Surely it would be that universals like "the perfect triangle" or "perfect body proportion" are just an ideas within our minds and hold no physical existence outside of our thinking of them. — intrapersona

No one argues that universals have physical existence. As I understand it, the issue is whether universals are nevertheless real - i.e., whether there are modes of being other than individual, particular actuality. Setting aside the notion of "perfect," the idea is that a triangle is a universal - there is an infinite continuum of potential triangles, with different combinations of angles and side lengths. They are all real because they possess certain characteristic properties, regardless of whether anyone thinks that they do.

Just to confirm, physicalism and universals are non-compatible right? — intrapersona

I think so, because physicalism entails that the only mode of being is physical existence.

You might take a look at the ongoing thread on "Does existence precede essence?" and the recent one on "Inescapable universals," since they have both touched on this subject.

As I understand it, the issue is whether universals are nevertheless real - i.e., whether there are modes of being other than individual, particular actuality. Setting aside the notion of "perfect," the idea is that a triangle is a universal - there is an infinite continuum of potential triangles, with different combinations of angles and side lengths. They are all real because they possess certain characteristic properties, regardless of whether anyone thinks that they do. — aletheist

If something is real, does it not need to have existant properties in some way? How can something be real and not exist? Universals seemed to be concepts much in the same way that I think of a pink fluffy cloud made out of uranium. The cloud doesn't exist but couldn't I say the cloud is real nonetheless? That sounds like what you are doing, what does real even mean in this context?

I tried looking at those threads but I just can't seem to read further without getting frustrated by not understanding this very basic issue I can't seem to get my head around.

whether there are modes of being other than individual, particular actuality. — aletheist

Where would these modes of being exist without an individual or "particular actuality" to observe them?

P.S. thanks for taking the time to help me here

there is an infinite continuum of potential triangles, with different combinations of angles and side lengths. — aletheist

Where does this infinitum continuum of potential exist? I thought universals weren't dependent on spacetime in anyway. Don't potential states of affairs need to depend on spacetime in order for them to be "potential"?

They are all real because they possess certain characteristic properties — aletheist

How can they be real if they are still just latent/dormant potential states? That is like saying the infinite potential of states of me in 5 minutes have certain characteristic properties. We could only ever say that I "may" have characteristic properties and we might not ever know what they are, incase out of the infinite amount of possibilities, I end up turning in to a pineapple in 3.5 minutes.

Surely it would be that universals like "the perfect triangle" or "perfect body proportion" are just an ideas within our minds and hold no physical existence outside of our thinking of them. — intrapersona

Have a read of this blog post by Ed Feser which discusses triangles as an example.

The gist of it is:

Consider that when you think about triangularity, as you might when proving a geometrical theorem, it is necessarily perfect triangularity that you are contemplating, not some mere approximation of it. Triangularity as your intellect grasps it is entirely determinate or exact; for example, what you grasp is the notion of a closed plane figure with three perfectly straight sides, rather than that of something which may or may not have straight sides or which may or may not be closed. Of course, your mental image of a triangle might not be exact, but rather indeterminate and fuzzy. But to grasp something with the intellect is not the same as to form a mental image of it. For any mental image of a triangle is necessarily going to be of an isosceles triangle specifically, or of a scalene one, or an equilateral one; but the concept of triangularity that your intellect grasps applies to all triangles alike. Any mental image of a triangle is going to have certain features, such as a particular color, that are no part of the concept of triangularity in general. A mental image is something private and subjective, while the concept of triangularity is objective and grasped by many minds at once. And so forth. In general, to grasp a concept is simply not the same thing as having a mental image.

Now the thought you are having about triangularity when you grasp it must be as determinate or exact as triangularity itself, otherwise it just wouldn’t be a thought about triangularity in the first place, but only a thought about some approximation of triangularity. Yet material things are never determinate or exact in this way. Any material triangle, for example, is always only ever an approximation of perfect triangularity (since it is bound to have sides that are less than perfectly straight, etc., even if this is undetectable to the naked eye). And in general, material symbols and representations are inherently always to some extent vague, ambiguous, or otherwise inexact, susceptible of various alternative interpretations. It follows, then, that any thought you might have about triangularity is not something material; in particular, it is not some process occurring in the brain. And what goes for triangularity goes for any thought that involves the grasp of a universal, since universals in general (or at least very many of them, in case someone should wish to dispute this) are determinate and exact in a way material objects and processes cannot be.

One point is that a triangle is the same for any mind, not just for the individual mind, and that the specification of 'a plane bounded by three straight lines' can be realised in many different physical forms.

Ok so all he said was that the thought of a triangle is different from the mental image of a triangle and that triangles are non-physical and don't exist in the mind either.

So then, where do they exist? If they are not a product of physical states, nor the mind then what? This sounds like another unjustified metaphysical claim yet it goes back to plato ffs what am i missing here?

The whole difficulty is that the concept 'triangle' doesn't exist anywhere, yet triangles are quite real - what a triangle is can be specified and communicated, you can write a simple programme to generate triangular shapes, anyone acquainted with the most basic geometry knows what a triangle is. So triangles are real, but they're not material. They're concepts.

The problem is, in our culture, everything is either 'in the mind' i.e. a product of the material brain, or 'out there somewhere'. Platonism doesn't see it like that, as for Plato, there are real ideas, or concepts, which will be the same for anyone capable of grasping them. But they're purely intelligible - they're not material objects, but intelligible objects.

Why are universals regarded as real things? — intrapersona

It's simply a reification, in the sense of a psychological projection into the objective world, of ideas and the mental aspects of language.

A lot of mistakes are made simply due to the reification (in this sense) of mental content.

To some extent there have been overt efforts in this regard--the general rejection of psychologism, the desire to make philosophy a science, etc., but often it's a simple oversight bolstered by a lack of analysis and a bit of ego, a la "how I think about things, my opinions, aren't just how I think about things or my opinions, they're FACTS." Part of it is also due to the fact that it can be far simpler to talk about things under an "as if" reification stance than it is to explain what's really going on physically (and that's partially due to the fact that our natural languages developed in relation to these mistaken beliefs).

Universals are properties and relations of things. For example, when you identify three things, you may also identify a fourth, such as the sum of the three, or a relation between them which has the shape of a triangle. That's not an approximation of some idea of a perfect triangle but a relation which exists independely of ideas. Its ontological status is that of the things: without three things there is neither their sum nor their relation.

Do you see the "sum of the properties"--like for example, say that we're talking about the property of redness, as an independent thing, though?

If something is real, does it not need to have existant properties in some way? How can something be real and not exist? — intrapersona

It depends on what you mean by "exist." Platonists might talk about forms that exist independently in a separate realm that is real, but non-material. Aristotelians see forms as composite with matter, such that they only strictly exist in their instantiations, but are still real apart from them. I prefer Peirce's terminology myself, where "real" means having identifiable properties independent of human thought, and "exist" means reacting with other things. Thus possibilities (qualities, feeling, spontaneity) and necessities (habits, laws, continuity) are real, but only actualities (things, facts, haecceity) exist.

Where does this infinitum continuum of potential exist? — intrapersona

"Where" is the wrong question. It presupposes that spatio-temporal existence, having a "here and now" aspect, is the only real mode of being.

Don't potential states of affairs need to depend on spacetime in order for them to be "potential"? — intrapersona

No, they only depend on spacetime in order for them to be actualized. If a potential state of affairs is real at all, then it must have a different mode of being than existence; otherwise, it would not be distinguishable from an actual state of affairs.

We could only ever say that I "may" have characteristic properties and we might not ever know what they are, incase out of the infinite amount of possibilities, I end up turning in to a pineapple in 3.5 minutes. — intrapersona

Why are we able to be confident that you will not turn into a pineapple in 3.5 minutes? Because that is not a real possibility, any more than a triangle turning into a rectangle while remaining within the infinite continuum of real triangles.

Whenever people posit such as real things that don't obtain somewhere, I can't get past a gut feeling that they're trying to sell me snakeoil.

I am not trying to sell you (or anyone else) anything, just doing my best to answer the question posed by the thread title. If you cannot accept the reality of anything except spatio-temporal existence, then realism about universals is obviously not for you.

Yeah, I didn't mean that personally. I'm just saying this re those sorts of views in general--from Plato and so on.

Surely it would be that universals like "the perfect triangle" or "perfect body proportion" are just an ideas within our minds and hold no physical existence outside of our thinking of them. — intrapersona

You don't have to believe in Platonic universals to believe in universals. Nevertheless Platonic universals are quite helpful with many problems.

Why does it sound like philosophers are saying that certain ideas of objects and forms actually have an existence outside of the mind? That just sounds silly, yet I know I am missing something here...

Just to confirm, physicalism and universals are non-compatible right? — intrapersona

No, this is false.

All universal theorists are arguing for is the existence of an entity that somehow exists in multiple places at the same time. The red of that firetruck is similar to the red of that fire hydrant in virtue of the fact that both objects instantiate the universal "red-ness".

It can be helpful to think of properties as ways objects are. Universal theorists think that these "ways" are repeatable entities. Those with the same property are literally instantiating the same universal.

Furthermore, it should be noted that not every single property has to be a universal, or has to have a copy somewhere. The more complex systems become the more likely unique arrangements of atoms will occur, arrangements that may never occur ever again.

Thus similarity is oftentimes not literal same-ness but rather a close resemblance in virtue of instantiating a certain number of similar universals, but perhaps not all.

All universal theorists are arguing for is the existence of an entity that somehow exists in multiple places at the same time. The red of that firetruck is similar to the red of that fire hydrant in virtue of the fact that both objects instantiate the universal "red-ness".

It can be helpful to think of properties as ways objects are. Universal theorists think that these "ways" are repeatable entities. Those with the same property are literally instantiating the same universal.

Furthermore, it should be noted that not every single property has to be a universal, or has to have a copy somewhere. The more complex systems become the more likely unique arrangements of atoms will occur, arrangements that may never occur ever again.

Thus similarity is oftentimes not literal same-ness but rather a close resemblance in virtue of instantiating a certain number of similar universals, but perhaps not all. — darthbarracuda

Re the parts in italics above, and especially the terms in bold, how would the entities in question be physical? Where would they be instantiated first off?

Re the parts in italics above, and especially the terms in bold, how would the entities in question be physical? Where would they be instantiated first off? — Terrapin Station

So the question is, how are universals physical? I would argue that "physicality" is a universal itself.

There's no "physical" and then "everything else" on top of it. What makes a universal physical is whether or not it is necessarily instantiated only in cases in which the property of physicality is instantiated.

If we're non-physicalists, like dualists, say, then we would say that the property of "blue-ness" is non-physical, perhaps mental, in virtue of the fact that "blue-ness" does not exist outside of the mind, and is thus a mental property. i.e. a property of the mind, vs a property of the physical.

What makes a universal physical is whether or not it is necessarily instantiated only in cases in which the property of physicality is instantiated. — darthbarracuda

Okay, but you're positing an entity that's not identical to its instantiations in particulars, right? What I'm asking you is how that entity is physical.

Okay, but you're positing an entity that's not identical to its instantiations in particulars, right? What I'm asking you is how that entity is physical. — Terrapin Station

Well, I mean, universal theorists don't have to be Platonists. We can be Aristotelian and believe that universals actually exist in the world and aren't just cheap knock-offs of the ones in the Platonic World of Forms.

So if I were a transcendental Platonist then yes, the Platonic Forms would not be physical, they would be "something else". If I were an Aristotelian immanent theorist, then universals would be physical if essentially paired with the universal of physicality.

It seems like you're avoiding answering the question I'm asking though. Re "We can be Aristotelian and believe that universals actually exist in the world"--that's fine, but how do they exist in the world, exactly as something physical? Re "Universals would be physical if essentially paried with the universal of physicality" I don't really know what that's saying.

Letters on a computer screen can only exist on a computer screen. It doesn't make sense to talk about the computational letter "B" in Times New Roman outside of its existence on a computer screen.

Similarly it doesn't make sense to talk of things like mass or shape outside of how they are instantiated by physical objects. I already said that physicality and other universals are not necessarily identical, but I also said that physical universals are "physical" in that they cannot be instantiated apart from physicality. They are separate properties but are unable to be separated.

Aristotelian substance is the name for the thing that exists without predicates, in which everything else is predicated of. You cannot have universals without substance, but without universals substance isn't anything discernible.

What makes a universal physical is whether or not it is necessarily instantiated only in cases in which the property of physicality is instantiated. — darthbarracuda

Would that include fields? Fields are studied by physicists, their effects can be detected by instruments, but they have nothing in common with physical objects, because they're not physical objects, and some of them are not detectable except in terms of their effects.

[Universals are] simply a reification, in the sense of a psychological projection into the objective world, of ideas and the mental aspects of language. — Terrapin Station

However, if number is included under the heading of 'universals', then it is clear that numerical reasoning has many consequences in the objective world, and enables many accurate predictions which otherwise couldn't be made. The history of science is practically built on such discoveries.

As to 'where universals are' - the idea behind this question is that everything real must be locatable in terms of space and time. But universals don't exist in that sense - instead they're inherent in the operations of the mind (they are, therefore, among what Kant would have classified as the 'transcendentals'). But that isn't to say that they're merely psychological or internal to thought. We have no choice but to think via universals:

in thinking, the intelligible object or form is present in the intellect, and thinking itself is the identification of the intellect with this intelligible. Among other things, this means that you could not think if materialism is true… . Thinking is not something that is, in principle, like sensing or perceiving; this is because thinking is a universalising activity. This is what this means: when you think, you see - mentally see - a form which could not, in principle, be identical with a particular - including a particular neurological element, a circuit, or a state of a circuit, or a synapse, and so on. This is so because the object of thinking is universal, or the mind is operating universally.

….the fact that in thinking, your mind is identical with the form that it thinks, means (for Aristotle and for all Platonists) that since the form 'thought' is detached from matter, 'mind' is immaterial too. — Loyd Gerson

Platonism vs Naturalism.

Would that include fields? Fields are studied by physicists, their effects can be detected by instruments, but they have nothing in common with physical objects, because they're not physical objects, and some of them are not detectable except in terms of their effects. — Wayfarer

I mean that's generally why I don't see the point in calling things "physical", it inevitably leaves things out or is so broad as to be indistinguishable from simply "being" in the naturalistic sense.

But I believe that no matter how exotic things are, they nevertheless have properties that make them what they are.

However, if number is included under the heading of 'universals', then it is clear that numerical reasoning has many consequences in the objective world, and enables many accurate predictions which otherwise couldn't be made. The history of science is practically built on such discoveries. — Wayfarer

As you could probably guess (or maybe already know), mathematical realism or platonism is no less a reification in my view. Our mathematical thinking certain is a handy tool, but that doesn't imply that it's something other than thinking.

Re the location questions to darth barracuda, that's simply in the context of him saying that realism on universals need not be incompatible with physicalism. So I'm querying how that would work, exactly.

Letters on a computer screen can only exist on a computer screen. It doesn't make sense to talk about the computational letter "B" in Times New Roman outside of its existence on a computer screen.

Similarly it doesn't make sense to talk of things like mass or shape outside of how they are instantiated by physical objects. I already said that physicality and other universals are not necessarily identical, but I also said that physical universals are "physical" in that they cannot be instantiated apart from physicality. They are separate properties but are unable to be separated.

Aristotelian substance is the name for the thing that exists without predicates, in which everything else is predicated of. You cannot have universals without substance, but without universals substance isn't anything discernible. — darthbarracuda

It sounds like you're saying that under physicalism, "universals" are simply the properties that obtain via particulars. But that's not realism on universals at all--that's nominalism.

It sounds like you're saying that under physicalism, "universals" are simply the properties that obtain via particulars. But that's not realism on universalism at all--that's nominalism. — Terrapin Station

Not necessarily, realism about universals would be that these properties, obtained by particulars, are one and the same across particulars. They are not physical, they are properties, universals, just as physicality is a universal.

Not necessarily, realism about universals would be that these properties, obtained by particulars, are one and the same across particulars. They are not physical, they are properties, universals, just as physicality is a universal. — darthbarracuda

Okay, but if they're not physical, then it's not physicalism.

Okay, but if they're not physical, then it's not physicalism. — Terrapin Station

But it can still be physicalism, as long as we limit particulars that exist as being physical. The properties of particulars may not be physical themselves. But in order to talk about physicalism, we have to know what physical even consists in, and it won't due to simply say the tautology "everything that exists is physical, and what is physical is everything that exists".

It's not physicalism if it posits there there are things in the world that aren't physical (whatever a particular species of physicalism considers "physical" to denote, exactly).