Agreed. Ignorance, isolation or exclusion of metaphysics is not scientific.

Having said that, science often attempts to conceal or constrain metaphysics (and thus uncertainty) within a limited value system. This means that those who interpret scientific explanations often remain ignorant, isolated or excluded from the metaphysical information available.

Agreed. Ignorance, isolation or exclusion of metaphysics is not scientific.

Having said that, science often attempts to conceal or constrain metaphysics (and thus uncertainty) within a limited value system. This means that those who interpret scientific explanations often remain ignorant, isolated or excluded from the metaphysical information available. — Possibility

It seems that Popper was staunchly against logical positivism without the anti-metaphysical attitude against it.

I want to understand why metaphysics as a structural issue is incompatible with science as we practice it today, despite metaphysical statements arising within it?

Science is based on phenomenology rather than metaphysics. Science deals with phenomena; in other words, science studies things as they appear to us. you can practice science regardless of what your metaphysical commitments, or lack of commitment, look like.

Science is based on phenomenology rather than metaphysics. Science deals with phenomena; in other words, science studies things as they appear to us. you can practice science regardless of what your metaphysical commitments, or lack of commitment, look like. — Janus

You can't exclude metaphysics from phenomenology, or can you...?

How?

Why is it that references to metaphysics never include definition of the term. You people dicsussing the term, of course you-all must know what it means, so it should be easy for you to say. Please say.

It seems that Popper was staunchly against logical positivism without the anti-metaphysical attitude against it. — Shawn

As far as I can see, Popper considered metaphysics to be relevant to science, but still ‘unscientific’ as such. We can employ metaphysics in the scientific method, but only as far as stating the hypothesis, which necessarily reduces the metaphysics of the question at best to a three-dimensional awareness in relation to value - where at least one dimensional aspect is reduced to a zero, constant or identical value to eliminate the ‘uncertainty principle’.

I want to understand why metaphysics as a structural issue is incompatible with science as we practice it today, despite metaphysical statements arising within it? — Shawn

In my view, the structure of metaphysics is relative, subjective and uncertain. This is what science tries to eliminate - metaphysics can inform the question in science, but not the answer; the theory, but not the proof.

It seems to me awkward to say that science is devoid of metaphysics. — Shawn

It isn't, though it should be.

We have the simulated reality hypothesis, that is seemingly unverifiable yet makes total sense from a scientific perspective. — Shawn

"It makes sense from a scientific perspective" does not mean it's science. It's pop-philosphy.

Thus, is science really devoid of metaphysics? It would seem to me that no, science is not devoid of metaphysics, and also has some theories that pertain to the domain of metaphysics. — Shawn

It does have those theories, especially at the current "bleeding edge".

This means that those who interpret scientific explanations often remain ignorant, isolated or excluded from the metaphysical information available — Possibility

interpreting explanations is not science, it's metaphysics. What source of metaphysical information is there?

Science is based on phenomenology rather than metaphysics. Science deals with phenomena; in other words, science studies things as they appear to us. you can practice science regardless of what your metaphysical commitments, or lack of commitment, look like. — Janus

:up:

In my view, the structure of metaphysics is relative, subjective and uncertain — Possibility

Relative to what?

Why is it that references to metaphysics never include definition of the term. You people dicsussing the term, of course you-all must know what it means, so it should be easy for you to say. Please say. — tim wood

Physics: the branch of science concerned with the nature and properties of matter and energy.

Meta-: with, after or beyond; more comprehensive, transcending.

Metaphysics: the branch of philosophy that deals with the first principles of things, including abstract concepts such as being, knowing, identity, time, and space.

I would define metaphysics as concerned with relational structures and concepts inclusive of, but not limited to, the nature and properties of matter and energy.

This means that those who interpret scientific explanations often remain ignorant, isolated or excluded from the metaphysical information available
— Possibility

interpreting explanations is not science, it's metaphysics. What source of metaphysical information is there? — Echarmion

Those who interpret scientific explanations are invariably not doing science - mostly they’re armchair scientists and dilettantes, popular science journalists or philosophers. It’s often like a literal reading of the Bible, devoid of context. But interpreting scientific explanations is not metaphysics, either.

The scientific method followed to conclusion is a process of reducing metaphysical information to what is measurable. Metaphysics comes before science, interpretation comes after.

The main source of metaphysical information is human experience. The human mind has been employing the ‘scientific method’ long before it was acknowledged as such, and has developed the capacity to integrate the uncertainty of metaphysical information - which scientific measurement does not - by distinguishing and relating between measurable/observable, potential/valuable and possible/meaningful information on multiple dimensional levels.

Metaphysics is incomplete science, but as such it is inclusive of a wealth of irreducible information that inspires our imagination, curiosity and creativity, as well as the pursuit of science itself.

In my view, the structure of metaphysics is relative, subjective and uncertain
— Possibility

Relative to what? — Echarmion

Relative to perceived potential/value.

Those who interpret scientific explanations are invariably not doing science - mostly they’re armchair scientists and dilettantes, popular science journalists or philosophers. It’s often like a literal reading of the Bible, devoid of context. But interpreting scientific explanations is not metaphysics, either. — Possibility

Well, then what is it? Interpreting science is evidently not in itself science, as the process of interpretation cannot at the same time be the object of itself. It's, if we use the traditional meaning of the word, a "meta-level".

The scientific method followed to conclusion is a process of reducing metaphysical information to what is measurable. Metaphysics comes before science, interpretation comes after.

The main source of metaphysical information is human experience. The human mind has been employing the ‘scientific method’ long before it was acknowledged as such, and has developed the capacity to integrate the uncertainty of metaphysical information - which scientific measurement does not - by distinguishing and relating between measurable/observable, potential/valuable and possible/meaningful information on multiple dimensional levels. — Possibility

You're throwing a lot of terms out here, which seem to lack a definition in the context. If metaphysical inmformation is just human experience, then what is "meta" about it? Experience is the base level, how things appear. Observation is merely a subset of experience, and measurement is a specific form of observation. The term "scientific measurement" refers to certain circumstances, but it's not an epistemological category. All observations, "scientific" or not, can be used as input for the scientific method. So, experience is the physical. The meta-level to that is interpretation of it's results.

Relative to perceived potential/value. — Possibility

Perceived potential or value of what?

When you can propose an experiment that supports your metaphysical claim then your metaphysical claim becomes a scientific claim. Metaphysics is just scientific conjecture.

In a sense, metaphysical claims are like religious claims. They both make claims that don't have any evidence to support them and don't propose experiments that could falsify or verify their claims.

Many religious people try to point out that religious claims are not scientific claims because it requires faith and that the supernatural is beyond the scope of science. But their claims are about the natural world in the sense that they are proposing causes to the natural world. How can something that isn't natural have an effect on the natural if they were't part of the same reality?

Metaphysical claims are in the same boat. While metaphysical claims at least don't necessarily indulge in this dualistic natural/supernatural thinking, they have the same amount of evidence as religious claims - none. With evidence and falsification being our means of determining what ideas are more useful than others, any metaphysical claim would be just as useful as any religious claim.

Physics: the branch of science concerned with the nature and properties of matter and energy.
Meta-: with, after or beyond; more comprehensive, transcending.
Metaphysics: the branch of philosophy that deals with the first principles of things, including abstract concepts such as being, knowing, identity, time, and space.
I would define metaphysics as concerned with relational structures and concepts inclusive of, but not limited to, the nature and properties of matter and energy. — Possibility

Pretty good! But I mean to lead you on a bit. Paraphrasing, science's concern is the world and the how it works. And science has its scientific method. Will you allow us to call it the thinking about things, understanding always that the thinking is an organized, scientific-kind of thinking about a determinate subject?

Metaphysics, then, being not science (because lacking the subject matter that is the province of science), cannot be the scientific-kind of thinking, but it certainly can be organized thinking. And following your definition as best we can, metaphysics, then, is organized thinking about matters of science.

But organized thinking, then, of what about science? You have listed "first principles," including "being, knowing, identity, time, and space." These would seem to include matters from other departments of philosophy not metaphysics. As such, the metaphysician uses the tools provided by other departments of philosophy, and science, and whatever wisdom tells her/him is appropriate for the task - as we all try do all the time, though perhaps the metaphysician's business is at all times to subject his own thinking to an attendant critical thinking that runs alongside.

What that leaves is an organized and critical thinking about a determinate subject matter, namely the thinking of scientists, itself understood as an organized, scientific-kind of thinking about the world.

It cannot be what scientists think for they already tell us that including the hows and whys of their thinking. Now let us think! What, exactly does a scientist do? Well, a lot of things, but I submit that at the very top of the list he presupposes. He asks nature a question. And this is the turn from Aristotle and mere observation to the Baconian interrogation of nature by "putting it to the question." And to ask any question, the question itself must be composed. Nature does not tell us what questions to ask, nor how to ask them or in what terms. Well, what does the scientist then presuppose?

It may seem that scientists from time immemorial have all "pre-supposed" the same things, the same thinking (and this part applies to the thinking and presupposing of everybody and not just scientists and metaphysicians), but the study of most things and topics shows this simply is not the case, in any arena of thinking or understanding. Presupposing is what we all do all the time, but what we presuppose changes.

By presupposition, we mean that which is supposed ante. That is, put up for question, the experiment to answer. But at the same time, it runs much deeper. For example, in order to test a supposition to obtain an answer, there must be the prior presuppositions about the supposition itself and the processes and the possibilities of getting an answer. Of these presuppositions, some inevitably are themselves subject to question. But here's the main point. Some of these presuppositions are not testable; they are instead that which by being presupposed constitute the ground upon which the science is erected. And which if overthrown, overthrow the science(s) built upon them. These latter are called absolute presuppositions, because the science that presupposes them presupposes them absolutely, and without which the science ceases to be what it thought it was. An example comes to mind although the same occurs at every scale in almost every area of thinking: eugenics, and more broadly, race.

We all presuppose; we all have/make certain absolute presuppositions. Insofar as our cultures large and small endure for greater or lesser periods of time, our suppositions also tend to endure. And as they change, so our suppositions - the most resistant to change being our absolute presuppositions.

And, not to be interminably long, this is where metaphysics finds its subject matter. Determining what absolute presuppositions are/were held by what groups of people where/when/under what circumstances. And how they changed and what they changed to. That is, if you will recognize it, metaphysics is a historical science: the study of certain matters of historical fact, whether of 10,000 years ago, or twenty minutes - properly understood, a broad and useful science!

The substance of this lifted more-or-less whole from R. G. Collingwood, expressed in several of his books, but explicitly in his An Essay on Metaphysics, at Amazon.

"It makes sense from a scientific perspective" does not mean it's science. It's pop-philosphy. — Echarmion

What makes you say that?

I want to understand why metaphysics as a structural issue is incompatible with science as we practice it today, despite metaphysical statements arising within it? — Shawn

Science needs to own all of the premises it sets forth to test whether asserted connections are true or not. It is a function of experimentation.
The need to make that a condition of doing science is neither an acceptance or rejection of metaphysical speculation or expression. To make it to be so is onerous and feels like extra work.

It seems to me awkward to say that science is devoid of metaphysics.

We have the simulated reality hypothesis, that is seemingly unverifiable yet makes total sense from a scientific perspective.

Thus, is science really devoid of metaphysics? It would seem to me that no, science is not devoid of metaphysics, and also has some theories that pertain to the domain of metaphysics.

Would you agree with this? — Shawn

i agree with this. Einstein used meta-physics as you well know. Modern Physics has alot more equations and tests involved, but all the information at our disposal has made progress like Einstein's much harder. I don't think this is a testimony to the lack of intellect among modern scientists, but information grows exponentially as the internet has shown us.

Modern scientists have to sift thru alot more information than they did 100s of years ago.

In 1000 years who know what scientists will believe. Sometimes a minor detail changes a whole equation or system completely.

It seems to me awkward to say that science is devoid of metaphysics.

We have the simulated reality hypothesis, that is seemingly unverifiable yet makes total sense from a scientific perspective. — Shawn

Untestable conjectures, especially those which don't explain anything more than current explanations and/or which are not parsimonious, are pseudo-scientific (Popper) and not, as I understand it, metaphysical.

Thus, is science really devoid of metaphysics?

Is science devoid of conceptual (i.e. categorical) presuppositions?

It would seem to me that no, science is not devoid of metaphysics, and also has some theories that pertain to the domain of metaphysics.

Would you agree with this?

No. Metaphysics, again as I understand it, proposes criteria for discerning 'impossible worlds' (i.e. ways actuality necessarily cannot be) from 'possible worlds' (i.e. ways actuality can be) - btw, I'm an actualist, not a possibilist - thereby concerning the most general states of affairs; unlike the sciences, which consist of testing models of how possible transformations of specific, physical (class, or domain, of) state of affairs from one to another (can be made to) happen, and thus is explanatory (even if only approximative, probabilistic), metaphysics explains only concepts abstracted from, and therefore useful for categorizing, (experience of(?)) 'how things are', and does not explain any facts of the matter. Metaphysics is not theoretical.

The nature of numbers, the nature of logic, the ontological status of scientific laws, and a host of conundrums arising from quantum mechanics, such as the nature of the wave function - these are all metaphysical questions implicit in science.

Some aspects of these are implied in any scientific model, meaning that science itself doesn't consist of elements that are derived de novo from a purported blank slate or devoid of presupposition. Science builds on foundations of logic, number, and observational rules, which themselves rest on axioms and assumptions, many of which are not and need not be proven by observation, but are required to make sense of observation.

This is compatible with the definition of metaphysics as being a science of first principles and axioms, the kinds of principles which must be assumed in order to make sense of anything or to frame any proposition whatever. Because these are at the basis of explanation, they cannot themselves be explained.

In Metaphysics Α.1, Aristotle says that “all men suppose what is called wisdom (sophia) to deal with the first causes (aitia) and the principles (archai) of things” (981b28), and it is these causes and principles that he proposes to study in this work. — SEP

A wise person must have a true conception of unproven first principles and also know the conclusions that follow from them. “Hence Wisdom must be a combination of Intelligence [Intellect; νοῦς] and Scientific Knowledge [ἐπιστήμη]: it must be a consummated knowledge of the most exalted objects.” Contemplation is that activity in which ones νοῦς (nous) intuits and delights in first principles.

Nichomachean Ethics

Note the allusion to 'unproven first principles', which is asserted because if everything needs to be proven, then an infinite regress cannot be avoided.

Why is it that references to metaphysics never include definition of the term. You people dicsussing the term, of course you-all must know what it means, so it should be easy for you to say. Please say. — tim wood

You can't exclude metaphysics from phenomenology, or can you...?

How? — Shawn

Metaphysics is usually taken to consist in thinking about what is the nature of reality, being, time, space, objects, causation and so on. Broadly speaking it deals with questions about origins and relations.

None of these questions need be thought about in order to practice science. So it is not a matter of exclusion of these and like questions, but of the realization that they are not usually included or necessarily reflectively involved in the practice of science.

Metaphysics, then, being not science (because lacking the subject matter that is the province of science), cannot be the scientific-kind of thinking, but it certainly can be organized thinking. And following your definition as best we can, metaphysics, then, is organized thinking about matters of science.

But organized thinking, then, of what about science? You have listed "first principles," including "being, knowing, identity, time, and space." These would seem to include matters from other departments of philosophy not metaphysics. As such, the metaphysician uses the tools provided by other departments of philosophy, and science, and whatever wisdom tells her/him is appropriate for the task - as we all try do all the time, though perhaps the metaphysician's business is at all times to subject his own thinking to an attendant critical thinking that runs alongside.

What that leaves is an organized and critical thinking about a determinate subject matter, namely the thinking of scientists, itself understood as an organized, scientific-kind of thinking about the world. — tim wood

Well, the first three definitions I offered are dictionary definitions. My last sentence states the meaning of metaphysics as I interpret it personally.

I disagree that metaphysics lacks the subject matter which is the province of science. As I said in my reply to @Echarmion, metaphysics comes before science, interpretation after - but the boundaries are far from distinct. The scientific method as I understand it is inclusive of both metaphysics and interpretation, which also transcend this method in their speculative tendencies. What we call ‘science’ as an activity refers more specifically to the process of stating and testing hypotheses with measurable data, yet metaphysics involves the organisation and reduction of information to testable predictions, and interpretation involves relating new information from tested predictions back to conceptual reality - neither of which are necessarily thought about (as @Janus said) in order to practice science.

So science (and more so physical science) is a very narrow form of testing predictions - one that is easily transferable or replicable as an informative experience, because it maps the reduction-interaction-interpretation process to measurable data, minimising uncertainty.

Quantum physics has theoretical and experimental areas of study: basically, the former deals with metaphysics, the latter with scientific process. Mathematics and potentiality wave calculations are not physical science, but they are seen as scientific in that their aim is towards scientific process.

I believe the aim of metaphysics is to map a process of reduction-interaction which enables us to test predictions about relational structures and concepts, particularly with regard to the nature and properties of matter and energy. The scientific method makes this process explicit, but it only deals with what predictions can be reduced to measurable data.

It is what the metaphysician does with irreducible predictions that many have a problem with. The human mind can test predictions and integrate new potential, probabilistic or even possible information into conceptual systems, without reduction to measurable data. We can even communicate this information, in its irreducible (uncertain) state, to other minds, mapping the ‘experience’ satisfactorily into conceptual systems - often using reified potential/value structures to conceal uncertainty.

So the real issue here is where our language is structured to conceal or downplay uncertainty. Science has dug this hole for themselves by reifying abstract concepts such as matter and energy, but even language, logic and morality refer to potential/value information, masking an uncertainty and subjectivity in relational structure which in reality is probabilistic at best.

In my view, it is in the interpretation of both scientific and metaphysical explanations where we need to be honest about the level of uncertainty in the information.

It seems to me awkward to say that science is devoid of metaphysics. — Shawn

I would say that scientists do metaphysics a lot.

To use the concept of an electron to make predictions is science.

To claim that an electron exists (which scientists do al the time) is metaphysics.

The term metaphysics is very ambiguous. If we don't clarify it, we can make a mess of it.

In my opinion and since Kant (to quote the sources is useful) metaphysics is a branch of knowledge that is based on universal and necessary knowledge obtained in the sole light of reason (without being based on experience). Based on this method, metaphysics seeks to achieve a knowledge different or superior to science about certain objects that science cannot investigate: the essence of supra-natural things and entities, such as God, free will, the Universe as a whole, etc...

Metaphysics should not be confused with analysis. Analyzing ordinary language or the scientific method is not metaphysical. Analysis does not seek to discover entities or relationships independent of experience, but to clarify knowledge of experience.

Therefore, the interpretation of science is not necessarily metaphysical. Although it can be. When scientists and philosophers discuss what kind of reality an electron is they are not doing metaphysics. They're doing philosophy of science, which is something else.

Otherwise, Kant's criticism of metaphysics is valid for me. Concepts without intuition/experience are empty. Metaphysics is not knowledge of anything.

metaphysics is a branch of knowledge that is based on universal and necessary knowledge obtained in the sole light of reason (without being based on experience). — David Mo

That applies to pure maths, also. And actually it's a very idiosyncratic definition of metaphysics as such.

I think the starting point always ought to be Aristotle's Metaphysics, as it was about his work that the term 'metaphysics' was coined in the first place. It doesn't define the scope of the subject, but, as I say, it's a good point of reference, because by starting there are least you're beginning with an agreed set of terms and references which is especially important in relation to this particular subject.

That applies to pure maths, also. — Wayfarer

No. Mathematics and logic are formal sciences. That is, they are not based on experience and they do not talk about facts. In Kantian terminology they are a priori and analytical.

Applied mathematics is a part of factual science, therefore it depends on experience. Mainly because it needs rules of correspondence between abstract mathematical concepts and empirical entities, which are given in experience. Their validity depends to a great extent on the adequacy of these rules to experience. For example: Euclidean mathematics is valid for common experience, but not for the theory of relativity.

I believe that the Kantian concept of metaphysics encompasses and is broader than the Aristotelian concept. I prefer it.

Metaphysics is a branch of knowledge that is based on universal and necessary knowledge obtained in the sole light of reason (without being based on experience). — David Mo

Mathematics and logic are formal sciences. That is, they are not based on experience and they do not talk about facts. — David Mo

These seem equivalent to me.

Metaphysics anticipates the general structures of reality by formulating the way our knowing operates.  Science actually works out the explanation of the data by a never-ending process of research.  — Bernard Lonergan

I would say that scientists do metaphysics a lot.

To use the concept of an electron to make predictions is science.

To claim that an electron exists (which scientists do al the time) is metaphysics. — A Seagull

the interpretation of science is not necessarily metaphysical. Although it can be. When scientists and philosophers discuss what kind of reality an electron is they are not doing metaphysics. They're doing philosophy of science, which is something else. — David Mo

“Philosophy of science is a sub-field of philosophy concerned with the foundations, methods, and implications of science. The central questions of this study concern what qualifies as science, the reliability of scientific theories, and the ultimate purpose of science.” - Wikipedia

I’m not sure I agree that discussing what kind of reality an electron is would necessarily be philosophy of science and NOT metaphysics. Certainly claiming that an electron exists is interpretation of science from a metaphysical perspective, not so much doing metaphysics as such. But I would say that discussing the nature of an electron’s existence is still a metaphysical discussion that may or may not delve into philosophy of science.

You're throwing a lot of terms out here, which seem to lack a definition in the context. If metaphysical inmformation is just human experience, then what is "meta" about it? Experience is the base level, how things appear. Observation is merely a subset of experience, and measurement is a specific form of observation. The term "scientific measurement" refers to certain circumstances, but it's not an epistemological category. All observations, "scientific" or not, can be used as input for the scientific method. So, experience is the physical. The meta-level to that is interpretation of it's results. — Echarmion

I’ve already offered definitions of ‘meta-‘ as well as ‘metaphysics’. Metaphysical information is not JUST human experience - it is from human experience, however, (ours and others) that we source our metaphysical information.

I agree that there is a nested hierarchy of experience, observation and measurement - but experience is not just the physics. Observation is how things appear, whereas experience is how things are perceived: inclusive of interoceptive affect, qualitative evaluation and quantitative potential. Measurement is one, two or three-dimensional information, observation is four-dimensional and experience is five-dimensional information. It is the irreducible five-dimensional information - the uncertain, subjective and relative details of an experience - which pertains to metaphysics in particular.

Interpreting scientific results draws once again on metaphysical information in relation to the experience, but this is not doing metaphysics as such.

the branch of philosophy that deals with the first principles of things, including abstract concepts such as being, knowing, identity, time, and space. — Possibility

Certainly claiming that an electron exists is interpretation of science from a metaphysical perspective — Possibility

It doesn't fit your own definition of metaphysics. Much less with the Kantian concept of metaphysics: our knowledge of the electron comes from experience. Any reflection on it is subject to that experience. It's not the level of abstraction of the first principles. When Bohr and Einstein differ on the nature of atomic particles they are doing philosophy (of science), not science. Their opposition is based on reasons that are not refuted by experience, sure. But that doesn't mean they're navigating in pure abstraction. If you want to adopt the neo-positivist concept of metaphysics, we're in another discussion.

Metaphysical information is not JUST human experience - it is from human experience, however, (ours and others) that we source our metaphysical information. — Possibility

Well then, explain how that works.

inclusive of interoceptive affect, qualitative evaluation and quantitative potential. — Possibility

Please explain these terms. I have no idea what they mean.

Measurement is one, two or three-dimensional information, — Possibility

Are you saying one can't measure time? Anyways where do you take this definition from, what's it based on?

observation is four-dimensional and experience is five-dimensional — Possibility

How does observation get an extra dimension? What's the fifth dimension and where does it come from?

It is the irreducible five-dimensional information - the uncertain, subjective and relative details of an experience - which pertains to metaphysics in particular. — Possibility

So metaphysics is just uncertain, subjective and relative physics? Sounds pretty much like random guessing.

Interpreting scientific results draws once again on metaphysical information in relation to the experience, but this is not doing metaphysics as such. — Possibility

Why not. It fits all the definitions.

What makes you say that? — Shawn

Scientists are not necessarily well versed in philosophy. So you often get fairly well-trodden metaphysical ideas, like the simulation hypothesis, get huge traction because it appeals to preconceived notions. It seems to "make sense". But the actual justification is flimsy.

It doesn't fit your own definition of metaphysics. Much less with the Kantian concept of metaphysics: our knowledge of the electron comes from experience. Any reflection on it is subject to that experience. It's not the level of abstraction of the first principles. When Bohr and Einstein differ on the nature of atomic particles they are doing philosophy (of science), not science. Their opposition is based on reasons that are not refuted by experience, sure. But that doesn't mean they're navigating in pure abstraction. If you want to adopt the neo-positivist concept of metaphysics, we're in another discussion. — David Mo

First of all, the definition I offered initially was a dictionary definition, but I also provided definitions for both physics and meta- which suggests the dictionary definition has shifted from the intended use of the term. So I offered my own definition (and I recognise now that I didn’t explain my position very well):

I would define metaphysics as concerned with relational structures and concepts inclusive of, but not limited to, the nature and properties of matter and energy. — Possibility

I disagree with Kant’s position on both metaphysics and experience in relation to knowledge. I disagree that metaphysics is pure abstraction, and think there is more to experience than Kant was aware of. I agree that Bohr and Einstein’s discussion is philosophical, not scientific, and that they are not navigating in pure abstraction. But my understanding of metaphysics is neo-positivist, not Kantian. Sorry for the confusion.