When everyone knows that what is in one's own box is not the same thing which is in another's box, and each person calls what is in one's own box a "beetle", why would anyone believe that what someone means by "beetle is the same as what someone else means by beetle? — Metaphysician Undercover
Clearly, under the terms of the example no one would think that any two people would mean the same thing with the word "beetle". — Metaphysician Undercover
Since "beetle" refers to what's in all those different boxes... — Metaphysician Undercover
...two people would only mean the same thing when using the word, if they were both referring to what's in one particular box. If this is case, then which beetle is being referred to, would have to be indicated in some other way. — Metaphysician Undercover
Your claim that all first-person points-of-view are exactly the same, by virtue of being first-person points-of-view, is just like saying that all things are exactly the same by virtue of being things. How is that a useful assumption, rather than a misleading assumption, in this context? — Metaphysician Undercover
What is in one box is not necessarily different from what is in another; only that nobody can know what is in another's box. — Luke
Regardless, if everyone assumes that what is in everyone else's box is different to what is in theirs, then the word "beetle" can only be used to refer to "the contents of a person's box", or to "the thing in the box, whatever it is". — Luke
Therefore, it doesn't matter what particular thing is in anyone's box. The particular contents of a particular box is irrelevant to the use of the word. The word can be used only to refer to some unknown thing in the box. As Wittgenstein says "...one can 'divide through' by the thing in the box; it cancels out, whatever it is." The word could still be used in this way even if there were nothing in the box. — Luke
Surely, "beetle" means "the contents of a person's box". — Luke
Otherwise, if nobody knows what anybody else means by "beetle", then how can this word be used in the language at all? — Luke
The word does refer to what's in all (or any of) those different boxes, but the particular contents of those boxes is irrelevant to the word's use. — Luke
What "other way" is there? Maybe one person could point at another while saying "beetle", or they could even say "your beetle" to make reference to the contents of that person's particular box. But the word would still only mean "the contents of your box, whatever it is". — Luke
To try to better explain via the law of identity: X = X. Hence, "a first person point of view = a first person point of view". — javra
Nevertheless, if you are a first person point of view, and if I am a first person point of view - this among all our other attributes which differentiates us - then (get ready) how would the "first-person-point-of-view-ness(or, -hood)" which we both share be in and of itself in any way different ... as that which we both at base minimally are as aware beings? — javra
The thingness, or thinghood (don't laugh, these are words one can find in a dictionary), of all things is nevertheless exactly the same, this by virtue of all things being things - rather than for example being actions. — javra
The law of identity states that a thing is the same as itself. Therefore, one person's point of view is the same as that person's point of view. — Metaphysician Undercover
The fact that the thing in the box could be anything does not mean that the thing in the box could be nothing. If there is nothing in the box the person is practising deception. — Metaphysician Undercover
Wittgenstein has indicated that this is a possibility, a person could imply "I have something in the box", by referring to the beetle in the box, when there is nothing in the box. — Metaphysician Undercover
Therefore it is possible that language could be used for deception. — Metaphysician Undercover
I agree with the first part here, "the particular contents of the particular box is irrelevant". — Metaphysician Undercover
The example does not indicate why any of us is inclined to call the thing in the box by that specific name. — Metaphysician Undercover
It's not a real example. There is no rule, or convention, which stipulates when you have a feeling within your body (beetle in the box), you must call it "pain". There are all sorts of different feelings within your body, therefore all sorts of different things within your box. So Wittgenstein's example obscures this fact, the multitude of things in the box, hiding the need to be able to distinguish one thing from another, within one's own box, with the premise that there is only one thing in the box, thereby establishing the groundwork for the deception. Recognizing this fact brings the deception into focus. — Metaphysician Undercover
The whole idea that there is only one thing in the box is faulty. — Metaphysician Undercover
Taking a different route, if I’m understanding you correctly: Since no singular first person point of view remains the same over time - e.g., the you of five seconds past is not identical to the you of the present - there thereby can be no personal identity through time. Is this correct? — javra
I should add that I don't consider the first person point of view to be a thing, i.e.a homunculus. — javra
Simply by using the word 'beetle' one is "practising deception"? — Luke
Great! Then it is also irrelevant (to the use of the word) whether a particular box contains something or not. — Luke
Is someone "practising deception" if they talk about unicorns or Santa Claus (since these don't really refer to anything)? — Luke
Are we discussing Wittgenstein's example here, or some other scenario that is only in your mind? — Luke
If I say of myself that it is only from my own case that I know what the word "pain" means - must I not say the same of other people too? And how can I generalize the one case so irresponsibly?
Now someone tells me that he knows what pain is only from his own case! --Suppose everyone had a box with something in it: we call it a "beetle". No one can look into anyone else's box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle. --Here it would be quite possible for everyone to have something different in his box. One might even imagine such a thing constantly changing. --But suppose the word "beetle" had a use in these people's language? --If so it would not be used as the name of a thing. The thing in the box has no place in the language-game at all; not even as a something: for the box might even be empty. --No, one can 'divide through' by the thing in the box; it cancels out, whatever it is. — Wittgenstein
The description is of something in the box. — Metaphysician Undercover
Did you not read what I wrote? Or do you have some sort of mental block which prevents you from understanding simple logic? The description is of something in the box. What it is, which in the box, is irrelevant to that description. It is simply stated that there is something in the box. How can you think that this means that it is also irrelevant whether or not there is even something in the box? It is described as something in the box, so whether or not there is something in the box is what makes the description true or false. How can you claim that whether or not there is something in the box is irrelevant, just because it is stipulated that what it is which is in the box is irrelevant. That is a completely illogical conclusion. — Metaphysician Undercover
People feel pleasure, pain, all sorts of emotions, and sensations. So the analogy of "beetle in the box" is completely inapplicable in the first place, because there must be all sorts of different things in the box, beetles, ants, caterpillars, butterflies, etc., just like there are all sorts of feelings other than pain within the person. — Metaphysician Undercover
So the issue is how do we know how to give which name to which thing in the box, and this is not even broached by Wiitgenstein, who is presenting the analogy as one thing in the box. — Metaphysician Undercover
As you have agreed, the contents of the box are irrelevant to the use of the word. — Luke
The word could still be used in exactly the same way even if the box was empty, despite your tirades about deception. — Luke
There you go, changing the terms again to "contents" — Metaphysician Undercover
The word could still be used in exactly the same way even if the box was empty, despite your tirades about deception.
— Luke
No! Obviously this is false! if you are talking to me about the thing in your box, when there is nothing in your box, and you know that there is nothing in your box, then you are practising deception. — Metaphysician Undercover
I said that the word could still be used in the same way even if the box was empty. — Luke
Whether or not there is something in the box is always relevant under the premise of the analogy, because what you would call "the same use" would be deception when there is nothing in the box, and therefore it would not really be the same, the use would be to deceive. — Metaphysician Undercover
Is it deceptive for a deaf person to talk about sounds and for a blind person to talk about colours? What's the deception? — Luke
If the deaf person is not hearing sounds, recognizes and understands this, and yet is talking about hearing sounds, that is deception — Metaphysician Undercover
You, as a thing just like any other thing, have small changes which occur to you over time, so your point of view changes, nevertheless you are still the same thing, and it is still your point of view. So the law of identity, which states that a thing is the same as itself, allows that a thing which is changing as time passes, might continue to be the same thing, because the thing never ceases to be the same as itself despite the fact that it is changing over time. — Metaphysician Undercover
It was you who was talking about a first-person-point-of view as if it were a thing, — Metaphysician Undercover
If the first-person-point-of-view is not a thing which can be talked about, then what is it that you are referring to with this phrase? — Metaphysician Undercover
If the "use" of the word is to refer to something which is not there, as if it were there, when the person knows that it is not there, then the "use" is deception. The person is using the words to deceive.
A person can say "I hear sounds", whether or not the person actually hears sounds. The "use" is dependent on whether the person actually hears sounds or not, because if sounds are not actually heard the "use" is deception. The person is using the words to deceive. — Metaphysician Undercover
If a given’s constituents are never identical across time, but only its holistic form can so remain, then the notion of identity can only apply to holistic forms. — javra
’ve been trying to express is that the holistic form of a first-person point of view is the same, qualitatively identical, for all numerically different first person points of view - despite the constituents of awareness pertaining to each being drastically different, thereby being a part of what makes each numerically different first person point of view unique. — javra
Maybe you no longer subscribe to realism when it comes to universals? I thought you did. Or maybe we hold drastically different understandings of these as well. — javra
All the same, I’m not here trying to convince you but am instead justifying my stance, which you took issue with. And I don't find the metaphysics of identity to be an easy topic. — javra
There will be a time over this course of slow transformation - in which the rock turns to sediments - when the given rock ceases to be the same given rock, instead being a different rock. — javra
Before this time is arrived at, its sameness over time is not a result of the same unchanging total package of constituent parts - which never remains the same — javra
A process, maybe? All the same, as I see it, what a first person point of view is ontologically - a thing, a process, both, or neither - does not need to be in any way known by us for one to hold a rather strong certainty that such nevertheless is, at the very least in the here and now. — javra
The word could be used in this way, to deceive, but it need not be. However, it has been your claim that the word can only be used in this way if the sense is lacking; that any use of the word must be a deception. — Luke
What is really the case is that when you have named the thing in your box "beetle", and there is nothing in your box, the word is necessarily used to deceive. The deception pervades all usage because you are implying that there is something in the box that you have named "beetle" when you know there is not. — Metaphysician Undercover
Until you make it known to others that there really is nothing in your box which is called "beetle", i.e. that the beetle is a fiction (in which case you are not using "beetle" to refer to the thing in your box anymore), all the usage of that term will be instances of deception. — Metaphysician Undercover
On the other hand, when there really is something in the box, one might still use the word for deception as well. — Metaphysician Undercover
Wittgenstein doesn't say that you name it. He says that the word has a use in these people's language. Anyone can learn the language, of course, and learn to use the word "beetle" accordingly. — Luke
Unless they make it known that they are deaf, a deaf person is practising deception with any and all usage of the word "sounds"? Do you realise how absurd this is? — Luke
Are you back-pedalling on your former agreement that the contents of the box are irrelevant to the use of the word? — Luke
What is irrelevant to the question of whether the use of the word depends on the contents of the box is your trivial concern regarding a particular use of the word in order to deceive. The same word or statement could be used in the same way, with the same meaning, in either an honest or a dishonest fashion. It makes no difference to the use/meaning of the word or statement. — Luke
I always presumed that Wittgenstein's example of the beetle and the box was just to show that it is a necessary condition for "pain" to have a meaning that it refers to something inner, but that "inner" here cannot mean private and undisplayable to others. I.e. it is necessary for "beetle" to have a meaning that people have things inside their boxes, but ii. they must be able to show others what is in the box. It must be necessary, since if it were not, then it would make sense for everyone's box to be empty, — jkg20
It must be necessary, since if it were not, then it would make sense for everyone's box to be empty, — jkg20
As for deception, in the case of the beetle and the box it only makes sense by somebody coming along and pretending that they even have their box: it might look like their box, but things that look like boxes are not always boxes, and if it were genuinely their box, it would have something inside it. — jkg20
iii the meaning of beetle is determined fully and only by whatever is in the box. — jkg20
Quick addendum: re. the football player faking pain: I take Wittgenstein as promoting the idea that fake pain behaviour is not pain behaviour, even if it looks like it. — jkg20
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