I don't know what you're talking about. You mean a building with different parts? Suppose you knocked a brick off a building. Is it a different building? No, it's the same one, missing a brick. Is this difference abstract? Obviously not.
What is so hard to understand about that? — The Great Whatever
I don't know what you're looking for when you mean 'in what sense.' Does the example not make sense to you? Do you not understand how a building can be the same building even if it loses a brick? — The Great Whatever
Why are those the only options? — The Great Whatever
Obviously it's insane to insist that any object can only remain the same so long as it remains physically the same in every respect.
So in the first place, your contention is misleading, because if we say, for example, that a piece of jade isn't identical physically from morning to evening, and therefore it can't be the same piece of jade unless abstractly, this is wrong insofar as the physical aspects of it relevant to its identity, including its composition and gross physical integrity, are identical.
And in the second place, there is no reason to insist that all differences are either those of minute physical arrangement or abstract.
What are the other options? — Michael
It's not insane to insist that any object can only remain physically the same so long as it remains physically the same in every respect. If there's a non-physical sense of sameness, such that two physically different things are the same, then what is it? — Michael
Sure it's insane. Such a view would be committed to saying you can't dent a chair without making the chair stop existing, which is an insane conclusion. — The Great Whatever
It can retain a functional identity, a physical identity more loosely grained than identical in every respect, a social identity, etc.
I think you misread. I said "It's not insane to insist that any object can only remain physically the same so long as it remains physically the same in every respect." — Michael
So we can't make counterfactual claims about a thing's function or social identity? These are the necessary concrete properties? — Michael
It's still insane though. As if the only relevant criterion for remaining the same is exactly the same in every respect. — The Great Whatever
We're not talking about names anymore, but count nouns like 'buildings,' which don't denote individuals but properties.
I would say that Obama is a name we give to a process that at least encompasses birth to death. Like most human concepts, it has fuzzy boundaries, so in some contexts we may want to extend the domain of reference to include times before or after death - eg a foetus, an embryo, maybe even a parent's sperm or ovum and, at the other end, a corpse, a skeleton or ashes.Does the formal identity 'Obama' signify a totality of processes from birth to death, or the entity that undergoes these processes? — John
It's not insane. It's a tautology. If a thing isn't physically the same then it isn't physically the same. — Michael
Then let's use "the White House" as an example rather than just "building". — Michael
The objection from the Kripke side seems to be that what we visualise is 'the Obama', not a POTUS almost identical to Obama. My response to that is
'what's the difference?' — andrewk
By contrast, I define Obama to be solely the actual Obama process in this world — andrewk
(1) What problem does Kripke think he is solving by introducing the rigid designator concept, that is not adequately covered by Wittgenstein and/or Russell (subject to minor adaptations for unusual cases they did not consider)? — andrewk
(2) Under Kripke's approach, it seems possible, on a formal basis, to imagine that Obama is a mountain. I don't know how that can mean anything without having to sign up to essentialism boots and all. — andrewk
The difference is the two have different truth conditions. For example, what you say is truth condition of the counterfactual could be fulfilled by supposing that some impostor heard about Obama, was jealous of his political power, so took on his name and killed him to take his place, all while knowing Mandarin. This is the sort of scenario that verifies an individual like B.O. who is president, has the same name, etc. speaks Mandarin. But it's not a scenario in which Obama speaks Mandarin; it's one in which his impostor does. — The Great Whatever
That's because the real Obama in that imaginary scenario is the one that was killed, and that one does not speak Mandarin. — andrewk
In the situation you have described, that process is the person that was killed by the impostor. So on my interpretation, as in Kripke's, the impostor is not Obama. — andrewk
There is only one scenario - lookalike impostor murders American presidential candidate named Barack Obama with Kenyan father, takes his place, and nobody notices. There are two ways of describing it - Kripke's and mine. You seem to be claiming that there is a difference - other than choice of words - implied by the two descriptions of the single scenario. You have not explained what that difference is.your view cannot say this, because as you've just gone through explaining, you cannot tell the difference between these two scenarios — The Great Whatever
I don't need to say which is Obama because in my description, we only talk about which one is like our world's Obama in almost every respect, and that one is the murder victim.You have no criterion by which to say which of the two is Obama, because you've stipulated that stipulating such a thing is impossible. — The Great Whatever
I don't need to say which is Obama because in my description, we only talk about which one is like our world's Obama in almost every respect, and that one is the murder victim. — andrewk
Then yes, you can say "what if the White House were blah blah blah," including something other than a building. — The Great Whatever
No. "Same" does not have to mean "exactly the same in every respect."
Why do you say that statement is contingently true? — Mongrel
'This table is made of clay.' To me that is contingent upon who is speaking, in what location, when, and what contextually they mean by 'clay', which has a rather imprecise meaning to it. So what is necessary about it? — mcdoodle
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