I think that the relationship between a proposition and what it enunciates, is analogous to the relation between the written words and the letters used to write them. Letters have a pragmatic function in the structure of the word, and words have a pragmatic or technical function in the formulation of theories.
The analysis of a concept is a legitimate philological task, but little or nothing useful to determine a current scientific theory. Heidegger wrote well, but not for scientists.

The analysis of a concept is a legitimate philological task, but little or nothing useful to determine a current scientific theory. Heidegger wrote well, but not for scientists. — Borraz

"Useful to determine a current scientific theory" is incoherent. Philosophy plays no role in scientific theory? Of course it does. The basis for modern science has its roots in Greek ontology, which is the subject of this thread. It's not simply a matter of philology, it's a history of Western thought and, therefore, modern science.

"Heidegger wrote well"? Says who? I didn't think he wrote particularly well, myself. What have you read, exactly, to make a claim one way or another about him I wonder?

Does anyone here have an analysis to share, original or otherwise? — Xtrix

Yes. The central issue in modern naturalism arises directly from the underlying presuppositions of modern scientific method as articulated by its founders including Descartes and Galileo. The advent of the new conception of physics and science swept aside the Aristotelian concept of science - as it had to do, because this conception was based on a thoroughly outmoded method largely comprising armchair reflections on what things ought to do, without the rigorous observation that true science requires. It was Galileo and Newton who recognised the fundamental building blocks of modern scientific method - mass, velocity, acceleration, and so on - in place of the archaic teleological mechanisms of medieval physics.

But this has had numerous unintendend and unforseen consequences. First and foremost the 'doctrine of scientific materialism', which holds that the only real, or ultimately real, entities in the Universe are those describable in terms analogous to mathematical physics. Whilst this has enabled an astonishing series of scientific developments, the consequences of which we see around us every day, it also has more subtle existential consequences which are much harder to discern.

Galileo and Descartes made the crucial conceptual division by proposing that physical science should provide a mathematically precise quantitative description of an external reality extended in space and time, a description limited to spatiotemporal primary qualities such as shape, size, and motion, and to laws governing the relations among them. Subjective appearances, on the other hand -- how this physical world appears to human perception -- were assigned to the mind, and the secondary qualities like color, sound, and smell were to be analyzed relationally, in terms of the power of physical things, acting on the senses, to produce those appearances in the minds of observers. It was essential to leave out or subtract subjective appearances and the human mind -- as well as human intentions and purposes -- from the physical world in order to permit this powerful but austere spatiotemporal conception of objective physical reality to develop. — Thomas Nagel, Mind and Cosmos, Pp 35-36

Which, in turn, has lead to a deep sense of 'otherness' from the natural world - a sense which was mostly absent from the ancient and medieval worldview, which presumed an affinity either between nous (intellect) and the natural order which it reflected, or between the divine intellect as reflected in the soul. There was an implicit conviction of a relationship between the cosmic, natural and human order, which is precisely what was undermined by the mechanist philosophy of Descartes, Galileo and Newton.

This gave rise, in turn, to the condition which philosopher Richard Bernstein named 'Cartesian Anxiety':

Cartesian anxiety refers to the notion that, since René Descartes posited his influential form of body-mind dualism, Western civilization has suffered from a longing for ontological certainty, or feeling that scientific methods, and especially the study of the world as a thing separate from ourselves, should be able to lead us to a firm and unchanging knowledge of ourselves and the world around us. The term is named after Descartes because of his well-known emphasis on "mind" as different from "body", "self" as different from "other".

Richard J. Bernstein coined the term in his 1983 book Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics, and Praxis.

Letters have a pragmatic function in the structure of the word, and words have a pragmatic or technical function in the formulation of theories — Borraz

You said that before. Please elaborate?

:up:

The advent of the new conception of physics and science swept aside the Aristotelian concept of science - as it had to do, because this conception was based on a thoroughly outmoded method largely comprising armchair reflections on what things ought to do, without the rigorous observation that true science requires. — Wayfarer

I really don't agree with this. What "concept of science" did Aristotle have, exactly? To say there was an "outmoded method" is also anachronistic, if we're to agree that there is such a thing as the "scientific method" at all, which I don't believe there is -- nor has it ever been defined.

I'm not sure you understood my question. I was asking for an analysis of phusis, which is the root of our words "physical" and "natural."

Thus I don't see how Nagel's quote is relevant, nor do I agree with his analysis.

Aristotle thought the air returns forward to push the arrow along after it was flung from the bow. No idea if this is true

He also thought heavy objects fall faster, not just stronger, than light ones

... what was (and is) this philosophy of nature? What is the basis of its interpretation of all that we can know through ou[r] senses and our reason? — Xtrix

Insofar as "our senses and our reason" are "natural" (i.e. of nature as well as in nature, that is, do not transcend nature), how is it even possible for us to "know" more than, or anything else but, "nature" when our cognitive apparatus consists of only "natural senses and reason"?

A clue is given from the word itself: "natural." And so "nature." This word comes from the Latin natura and was a translation of the Greek phusis.

It turns out that φῠ́σῐς (phusis) is the basis for "physical." So the idea of the physical world and the natural world are ultimately based on Greek and Latin concepts, respectively.

So the question "What is 'nature'?" ends up leading to a more fundamental question: "What is the 'physical'?" and that ultimately resides in the etymology of φῠ́σῐς and, finally, in the origins of Western thought: Greek thought.

The even more fundamental, or preliminary (thus, 'perennial'), question at the root (ῥάδιξ) of (Western and non-Western) "thought": "what is real?" - more precisely: what about 'any X' differentiates 'real X' from 'not-real X'?

Fun thing I discovered recently: the roots of "physics" and "ethics" have senses very, very similar to "nature" and "nurture". Etymologically, the physical or natural is the inborn; the ethical or "nurtural" is the cultivated.

It is an elemental conception of the 20th century. Please read:
Popper, K. R. (2002): Unended Quest: An Intellectual Autobiography, London & N.Y.: Routledge [1978], 7, pp. 15 ss.

It is an elemental conception of the 20th century. Please read:
Popper, K. R. (2002): Unended Quest: An Intellectual Autobiography, London & N.Y.: Routledge [1978], 7, pp. 15 ss. — Borraz

Haha, ok.

"Useful to determine a current scientific theory" is incoherent. Philosophy plays no role in scientific theory? Of course it does. The basis for modern science has its roots in Greek ontology, which is the subject of this thread. It's not simply a matter of philology, it's a history of Western thought and, therefore, modern science. — Xtrix

Excuse me, but saying that contemporary science has something to do with the Greek concept of nature, perhaps, probably indicates that one has vague ideas of one and the other. Even the conception of the physical during the Enlightenment is not related to contemporary physics. By the way, have you heard of Einstein?

"Heidegger wrote well"? Says who? I didn't think he wrote particularly well, myself. What have you read, exactly, to make a claim one way or another about him I wonder? — Xtrix

For example, Heidegger, M (1976) Wegmarken, Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, in Gesamtausgabe; V.9. I Abteilung : Veroffentlichte Schriften 1914-1970, pp. 105 ss.

I really don't agree with this.... To say there was an "outmoded method" is also anachronistic, if we're to agree that there is such a thing as the "scientific method" at all, which I don't believe there is -- nor has it ever been defined. — Xtrix

"I don't agree.... I don't believe.., ..nor has it ever been defined."

From our friends at Dictionary.com:
"scientific method, n.
The principles and empirical processes of discovery and demonstration considered characteristic of or necessary for scientific investigation, generally involving the observation of phenomena, the formulation of a hypothesis concerning the phenomena, experimentation to demonstrate the truth or falseness of the hypothesis, and a conclusion that validates or modifies the hypothesis."

As to your opinions and your beliefs, how do they weigh in the scales of argument?

It is a fascinating book. Karl wanted to leave something good in the world. Enjoy it.

Insofar as "our senses and our reason" are "natural" (i.e. of nature as well as in nature, that is, do not transcend nature), how is it even possible for us to "know" more than, or anything else but, "nature" when our cognitive apparatus consists of only "natural senses and reason"? — 180 Proof

That's fine -- once we know what "nature" is. Saying our senses and our reason are part of nature is sensible, but nothing new.

The even more fundamental, or preliminary (thus, 'perennial'), question at the root (ῥάδιξ) of (Western and non-Western) "thought": "what is real?" - more precisely: what about 'any X' differentiates 'real X' from 'not-real X'? — 180 Proof

I don't agree with that. This has been believed for centuries, of course, but I don't find it compelling. "What is real" is hardly more fundamental than, for example, "What is?" I think we'd agree on that. So my point in creating this thread was to question the origins of the concept "nature" -- not the "real," although this is related. Why is it related? Because most scientists (and philosophers) would claim, as you are, that what is "real" is what's natural.

Maybe you can present a better way of connecting the two.

Fun thing I discovered recently: the roots of "physics" and "ethics" have senses very, very similar to "nature" and "nurture". Etymologically, the physical or natural is the inborn; the ethical or "nurtural" is the cultivated. — Pfhorrest

Well "inborn" is an interesting translation. I've heard a more common one is "birth" or, in Heidegger, an "emerging, abiding sway" (kind of a strange wording). But apparently the contrast in Homer's day, and through to the pre-Socratics, was between phusis and nomos. So that definitely makes sense.

in regard to etymology, the Greek word is similar to saying something like: "Events keep Happening."
It is relentless and leaves us poor mortals trying to get a grip when we control very few things.
The idea that many things can be determined is closely combined with the idea that we control nothing.
Not because of some idea of nihilism but because of the original idea of not being able to do certain things being an acceptance of some inevitable process.

"Useful to determine a current scientific theory" is incoherent. Philosophy plays no role in scientific theory? Of course it does. The basis for modern science has its roots in Greek ontology, which is the subject of this thread. It's not simply a matter of philology, it's a history of Western thought and, therefore, modern science.
— Xtrix

Excuse me, but saying that contemporary science has something to do with the Greek concept of nature, perhaps, probably indicates that one has vague ideas of one and the other. — Borraz

OK -- why? This isn't an argument. You're offering nothing here.

Even the conception of the physical during the Enlightenment is not related to contemporary physics. By the way, have you heard of Einstein? — Borraz

Are you going to present any kind of analysis? Making vague statements and asking fatuous questions isn't interesting to me.

"Heidegger wrote well"? Says who? I didn't think he wrote particularly well, myself. What have you read, exactly, to make a claim one way or another about him I wonder?
— Xtrix

For example, Heidegger, M (1976) Wegmarken, Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, in Gesamtausgabe; V.9. I Abteilung : Veroffentlichte Schriften 1914-1970, pp. 105 ss. — Borraz

This is an "example" of what? That Heidegger wrote well or what you've read? If the latter, why am I particularly interested in "pp. 105"?

"I don't agree.... I don't believe.., ..nor has it ever been defined."

From our friends at Dictionary.com:
"scientific method, n.
The principles and empirical processes of discovery and demonstration considered characteristic of or necessary for scientific investigation, generally involving the observation of phenomena, the formulation of a hypothesis concerning the phenomena, experimentation to demonstrate the truth or falseness of the hypothesis, and a conclusion that validates or modifies the hypothesis."

As to your opinions and your beliefs, how do they weigh in the scales of argument? — tim wood

It's not my opinion -- it has never been defined. Maybe it will be some day. I don't "believe" because I see no evidence for the claim that you and others are making. If you have evidence, present it please.

By the way, this is now the fourth time in this forum that someone has quoted the dictionary to settle an argument. It's almost unbelievable. Were you really thinking, in this case, that I believed there wasn't such a thing as a science dictionary -- or dictionaries in general? Or that someone couldn't simply make up a definition? Is this how we settle philosophical questions about meaning? By consulting the dictionary?

We have to do better than this. Within the context of philosophy -- in this case, the philosophy of science -- there have been many attempts to define the scientific method, as I assume you know. It is often believed that there is one, even among scientists. But there isn't. The concept of the "inductive method" goes back at least to Bacon, and we could talk about that and its variations in history, but there's a great deal in science that simply doesn't fall into this methodology.

Science is not separated from "philosophy," as I indicated in my original post. It's certainly not separated by a special "method" that accounts for its successes. If you have specific insights or evidence that demonstrates it, I'd be happy to hear it. But citing the dictionary? Come on.

in regard to etymology, the Greek word is similar to saying something like: "Events keep Happening."
It is relentless and leaves us poor mortals trying to get a grip when we control very few things. — Valentinus

Why is phusis something like "Events keep happening"? Could you offer more here please?

I want to repeat part of my initial post:

So the question "What is 'nature'?" ends up leading to a more fundamental question: "What is the 'physical'?" and that ultimately resides in the etymology of φῠ́σῐς and, finally, in the origins of Western thought: Greek thought.

The analysis of this concept is very important indeed to understand our current scientific conception of the world, and therefore the predominant world ontology (at least non-religious, or perhaps simply the de facto ontology ). Does anyone here have an analysis to share, original or otherwise? Full disclosure: I am particularly struck by Heidegger's take, especially in his Introduction to Metaphysics. But other analyses are certainly welcome.

I'm interested in the analysis of the Greek word phusis. The claim that this word is the origin of our word "physics" and "nature" shouldn't be controversial, but perhaps it is more troubling than I assumed -- in which case, if anyone wants me to elaborate further on why I make that statement I'd be happy to.

Otherwise, if we take this as a given, we should move on to understanding the word itself and its historical variations in meaning. To do so, one should know something about ancient Greek history and both Homeric and Attic Greek language. These should be considered prerequisite for this discussion -- at least in terms of what I'm interested in hearing. This is what I meant by "analysis." I did not mean armchair speculations, feelings, evidence-free claims, vague statements, etc.

Friendly clarification.

In the entry to Liddell and Scotts' Lexicon, the definition of the word starts with this:

"The nature, natural qualities, powers, constitution, condition of a person or thing."

That suggests that events that occur outside of such conditions and qualities are rare if possible.

@Valentinus beat me to it. From Cunliffe, A Lexicon of Homeric Dialect.

Fwiw.

φῦσαι foosai a pair of bellows

φυσάω foosahoh of bellows, to blow

φυσιάω foos-e-ahoh of horses, to breathe hard, pant, snort

φυσίζοος foosidzoos life giving. Epithet of the earth.

φυτεύω footeuoh to cause to grow, plant

φύω foo-oh to put forth, to bring forth, to produce, to cause to grow.

φῦσις foosis the word of the OP, apparently does not occur in Homer.

That's interesting indeed. I'm not familiar with Cunliffe but will check it out.

"Aristotle’s Physics is the hidden, and therefore never adequately thought out, foundational book of Western philosophy."

Perhaps I should have started a thread about this to make it more accurate.

From Miguel de Beistegui's Truth and Genesis:

"From Parmenides, Aristotle retains the conception of philosophy as addressing beings in their being, where being refers not to some privileged being or element, in the way of the physicists, but to their common origin or ground, or to the principle from which they unfold. This is a principle that lies beyond and is distinct from the realm of physical things; it is, quite literally, meta-physical. Yet, from Heraclitus, and from the Ionian physics echoed in his work, Aristotle retains a conception of the world in which we live as a world essentially in motion, as a world of becoming, yet a world that does not fall so much under the authority of the senses and of a type of approximate knowledge known as opinion, as it is incorporated within philosophical discourse, thus raising the highly complex philosophical question of the relation between being and becoming, between the metaphysical (which continues to speak in the name of a certain conception of Φῠ́σῐς) and the physical. With the birth of philosophy as the science of beings as such and as a whole, or as a questioning of beings as to their being, philosophy asserts itself from the start as the twofold science of physics and meta-physics.

As far as Aristotle’s physics is concerned, I shall limit myself to a few remarks. The first and perhaps most decisive feature that needs to be stressed is that this is a physics, and thus a conception of natural phenomena, that is not mathematical but ontological and metaphysical through and through. This is what distinguishes it from modern physics. Aristotle’s physics remains entirely within the confines and under the jurisdiction of metaphysics. The Aristotelian cosmos, for example, is not compatible with Euclidean geometry, and his considerations regarding the structure of the universe, which he sees as metaphysically curved and circular, do not even attempt to reconcile it with Euclidean geometry. Strangely enough, it is perhaps closer to Riemann’s geometry (at least potentially), which Einstein used in his demonstration of the physical curvature of space-time.

For Aristotle, as for the physics up to Galileo and Descartes, geometry is not the fundamental science of the real world; it is not the science that expresses the essence and fundamental structure of that world. It is only an abstract science which, in the eyes of physics, itself the science of what is, can only ever serve as an adjunct. It is perception, and not mathematical speculation, experience, or a priori geometrical reasoning, that constitutes the bedrock for the true science of the real world. This is precisely the approach that will be overturned by Galileo. In short, Aristotle’s conception of nature cannot be abstracted from the ontological considerations within which it occurs.

...The second point concerns the most relevant aspects of the Aristotelian conception of nature. As an immediate effect of the first aspect of Aristotle’s conception of the universe, one disqualified by modern science, it should be noted that the Aristotelian cosmos is finite, differentiated, and hierarchical: it is composed of various spheres, vertically ordered, each sphere corresponding to a degree of ontological perfection higher than that of the sphere immediately below, all spheres being moved by their inner telos more fully expressed in the higher spheres. At the top of this pyramidal structure lies the divine principle, the motionless origin of all motion, or the Prime Mover.

Aristotle emphasizes that metaphysics (which he also calls “first philosophy”) is required only to the extent that there is indeed a motionless reality, without the existence of which physics would be the primordial and universal science. It is the very existence of a motionless reality that turns physics — the object of which is the kind of reality that has the principle of its own motion and rest within itself, in contrast to the technical object — into a merely secondary philosophy. For Aristotle, Φῠ́σῐς does not designate the whole of reality, but only “a specific kind of beings.” There is, therefore, a reality of being, which the world of becoming does not exhaust."

"OK -- why? This isn't an argument. You're offering nothing here, etc"
Because you ask about very elementary things. I leave the reference and read you:
- Kuhn, T. S. (1962): The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.


"If the latter, why am I particularly interested in "pp. 105"?"
The same. It is the quote from the classic essay entitled Was ist Metaphysik? (1929).
Wonderful, pure art of writing ... although scientifically null. Read it.

The advent of the new conception of physics and science swept aside the Aristotelian concept of science - as it had to do, because this conception was based on a thoroughly outmoded method largely comprising armchair reflections on what things ought to do, without the rigorous observation that true science requires. — Wayfarer

Do you see this as a problem? I do. If there is no discipline in the way that things are described, i.e. no logical rules for how things ought to be described, then we allow for illogical descriptions. For an example of illogical descriptions consider quantum physics. Replacing "what things ought to do", based in sound principles of logic, as the foundation of science, with observational descriptions which have no solid rules as to how things ought to be described, leaves us with equivocal descriptions.

First and foremost the 'doctrine of scientific materialism', which holds that the only real, or ultimately real, entities in the Universe are those describable in terms analogous to mathematical physics. — Wayfarer

Yes, I think this is the heart of the problem. Mathematical terms are not descriptive terms. We allow absolute freedom in mathematical axioms (infinity for example), in order that the mathematics may be applicable to anything which we may encounter. But the mathematics is not applied directly to the things themselves, it is applied to our perceptions and descriptions of things, noted observations. We use mathematics to measure the features which are apprehended and noticed by us.

If we allow that mathematics may be applied as descriptions, we attempt to remove that medium between the freedom of mathematical axioms, and the reality of physical things. The medium cannot actually be removed though because it is the way that we see things. That it can be removed, is an illusion, a sort of deception. Since the medium is the description, which ought to be disciplined by logic, this illusion, that it can be removed, veils the need for a logical description. Now we have an attempt to apply the undisciplined absolute freedom of mathematical axioms directly to physical things as descriptions of those things, resulting in the deception of illogical descriptions.

From Miguel de Beistegui's Truth and Genesis: — StreetlightX

Miguel knows a thing or two. An education in few paragraphs and crystal-clear. In a short span he clarifies and resolves much about Aristotle. Thank you for posting this. Worth its digital weight in digital gold. Something all of us should read. Did I say thank you already?

The book itself (at Amazon) looks formidable!