer, see our fellow humans and animals as fellow-sufferers, have compassion, and perhaps lose ourselves in art and music.

In a way it is two ways of rebelling:

Grounded = asceticism, aesthetic contemplation, seeing everyone as fellow-sufferers

Groundless= focus on projects, tasks, details in the full knowledge that there is no general meaning. Embrace the absurd by focusing that much more on the details of life.
@Moliere @The Great Whatever @Thorongil

To my mind 'the aimless, self-devouring, World Will' à la Schopenhauer (re: noumenon) is tragic - the epitome of pessimism because "life, nature, creatures ..." are, of necessity it follows, nothing but Will's avatars-puppets - and I agree, more or less, with Moliere that 'Radical Contingency' is [merely] absurd à la Zapffe (or Meillassoux), which is more preferable to me in so far as its antithesis - radical necessity (i.e. X = Y & ~Y aka "changelessness, permanence, totality") - [seems] both self-contradictory and factually-ontically inconsistent.

Will's puppets sub specie durations, but the Will itself sub specie aeternitatius. So there is some relief to be found in the denial of the will - which effectively destroys the part sub specie durationis.

All creatures appear to strive. What rational justification can there be for hypostatizing that fact as a purposeless, indifferent "monistic will"?

I mean, I can see the attraction of imagining a purposeful, loving will in the light of which abnegation of own-will in order to receive the love might make sense, but abnegation of own-will in light of a purposeless, indifferent will seems pointless; if a monistic will were to be postulated and understood to be indifferent then it should become a matter of indifference to us, surely?

In any case,it seems to me that any postulation of a monistic will, purposeful or purposeless, must be an irrational act of projection.

All creatures appear to strive. What rational justification can there be for hypostatizing that fact as a purposeless, indifferent "monistic will"? — John

Schop would say that if we look at our own internal drive, Will is manifest in this. His next step is to apply it to the noumena. All that is in the phenomenal world is a "will-to-life" which are simply manifestations of the noumenal principle of will.

I mean, I can see the attraction of imagining a purposeful, loving will in the light of which abnegation of own-will in order to receive the love might make sense, but abnegation of own-will in light of a purposeless, indifferent will seems pointless; if a monistic will were to be postulated and understood to be indifferent then it should become a matter of indifference to us, surely? — John

I don't think abnegation is the appropriate word. We are not giving up anything for a purposeless will. Rather, we are simply derivations of the purposeless will. Schop thought that the most complete way to get out of will's directive (which is a default, not a choice), is to try to be an ascetic and decrease the will-to-live to a minimum. Thus, a sort of purpose can be inbuilt in this system, which is to say to deny the will-to-live and thus end suffering.

Granted, any metaphysical ground can be used in this example. However, Schop's conception is most interesting because, though it is a metaphysical ground, it is pessimistic in its evaluation of the ground. As @180 Proof pointed out, the radical contingency of a groundless metaphysics, in its own way, can also be profoundly pessimistic, even though there is no pessimistic ground. Rather, the pessimism comes from the fact that since there is no ground, everything tends towards the absurd as there is no real connecting principle (we are not all fellow-sufferers, and manifestations of will), but rather a sort aesthetic of "everything and nothing" whereby nothing has rhyme or reason, suffering is completely contingent, happiness is completely contingent, and there is a nihilistic nothingness at the bottom of any justification.

Excellent summaries on this page. I would only add that Schopenhauer does not use the term "noumenon" in his writings and criticizes Kant for doing so.

The problem with the notion of 'purposeless will' is that it seems somewhat self-contradictory. If striving is not manifesting any overarching purpose then it just consists in something like 'reactively directed energy vectors'. and the word 'will' in this context seems inappropriate.

It might make sense to reign in our reactivity and energy expenditure for the sake of gaining and maintaining an optimally balanced creative state vis a vis our interactions, but absent an overarching purpose, or at least transcendent order (as in Buddhism, for example), I can't see any greater salvific possibility beyond that.

The problem with the notion of 'purposeless will' is that it seems somewhat self-contradictory. If striving is not manifesting any overarching purpose then it just consists in something like 'reactively directed energy vectors'. and the word 'will' in this context seems inappropriate. — John

The will by its very nature does have a goal: satisfaction, the end of willing. However, because the will in-itself lies outside of the forms of knowledge, it unwittingly feeds on itself in order to accomplish this end. In doing so, it objectifies itself, which in turn allows for knowledge of itself. So the will can only be said to have a purpose in retrospection, not originally.

My view is simply that the basis is not 'it' but 'you'. I think Schelling said something similar. So there's no ultimate thing whatever, all things are compounded - even atoms are compounded. So ultimately my view is panentheistic, the Universe is alive, our only problem is not realizing that, which is caused by our attachment to the insentient. I guess that is gnostic, but that's it.