The Two Oughts Problem of Morality

TheMadFool

As we are all familiar with, morality is about oughts. I regard the fundamental premise of morality to be a dissatisfaction, even a deep sadness, about what is - the status quo. Thus, it (morality) is basically a list of of oughts and ought nots which, if anything, is an attempt to change things, presumably, for the "better".

I'm aware that there are a couple of moral theories with illustrious origins but, if I've understood anything it's that none of them are adequate to cover all the bases. I consider this state of affairs regrettable to say the least and would like to proffer, first, an explanation as to why this is and second, to demonstrate that any attempt to construct a moral theory is doomed from the outset.

Firstly, why is there no moral theory that is inconsistency-free? To answer that we need to return to the basics - the ought/ought not nature of morality. In this regard, that which is germane to this discussion is the fact that "ought" has two types meanings:

1. ought: simply expresses a desire/wish but lacks force in the sense it implies a certain course of action. For instance "it ought to rain" expresses the simple desire or wish for rain as expressed as "wish it would rain"

2. ought: indicates the obligatory nature of something. For example, "we ought to help the poor" means that it's obligatory to help the poor.

It is my contention that the oughts of morality are type 1 oughts and are wishes/desires that are not linked in any way to obligations, either to do or not to do an act. Why I say this is will be explained in the next paragraph. Type 1 oughts arise from, not careful deliberation, but from imperfect moral intuitions and are thus necessarily rough guidelines intended to cover most, but not all, cases.

Why are moral oughts not, as I claim here, obligatory; they are, at best, simply our wishes/desires for something better. This is because an essential aspect of morality is responsibility and to be responsible for one's actions, one must be free; in other words, there can be no obligations to act or not to act in certain ways in morality. To be morally responsible, we must be free. To be free, there mustn't be obligations. If there mustn't be obligations, the oughts of morality mustn't be obligatory. Ergo, to be morally responsible, the oughts of morality mustn't be obligatory.

If moral oughts can't be obligatory then the very first premise of all moral theories, that moral oughts should be obligatory in the sense of a type 2 ought, contradicts the other vital principle of morality I mentioned, the principle that to be moral agents, freedom is necessary. Ergo, if one wishes to construct a moral theory that makes us obligated to do good and not bad as all moral theories so far have tried to, it would effectively relieve its adherents of any moral responsibility since they would lack the freedom to do anything but good.

In summary:

1. Moral oughts are simply wishes/desires for something better and can't be obligations for freedom is essential to morality

2. Any moral theory that attempts to make the good obligatory and the bad prohibitory, like all moral theories so far, is self-refuting because, as I said, freedom is an essential ingredient for moral responsibility

Comments...

christian2017

As we are all familiar with, morality is about oughts. I regard the fundamental premise of morality to be a dissatisfaction, even a deep sadness, about what is - the status quo. Thus, it (morality) is basically a list of of oughts and ought nots which, if anything, is an attempt to change things, presumably, for the "better".

I'm aware that there are a couple of moral theories with illustrious origins but, if I've understood anything it's that none of them are adequate to cover all the bases. I consider this state of affairs regrettable to say the least and would like to proffer, first, an explanation as to why this is and second, to demonstrate that any attempt to construct a moral theory is doomed from the outset.

Firstly, why is there no moral theory that is inconsistency-free? To answer that we need to return to the basics - the ought/ought not nature of morality. In this regard, that which is germane to this discussion is the fact that "ought" has two types meanings:

1. ought: simply expresses a desire/wish but lacks force in the sense it implies a certain course of action. For instance "it ought to rain" expresses the simple desire or wish for rain as expressed as "wish it would rain"

2. ought: indicates the obligatory nature of something. For example, "we ought to help the poor" means that it's obligatory to help the poor.

It is my contention that the oughts of morality are type 1 oughts and are wishes/desires that are not linked in any way to obligations, either to do or not to do an act. Why I say this is will be explained in the next paragraph. Type 1 oughts arise from, not careful deliberation, but from imperfect moral intuitions and are thus necessarily rough guidelines intended to cover most, but not all, cases.

Why are moral oughts not, as I claim here, obligatory; they are, at best, simply our wishes/desires for something better. This is because an essential aspect of morality is responsibility and to be responsible for one's actions, one must be free; in other words, there can be no obligations to act or not to act in certain ways in morality. To be morally responsible, we must be free. To be free, there mustn't be obligations. If there mustn't be obligations, the oughts of morality mustn't be obligatory. Ergo, to be morally responsible, the oughts of morality mustn't be obligatory.

If moral oughts can't be obligatory then the very first premise of all moral theories, that moral oughts should be obligatory in the sense of a type 2 ought, contradicts the other vital principle of morality I mentioned, the principle that to be moral agents, freedom is necessary. Ergo, if one wishes to construct a moral theory that makes us obligated to do good and not bad as all moral theories so far have tried to, it would effectively relieve its adherents of any moral responsibility since they would lack the freedom to do anything but good.

In summary:

1. Moral oughts are simply wishes/desires for something better and can't be obligations for freedom is essential to morality

2. Any moral theory that attempts to make the good obligatory and the bad prohibitory, like all moral theories so far, is self-refuting because, as I said, freedom is an essential ingredient for moral responsibility

Comments... — TheMadFool

There is a quote from a certain holy book that says something akin to (and i'm purposely leaving out details), "in the after life these types of people although still are going to be in the after life, will be judged/discerned for their conduct here on earth."

Basically that particular holy book doesn't absolutely require good behavior but based on numerous variables will recieve rewards based on things like suffering and productivity and the list goes on and on.

Some philosophies/religions view these things as you don't have to do these good things but there are rewards for people who go the extra mile.

TheMadFool

There is a quote from a certain holy book that says something akin to (and i'm purposely leaving out details), "in the after life these types of people although still are going to be in the after life, will be judged/discerned for their conduct here on earth."

Basically that particular holy book doesn't absolutely require good behavior but based on numerous variables will recieve rewards based on things like suffering and productivity and the list goes on and on.

Some philosophies/religions view these things as you don't have to do these good things but there are rewards for people who go the extra mile. — christian2017

Judging, as an aspect of morality, makes sense only if we're free and thus can be held accountable. That said, paradoxically, the self-refuting character of judgement vis-a-vis morality is evident in the reward it promises and the punishment it threatens which effectively negate our freedom. Which red-blooded human can deny paradise or accept hell?

christian2017

There is a quote from a certain holy book that says something akin to (and i'm purposely leaving out details), "in the after life these types of people although still are going to be in the after life, will be judged/discerned for their conduct here on earth."

Basically that particular holy book doesn't absolutely require good behavior but based on numerous variables will recieve rewards based on things like suffering and productivity and the list goes on and on.

Some philosophies/religions view these things as you don't have to do these good things but there are rewards for people who go the extra mile.
— christian2017

Judging, as an aspect of morality, makes sense only if we're free and thus can be held accountable. That said, paradoxically, the self-refuting character of judgement vis-a-vis morality is evident in the reward it promises and the punishment it threatens which effectively negate our freedom. Which red-blooded human can deny paradise or accept hell? — TheMadFool

Considering i can't really predict tommorow, nor 10 days from now nor 10,000 years from now nor X time from now, i can't say you are wrong.

I'm sure even though both of us believe in Scientific determism, that we would both agree our perception of the past and what we learn from the past, atleast to some small measure effects the future.

christian2017

There is a quote from a certain holy book that says something akin to (and i'm purposely leaving out details), "in the after life these types of people although still are going to be in the after life, will be judged/discerned for their conduct here on earth."

Basically that particular holy book doesn't absolutely require good behavior but based on numerous variables will recieve rewards based on things like suffering and productivity and the list goes on and on.

Some philosophies/religions view these things as you don't have to do these good things but there are rewards for people who go the extra mile.
— christian2017

Judging, as an aspect of morality, makes sense only if we're free and thus can be held accountable. That said, paradoxically, the self-refuting character of judgement vis-a-vis morality is evident in the reward it promises and the punishment it threatens which effectively negate our freedom. Which red-blooded human can deny paradise or accept hell? — TheMadFool

Your past conversations with your Mom, your Aunt and so on effect your future conversations atleast to some small measure.

Echarmion

1. ought: simply expresses a desire/wish but lacks force in the sense it implies a certain course of action. For instance "it ought to rain" expresses the simple desire or wish for rain as expressed as "wish it would rain" — TheMadFool

The way I understand the English language, "it ought to rain" is meant to convey that there is some reasonable expectation of rain. It's not always just a wish, though of course it can be used that way.

Why are moral oughts not, as I claim here, obligatory; they are, at best, simply our wishes/desires for something better. This is because an essential aspect of morality is responsibility and to be responsible for one's actions, one must be free; in other words, there can be no obligations to act or not to act in certain ways in morality. To be morally responsible, we must be free. To be free, there mustn't be obligations. If there mustn't be obligations, the oughts of morality mustn't be obligatory. Ergo, to be morally responsible, the oughts of morality mustn't be obligatory. — TheMadFool

You're confusing freedom with randomness. If you decide to act based on an obligation, you're employing your freedom. On the other hand, if you act without considering any obligations, whatever their source, what remains is acting purely on your momentary whims. A good example of someone who acts solely based on their moment to moment whims is a drug addict, for whom the overriding consideration is always how to get the next fix. It'd be very weird to hold such a person up as a paragon of freedom.

Ergo, if one wishes to construct a moral theory that makes us obligated to do good and not bad as all moral theories so far have tried to, it would effectively relieve its adherents of any moral responsibility since they would lack the freedom to do anything but good. — TheMadFool

This does not follow. Being obligated to do something is not the same thing as being compelled to do it. All moral philosophies recognise that moral duties can be and are shirked. It is exactly the core principle of an obligation that it's supposed to guide your will. You have to will an obligation be fulfilled.

TheMadFool

You're confusing freedom with randomness. — Echarmion

Thank you very much. Perhaps the confusion arises because they're so similar. Randomness essentially doesn't favor any option among those available and freedom too means all options are equal in value. The difference between randomness and a good person and a bad person is in the first case, good and bad are equiprobable at 50%, in the second case probability of good is > 50% and in the third case the probability of bad > 50%. What do you think? Randomness and freedom though identical in terms of equal valuation of the available options, will differ in the nature of the outcomes - the good will do good and the bad will do bad and if you were random, you'd be doing both good and bad in equal measure.

TheMadFool

All moral philosophies recognise that moral duties can be and are shirked. — Echarmion

That, in my humble opinion, is freedom. Rejecting a valuation system that makes you have a preference.

tim wood

↪TheMadFool

I reckon you're smart enough to have read some Kant, but apparently you have not. I've heard it said that pre-Kantian philosophy is "naive." I am not sure just what that means, but I suppose it means innocently ignorant. Any consideration of morality/ethics that does not take cognizance of Kant, navigate through his ways, is naive in that sense. It appears as well you haven't glanced at any ancient thinking on the subject. I'm thinking Greek, but there are other ancient worlds of morality/ethics in addition to theirs. (@Wayfarer?)

1. Moral oughts are simply wishes/desires for something better and can't be obligations for freedom is essential to morality

2. Any moral theory that attempts to make the good obligatory and the bad prohibitory, like all moral theories so far, is self-refuting because, as I said, freedom is an essential ingredient for moral responsibility — TheMadFool

Think about this, a lot more. I submit that in this is understood neither freedom nor ought. And regulatory aspects are matters of law and community, whether family, faith, polis, or nation. As such in application there is both loss and gain, so that law is identical to moral obligation maybe never, but ought to run alongside.

I suspect, though, that you already know most of this.

TheMadFool

↪tim wood

I agree that I haven't read many of the works and philisophers you mention and I also must confess that my OP is not as well thought out as I would've liked but if you'll allow me to summarize the gist of my argument you might see my point:

1. If there's moral responsibility then free will is essential

2. If morality is made obligatory then, free will isn't essential

3. morality is made obligatory (by all moral theories)

Ergo

4. free will isn't essential (2, 3 modus ponens)

5. there is no moral responsibility (1, 4 modus tollens)

6. If morality is of any value then, there should be moral responsibility

Ergo,

7. morality is of no value (5, 6 modus tollens)

Sam26

1. Moral oughts are simply wishes/desires for something better and can't be obligations for freedom is essential to morality

2. Any moral theory that attempts to make the good obligatory and the bad prohibitory, like all moral theories so far, is self-refuting because, as I said, freedom is an essential ingredient for moral responsibility — TheMadFool

I can't make any sense out of either of these premises. I understand what your point is, I just don't believe either (1) or (2) is true. It may be true that some people believe "oughts" are derived from "wishes/desires," but that would make them arbitrary and capricious. What you might consider moral and obligatory might conflict with what I consider moral and obligatory. How would we arrive at any consensus if there weren't good (objective) reasons to suppose that generally love is better than hate, or that murder (as opposed to justifiable killing) is always wrong.

One contention we might be consider is that oughts are derived from that which we value. We value love much more than hate, because we see the outcomes of love over hate. We also value truth-telling generally over lying, because we see the outcome in relationships (business, friends, and family relationships).

Finally, it's correct to assume that freedom is an essential ingredient of morality. However, freedom must be seen in the correct context, that is, it's the power to do otherwise. To say that one should generally keep one's promises doesn't take away one's freedom to not keep one's promises. The freedom to do otherwise is still present, it's just that it's not generally the best course of action - the best moral action. Why? Because we see that in our daily lives keeping promises promotes the good in a variety of ways.

Echarmion

Randomness essentially doesn't favor any option among those available and freedom too means all options are equal in value. — TheMadFool

I don't see why freedom would mean that all options are equal in value. Isn't selecting an options regardless of and specific value an expression of freedom?

The difference between randomness and a good person and a bad person is in the first case, good and bad are equiprobable at 50%, in the second case probability of good is > 50% and in the third case the probability of bad > 50%. What do you think? — TheMadFool

I think that the idea of good or bad people and freedom don't mix well. If we take freedom seriously, it means there aren't good or bad people, only good or bad decisions. That's, incidentally, another key concept to remember when discussing freedom - freedom is about making decisions. If you decide to follow a rule, that's freedom.

That, in my humble opinion, is freedom. Rejecting a valuation system that makes you have a preference. — TheMadFool

Doesn't this imply that accepting a valuation system, as the equal and opposite act, is also freedom? And therefore obligations are compatible with freedom?

A Seagull

7. morality is of no value (5, 6 modus tollens) — TheMadFool

Then reject morality... no problem. :)

Mww

law is identical to moral obligation maybe never, but ought to run alongside. — tim wood

What a great idea for a moral philosophy: find a way to connect the rational conception of law with the transcendental conception of freedom, within the context of the ultimate subjectivity of moral feeling.

Oh wait.......never mind.

You make an excellent point, just sayin’.

tim wood

Since you have gone to the trouble, I ought to be obliging enough to attack.

1. If there's moral responsibility then free will is essential — TheMadFool

Reason, not free will. Perhaps you'll offer your understanding of freedom and free will. Per Kant, freedom is just the freedom to do your duty, as reason discovers your duty to you. I, myself, sometimes like to look at expensive wristwatches online. Some of them I desire, covet, lust after, would like to own, and could buy (buy, that is, in theory). That is, you might say I am free to do all of those things. Kant would say - did say - that in none of these am I free. (Alas, I have not to hand his terminology!)

2. If morality is made obligatory then, free will isn't essential

Better: if morality is made obligatory, is it still morality? Depends on who's doing the making. Self-legislation (again, per Kant) in accord with reason and duty just is (the exercise of) freedom. If imposed from without, then it sounds like law, which is not morality.

3. morality is made obligatory (by all moral theories).

Just plain not so.

Ergo

4. free will isn't essential (2, 3 modus ponens)

5. there is no moral responsibility (1, 4 modus tollens)

6. If morality is of any value then, there should be moral responsibility

Ergo,

7. morality is of no value (5, 6 modus tollens)[/quote]

Off the rails here. Small point: can't make a valid syllogism with two negative premises. And I should be very surprised if you're buying your own conclusion.

A Seagull

Per Kant, freedom is just the freedom to do your duty, as reason discovers your duty to you — tim wood

Duty... pfft!

tim wood

Duty... pfft! — A Seagull

A joke, yes? Ok. But if not you need to investigate what duty means in Kantian terms. If you pfft duty, you pfft freedom.

A Seagull

If you pfft duty, you pfft freedom. — tim wood

Can you prove that?

tim wood

↪A Seagull

If you accept the proposition that freedom just is the freedom to do one's duty - and if you read even a little Kant you will understand and assent - then you could set up a kind of equation: freedom = doing one's duty. In the same sense that e=mc^2 demonstrates that mass and energy are equivalent, so the equal sign demonstrates the equivalence of doing one's duty and freedom. Given, then, that equivalence - and in this case it needs be by no means precise - blowing up or blowing off one is the same as blowing up blowing off the other. Or, as you put it, pfft this is also pfft that.

However, there is no end of people who confuse freedom with both license and liberty. And who suppose that in gratifying impulse - even including the demands of addiction - they are free. Kant, on the other hand, and in excellent company across the centuries from the Greeks till now, holds that to be subject to desire is to be more-or-less a slave, and to that degree, unfree.

A reasonable place to start with Kant is with his lectures on ethics, e.g., here:
https://www.abebooks.com/servlet/BookDetailsPL?bi=30574776875&searchurl=kn%3DKant%253A%2BLectures%2Bon%2BEthics%26sortby%3D17&cm_sp=snippet-_-srp1-_-title6

Or your local or school library.

TheMadFool

I don't see why freedom would mean that all options are equal in value. Isn't selecting an options regardless of and specific value an expression of freedom? — Echarmion

Yes, but that means those options available to you are, in your eyes, equal in value. Had it been that some options were more valuable than others, then you would prefer those over others and so, since the choices you make are determined by the value of the options, you are, in every sense of the word, compelled to make those choices. No freedom there.

I think that the idea of good or bad people and freedom don't mix well. If we take freedom seriously, it means there aren't good or bad people, only good or bad decisions. That's, incidentally, another key concept to remember when discussing freedom - freedom is about making decisions. If you decide to follow a rule, that's freedom. — Echarmion

Firstly, I would like to thank you for raising the important question of how freedom, my version of it where there are no compelling forces (obligations) that decided whether you choose to be bad or good, seems identical to randomness. After all if we are free in that sense then we might as well do things randomly, there being no reason to be either good or bad.

Secondly, there's the notion of moral responsibility which basically asserts that one must be free to have done either good/bad to deserve praise/blame respectively. No one will ever come to the conclusion that you are good because you donated to charity if that donation was made at gunpoint and also no will think you are bad if you gave up company secrets if that too was done under threat. In other words morality is meaningless if one is obligated to be moral.

Given this is so, any moral theory that builds itself up on the premise that people should be obligated to do good and prohibited from doing bad is self-refuting for it amounts to coercion and this, in the worst way possible, nullifies moral responsibility which I referred to in a previous paragraph.

Therefore, my insistence that we must be free from any and all obligations and therefore my attempt to tease out a distinction in the meaning of ought. The actual moral ought that we should be guided by is the one that expresses simply a wish/desire which doesn't carry the weight of duty i.e. isn't an obligation; we should be wary of the other moral ought which is, good intentions notwithstanding, of the obligatory kind that, as I've mentioned, voids a fundamental moral principle, the principle of moral responsibility.

So, the moral freedom I recommend isn't random in the sense that there are absolutely no guidelines to morality and we act on whims, but is based on moral oughts that are nothing more than the wishes/desires of people to be good and not bad, possessing no power to force our hands to be moral and not immoral.

Echarmion

Yes, but that means those options available to you are, in your eyes, equal in value. Had it been that some options were more valuable than others, then you would prefer those over others and so, since the choices you make are determined by the value of the options, you are, in every sense of the word, compelled to make those choices. No freedom there. — TheMadFool

But that's the thing. I am not compelled. I can make the less valuable choice. Of course you could make a semantic argument that, by definition, the choice I end up making was the one I valued most. But then the freedom lies in assigning the values in the first place.

In other words morality is meaningless if one is obligated to be moral. — TheMadFool

You're equating obligation with force here. That is causing you to be confused. Having a moral duty isn't at all like being forced at gunpoint.

Given this is so, any moral theory that builds itself up on the premise that people should be obligated to do good and prohibited from doing bad is self-refuting for it amounts to coercion and this, in the worst way possible, nullifies moral responsibility which I referred to in a previous paragraph. — TheMadFool

Right. But then no moral philosophies that I know of do this, so the point is moot.

Therefore, my insistence that we must be free from any and all obligations and therefore my attempt to tease out a distinction in the meaning of ought. The actual moral ought that we should be guided by is the one that expresses simply a wish/desire which doesn't carry the weight of duty i.e. isn't an obligation; we should be wary of the other moral ought which is, good intentions notwithstanding, of the obligatory kind that, as I've mentioned, voids a fundamental moral principle, the principle of moral responsibility. — TheMadFool

Again, a duty is a mental thing you can ignore. It doesn't take your freedom away.

So, the moral freedom I recommend isn't random in the sense that there are absolutely no guidelines to morality and we act on whims, but is based on moral oughts that are nothing more than the wishes/desires of people to be good and not bad, possessing no power to force our hands to be moral and not immoral. — TheMadFool

Obviously it possesses no power to literally force your hand . If it did, there'd be no reason for moral philosophy. Morality would instead be a topic of physics.

TheMadFool

But that's the thing. I am not compelled. I can make the less valuable choice. Of course you could make a semantic argument that, by definition, the choice I end up making was the one I valued most. But then the freedom lies in assigning the vakued — Echarmion

This point is moot because in my reply I mentioned that moral choices aren't random for they're based on oughts that express desires/wishes of the people. These desires/wishes are, to me, moral intuitions and are thus necessarily imperfect guidelines, to cover most but not all moral issues, rather than laws that apply under all cases. Let's just say that the moral oughts that I prefer are recommendations we're free to accept/decline and not injunctions we're obligated to follow; this would preserve the notion of moral responsibility, without which morality would be meaningless.

TheMadFool

I can't make any sense out of either of these premises. I understand what your point is, I just don't believe either (1) or (2) is true. It may be true that some people believe "oughts" are derived from "wishes/desires," but that would make them arbitrary and capricious. What you might consider moral and obligatory might conflict with what I consider moral and obligatory. How would we arrive at any consensus if there weren't good (objective) reasons to suppose that generally love is better than hate, or that murder (as opposed to justifiable killing) is always wrong.

One contention we might be consider is that oughts are derived from that which we value. We value love much more than hate, because we see the outcomes of love over hate. We also value truth-telling generally over lying, because we see the outcome in relationships (business, friends, and family relationships).

Finally, it's correct to assume that freedom is an essential ingredient of morality. However, freedom must be seen in the correct context, that is, it's the power to do otherwise. To say that one should generally keep one's promises doesn't take away one's freedom to not keep one's promises. The freedom to do otherwise is still present, it's just that it's not generally the best course of action - the best moral action. Why? Because we see that in our daily lives keeping promises promotes the good in a variety of ways. — Sam26

1. To be morally responsible we need to be free.

2. Moral theories (at least those I'm familiar with) are in the business of making moral injunctions we must adhere to

3. If moral theories are in the business of making moral injunctions we must adhere to then, we're not free

Ergo,

4. We're no free (2, 3 modus ponens)

Ergo

5. There's no moral responsibility (1, 4 modus tollens)

6. If there's no moral responsibility, then morality is meaningless

Ergo

7. morality is meaningless (5, 6 modus ponens) (IF moral theories are premised on formulating moral injunctions)

8. We want morality to be meaningful AND we want moral responsibility

Ergo

9. moral theories should stop making moral injunctions (7, 8 modus tollens)

Please note that the moral oughts I find morally relevant are the wishes/desires of people; they are simply recommendations concerning moral thought/speech/behavior and not the other kind of moral ought we see cropping up in moral theories. They are sourced from moral intuitions rather than from full rational analysis of morality and are rough guidlines to serve most moral issues and are not the laws that moral theories are so fond of.

Sam26

Please note that the moral oughts I find morally relevant are the wishes/desires of people; they are simply recommendations concerning moral thought/speech/behavior and not the other kind of moral ought we see cropping up in moral theories. They are sourced from moral intuitions rather than from full rational analysis of morality and are rough guidlines to serve most moral issues and are not the laws that moral theories are so fond of. — TheMadFool

You didn't address my argument which disputes your premises. All you did was repeat yourself. Your proofs are irrelevant if the premises are false, which I believe is the case.

A Seagull

↪tim wood

Thank you for that.

However it hardly constitutes a proof. And in any case I totally disagree. To claim that freedom is the freedom to do one's duty does not mean that that is the case.

The whole concept of duty is a fabrication by the flatulent elite to try to restrict the inherent freedoms of the peasantry.

Wayfarer

It appears as well you haven't glanced at any ancient thinking on the subject. I'm thinking Greek, but there are other ancient worlds of morality/ethics in addition to theirs. (@Wayfarer?) — tim wood

I quite agree with your remarks. Actually the OP expresses a re-statement of the so-called 'boo/hurrah' theory of ethics, which is emotivism - that all ethical statements express is what we like (hurrah!) or don't (boo!) But to deep dive into the cultural background of all of that is more than I have time to do at the moment, regrettably. Suffice to say, for those who accept there is a real good, a truly good, then many of these issues appear in a different light.

TheMadFool

You didn't address my argument which disputes your premises. All you did was repeat yourself. Your proofs are irrelevant if the premises are false, which I believe is the case. — Sam26

Well, you didn't specify which of my premises you disagree with.

TheMadFool

Actually the OP expresses a re-statement of the so-called 'boo/hurrah' theory of ethics, which is emotivism - that all ethical statements express is what we like (hurrah!) or don't (boo!) — Wayfarer

This is interesting. I was wondering if there is a rationale behind the moral oughts taken as expressions of people's wishes/desires. Clearly, the people's wishes/desires serve a social purpose - morality seems to be there to keep the peace. So, even if such moral oughts are only desires/wishes, they aren't simply approving hurrahs and disapproving boos in the sense of being reflexive emotions sans thinking.

wiyte

I assert that morality spurs from the mind and exists metaphysically - it's a logical conundrum concerning existence.

It doesn't exist in physical form, but metaphysical morality exists.

Sensory units can configure a moral course from sensory data.

When the collective universe is pit against an individual's mind, we know that there's moral, and immoral things, we can do.

It's not a question of 'ought' but rather possibility, a 'can' question. I can exist on this planet without causing it to become unhealthy.

I can produce a next generation Child.

Good is the way minds can be harmonious with the universe.

The universe supports this activity and it, potentially, supports existence.

Evil is nothing in comparison.

I don't produce children. I make the world unhealthy - contrary to the original process of the world.

In any case, morality is a mental and metaphysical phemonenon. What's good if only a lone sphere exists?

There has to be an element of power that can be used properly or misused.

Pinprick

So, even if such moral oughts are only desires/wishes, they aren't simply approving hurrahs and disapproving boos in the sense of being reflexive emotions sans thinking. — TheMadFool

Unless we have evolved to respond with positive emotions to what we now call “moral oughts.” In which case all thinking done on the subject is after the fact, simply post hoc justification of our emotional responses. IOW, moral oughts are simply our attempts at justifying our emotional responses in regards to behavior.

The Two Oughts Problem of Morality

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