E.g. à la Witty's "private language argument", etc. — 180 Proof
http://lab404.com/misc/ltdinc.pdfCould we maintain that, following the death of the receiver, or even of both partners, the mark left by one of them is still writing? Yes, to the extent that, organized by a code, even an unknown and nonlinguistic one, it is constituted in its identity as mark by its iterability, in the absence of such and such a person, and hence ultimately of every empirically determined "subject." This implies that there is no such thing as a code-organon of iterability-which could be structurally secret. The possibility of repeating and thus of identifying the marks is implicit in every code, making it into a network [une grille] that is communicable, transmittable, decipherable, iterable for a third, and hence for every possible user in general. To be what it is, all writing must, therefore, be capable of functioning in the radical absence of every empirically determined receiver in general. — Derrida
This criticism, he argued, presupposes a conception of reason as a cognitive faculty of the individual thinking subject that is employed as an instrument for apprehending truths. He aimed to show that this view of the nature of reason is mistaken, that reason is one and the same in all thinking subjects, that it is universal and infinite, and that thinking (Denken) is not an activity performed by the individual, but rather by “the species” acting through the individual. “In thinking”, Feuerbach wrote, “I am bound together with, or rather, I am one with—indeed, I myself am—all human beings” (GW I:18). — link
The main idea is that thought is external-social-alien and not internal-private-familiar. Or (at least) that thought or mind is more like the first and less like the second than we tend to suppose. Wittgenstein's beetle is a powerful indicator of this, but the idea goes back further. — jjAmEs
Actually, MU, words are just visual scribbles and sounds. The hearing or seeing the word, "beetle" would be just as "internal" as any other experience of some visual or sound. If we all have different "beetles", then how we hear and see any word would be different for each of us as well. How would we be able to communicate if we actually do have different beetles in each of our boxes? It must be that we all have similar beetles if we are able to communicate.Huh? I take Wittgenstein's "beetle" as an indication of the exact opposite to what you say. The only thing external, social, is the word "beetle". The important thing, what matters, is what's in the box, and this is internal, private. — Metaphysician Undercover
Actually, MU, words are just visual scribbles and sounds. The hearing or seeing the word, "beetle" would be just as "internal" as any other experience of some visual or sound. If we all have different "beetles", then how we hear and see any word would be different for each of us as well. How would we be able to communicate if we actually do have different beetles in each of our boxes? It must be that we all have similar beetles if we are able to communicate. — Harry Hindu
It seems to me that we all have the same beetle in our boxes if we understand when someone is using language and when they aren't. — Harry Hindu
Huh? I take Wittgenstein's "beetle" as an indication of the exact opposite to what you say. The only thing external, social, is the word "beetle". The important thing, what matters, is what's in the box, and this is internal, private. — Metaphysician Undercover
How would we be able to communicate if we actually do have different beetles in each of our boxes? It must be that we all have similar beetles if we are able to communicate. — Harry Hindu
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PragmatismA social organism of any sort whatever, large or small, is what it is because each member proceeds to his own duty with a trust that the other members will simultaneously do theirs. Wherever a desired result is achieved by the co-operation of many independent persons, its existence as a fact is a pure consequence of the precursive faith in one another of those immediately concerned. A government, an army, a commercial system, a ship, a college, an athletic team, all exist on this condition, without which not only is nothing achieved, but nothing is even attempted. — James
The sign functions independently of what's in the box. — jjAmEs
Therefore the sign does not function independently of what's in the box unless you characterize language as deception. — Metaphysician Undercover
If I say of myself that it is only from my own case that I know what the word "pain" means - must I not say the same of other people too? And how can I generalize the one case so irresponsibly?
Now someone tells me that he knows what pain is only from his own case! --Suppose everyone had a box with something in it: we call it a "beetle". No one can look into anyone else's box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle. --Here it would be quite possible for everyone to have something different in his box. One might even imagine such a thing constantly changing. --But suppose the word "beetle" had a use in these people's language? --If so it would not be used as the name of a thing. The thing in the box has no place in the language-game at all; not even as a something: for the box might even be empty. --No, one can 'divide through' by the thing in the box; it cancels out, whatever it is.
— Wittgenstein
A thought: idealism, or the role of the mental in constructing (our?) reality, seems inevitable once you spend enough time philosophizing.
On the other hand, that mind is intrinsic and underlies everything, is exactly what creatures with minds would say. Especially after they spend a lot of time thinking.
"I am the center of the universe, and everything else moves around me." - how am I to disprove this to myself? — Pneumenon
Let me remind you that similar does not mean the same, it means different with similarities. So even if we have similar things under the title "beetle", they are not the same, and contrary to your claim, they actually are different. — Metaphysician Undercover
Your explanation of "similar" is circular.Above you said "similar". Now you say "the same". Which do you really believe? Clearly, under the terms of Wittgenstein's example, the thing in my box is not the same thing which is in your box. — Metaphysician Undercover
Considering W was a bad writer, it's no surprise there are bad readings of his writings.This suggests that your interpretation of W is a bad reading. Of course we have uses for words that refer to some interior. But it all falls apart on close examination. It's already there, the whole collapse, in positing some distinct interior that is radically other. This interior could not interact with the complementary exterior. Dualism as a first approximation is not ridiculous, but taking a serviceable but rough and imperfect distinction as absolute just doesn't work. The fantasy of a divine geometry (constructing existence from a system of words deductively) is only that, a fantasy. And it scratches a religious itch. Self-caused. Self-justified. Self-known. Etc. A continuation of monotheism in another register. — jjAmEs
Natural selection would be the explanation as to how we all have the same beetles in our box. Natural selections "selected" the beetles (colors, sounds, etc,) that the brain uses to interpret the world. So what would cause us to become separated? There needs to be a causal explanation as to why we would all have different beetles. — Harry Hindu
Your beetle is not my beetle and they are separate. However we are looking at the exact same beetle - the color black, the shape of the letter W, the sound of the letter W, are all the same for each of us, or else how would we be able to communicate? — Harry Hindu
the color black, the shape of the letter W, the sound of the letter W, are all the same for each of us, or else how would we be able to communicate? If I said, "beetle" and you hear, "bottle", then how are we going to ever be able to communicate our beetles? — Harry Hindu
Even if you experience purple when I experience blue, we both experience those colors consistently when there is a particular wavelength of light interacting with our eyes. Because the experience (the effect) is consistent with the cause, we would both never know what that our inner experience is different, but we would both be talking about the same thing - that particular wavelength of light, just as if we spoke different languages, we use different symbols to refer to the same thing. — Harry Hindu
If we didn't have similar beetles, we would never understand what we are talking about. — Harry Hindu
If you're agreeing that we all experience the same colors, then I don't understand why you disagree with me about a "private" language. If we all experience the same colors, then it seems to me that we all share the same language of the mind. It seems that we are all informed of the state of the world in the same way. Being informed is part of what communication is, and we are all informed the same way.I think we probably do see the same colors, etc., for reasons you've mentioned. But I think it misses the point of Wittgenstein in the passage quoted. Language can't depend on what is radically private. The most obvious thing to consider is how our actions are synchronized.
To work what is radically private by assumption into causal explanations seems like a bad way to go. It's inaccessible and uncheckable by definition. Whatever it is, it can't play an important role. — jjAmEs
As I said, they are the same independent of the difference of being in different spatial-temporal locations. You see the word, "Wittgenstein" the same as I do, just from a different location in space. We are looking at the same thing - the word on the screen. Our experiences are about the same thing. If not then we're not talking about the same thing when we talk.As I said, "similar" does not mean "the same", it means different. Your post is just a big contradiction. You start out by saying that our beetles must be "the same" in order for their to be communication, and you end up by saying that they must be similar (different) in order for there to be communication. Which do you really believe is the case, must they be the same, or different? — Metaphysician Undercover
Colour does not consist of "a particular wavelength of light", it's far more complex than that, so we can't even start on this analogy. — Metaphysician Undercover
This suggests that your interpretation of W is a bad reading. — jjAmEs
As I said, they are the same independent of the difference of being in different spatial-temporal locations. — Harry Hindu
You see the word, "Wittgenstein" the same as I do, just from a different location in space. We are looking at the same thing - the word on the screen. Our experiences are about the same thing. If not then we're not talking about the same thing when we talk. — Harry Hindu
I said that we both experience the same color when the same wavelength of light interacts with our eyes. — Harry Hindu
Why do philosophers seem to shun this notion of "aboutness". Our minds have this defining property of being about the world, while at the same time being part of the world. It seems to me that minds inherently understand aboutness - that sounds are about what is making the sound, not the thing itself - that pee and poo is about the health of another organism, that the sound of grass and brush rustling is about something moving in the brush, etc. So it seems to me that the "private" language is really a shared language of the world communicating with minds about it's state-of-affairs. It even informs you when someone is using language as opposed to not. How can you learn a language if you don't already understand the concept of communication, or aboutness prior to learning a language? The type of brain and sensory organs one has seems to be the difference in the complexity of this "private" language. — Harry Hindu
We might be seeing the same thing, but each of our respective experiencing of that is different. And that's what we're talking about, what's inside each of our minds, and that is different. My experiences involved with that word are different from yours. — Metaphysician Undercover
I don't agree with this. I disagree with people about the colour of things quite frequently. Sometimes I see as a green what others see as a blue, or I see as a purple what others see as a pink, etc.. We clearly do not see the same colour when the same wavelengths interact with our eyes. What colour it is, is a judgement made, based on training and habit, which varies from one to the other. — Metaphysician Undercover
It is critically relevant to what we are talking about, MU. Think about about it. When someone experiences a particular color and they use a word to refer to that color, the color you're experiencing (whether it is different or not) will be associated with that word. That is the word you'd use for that color experience. How would you ever know that what you see is different than what someone else is if you are both using the same word to refer to a particular color experience? So you could never actually know that when someone sees blue, you see green, because that is the word you learned to associate with that color experience. You would know what beetle is another's box if you know that your beetle is different. In other words, the beetle is no longer private.This, I can't see as relevant to what we're talking about. But I really don't understand any point being made here, if there is a point being made here, so maybe that's why. We were talking about whether what's in my mind is the same as what's in your mind. And I really don't see how they could be the same or else I would know what you are thinking. — Metaphysician Undercover
How would you ever know that what you see is different than what someone else is if you are both using the same word to refer to a particular color experience? — Harry Hindu
If you claim to have different color experience, how do you know that you don't have different auditory experiences? — Harry Hindu
How would you learn to communicate and make the right sounds if you didn't have an accurate experience of someone else speaking? It must be that we do experience the world similarly so that we all make the same sounds with our mouths, or scribbles on a screen, when speaking or writing. — Harry Hindu
Communicating doesn't consist of making "the right sounds", it consists of understanding.... In this way we won't be inclined to say that similar things are the same, and we'll have some rigorous logical principles to approach the issue.. — Metaphysician Undercover
We each have something different in our boxes which we call a "beetle". The "language-game" might be entirely external, as Wittgenstein implies, but this does not indicate that it's not the case that what's important is what's in the box. — Metaphysician Undercover
If you're agreeing that we all experience the same colors, then I don't understand why you disagree with me about a "private" language. If we all experience the same colors, then it seems to me that we all share the same language of the mind. — Harry Hindu
In order to learn a language, you have to already understand the concept of object permanence, (ie realism) - that there are things in the world that are outside of your experience and that language can be about those things. — Harry Hindu
How does one even come to understand language-use without first understanding the concept of communication? It seems to me that you need to be able to understand communication for you to understand when some sound you hear is someone is communicating with you as opposed to a glass breaking, a wave crashing or the wind blowing. — Harry Hindu
307. "Are you not really a behaviourist in disguise? Aren't you at bottom really saying that everything except human behaviour is a fiction?"—If I do speak of a fiction, then it is of a grammatical fiction.
308. [...] And now it looks as if we had denied mental processes. And naturally we don't want to deny them.
To me this is a default view that some of the more recent philosophers have successfully challenged. Our so-called 'rigorous logical principles' are perhaps reducible to making the right sounds and simply conforming to norms that are mostly tacit. — jjAmEs
The quote is explicit about what's in the box cancelling out. — jjAmEs
But upon close examination the whole idea of the inside opposed to an outside comes apart. — jjAmEs
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