Amazing, you do not engage but just claim; you make it up as you go along without any understanding of what you're talking about. But I've grabbed this tar-baby too often to grab it again. It is - you are - extremely vexing and annoying, which is too bad because you seem smart. All yours, and out.

Amazing, you do not engage but just claim; you make it up as you go along without any understanding of what you're talking about. — tim wood

LOL. That coming from the person who incessantly insisted that Zeno's "Achilles and the Tortoise" paradox consisted of Achilles making stops, despite the fact that I explained numerous times that Zeno stipulated constant motion.

It is - you are - extremely vexing and annoying, which is too bad because you seem smart. All yours, and out. — tim wood

Things are not always as they seem, but sometimes they are. I know that being shown one's own mistakes, when it's not done in a careful and considerate way (and even if it is sometimes), can be a very annoying thing. I'll take this as a learning experience and try to work harder on finding that careful and considerate way.

I'll take this as a learning experience and try to work harder on finding that careful and considerate way. — Metaphysician Undercover

Be as nasty as you like, but just answer the questions you're asked instead of evading them, and when asked for discussion, don't resort to unsupported and nonsensical claims or outright misdirection or misrepresentation. That is, just Be the civil person you claim you want to be and skip the trollery.

Plato demonstrated the appearance of incompatibility between Heraclitus' becoming, and Parmenides' being, and Aristotle showed conclusively that this is the case with a number of arguments, one I presented already in this thread. Apprehension of these arguments leads one away from accepting any postulates which stipulate that being and becoming are one and the same thing. — Metaphysician Undercover

It's true that the distinction between "being and becoming" have their origins in Plato and Aristotle. But think about it for a minute -- what, exactly, "becomes"? Things change and move, they arise and pass -- but this presupposes a being and thus being itself. Plato associates Parmenides' being with some kind of permanence opposed to change.

It's not that any of this is "wrong" -- that would be presumptuous. They weren't idiots. Rather it's that by this point the original sense of being, as phusis, is pushed to the background. By the time Plato and Aristotle show up, being has transformed into "idea" and "ousia." But most of the trouble lies in our interpretation of what "becoming" means.

If this is really what Heidegger says, I think he is wrong. — Metaphysician Undercover

Don't take my word for it:

Even today, in accounts of the inception of Western philosophy, it is customary to oppose Parmenides' teaching to that of Heraclitus. An opt-cited saying is supposed to derive from Heraclitus: panta rhei, all is in flux. Hence there is no being. All "is" becoming.

[...]

Of course, when someone asserts the opposite, that in the history of phlosophy all thinkers have at bottom said the same thing, then this is taken as yet another outlandish imposition on everyday understanding. What use, then, is the multifaceted and complex history of Western philosophy, if they all say the same thing anyway? Then one philosophy would be enough. Everything has always already been said. And yet this "same" possess, as its inner truth, the inexhaustible wealth of that which on every day is as if that day were its first. —

I think that's clear enough. I think you should check it out, too -- definitely worth the time. It's Introduction to Metaphysics p. 74.

It may be the case, that Parmenides describes "phusis" with "being", and Heraclitus describes "phusis" with "becoming", but this does not mean that being and becoming are one and the same thing. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, it just means we're in one phase of "restricting" being, which has an interesting history, and begins with this distinction and then, later, "being and seeming," "being and thinking," etc.

So for example, if one person describes a substance as solid, and another person describes the same substance as liquid, this does not indicate that "solid" and "liquid" have the same meaning. — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree. It does mean, however, that "substance" retains its meaning.

To extend this analogy to our case, it would be like describing a substance as a "substance and a liquid." We have to know something about what "substance" means before we can contrast the two. There's also the problem of what we mean by "liquid" (or in this case, "becoming").

"Heraclitus, to whom one ascribes the doctrine of becoming, in start contrast to Parmenides, in truth says the same as Parmenides. He would not be one of the greatest of the great Greeks if he said anything else. One simply must not interpret his doctrine of becoming according to the notions of a nineteenth-century Darwinist." (Introduction, p 75.) [My emphasis]

Maybe you do not see this as a problem, but I do, as I think it makes it impossible to understand the thing being described. Therefore, I believe that this problem of contradiction needs to be exposed, as Socrates and Plato did, and addressed in a rational manner, as Aristotle did, before we can proceed toward an understanding of the thing which is being described in contradictory ways. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't see this particular issue as a problem, no. There are many ways of interpreting things. The wave-particle business you mentioned is a good example. So's the proverbial glass being "half-empty" and "half-full." Is either a "problem"? Well maybe, but what's not an issue is that something is being interpreted.

Anticipating later analyses: it's worth remember that, at bottom, whenever we are engaged in these questions and problems (in philosophy or science), we're interpreting and analyzing -- which is a certain mode of our existence. That mode, reaching back at least to the Greeks, involves presence. This is a mode of our being -- Heidegger calls it the "present-at-hand" -- and includes (of course) an aspect of time (the present).

This in turn is related to ideas of "truth" and all of its transformations, which in the early Greeks was called "aletheia." This term, like phusis, has to do with a "disclosure," an "openness," an "emergence" -- all of which shows up in the context of "presence" and is closely related to "phusis." And so we're back at the OP question.

Nature is everything that happens within the universe.

OK. And not reciprocally? What part of the universe isn't nature? If everything that happens "in the universe" is nature, then why not say the universe and nature are the same thing?

This isn't much of an answer, I'm afraid. But regardless, like I've state elsewhere, I'm not interested in just "defining" what the word means. There's too much of that that in philosophy already. We're trying to explore the basis for the word itself -- which was a Latin translation of the Greek word "phusis."

What part of the universe isn't nature? — Xtrix

Every "part" of the universe is nature.

We're trying to explore the basis for the word itself -- which was a Latin translation of the Greek word "phusis." — Xtrix

I don't see what you'll be getting out of your foray into etymology intellectually besides context, but carry on as you wish.

If I could interject here.

Zeno's paradoxes are precisely that. Paradoxes. There are many of them.

Or take the ship of Theseus -- is it the same ship or not? Should we be arguing about it?

There can't be any answer to these riddles. They're interesting to think about, but the both of you taking a position and trying to defend that position is fruitless.

Every "part" of the universe is nature. — BraydenS

Then why bother distinguishing the two and say nature happens "in" the universe?

We're trying to explore the basis for the word itself -- which was a Latin translation of the Greek word "phusis."
— Xtrix

I don't see what you'll be getting out of your foray into etymology intellectually besides context, but carry on as you wish. — BraydenS

We'll be getting out of it a better understanding of the philosophical foundations of modern science (and not only that). Understanding science, such a huge feature of our present historical time, is important if we're to understand where we're going as a species. That's my belief.

But ultimately, asking what one "gets out" of philosophy is implying it has to have some use, which is reminiscent of those among us who can't see the value of anything that can't be monetized. Kind of sad.

Then why bother distinguishing the two and say nature happens "in" the universe? — Xtrix

Because we cannot talk about or sense the universe in any way, only parts of it.

asking what one "gets out" of philosophy is implying it has to have some use, which is reminiscent of those among us who can't see the value of anything that can't be monetized. — Xtrix

But you just exclaimed that your use of understanding the etymology of the word was for "understanding science", which is a philosophical system of thought built on it's ability to be applied practically and pragmatically.

Then why bother distinguishing the two and say nature happens "in" the universe?
— Xtrix

Because we cannot talk about or sense the universe in any way, only parts of it. — BraydenS

We can't talk about the universe in any way, yet you are talking about it.
We can't sense the universe in any way, except its parts -- and what are its parts? Everything in nature.

This is all pretty silly. No offense.

asking what one "gets out" of philosophy is implying it has to have some use, which is reminiscent of those among us who can't see the value of anything that can't be monetized.
— Xtrix

But you just exclaimed that your use of understanding the etymology of the word was for "understanding science", which is a philosophical system of thought built on it's ability to be applied practically and pragmatically. — BraydenS

No, I said this is my belief. But regardless of whether it has any "use" at all, it's interesting for its own sake.

Also, to casually throw around a definition like "a philosophical system of thought [redundant] built on its ability to be applied practically and pragmatically [redundant]" is kind of ridiculous. There is such a thing as "philosophy of science," if you're not aware. That means many minds, much greater than yours, have struggled with the question of what science is. It's not so simple. You could be right or wrong, but simply declaring it accomplishes nothing.

I'm always struck by people who want to quickly and confidently proclaim a definitive answer, or some solid definition, for something or other -- without any context. I'm further struck to watch as they're satisfied by this, as if by doing so they've settled anything.

We have to do better than this. Try reading this thread for starters. Spouting empty nonsense won't be tolerated -- it'll be, properly, ignored.

No, it just means we're in one phase of "restricting" being, which has an interesting history, and begins with this distinction and then, later, "being and seeming," "being and thinking," etc. — Xtrix

I don't see where this comes from, nor what you mean by it. Can you explain? What do you mean by restricting being?

"Heraclitus, to whom one ascribes the doctrine of becoming, in start contrast to Parmenides, in truth says the same as Parmenides. — Xtrix

As I said, I think Plato demonstrated the difference between them. And, I think that to claim that they both said the same thing is to misunderstand what they said.

don't see this particular issue as a problem, no. There are many ways of interpreting things. The wave-particle business you mentioned is a good example. So's the proverbial glass being "half-empty" and "half-full." Is either a "problem"? Well maybe, but what's not an issue is that something is being interpreted. — Xtrix

Having contradictory interpretations is not the same as "half-empty"/ "half-full", as these two are not contradictory. Do you see the difference, between interpretations which are different, yet consistent with each other, and interpretations which contradict each other? It is the latter which I see as a problem, the former is not a problem.

They're interesting to think about, but the both of you taking a position and trying to defend that position is fruitless. — Xtrix

What about your thesis that all philosophy is saying the same thing? How can any philosophers disagree?

We can't talk about the universe in any way, yet you are talking about it. — Xtrix

I am talking about the idea of everything, not everything.

An idea of everything is not equivalent with everything. An idea of everything is itself natural, that is, within the universe, that is, limited. That is why you cannot talk about the universe/everything.

Your response is similar to proving that there is such a thing as "nothing" because we have an idea of nothing. But our idea of nothing is not nothing. Our idea of nothing is not equivalent with nothing. Our idea of nothing is something. That is why you cannot talk about nothing.

That means many minds, much greater than yours, have struggled with the question of what science is. — Xtrix

But a definition isn't something you find. It's something you create.

You could be right or wrong, but simply declaring it accomplishes nothing. — Xtrix

I believe exactly the opposite. Not declaring a definition accomplishes nothing. Declaring a definition accomplishes something.

I'm always struck by people who want to quickly and confidently proclaim a definitive answer, or some solid definition, for something or other -- without any context. I'm further struck to watch as they're satisfied by this, as if by doing so they've settled anything. — Xtrix

I have settled something, I have settled some defintion, my definition, of a word.

Spouting empty nonsense won't be tolerated -- it'll be, properly, ignored. — Xtrix

I have no doubt it appears like nonsense to those who look for definitions endlessly outside of themselves, believe the idea of everything is the same as everything, believe declaring definitions accomplishes less than not declaring definitions, who belittles on impact from anger (which always springs from some weakness), who thinks things are "interesting for their own sake" (and not for some power), who gets on his high horse while talking about the "philosophy of science", who though calling science pragmatic and practal was redundant (even though they just looked down upon "use"), etc. etc. etc.

And of course, I'm not mad in any way. In fact, I even have the virility left to properly define science as a philosophical system of thought (since the previous wasn't a definition, it was me showing you that your hatred of "use" was naive).

Science is applied epistemology. This is the gift I give you for this fun conversation. Hope to see you around!

Some yes. Ship of Theseus, sure. Resolvable on the basis of acceptance of criteria that could be other than they are. Others, no. Those are soluble in a solution of knowledge and understanding. Achilleus catches up with and passes the Tortoise every time. There is therefore no paradox, but instead an error. Zeno makes his errors because of a then general non-understanding of motion and of how to sum infinite series. His examples, then, highlight how that lack is a problem.

And again, taking Zeno as true and thinking it through yields all kinds of other "paradoxes" that make even less sense.

But Zeno's not the problem here, the problem is willful ignorance. In this case mine, for not letting it go.

I am talking about the idea of everything, not everything. — BraydenS

This assumes there's a difference, which is not obvious. But let's say there is. In that case, nature is everything as well. Everything within nature is substance. There, I just defined it into existence. I guess that settles it?

An idea of everything is itself natural, that is, within the universe, that is, limited. That is why you cannot talk about the universe/everything. — BraydenS

If we can't talk about "it," and only the "idea" of "it," then you're essentially equating the "universe" with Kant's thing-in-itself, which isn't compelling at all. We can argue the same way about "God," too.

This is exactly why armchair philosophy and throwing around definitions without context is a waste of time. It proves nothing, it's not interesting, it doesn't further the conversation along -- we can't disprove it, we can't study it -- who cares?

Quite apart from the fact that this has nothing to do with the topic of this thread.

But a definition isn't something you find. It's something you create. — BraydenS

Yes, you create a definition in the context of a wider explanatory theory, which you don't have. What you don't do is walk into a physics department and declare what "energy" means to you based on your extensive armchair contemplations. Likewise with philosophy. If you care to give evidence or reasons, or demonstrate any knowledge of the questions and controversies within the philosophy of science, you're welcome to. In the meantime, we can "define" things out in space all we want -- so what?

You could be right or wrong, but simply declaring it accomplishes nothing.
— Xtrix

I believe exactly the opposite. Not declaring a definition accomplishes nothing. Declaring a definition accomplishes something. — BraydenS

No, it doesn't. Simply defining something for yourself may be fun, but it "accomplishes" exactly as much as saying nothing at all. Defining something with reason and evidence within a wider theory, sure. That's in fact what they do in science. But all of that extra work hasn't been done in this case, thus accomplishing nothing.

If you view making up a definition for yourself as an accomplishment, you're welcome.

I have settled something, I have settled some defintion, my definition, of a word. — BraydenS

Fine -- which is completely useless to a conversation with other human beings. Better to go talk to yourself in that case, because otherwise it's settled exactly nothing.

I have no doubt it appears like nonsense to those who look for definitions endlessly outside of themselves, — BraydenS

"Outside of themselves" is meaningless. Definitions don't float around in space somewhere to be found, nor is anyone saying this.

And it is nonsense. As I've noted before, spin doesn't work here -- you either know Greek or not, for example. Stopped being a sciolist.

believe the idea of everything is the same as everything — BraydenS

And yet you've still not shown the difference. Something completely unknown, which cannot be sensed or talked about in any way, which you claim the universe to be (but not the "idea" of it), is a useless concept. I suppose the "idea" of a cup can be talked about, yet the cup "outside our idea" is completely unknowable? That's Kant. That's nothing new. Why you invoke this for differentiating "universe" and "nature" is strange indeed.

who belittles on impact from anger (which always springs from some weakness), — BraydenS

Who's belittling? And who's angry?

Besides, anger does not always spring from weakness. But your welcome to keep declaring broad, vague, unsupported statements.

who thinks things are "interesting for their own sake" (and not for some power) — BraydenS

Got me there, I suppose. I do find things interesting for their own sake, yes. There's obviously a degree of pleasure and perhaps "power" involved -- but it need not be "useful." Playing music, thinking, etc.

who gets on his high horse while talking about the "philosophy of science", — BraydenS

I pointed out that there is such a thing as the philosophy of science. This puts me on a "high horse"? I'm precisely saying the opposite: a little humility is appropriate. Walking into a discussion and simply conjuring personal definitions, without any explanation or demonstrating knowledge of the topic or its history, perhaps would count more as being on a "high horse."

In fact, I even have the virility left to properly define science as a philosophical system of thought — BraydenS

Again, declared without an explanation. Yes, I happen to agree that science is philosophy -- I said that from the beginning. It was called, in Descartes and Newton, "natural philosophy." That's not the point. Perhaps if you deign to read before feeling entitled to make sweeping declarations, you could contribute something.

So far you've contributed nothing.

Science is applied epistemology. — BraydenS

This doesn't make sense even as a personal definition. Espistemology is a branch of philosophy, that studies knowledge. That's where the word comes from -- the Greek for "knowledge." Science is not epistemology, "applied" or otherwise. Science is, as I repeat, natural philosophy. It's concerned with nature, in theory and in practice. Again, this isn't MY definition. I didn't simply "come up" with it.

As I said elsewhere -- a prerequisite for this discussion is knowledge of Greek history and language. I'm not interested in personal, context-free definitions. If that's all you have to contribute, than I thank you and I wish you well. If you have something of real worth to contribute, I'm all ears.

Having contradictory interpretations is not the same as "half-empty"/ "half-full", as these two are not contradictory. Do you see the difference, between interpretations which are different, yet consistent with each other, and interpretations which contradict each other? It is the latter which I see as a problem, the former is not a problem. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, I see the difference. The analogy was flawed, of course. The point remains: something is being interpreted. We all agree. I'm not denying that there are conflicting interpretations -- in fact the history of how these interpretations evolved is the point of this discussion, in part.

No, it just means we're in one phase of "restricting" being, which has an interesting history, and begins with this distinction and then, later, "being and seeming," "being and thinking," etc.
— Xtrix

I don't see where this comes from, nor what you mean by it. Can you explain? What do you mean by restricting being? — Metaphysician Undercover

You're right, it does need explanation. The "restriction of being" I was referring to was Heidegger's chapter of the same name in Introduction to Metaphysics, in which he discusses the four ways Being as been contrasted with an "Other." Becoming, seeming, thinking, and the ought -- these are the four.

Being and becoming, along with "being and seeming," are the most ancient. He discusses how they became disjoined, and how the disjunction sprung from an essential unity. That unity is phusis.

Things that manifest, that emerge, that "grow," come to take two on different aspects -- that which persists in stability and that which is unstable, which arises and perishes. This relates also with that which "appears" as a "seeming" -- a semblance, which eventually hardens into a "mere seeming" in the sense of Plato, who then contrasts this with the Idea.

I'm simplifying greatly, of course. There's a lot of evidence supporting this which we can discuss further, but in general this is what I meant by restriction of being. You may find it compelling or not, but it's worth exploring.

They're interesting to think about, but the both of you taking a position and trying to defend that position is fruitless.
— Xtrix

What about your thesis that all philosophy is saying the same thing? How can any philosophers disagree? — Metaphysician Undercover

They can disagree in all kinds of ways. I'm not denying that. True thinkers think being. There are many ways of interpreting and talking about it.

Shots in the dark, since I fell out of the discussion.

) Kant was a doubting Platonist who had a love for nature Plato did not

2) to feel is as noble as to think. If thinking nothing makes you feel best, you must ask what purpose of life is

3) Science doesn't need purpose however. All it needs is trial and risk taking.

you're essentially equating the "universe" with Kant's thing-in-itself — Xtrix

Skimmed over your post, and you got this right! Only, the universe is not a thing.

you're essentially equating the "universe" with Kant's thing-in-itself
— Xtrix
Skimmed over your post, and you got this right! Only, the universe is not a thing. — BraydenS

Lol. Ok bud, whatever you say. :) Enjoy talking about something that doesn't exist with someone else. It's too riveting for me.

The point remains: something is being interpreted. We all agree. I'm not denying that there are conflicting interpretations -- in fact the history of how these interpretations evolved is the point of this discussion, in part. — Xtrix

Yes, this is what I was saying, something is being interpreted, and this is what you have named "phusis". As I explained there are two distinct descriptions of this thing, one under the terms of "being", the other under the terms of "becoming". If these two distinct descriptions were consistent with each other, like "half empty" and "half full" are consistent with each other, there would be no problem. But Plato and Aristotle demonstrated that these two descriptions are not consistent with each other. Whatever it is which is described as "being" cannot be the same thing which is described as "becoming". So, Aristotle proposed that this one thing, "phusis", has two distinct aspects which he called matter and form, to account for these two distinct descriptions.

Things that manifest, that emerge, that "grow," come to take two on different aspects -- that which persists in stability and that which is unstable, which arises and perishes. — Xtrix

Right, these are the two distinct aspects. Stability relates to being, and instability relates to becoming. Under the Aristotelian divisions, the matter persists, as what is stable, unchanging, in spite of the changes involved with generation and corruption. The form of the thing is what actually changes. So regardless of what type of object it is that we are looking at, we can identify these two aspects of the object, the aspect which is described in terms of being, stability, which is the matter, and the aspect which is described in terms of becoming, instability, which is the form.

When thinking about Kant and the world with it's mathematics, it is common sense that 2 plus 2 equals 4 appplies to the world. But there are many strange geometries: https://www.bing.com/videos/search?q=pbs+edge+of+an+infnite+universe&docid=608049205598619846&mid=028119E3662230F5BD84028119E3662230F5BD84&view=detail&FORM=VIRE

There are also many spiritualities. Look at the Car's Jr. star and try to imagine it NOT having a smiling face. This is what Kant did for the world, and he enjoyed it. He went back to the world with his new found faculty of Judgment and experienced a bittersweet world

Yes, this is what I was saying, something is being interpreted, and this is what you have named "phusis". As I explained there are two distinct descriptions of this thing, one under the terms of "being", the other under the terms of "becoming". If these two distinct descriptions were consistent with each other, like "half empty" and "half full" are consistent with each other, there would be no problem. But Plato and Aristotle demonstrated that these two descriptions are not consistent with each other. Whatever it is which is described as "being" cannot be the same thing which is described as "becoming". So, Aristotle proposed that this one thing, "phusis", has two distinct aspects which he called matter and form, to account for these two distinct descriptions. — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree -- if we're ascribing to the word "being" as something "changeless," for example. In that case, yes of course that's radically different from something that perpetually changes. That's one way to define "being."

But when you view being in a different sense -- not as the "changeless" but as that which emerges, as in phusis, then you see the original unity. Granted, they do become disjoined -- just as later they do as "being and thinking" -- but we come to understand from what they became disjoined: the Greek sense of being in phusis.

"Becoming" has as much "being" as form or Idea, in this sense.

Things that manifest, that emerge, that "grow," come to take two on different aspects -- that which persists in stability and that which is unstable, which arises and perishes.
— Xtrix

Right, these are the two distinct aspects. Stability relates to being, and instability relates to becoming. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, they both relate to being in the sense of phusis mentioned above. They're both aspects of this. Phusis -- the Greek understanding of being -- is not only "stability" or "changeless Form." If that were the case, the only entities that "are," or that "have" being, are those that don't change. But that's absurd: a river "is" just as much as a triangle, matter, or universal concept "is."

Phenomena seem to change and some seem to stay the same way. This relation between the permanent and impermanent is an ancient distinction. But to ascribe "being" only to the former is a mistake, and quite different from the Greek concept of being in phusis. This is Heidegger's point and the point I'm attempting to make here.

Who exactly are you responding to? If no one, what are you talking about?

There are also many spiritualities. Look at the Car's Jr. star and try to imagine it NOT having a smiling face. This is what Kant did for the world, and he enjoyed it. — Gregory

And he "enjoyed" it? What does that mean? And what, exactly, are you claiming he "did for the world?" And, further, how does ANY of this relate to phusis or anything anyone on here is talking about?

how does ANY of this relate to phusis or anything anyone on here is talking about? — Xtrix

You are just bringing up a cryptic word and thinking it's going to get somewhere in a conversation. Concepts are what count. We have no sure knowledge of what ancient texts mean.

how does ANY of this relate to phusis or anything anyone on here is talking about?
— Xtrix

You are just bringing up a cryptic word and thinking it's going to get somewhere in a conversation. — Gregory

You're not answering the question.

I'm not interested in your opinion about this thread's topic, of which you've contributed nothing. There's nothing "cryptic" about the word phusis, by the way. And if there is, you wouldn't even know it because you understand absolutely nothing about it.

Concepts are what count. — Gregory

Phusis is a concept, a very concrete one. It's also the topic of this thread. If you know nothing of ancient Greek thought or the Greek language, or don't find it compelling, feel free to utter off-topic, incoherent nonsense like "concepts are what count" and "Kant enjoyed doing it" somewhere else. In fact, I urge you to.

We have no sure knowledge of what ancient texts mean. — Gregory

Another silly statement. We have no sure knowledge about any historical event, either. Is history therefore not worth pursuing?

It's very easy to utter complete nonsense and posture as a "philosopher." But there are people out there doing real work and making real progress while you engage in your mental masturbation. Please leave the real work to them.

I have no interest in your ramblings.

You haven't made a case for a single idea of this whole thread. You aren't versatile

There, it's working :)



I don't know what relates to this thread. God can render all human reasoning open to doubt. You sound like Cicero. Is you're way better than epoche and ataraxia? Kant divided his mind into practical reason, judgment, reason general, understanding, intuitions. The combinations he used with them were fascinating. There are many writers on this forum that have very interesting angles. But you think this thread has made much work, so In a paragraph, what have you discovered?

Reread the following: here. You're boring me.

Protagoras is my favorite Greek. One of his works was read by Porphyry in the third century CE, but none survive to this day. People wanted Christian faith instead and so destroyed his legacy.

"He seems to have held that a tangent touches a circle not only at one point, but at more than one, clearly arguing from visual experience of drawn lines."

Ok buddy. I like Protagoras too. Appreciate the input.