(a) it doesn't address that the answer depends on who is using the term in a particular occaasion — Terrapin Station
(b) depending on what the quote-free Richard Nixon refers to to you, your answer could very well be wrong with respect to a particular utterance of "Richard Nixon." — Terrapin Station
This was just my point. Hence the revisionism, insofar as 'contingency speech' is an ordinary feature of language as revealed through counterfactuals. Andrewk is poised to reject an entire grammatical construction as literally nonsensical. — The Great Whatever
This doesn't make an individual 'equivalent to' a set of properties, though, which strictly speaking sounds like nonsense to me, a category error. — The Great Whatever
Because it doesn't matter. — The Great Whatever
Words don't refer to someone 'to me.' They have conventional referents. — The Great Whatever
If when we refer to a building we're referring to its bricks then to suggest that that building might have been constructed from different bricks is to suggest that those bricks might have been different bricks. But then it doesn't make sense to claim that they're the same bricks. — Michael
I think this is confused as it treats properties like mereological parts of an individual. They're not – a property is just sort of a mapping from individuals to truth values, or a group of individuals if you like, — The Great Whatever
This doesn't seem right to me. You can suppose a building were made of different bricks just fine without assuming that the bricks themselves were different (perhaps they were used for the construction of yet another building).
Very funny. Of course it matters. That's what extension is--what someone has in mind as the extension of a term. — Terrapin Station
Yes they do. All that "conventional" is is the fact that a lot of people have the "same" thing in mind with a reference. It's a lot of "to mes"--it's to Betty and Joe and Frank and Gina and everyone who happens to have that thing in mind on a particular occasion. — Terrapin Station
There's glory for you!'
'I don't know what you mean by "glory",' Alice said.
Humpty Dumpty smiled contemptuously. 'Of course you don't — till I tell you. I meant "there's a nice knock-down argument for you!"'
'But "glory" doesn't mean "a nice knock-down argument",' Alice objected.
'When I use a word,' Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, 'it means just what I choose it to mean — neither more nor less.'
'The question is,' said Alice, 'whether you can make words mean so many different things.'
'The question is,' said Humpty Dumpty, 'which is to be master — that's all.'
Alice was too much puzzled to say anything; so after a minute Humpty Dumpty began again. 'They've a temper, some of them — particularly verbs: they're the proudest — adjectives you can do anything with, but not verbs — however, I can manage the whole lot of them! Impenetrability! That's what I say!'
'Would you tell me please,' said Alice, 'what that means?'
'Now you talk like a reasonable child,' said Humpty Dumpty, looking very much pleased. 'I meant by "impenetrability" that we've had enough of that subject, and it would be just as well if you'd mention what you mean to do next, as I suppose you don't mean to stop here all the rest of your life.'
'That's a great deal to make one word mean,' Alice said in a thoughtful tone.
'When I make a word do a lot of work like that,' said Humpty Dumpty, 'I always pay it extra.'
Something's extension is what someone has in mind as its extension? — The Great Whatever
Why is it not just its extension? — The Great Whatever
Clearly I can't give a speech and use 'Richard Nixon' to refer to Dwight Eisenhower. — The Great Whatever
When everyone inevitably tells me I'm using the wrong name, I can't protest and say I wasn't, — The Great Whatever
'Richard Nixon' refers to Richard Nixon. Not to whoever you want it to refer to. — The Great Whatever
How can something refer to someone 'to me?' — The Great Whatever
Nope. An individual is whatever it is – a person, a brick, or whatever. Individuals as formal objects in models do just that; they model. It's not as if when I write down how the model works the individuals are somehow in my head or the formal system or the piece of paper. They're wherever they are; the model models their behavior. — The Great Whatever
Agreed. But then I don't see the force of what you're saying. Individuals are just what individuals are according to vulgar opinion, various sorts of things. We can also use the term 'individual' to describe whatever we use to model them. But then it's misleading to claim that individuals are just abstract objects in formal models. — The Great Whatever
Well, andrewk's position seems to be that when we talk about Obama we're not talking about a formal object, but the actual person. — Michael
And of course the actual Obama can be supposed to have different properties. We do it all the time. — The Great Whatever
No, the building is a building. It's made of bricks, sure, but it's not identical to them — The Great Whatever
An edifice need not be identical to its material parts, because it can retain a functional identity even when they're swapped out, even entirely over time. — The Great Whatever
Well, andrewk's position seems to be that when we talk about Obama we're not talking about a formal object, but the actual person. So that the formal object Obama can coherently be supposed to have different properties is not that the actual Obama can coherently be supposed to have different properties. — Michael
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