With respect to Pascal's Wager, one thing to consider is this: from the viewpoint of 'the atheist', there's nothing to gain, and nothing to lose - by definition. It's a bet about a belief which he or she has already rejected.

From the viewpoint of 'the believer', there's a lot at stake - living versus dying, eternal felicity vs eternal torment.

'The atheist' still might say, what evidence is there for any such 'outcome'? To which the answer can only be, the testimony of revealed religions (and not only that of the Christian religion).

So it's not really accurate to say that there's no difference between the two bets. Sure, 'the atheist' doesn't believe there's any difference, but that is part of what it takes to be an atheist!

Suppose that you have two possible actions, A1 and A2, and the worst outcome associated with A1 is at least as good as the best outcome associated with A2; suppose also that in at least one state of the world, A1's outcome is strictly better than A2's. Let us say in that case that A1 superdominates A2. Then rationality seems to require you to perform A1.[1]
SEP

Maybe you can point out irrational part of this. — Cavacava

What if A1 is "not believing in God, leading to eternal bliss" and A2 is "believing in God, leading to eternal torment".

Therefore it's rational to not believe in God.

Not sure I understand your problem. Here is what Wallace Stevens had to say about Pascal's Wager from his 1923 book Harmonium:

Pascal begins by painting a situation where both the existence and non-existence of God are impossible to prove by human reason. So, supposing that reason cannot determine the truth between the two options, one must "wager" by weighing the possible consequences. Pascal’s assumption is that, when it comes to making the decision, no one can refuse to participate; withholding assent is impossible because we are already "embarked", effectively living out the choice.

One of the premises of his argument is that

the worst outcome associated with A1 is at least as good as the best outcome associated with A2;

and I don't see how your objection meets this premise.

I don't think Pascal's Wager is really dealing with "mere intellectual assent". What exactly could mere intellectual assent be anyway? Mouthing the words "I believe in God" while not really believing? Would that even fool yourself?

It's not a matter of mere logical possibilities. The choice to believe or not is made in light of the possibility of (at least some if not all) religions being true revelations. Assuming that religions are revelations, there are no revelations of the silly kind of possibility you have imagined. Even if religions are merely serious existential propositions, there are no serious existential propositions such as your example, so why should it even come under consideration?.

"Intellectual assent" means sincerely believing that God exists or is real, not just mouthing the words. Again, I question the assumption that this, by itself, is sufficient to satisfy God and gain whatever benefits God has to offer, in this life and/or the next. What do you see as the requirements for a successful wager, according to Pascal?

The irrationality of Pascal's Wager is that it doesn't follow in the way your A1 and A2 example does. It strictly assumes that a single God, usually the Christian God, is the only proper choice of theistic belief.

Indeed Pascal's Wager is often used as a trump card; when all other forms of argument fail, just claim that it's more reasonable to believe in God than to not believe in God.

Trouble arises when we realize that the Abrahamic God is not the only conception of God, and benevolence and rationality is not the only possible dispositions of God. In fact a cursory look at the world casts his benevolence and rationality into doubt.

Assuming that religions are revelations, there are no revelations of the silly kind of possibility you have imagined. Even if religions are merely serious existential propositions, there are no serious existential propositions such as your example, so why should it even come under consideration?. — John

Because the claim was that it's a valid argument. Validity is about logical possibility. If it's logically possible that a conclusion if false given the premises, then it's not a valid argument. That's what the conventional concept of validity is.

But sincerely believing in God cannot be a matter of mere intellectual assent, because for it to be a mere intellectual matter God would have to be thought as an empirical object. But then you could have no idea of what you were believing in, so it would necessarily be just a matter of mouthing empty words.

Not sure I understand your problem. — Cavacava

It's very simple. It's possible that you live as though god exists, or that you assert belief in god, or however exactly you'd like to put that, and the upshot of that is that you're punished for it in the afterlife, whereas if you denied that god exists, it's possible that you're rewarded in the afterlife.

You've got that wrong. You are claiming that at least one of the premises could logically be false, which would not make it an invalid argument, but an unsound one.

Nope. I'm saying that the conclusion isn't either guaranteed by the premises or a tautology. There are other possible conclusions that follow from the same premises (where the premises aren't contradictory). That makes it invalid.

You could formulate it in a much different way so that it's a valid argument, perhaps, but do that work if that's what you want to suggest.

Yes, and imagine if you are an agnostic.

I do not understand your reply. Are you claiming that "intellectual matters" are somehow limited to "empirical objects"? Why would my assent to the existence/reality of God entail having no idea of what I was believing?

One could at the last assent to a god who unconditionally accepts us and understands our frailties, follies, and foolishnesses. This god forever cares for the souls of all humanity , regardless of what they did or didn't believe, did or didn't do, and IF indifferent to our suffering in this world, does not rejoice in our pain. What this god offers is the expectation of an eternal home, neither a tedious heaven nor a hideous hell.

Feel free to add on whatever else you need. You want to be reunited with dead lovers, dead dogs, dead parents, and dead children? Sure. No problem. You want the tunnel of light? Fine. You want fluffy white clouds, harps, trumpets, and angel wings? OK, but be aware that this option also comes with red devils, pitchforks, and pits of boiling high fructose corn syrup. Upon death you roll the dice, which may or may not be loaded, and you get EITHER the white fluffy clouds or the hot fructose.

Or you can opt for eternal non-existence, which offers relief from your present suffering. Unfortunately, you can not combine offers. You either get reunion with dead lovers, or you get eternal non-existence, but not both.

This argument is a wager, it assumes certain possibilities have a certain utility. If you think that by believing in God you may compromise your eternal life, then you do not wager a belief in God, but if you similar to others think that God is Good, then the your wager of belief is certainly no worse than the atheistic non-belief and if true then you are eternally ahead...infinite utility.

This argument is a wager, it assumes certain possibilities have a certain utility. If you think that by believing in God you may compromise your eternal life, then you do not wager a belief in God, but if you similar to others think that God is Good, then your wager of belief is certainly no worse than the atheistic non-belief and if true then you are eternally ahead...infinite utility. — Cavacava

You're assuming, here, that the reality "behind the bet" has something to do with the gambler's beliefs.

I know a lot of folks who would love for that to be the case prior to hitting the casino.

I mean to say that we give intellectual assent only to things we can confirm by observation or that we think we have good reasons to believe are confirmed by the observations of those whose expertise we trust, or to things that are intuitively self-evident.

Your assertion fails its own test. It is not something that I can confirm by observation, I have no good reasons to believe that it is confirmed by the observations of those whose expertise I trust, and it is not intuitively self-evident to me.

People give intellectual assent to all kinds of things, for all kinds of reasons. I still do not see what point you are trying to make regarding Pascal's Wager.

It's not a matter of mere logical possibilities. The choice to believe or not is made in light of the possibility of (at least some if not all) religions being true revelations. — John

I don't think that was necessarily true in times past; the co-existence of the various global religions is in many ways an historical novelty.

But awareness of other religious traditions certainly does cast some light on 'Pascal's Wager', because of the convergence of the testimony of the different traditions on fundamental religious ideas. That is where the discipline of comparative religion is relevant, as it provides a methodical - even scientific - way of understanding the similarities and differences between the truth-claims of different traditions.

Many will object that the examination of religious truth claims could never be a matter for science, but in times past, there was a recognition of the idea of a 'scientia sacra', the 'sacred science', the subject matter of which was the 'divine ascent'. The 'scientia sacra' is commonly encountered in the texts of the so-called 'perennialists' - those who say that the various 'high traditions' of spirituality are all offshoots of the same primordial tree 1. That refers to writers including Frithjof Schuon, Ananda Coomaraswamy, Titus Burckhardt, and Marco Pallis, to name a few.

It strictly assumes that a single God, usually the Christian God, is the only proper choice of theistic belief. — darthbarracuda

It is possible to profess Christianity, but not to assent to the notion of a 'Christian god'.

How? There is one sense in which God is subject to definition - being the subject of religious literature and theological convention, so as to have accepted and defined meanings and references which are assented to by cultures and religions.

But there's another sense in which God is beyond definition - insofar as to define something is to describe it in terms of something else - and that is not something one can ever do in this case.

Accordingly, there are many profound ambiguities around the matter of the nature of [whatever that is]. Being aware of the 'unknown' nature of [that] is a profound spiritual practice in it's own right. (It's also a way to balance agnosticism and spirituality).

But atheism generally wants the questioned defined so as to show that they know what it is they think they're refuting - hence you'll often see expressions such as 'the Abrahamic God' in such debates, to narrow the scope to what the atheist believes definitely doesn't exist.

Hence Noam Chomsky's 'I'll tell you if I'm an atheist if you tell me what it is I'm supposed not to believe in'. X-)

One could at the last assent to a god who unconditionally accepts us and understands our frailties, follies, and foolishnesses. — Bitter Crank

That is mainstream Christian doctrine.

Or you can opt for eternal non-existence, — Bitter Crank

Ah, but can you? How do you know the itch which gave birth to you in the first place won't forever continue to do that?

Well isn't life a lot like that, we believe certain things and we act accordingly. We don't always know the "reality" of our beliefs, but we do assign them values, and I think what Pascal is saying is that if you assign good values to a belief in god, then you have nothing to lose in believing in him, and you have the potential to gain a lot.

If think the deathbed scenario paints this situation in stark relief, one must make a choice, do you talk to the Chaplain or not Terrapin? Do you confess or just die?

The argument as it is usually given is:

P1. There are four possibilities: I don't believe in God and there is no God. I don't believe in God and there is a God. I believe in God and there is no God. I believe in God and there is a God.

P2. If I believe in God and there is a God, then I will receive eternal life in the presence of God. If I don't believe in God and there is a God, then I will not receive eternal life in the presence of God.
If I don't believe in God and there is no God, then I will not receive eternal life. If I believe in God and there is no God then I will not receive eternal life.

Conclusion: If I want to receive eternal life then I should believe in God.

You could also include the stronger claim into premise 2 that if I don't believe in God I will receive eternal damnation.

The argument is perfectly valid, given its premises.

Other things that have been amply confirmed by observation can give you good reason to believe the testimony of others when it comes to empirical matters.

The point is that it doesn't make sense,in a merely intellectual context, to give intellectual assent to things, of which you can have no idea what it is you are assenting to.

Well, yes I was just allowing for our contemporary knowledge of there being many religions. In times where people only knew of one or two religions, or where it was thought that there is only one religion or only one true religion, I think the point still holds, though.

In relation to your reference to comparative religion; I would agree that there are certainly commonalities among religions in general, and that it is possible to understand the differences between revelations as being reflecting what has been suitably relevant to different peoples at different times and places.

It is not something that I can confirm by observation, I have no good reasons to believe that it is confirmed by the observations of those whose expertise I trust, and it is not intuitively self-evident to me. — aletheist

Actually, I had thought that you had accidentally left out an "IF": " IF it is not something that I can confirm....". But now I see another interpretation. You may be referring to a particular belief: "IT". If that belief you are referring to is the belief in God, then you are supporting my point; that it does not make sense to give merely intellectual assent to the existence of God.

It should have been clear that I was referring to your own previous statement.

I mean to say that we give intellectual assent only to things we can confirm by observation or that we think we have good reasons to believe are confirmed by the observations of those whose expertise we trust, or to things that are intuitively self-evident. — John

This assertion is not something that I can confirm by observation, I have no good reasons to believe that it is confirmed by the observations of those whose expertise I trust, and it is not intuitively self-evident to me. That is why I said that it fails its own test.

Or you can opt for eternal non-existence
— Bitter Crank

Ah, but can you? How do you know the itch which gave birth to you in the first place won't forever continue to do that? — Wayfarer

Of course I know no such thing, but nowhere along the line did the idea of of infinite rebirth sprout and take root. I won't fear that I will be reincarnated as a scarab beetle, either, or that my relatives will in some way be responsible for supporting my ghost in the after world. Scores of millions of people on their death beds will be concerned about those issues, and they won't be concerned about fluffy clouds and angels with harps of gold.

I don't know how I will feel as I lay dying. Lots of dying people feel really just wretched, and are probably not engaging in a lot of philosophizing. They're trying to just make it through the day, or to death, whichever one comes first. On the one or two occasions when I have been very, very sick I didn't give the afterlife a thought.

Now is the time to deal with the issue, when one is feeling pretty good and clear headed. Think about it and settle on one side of the fence or the other. There either is a god or their isn't. Then live accordingly.

But I never said you should accept what I said if it is not intuitively obvious to you. I believe what I said is true because it is intuitively obvious to me. We, however, are different people operating under different presuppositions, and disagreement is always, obviously, possible.

On the other hand you could always provide a counter example if you can. Or explain how you think we could believe something in a propositional sense and on a merely intellectual basis if we don't have any clear idea of what it is that we are believing.

Now is the time to deal with the issue, when one is feeling pretty good and clear headed. Think about it and settle on one side of the fence or the other. There either is a god or their isn't. Then live accordingly. — Bitter Crank

It's not so clear-cut. Buddhists don't think there is a god, but their ethical philosophy has a lot in common with those who do.