Focus on the essential. Logic & math are also found elsewhere but the empirical is an exclusively scientific feature. — TheMadFool

Where is this "elsewhere"? What are you implying? If the empirical is exclusively scientific, it doesn't mean science is exclusively empirical. It includes, therefore, logic, mathematics and theory. These are usually considered "cognitive" or "mental." Is this "elsewhere" not science? Is the study of linguistics not science, for example?

There is a theoretical component to the activity we call science. There's a "mental" component to all conscious experience, empirical or otherwise. I'll assume you're not denying this.

Therefore, with this taken as a truism, we're already within a traditional conception: that of the "mind" and the "body" (Descartes) or perhaps the "subject and object" (more in Kant). This is the philosophical basis for modern science, including contemporary science.

What was the notion of "nature" in the 16th and 17th centuries? Take Principles of Natural Philosophy, Descartes' rarely-read but arguably most important work (according to him), or Newton's Mathematical Principles for Natural Philosophy, as two important examples. Take even Galileo's Discourses and Mathematical Demonstrations Relating to Two New Sciences. In the latter, he starts off discussing, to no surprise, Aristotle's Physics. The very titles of the former examples indicate that "natural philosophy" is presupposed as a very definite domain of philosophy (here meaning"thinking" in the broadest sense, perhaps).

Ask yourself what these three men's conception of "nature" was. Whatever it was, it will give us a major clue into the intellectual foundations for modern philosophy and science. So the question isn't a trivial one. You agree that Galileo, Descartes, and Newton weren't imbeciles; it's therefore important to actually read what they said. We may have more knowledge now, based on new discoveries, and in this sense we have gone "farther" than these thinkers. But any progress has been won on the tracks they laid.

The ultimate goal here is to learn something about phusis and, more importantly, about Greek thought. If we agree with Heidegger that these first thinkers (Anaximander, Parmenides, and Heraclitus) were more concerned with "being" than most philosophers since (as the question has gone largely unasked in its own right), then our question is also about being -- our particular, "Western" understanding of being -- our "ontology."

We can't study "being" in the scientific sense perhaps -- if science is more narrowly defined -- but whatever "it" is that allows the very things science studies (physical, chemical, biological beings) to show up for us in the first place -- THAT can be considered "being." No matter the mode we're in when things appear to us. By "no matter the mode" I mean not only our theoretical mode (in our Western,present-favoring understanding of beings as "substance" [[i]ousia[/i]]), what Heidegger called "presence-at-hand," but also our "practical" mode, seen in our everyday actions, interactions, routines, and habits -- most of which is not consciously chosen and of which we're not usually constantly aware of. He calls this the "ready-to-hand."

Heidegger says the latter (everyday activity and habit) tells us more about where our usual "theoretical" ontological interpretation comes from in the first place (and also our interpretations of human nature, the "world," time and space). He concludes that our current, unquestioned and tacitly assumed interpretation (when doing philosophy and science) has its origins in the Greeks, and is due to them favoring the present, which is only one aspect of our "lived time" of everyday life (he calls "temporality"), which is an experience of all-three-at-once.

Whatever allows any of this to show up, that's essentially being. Any understanding of it -- and we all have an understanding, theoretical or "pre-theoretical." Therefore, everything that shows up within this understanding (whether pre-theoretically, or theoretically as in "interpretation" or a "system of beliefs") -- behavior, science, customs, a shared worldview, morality, a class system, gender norms, etc., is going to make sense within this context. In the Greek world, for example, "saints and sinners" wouldn't have made any sense. In the Medieval world, they certainly did. So an understanding of being is arguably as fundamental to culture as religion or language is.

Heidegger wants to get "under" or perhaps "outside" of the traditional ontology by flushing out these "everyday" experiences and analyzing them philosophically -- but without the "baggage" of the tradition's (ultimately Greek) vocabulary and semantics. This is the topic of Part II of Being and Time, which never came but which he published in other volumes.

I've provided a little background here in order to move the conversation in a perhaps a more fruitful direction.

Imo, the ancient Greek understanding of nature – or of the physical – would be direly incomplete without an ancient Greek understanding of logos. I here principally have in mind philosophies such as that of Heraclitus’ and of the Stoics.

Tangentially, I strongly emphasize that one should not confuse the ancient Greek understanding(s) of logos with the Abrahamic, monotheistic understanding of logos, i.e., with the notion that logos is “the word” of an omnipotent psyche by whose will all becomes created. Rather, here, logos is the stuff from which notions such as that as the anima mundi (world soul) become established. It is not just discourse and, by extension, the thought (hence human reasoning) that produces it, but also cause and effect, natural law, and the like.

Still, what Ancient Greek logos is was something that was debated even back then, never mind now when it’s very usage gets derided as mystical babble. Seems as though discussing what logos signified to the Ancient Greek philosophers (and, as is the case with Stoicism, many religious adherents, as we would today call them) would be somewhat of a quagmire.

Still, while being and logos may not be the same, for the Ancient Greeks, being as we know and live it is intimately entwined with logos – which, in essence, then presents that which is natural, or else physical, i.e. that which is “in-born”.

Just remembered, matter – in Latin, materia – is directly derived from the Latin mater (“mother”); in ancient Greece this general mindset was intimately intertwined with notions such as that of Gaia and, again, for the Stoics, of an anima mundi … this being in many ways reminiscent of ancient understandings of the “virgin mother” (birthing sentience without being inseminated), and this long before the convergence of ideologies at the first Council of Nicaea which is Christianity as we now know it.

The translation is enough. You have referred, for example, to infinite divisibility. It's by no means clear to me that Zeno or any other Greek had anything at all like any modern understanding of the concept of infinity - keeping in mind they were hard pressed to write large numbers or do calculations. You said Zeno stipulated divisibility of space. News to me that he did. He implied very reasonably that given a distance, you could think in terms of lesser distances within that distance. My point is that you read into it what isn't there. Achilleus manifestly in all cases completes the course and beats the tortoise. On the face of it, then, any argument that says he cannot or does not is flawed. The only question is what's the flaw? The flaw is in the idea that he takes a distinct increment of time at each point on the course, meaning that there is a discreet constant interval of time during which he is at that and only that point. But that isn't the case. There is no paradox.

And you have ignored the question of the tortoise. If Achilleus can't proceed, how can the tortoise?

I've provided a little background here in order to move the conversation in a perhaps a more fruitful direction. — Xtrix

Are you able to comment from your experience what the ancient Greek understanding was with respect to what we translate as being, or to be? My limited experience is that they don't use the word. They have it, to be sure, but unless it qualifies or answers something particular about what or how something is, they leave it implied or they use some other more concrete or descriptive verb. Almost as if being in the general sense was not something for them, possibly because it usually was not in question. I never find in the Greek sentences of the form X is Y, except as some special qualification. (Doesn't mean they aren't there; I just have not noticed any, and for several reasons I would.)

And what law is that? My point should be obvious, and made more-or-less explicitly by Hume: you don't see laws. You observe what you suppose to be event, and maybe craft up an account of the event that seems to work. The distinction runs deep into what concerned Kant in Hume's own account. That is, the law is a creation of mind, and there's no law that says that what we think of as a law, is the way anything actually works. And indeed, across history people have composed different and differing laws concerning similar events. Aristotle himself is an example of such a person. — tim wood

Well, I agree that all laws suffer from the same problem that all inductive generalizations do viz. they all lack logical necessity but this doesn't void the fact that they are essentially patterns in the behavior of matter-energy discerned from observed data.

Indeed, as you rightly pointed out, a given pattern in the way matter-energy interacts may be made to agree with more than one law but that doesn't imply that the pattern can't be observed, that the law can't be observed; it simply means the law that we consider to be true may not be the actual law that produces the pattern.

Whatever allows any of this to show up, that's essentially being. Any understanding of it -- and we all have an understanding, theoretical or "pre-theoretical." Therefore, everything that shows up within this understanding (whether pre-theoretically, or theoretically as in "interpretation" or a "system of beliefs") -- behavior, science, customs, a shared worldview, morality, a class system, gender norms, etc., is going to make sense within this context. In the Greek world, for example, "saints and sinners" wouldn't have made any sense. In the Medieval world, they certainly did. So an understanding of being is arguably as fundamental to culture as religion or language is. — Xtrix

That's how I understand it, too. This reminded me of the quotes from the Dilthey/Yorck letters that Heidegger used in the intro of the first draft of Being and Time. I can't easily quote those, but this is close:

Together with Dilthey, Yorck was the first philosopher to elaborate the specific concept of historicity [Geschichtlichkeit] as a defining characteristic in the ontology of human beings. In particular, Yorck emphasized the generic difference between the ontic and the historical, i.e., the difference between what is seen or conceptualized (and aesthetically contemplated) as permanent nature, or essence, or idea, and the felt historical rhythm of life, i.e., life's immersion in and belonging to the overarching and always changing waves of history. In contradistinction to Dilthey's epistemological endeavors to clarify the foundations of the historical sciences vis-à-vis the natural sciences, Yorck aimed exclusively at the ontology of historical life, particularly the historical band (syndesmos) and effective connection (virtuality) that unites generational life. Based on the primacy of historical life, Yorck adopted a decidedly anti-metaphysical stance, rejecting all claims of knowledge sub specie aeternitatis. — link

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/yorck/

As Dreyfus emphasizes (and you mention), understandings of beings aren't necessarily explicit. And perhaps the most crucial understandings are completely tacit. We can find a little of this in Hegel.

But men do not at certain epochs, merely philosophize in general, for there is a definite Philosophy which arises among a people, and the definite character of the standpoint of thought is the same character which permeates all the other historical sides of the spirit of the people, which is most intimately related to them, and which constitutes their foundation. The particular form of a Philosophy is thus contemporaneous with a particular constitution of the people amongst whom it makes its appearance, with their institutions and forms of government, their morality, their social life and the capabilities, customs and enjoyments of the same; it is so with their attempts and achievements in art and science, with their religions, warfares and external relationships...
...
The Philosophy which is essential within Christianity could not be found in Rome, for all the various forms of the whole are only the expression of one and the same determinate character. Hence political history, forms of government, art and religion are not related to Philosophy as its causes, nor, on the other hand, is Philosophy the ground of their existence - one and all have the same common root, the spirit of the time. It is one determinate existence, one determinate character which permeates all sides and manifests itself in politics and in all else as in different elements; it is a condition which hangs together in all its parts, and the various parts of which contain nothing which is really inconsistent, however diverse and accidental they may appear to be, and however much they may seem to contradict one another. — Hegel

https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/hp/hpintrob.htm#B1a

To me the 'spirit of [a] time' is something like its understanding of being.

But if Philosophy does not stand above its time in content, it does so in form, because, as the thought and knowledge of that which is the substantial spirit of its time, it makes that spirit its object. — Hegel

To me this gels with phenomenology as a making explicit of what is tacitly already dominant.

On the issue of this thread, I continue to think that science is really about power (knowledge is power power is knowledge). We are lords and masters of nature. We feel it and do it without necessarily ever thinking it or confessing it. We know to the degree that we can do. The rest is maybe politics (its own kind of manipulation.) Is this true? To me it's the spirit of the times, manifested in the relative status of different occupations.

Where is this "elsewhere"? What are you implying? If the empirical is exclusively scientific, it doesn't mean science is exclusively empirical. It includes, therefore, logic, mathematics and theory. These are usually considered "cognitive" or "mental." Is this "elsewhere" not science? Is the study of linguistics not science, for example?

There is a theoretical component to the activity we call science. There's a "mental" component to all conscious experience, empirical or otherwise. I'll assume you're not denying this.

Therefore, with this taken as a truism, we're already within a traditional conception: that of the "mind" and the "body" (Descartes) or perhaps the "subject and object" (more in Kant). This is the philosophical basis for modern science, including contemporary science.

What was the notion of "nature" in the 16th and 17th centuries? Take Principles of Natural Philosophy, Descartes' rarely-read but arguably most important work (according to him), or Newton's Mathematical Principles for Natural Philosophy, as two important examples. Take even Galileo's Discourses and Mathematical Demonstrations Relating to Two New Sciences. In the latter, he starts off discussing, to no surprise, Aristotle's Physics. The very titles of the former examples indicate that "natural philosophy" is presupposed as a very definite domain of philosophy (here meaning"thinking" in the broadest sense, perhaps).

Ask yourself what these three men's conception of "nature" was. Whatever it was, it will give us a major clue into the intellectual foundations for modern philosophy and science. So the question isn't a trivial one. You agree that Galileo, Descartes, and Newton weren't imbeciles; it's therefore important to actually read what they said. We may have more knowledge now, based on new discoveries, and in this sense we have gone "farther" than these thinkers. But any progress has been won on the tracks they laid.

The ultimate goal here is to learn something about phusis and, more importantly, about Greek thought. If we agree with Heidegger that these first thinkers (Anaximander, Parmenides, and Heraclitus) were more concerned with "being" than most philosophers since (as the question has gone largely unasked in its own right), then our question is also about being -- our particular, "Western" understanding of being -- our "ontology."

We can't study "being" in the scientific sense perhaps -- if science is more narrowly defined -- but whatever "it" is that allows the very things science studies (physical, chemical, biological beings) to show up for us in the first place -- THAT can be considered "being." No matter the mode we're in when things appear to us. By "no matter the mode" I mean not only our theoretical mode (in our Western,present-favoring understanding of beings as "substance" [[i]ousia[/i]]), what Heidegger called "presence-at-hand," but also our "practical" mode, seen in our everyday actions, interactions, routines, and habits -- most of which is not consciously chosen and of which we're not usually constantly aware of. He calls this the "ready-to-hand."

Heidegger says the latter (everyday activity and habit) tells us more about where our usual "theoretical" ontological interpretation comes from in the first place (and also our interpretations of human nature, the "world," time and space). He concludes that our current, unquestioned and tacitly assumed interpretation (when doing philosophy and science) has its origins in the Greeks, and is due to them favoring the present, which is only one aspect of our "lived time" of everyday life (he calls "temporality"), which is an experience of all-three-at-once.

Whatever allows any of this to show up, that's essentially being. Any understanding of it -- and we all have an understanding, theoretical or "pre-theoretical." Therefore, everything that shows up within this understanding (whether pre-theoretically, or theoretically as in "interpretation" or a "system of beliefs") -- behavior, science, customs, a shared worldview, morality, a class system, gender norms, etc., is going to make sense within this context. In the Greek world, for example, "saints and sinners" wouldn't have made any sense. In the Medieval world, they certainly did. So an understanding of being is arguably as fundamental to culture as religion or language is.

Heidegger wants to get "under" or perhaps "outside" of the traditional ontology by flushing out these "everyday" experiences and analyzing them philosophically -- but without the "baggage" of the tradition's (ultimately Greek) vocabulary and semantics. This is the topic of Part II of Being and Time, which never came but which he published in other volumes.

I've provided a little background here in order to move the conversation in a perhaps a more fruitful direction. — Xtrix

:ok: I'll leave you to more fruitful discussions with others. Thanks.

The translation is enough. You have referred, for example, to infinite divisibility. It's by no means clear to me that Zeno or any other Greek had anything at all like any modern understanding of the concept of infinity - keeping in mind they were hard pressed to write large numbers or do calculations. You said Zeno stipulated divisibility of space. News to me that he did. He implied very reasonably that given a distance, you could think in terms of lesser distances within that distance. — tim wood

I don't see how this is relevant. You insist that we speak in Zeno's terms, now you want to talk about how Zeno's terms relate to modern conceptions. It's you who is insisting we leave modern conceptions out of this, so be consistent, and leave it out.

. Achilleus manifestly in all cases completes the course and beats the tortoise. — tim wood

Huh? Clearly you haven't followed Zeno's example! Achilles can't beat the tortoise, according to the terms of the example. Since you keep saying things which aren't there, talking about stops, pauses, and now the assumption that Achilles beats the tortoise, it's obviously you who's reading into it, what's not there.

The flaw is in the idea that he takes a distinct increment of time at each point on the course, meaning that there is a discreet constant interval of time during which he is at that and only that point. — tim wood

What you are describing here is a stop. An "interval of time during which he is at that and only that point". We went through this already, there is no such stop, or pause, described in the example by Zeno.

It is stipulated that each runner runs at a constant speed. Achilles runs faster than the tortoise, but the tortoise has a head start. The tortoise is already ahead, and moving forward when Achilles is moving forward. Achilles has to get to the tortoise's starting point before passing the tortoise, and this takes some time. In that period of time, the tortoise moves ahead. Now Achilles has to get to that point where the tortoise has moved ahead to. But in the time that it takes him to get there, the tortoise has moved further ahead again. This will continue indefinitely (infinitely) and Achilles will never surpass the tortoise.

See, there is no stopping at any of the points, both the tortoise and Achilles are moving at a constant speed, Achilles faster than the tortoise. However, the period of time that it takes for Achilles to get to where the tortoise was, during which time the tortoise moves further ahead, becomes shorter and shorter and shorter. So long as there is that short period of time, the tortoise will always get further ahead. And, there will always be that short period of time, because there will always be a short space that the tortoise is ahead of Achilles and according to the stipulation of Achilles' constant speed, it will require a period of time for him to cover that space and get to where the tortoise was.

And you have ignored the question of the tortoise. If Achilleus can't proceed, how can the tortoise? — tim wood

I ignored the question of the tortoise because I couldn't see what the question was. Now I see that it's not relevant, and seems to be based in your misunderstanding of "stops". Both Achilles and the tortoise are moving at constant speeds, there is no stops, or pauses, and it is not the case that Achilles can't proceed. Achilles always proceeds (constant), just like the tortoise always proceeds, but Achilles cannot catch up to the tortoise, for the reason explained above, as presented by Zeno.

Are you able to comment from your experience what the ancient Greek understanding was with respect to what we translate as being, or to be? My limited experience is that they don't use the word. They have it, to be sure, but unless it qualifies or answers something particular about what or how something is, they leave it implied or they use some other more concrete or descriptive verb. Almost as if being in the general sense was not something for them, possibly because it usually was not in question. I never find in the Greek sentences of the form X is Y, except as some special qualification. (Doesn't mean they aren't there; I just have not noticed any, and for several reasons I would.) — tim wood

If you want to understand the ancient Greek meaning of "Being", read Parmenides, and the other Eleatics, among whom Zeno was one.

Imo, the ancient Greek understanding of nature – or of the physical – would be direly incomplete without an ancient Greek understanding of logos. — javra

That's a very important point - you're absolutely correct.

The word logos as "discourse" is what's commonly assumed, and later becomes a matter of propositions and eventually logic. But initially it was much closer semantically to an idea of Phusis.

I'll respond more fully later about all of that, but your point is well taken.

About the word "being" itself in Greek I don't have much knowledge. I didn't think there was such a word, actually. Phusis (as that which emerges), and later ousia, seem to be the words used, but if you know more I'm certainly interested.

I'll leave you to more fruitful discussions with others. Thanks. — TheMadFool

There's no sense taking this personally. I respect what you say about science - there's plenty of truth in it. But as much as I'm normally not a stickler for staying "on topic," I don't want to lose sight of my main question and be sent adrift on a discussion about empiricism. You can understand that I'm sure.

Nevertheless, if you're uninterested that's fair enough.

To me this gels with phenomenology as a making explicit of what is tacitly already dominant. — jjAmEs

Very well said. Yes indeed, I couldn't agree more.

It's not only the emphasis on "practical" behavior which is novel, as overlooked as that has been in academic philosophy - but a way in which to analyze it without invoking the use of traditional concepts (I.e., "phenomenologically"). This is why people unjustly accuse Heidegger of being a charlatan, as he had to essentially invent words in order to discuss the topic.

If you want to understand the ancient Greek meaning of "Being", read Parmenides — Metaphysician Undercover

An excellent place to start, no doubt. Now to study the morphing of this understanding in the time between Parmenides and Aristotle is especially fascinating.

Both Achilles and the tortoise are moving at constant speeds, there is no stops, or pauses, and it is not the case that Achilles can't proceed. Achilles always proceeds (constant), just like the tortoise always proceeds, but Achilles cannot catch up to the tortoise, for the reason explained above, as presented by Zeno. — Metaphysician Undercover

And the mistake in Zeno is the hidden pause. Zeno's presentation is that of a man not clear on what motion is. If you buy Zeno's account, well, sure, Achilleus never catches the tortoise. But in reality, as Zeno well knows, Achilleus passes the tortoise PDQ. It's for us, then, to find the mistake, which is the assumption that there is a discreet moment, & etc, as described just above. Of course, if you wish to wager on the tortoise, I'll take those bets all day long.

If you want to understand the ancient Greek meaning of "Being", read Parmenides, and the other Eleatics, among whom Zeno was one. — Metaphysician Undercover

& @Xtrix Don't you mean if I wish to encounter the Greek aporia about the one and the many, parts and wholes, and so forth? The OP is about the Greek word φὐσις, phusis. My bias is that the right way to approach understanding Greek words is not to hang from a basket in a tree and try to surround them with a rarified thinking, but to approach them instead in use, as they were used, as best we can tell - which is neither as easy nor straightforward as it sounds - it goes to the problem of meaning as opposed to translation.

Greek certainly does have a "to be" and "being," but they just do not use them as we do in English. They seem never to say, "Bob is a carpenter." Maybe instead, "Bob the carpenter." If there is confusion about what Bob does, then maybe, "Bob the one who is the carpenter," or something like. I'm tempted to say that Greeks don't predicate being; it's already built in, in some way. Which implies that they weren't so much about categorization, genus and species, as a way of understanding their world. I suspect that is not just language, but reflects also an ancient way of living and how life was understood - as particulars here and now to be dealt with.

We all the time ask what's this, what's that, and answer in terms of being: this is that, these are those - as if that answered the question! We might ask, for example, who Socrates is, expecting in answer a bunch of ises: "He is that man there; he is the one who this, that, and so forth."

I think the Greek would understand our initial question as our attempt to remedy some ignorance of our own about Socrates, in the sense of where he is, or which one he is. But as to what he is, I think the ancient Greek would simply regard him, and indeed most of the things around them, as sui generis, and not what class of things they were.

This seems, then, a matter of manyness, of difference. Phusis, then, a conscious and deliberate attempt to gather the manyness of nature into a one. Of course that calls upon an understanding fo the Greek conception of nature, a topic in itself.

"With the question of the meaning of being, our investigation comes up against the fundamental question of philosophy. This is one that must be treated phenomenologically. [...] This expression does not characterize the what of the objects of philosophical research as subject-matter, but rather the how of that research. (Being & Time, p. 50)

In Heidegger, phenomenon = the manifest. Regarding phenomenon and seeming (semblance), the latter already includes the former -- that is, no-thing can "merely look like so-and-so" without first manifesting (be a phenomenon in the first sense).

That's the phenomenon aspect of "phenomenology."

As for the λογοσ, which you mentioned:

"λογοσ as "discourse" means rather the same as δηλουν: to make manifest what one is 'talking about' in one's discourse. Aristotle has explicated this function of discourse more precisely as αποφαινεαθαι. The λογοσ lets something be seen (φαινεαθαι), namely, what the dis­course is about; and it does so either for the one who is doing the talking (the medium) or for persons who are talking with one another, as the case may be. Discourse 'lets something be seen' απο ... : that is, it lets us see something from the very thing which the discourse is about. In discourse (αποφαναισ) so far as it is genuine, what is said is drawn from what the talk is about, so that discursive communication, in what it says, makes manifest what it is talking about, and thus makes this accessible to the other party. This is the structure of the λογοσ as αποφαναισ." —

He'll eventually say that logos, as a "letting-something-be-seen" can be true or false, but truth in the Greek sense of αληθεια (aletheia), "unconcealedness." And falseness as "covering up."

Αισθησισ -- perception, gets invoked here, etc.

In the end, phenomenology means:

Thus "phenomenology" means [...] that which shows itself be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself. This is the formal meaning of that branch of research which calls itself "phenomenology". —

Logos, therefore, plays a prominent role and is important to understand in our search for the meaning of being. Later it becomes relevant in terms of how it's evolved as a term and eventually comes to mean "logic" as the science of thought. But that's a different matter.

Now to study the morphing of this understanding in the time between Parmenides and Aristotle is especially fascinating. — Xtrix

The idea of "being" as presented by the Eleatics, is heavily influenced by Pythagorean idealism. I believe Pythagoras and Parmenides were both in the southern Italy area of Greece. This idea of "being" can be contrasted with the "becoming" of Heraclitus.

What would be interesting would be to see how both "becoming" and "being" get unified into the one Latin concept of "existence". I believe it its done through the Aristotelian matter and form, but this would be a complex research project.

But in reality, as Zeno well knows, Achilleus passes the tortoise PDQ. — tim wood

Right, that's the point I was making. In reality Achilles will pass the tortoise, therefore the notion of continuous, constant motion, infinitely divisible, as presented in the paradox is faulty.

It's for us, then, to find the mistake, which is the assumption that there is a discreet moment, & etc, as described just above. — tim wood

The discrete moments you described consist of stops. There is no such thing in Zeno's presentation, there is constant, continuous motion, with infinitely divisible time and distance. So your interpretation is very clearly wrong. I suggest you read up on that paradox and get a clear understanding of it before you make any further attempts to discuss it.

It's not only the emphasis on "practical" behavior which is novel, as overlooked as that has been in academic philosophy - but a way in which to analyze it without invoking the use of traditional concepts (I.e., "phenomenologically"). This is why people unjustly accuse Heidegger of being a charlatan, as he had to essentially invent words in order to discuss the topic. — Xtrix

I agree. Heidegger had a good reasons for inventing his jargon. I especially like the young Heidegger, https://www.scribd.com/doc/93511246/Van-Buren-The-Young-Heidegger-1994 The first draft of Being and Time is a condensed eye-opening classic https://www.amazon.com/Concept-Time-Contemporary-European-Thinkers/dp/144110562X.

I link to these for anyone skeptical but curious about Heidegger. I couldn't make up my mind whether he was a charlatan till I read some of his pre- Being and Time work. The man could and did write quite clearly and directly, especially in lectures.

Have you checked out Groundless Grounds? It's a great synthesis of Heidegger and Wittgenstein. I suppose holism and know-how are two of the most liberating themes. The liberation is freedom from a bad philosophy of merely playing with words (metaphysical quagmire with not even a political-emotional payload, for instance).

The discrete moments you described consist of stops. There is no such thing in Zeno's presentation, there is constant, continuous motion, with infinitely divisible time and distance. So your interpretation is very clearly wrong. I suggest you read up on that paradox and get a clear understanding of it before you make any further attempts to discuss it. — Metaphysician Undercover

You're not getting it. Zeno doesn't say stops, but that's what he means; that's all he can mean.

therefore the notion of continuous, constant motion, infinitely divisible, as presented in the paradox is faulty. — Metaphysician Undercover

"as presented in the paradox," there you've got it. Outside the paradox, no problem. The problem is in the paradox.

therefore the notion of continuous, constant motion, infinitely divisible is faulty. — Metaphysician Undercover

But consider this edited quote of yours: is this what you're saying? That without regard to anything of Zeno's that continuous constant motion, infinitely divisible (again, not to be confused with infinitely divided), is wrong?

I've been reading this article on Yorck (which is generally great) and stumbled upon something that seems relevant to the OP. Since Yorck influenced Heidegger, this is not surprising, but perhaps of value. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/yorck/#PsyLif

According to Yorck, in Ancient Greece consciousness displayed a particular configuration of the primacy of cognition. For the Greeks, the stance of consciousness towards the world is pure looking. It is through looking that reality is understood. Affectivity (feeling) and volition are not countenanced as functions that disclose the world as such.[18] Truth lies in the beholding eye alone; contemplation, theoria, and intuition take centre stage.

It is as if the clear-sighted eye is expressed in words. On the basis of this condition of consciousness, the function of looking [Anschauung], ocularity [Okularität], becomes the organ of all free work of the mind, particularly of philosophy. (ST, p. 30)

Yorck finds evidence for the prevalence of ocularity or the aesthetic attitude, which is centred on plasticity [Gestaltlichkeit], in Homer, Pythagoras, Plato, and Aristotle, among others.

Form and content constitute the aesthetic dichotomy which governs Greek thought in its entirety, the result of the liberation of ocularity from all other sensuality, the aesthetic liberation, which strikes a chord in everyone who has entered the threshold of Greek life. Looking is the essential comportment; hence, Gestalt or Form [qualifies as] ousia or substance.[19] (ST, p. 31)

That Greek metaphysics seeks the unchangeable and impassable is the result of the relative suppression of feeling and willing that is latent in all cognition, which abstracts from feeling and temporality, as well as objects of human desire (ST, p. 42). Put differently, the structural timelessness of thought as such is intensified in metaphysical thought where it becomes “absolute” (ST, p. 42). Yorck emphasizes that “negation of temporality” marks “the decisive metaphysical step” (ST, p. 66). Metaphysics constitutes the counter-move against the feeling of temporality (that everything passes away), as well as the liberation from the dependence on objects desired by the will. According to Yorck, the escape from temporality and attachment determines the entire metaphysical tradition up to and including Hegel (because even Hegel “ontologizes” life) (ST, p. 83). — link

This is helpful too.

Next, Yorck also claims that “time originates in feeling” (ST, p. 135). But as feeling is non-projective, it follows that, originally, “temporality” is not “objective”[13] (ST, 146). Yorck distinguishes between the feeling of transitoriness, i.e., that everything passes away [Vergänglichkeitsgefühl] (ST, p. 33), and the feeling or awareness of one's own mortality [Sterblichkeitsgefühl][14] (ST, p. 90). Acquiescence into one's own mortality constitutes the opposite pole to self-affirmation, “self-renunciation” [Selbsthingabe] (ST, p. 14), which is thus distinct from and even antithetical to the ethical impetus in philosophy and science. Yorck argues that the inversion of volitional and cognitive projection in feeling and its concentration in pure, passive interiority amounts to a “religious comportment” and the feeling of dependency (ST, 121). To the extent that the religious concentration of life in interiority is inversely related to projective representation, Yorck understands religious life in terms of its “freedom from the world” or Weltfreiheit (ST, p. 81 & 112). Psychologically, freedom from the world is the precondition for the consciousness of a world-transcendent God, or the consciousness of transcendence (ST, p. 105). Yorck only hints at the projection sui generis involved in transcendence. But it is a projection that has no cognitive or volitional content, such that God is intended without becoming “an object,” and willing becomes a “non-willing,” albeit without loss of energy (ST, 104).

Drawing on Dilthey and Schleiermacher, Yorck argues that immediate and indubitable reality of life is exclusively “guaranteed” through volition and affectivity alone. Yorck writes: “That which opposes me or that which I feel, I call real,” because I cannot doubt what resists my will or affects my personal life, whereas it is always possible to doubt objects neutrally represented in space outside me (ST, p. 89). What is thought and grasped as an unchanging, stable and self-same object in the space of thought does not affect me or solicit a desire. For Yorck, cognition, in abstraction from feeling and volition, is the realm of pure “phenomenality,” which is always open to doubt in virtue of its being merely represented or thought (ST, p. 88). Because “the category of reality is a predicate of feeling and willing” alone (ST, p. 128), Yorck concludes that it is an “utterly uncritical” and self-contradictory undertaking to attempt to prove “the reality of the world” by means of the understanding (ST, p. 129). What Yorck writes to Dilthey in a more general vein is also applicable to this particular problem: — link

Freedom from the world is something like a willingness to die. As Hobbes noted, we seek resources and power as a way to increase our security. Worldliness is a swelling assimilation of wealth, reputation, allies, etc. The denial of time is a denial of death. To participate in eternity is to become one with the undying and therefore undead. There is some overlap here with the metaphilosophy thread. Some philosophy is useless in its connection to transcendence, which makes it a kind of renunciation. Anti-metaphysical philosophy that accepts time is like this perhaps. But metaphysics is a different kind of renunciation too. And Heidegger had modes with fit with this, I think.

This idea of "being" can be contrasted with the "becoming" of Heraclitus. — Metaphysician Undercover

No. As Heidegger points out, and quite rightly, Heraclitus and Parmenides are saying the same thing. They're both discussing being. "Being and becoming" is the first "restriction" discussed in his Introduction to Metaphysics, in fact.

Again I return to the question of phusis. It's here that we find clues to the Greek conception of being. Parmenides and Heraclitus are interested in exactly this question.

To argue being is distinct from becoming and pit these two thinkers against one another may be something we learn from philosophy books and in most school rooms, but it's just a mistake- in my view. There are better analyses.

What would be interesting would be to see how both "becoming" and "being" get unified into the one Latin concept of "existence". I believe it its done through the Aristotelian matter and form, but this would be a complex research project. — Metaphysician Undercover

I think your analysis is way off base and therefore your research project, although it would be doubtlessly complex, would be a blind alley.

This is vague, of course, but it would take a while to dismantle most of what you said, and I'd prefer to stay on the topic of phusis - the Greek conception of being at the beginning of Western thought.

Thank you, James. I'll check out the links and those citations soon.

Zeno doesn't say stops, but that's what he means; that's all he can mean. — tim wood

OK boss. Zeno says that each runner runs with a constant speed, yet he means that one is stopping and starting. That's a great interpretation you're giving me. No wonder we disagree

But consider this edited quote of yours: is this what you're saying? That without regard to anything of Zeno's that continuous constant motion, infinitely divisible (again, not to be confused with infinitely divided), is wrong? — tim wood

Yes, Zeno demonstrated that.

No. As Heidegger points out, and quite rightly, Heraclitus and Parmenides are saying the same thing. They're both discussing being. "Being and becoming" is the first "restriction" discussed in his Introduction to Metaphysics, in fact. — Xtrix

If this is really what Heidegger says, I think he is wrong. Hegel also tried to make them into the same thing, by saying that becoming consists of being and not being, in his dialectics of being. He employs a system of negation to characterize becoming. But I think this is wrong as well, and maybe Heidegger's principles are Hegelian.

Plato demonstrated the appearance of incompatibility between Heraclitus' becoming, and Parmenides' being, and Aristotle showed conclusively that this is the case with a number of arguments, one I presented already in this thread. Apprehension of these arguments leads one away from accepting any postulates which stipulate that being and becoming are one and the same thing.

Again I return to the question of phusis. It's here that we find clues to the Greek conception of being. Parmenides and Heraclitus are interested in exactly this question. — Xtrix

It may be the case, that Parmenides describes "phusis" with "being", and Heraclitus describes "phusis" with "becoming", but this does not mean that being and becoming are one and the same thing. In this case, being and becoming are distinct concepts being employed to describe the same thing. If these two concepts are incompatible, then there is a problem.

So for example, if one person describes a substance as solid, and another person describes the same substance as liquid, this does not indicate that "solid" and "liquid" have the same meaning. It indicates a problem in 'the description' of the substance, because the two descriptions incompatible. Likewise, if one person describes the transmission of a certain quantity of energy as a wave, and another person describes it as a particle, these two are incompatible and there is clearly a problem with the description of the transmission of this energy.

To argue being is distinct from becoming and pit these two thinkers against one another may be something we learn from philosophy books and in most school rooms, but it's just a mistake- in my view. — Xtrix

I don't agree with this at all. When the same thing is described in incompatible ways, this means that 'the description' of this thing is contradictory. Neither the one, nor the other, is self-contradictory, but the two contradict each other. Maybe you do not see this as a problem, but I do, as I think it makes it impossible to understand the thing being described. Therefore, I believe that this problem of contradiction needs to be exposed, as Socrates and Plato did, and addressed in a rational manner, as Aristotle did, before we can proceed toward an understanding of the thing which is being described in contradictory ways.

But consider this edited quote of yours: is this what you're saying? That without regard to anything of Zeno's that continuous constant motion, infinitely divisible (again, not to be confused with infinitely divided), is wrong?
— tim wood
Yes, Zeno demonstrated that. — Metaphysician Undercover

Let's refine this. Two things. Are we to say that according to MU continuous motion is impossible? And that it is not possible to assign numbers that are arbitrarily small that each represent a unique point in the progress of that motion (if you do not like this way of expressing infinite divisibility, provide your own version).

No reference to Planck or QM; Zeno had no notion of either, nor was that his point.

Let's refine this. Two things. Are we to say that according to MU continuous motion is impossible? And that it is not possible to assign numbers that are arbitrarily small that each represent a unique point in the progress of that motion (if you do not like this way of expressing infinite divisibility, provide your own version). — tim wood

That's right, such would not be a proper representation of how motion really exists.

And Zeno demonstrated this to me, regardless of whether Zeno demonstrated it to you, or to anyone else, for that matter, he still demonstrated it to me.

Are we to say that according to MU continuous motion is impossible?
— tim wood
That's right, — Metaphysician Undercover

If it's not continuous, what is it? Non-continuous? Discontinuous? Is the object in motion actually at all times under acceleration? (And there is the concept of continuous acceleration - the derivatives of speed - they cannot be continuous either.) How does it work? And to be sure, if the motion from A to B cannot be continuous, then certainly the motion from A halfway to B cannot be either - or for any other distance. It would appear that any motion at all cannot be continuous. I think you have a problem here - how will you resolve it?

f it's not continuous, what is it? Non-continuous? Discontinuous? — tim wood

Yes, I'd say some form of "discontinuous". The physicists haven't figured that out yet, perhaps discrete intervals as QM suggests. Take a look at Achilles, the human runner, for example. Each time the forward foot hits the ground in the act of running, there is a slow down as the leg absorbs the impact, and an acceleration when that foot becomes the rear foot, and pushes off. You might not see this alternation when you're watching the runner, but you feel it when you're running. Running is not a constant continuous motion. The forward foot cannot be hitting the ground at the same time the rear foot is pushing off

Is the object in motion actually at all times under acceleration? (And there is the concept of continuous acceleration - the derivatives of speed - they cannot be continuous either.) How does it work? — tim wood

Acceleration is a very difficult problem which no one has come anywhere near to figuring out. If something is at rest, and then it is in motion, there must be a very short period of time when the acceleration is infinite. Do you see this? Going from 0 speed to any speed requires infinite acceleration.
You might think that it's not a real problem because rest is not a real concept in relativity based physics, but the problem is there nevertheless, any time a force is applied to an object. There is a very short period of time when the behaviour of the object cannot be known.

And to be sure, if the motion from A to B cannot be continuous, then certainly the motion from A halfway to B cannot be either - or for any other distance. It would appear that any motion at all cannot be continuous. I think you have a problem here - how will you resolve it? — tim wood

It's not a problem for me, just a brute fact of reality, no motion is continuous. It just appears like some motions are continuous, and people like to represent motion as continuous because it's easier than trying to deal with the reality of various forces being applied to every object at every passing moment of time, especially when we have very little, if any, information about these forces. Instead, we take continuity for granted, as Newton's first law. But that's just a convenient falsity. And now that physicists have started dealing with extremely short periods of time, that falsity has manifested as quantum uncertainty. That's the "short period of time when the behaviour of the object cannot be known", referred to above. So it is a problem for physicists, but I'm not one of them.

Yes, I'd say some form of "discontinuous". The physicists haven't figured that out yet, — Metaphysician Undercover

Wasn't asking them, asking you; it's your claim.

Take a look at Achilles, — Metaphysician Undercover

Not talking about Achilleus; we set hi aside, remember. The question was to your and your claim.

Acceleration is a very difficult problem which no one has come anywhere near to figuring out. — Metaphysician Undercover

Then how is it you claim to know?

It's not a problem for me — Metaphysician Undercover

You ignore the question.

and people like to represent — Metaphysician Undercover

Yep, some people. When the question is to you and what you claimed, why are you talking about "people"?

But that's just a convenient falsity. — Metaphysician Undercover

Again non-responsive.

And now that physicists have started dealing with extremely short periods of time, that falsity has manifested as quantum uncertainty. — Metaphysician Undercover

Remember the qualification above? No running away to the voodoo of QM.

You have made and insisted on a nonsensical claim:
Are we to say that according to MU continuous motion is impossible?
— tim wood
That's right,
— Metaphysician Undercover

According to you continuous motion is impossible, based on your understanding of Zeno, which you endorse. Being asked how you resolve manifold problems associated with your claim, you completely evade the question. One more time only:
Defend your claim - no evading. Give an account for what motion is, such that it is impossible for it to be continuous. And no QM or Planck anything: those have nothing to do with your claim.

According to you continuous motion is impossible, based on your understanding of Zeno, which you endorse. — tim wood

Right, continuous motion is impossible, and Zeno demonstrated that to me.

Being asked how you resolve manifold problems associated with your claim, you completely evade the question. One more time only: — tim wood

The only problems I see are the problems which physicists have because they fail to respect the reality demonstrated by Zeno, that continuous motion is impossible. I'm not a physicist, so these are not my problems. But I've told you how to resolve them, dismiss the notion that motion is continuous.

Give an account for what motion is, such that it is impossible for it to be continuous. — tim wood

Motion is change of place. Change of place involves a beginning place and an ending place. A continuous thing is unbroken by any beginning or endings. Therefore it is impossible that motion is continuous.