You can say it, but you're speaking nonsense. — Michael
So are you saying that in some respect it's the same building but in some other respect it's a different building? — Michael
Clearly not, since in due time the White House might become something other than a building due to gradual changes. Yet it would still have the continuity of a single individual. I'm not speaking nonsense; you lack imagination. — The Great Whatever
All uses of "same" mean "same in some respect." That's how the word is actually used. — The Great Whatever
I was referring to the claim that in some hypothetical situation my mother could have given birth to the White House. It's nonsense. — Michael
And we do use the word "same" to refer to something being the same in every respect. For example, my father and my brother's father are the same person. — Michael
No, here you used "person" as a sortal. — The Great Whatever
The question is what is this 'the one' to which the sentence refers. It sounds like the elusive 'persistent self'. Hume searched but couldn't find it. Nagarjuna denied it existed. I find myself currently persuaded by their arguments, so to me the definition of a person as a process is far more intuitive and less problematic than as a metaphysical object called a self.I would not define Obama as the Obama process at all but as the one who undergoes the process and is fully present at every stage of the process as the entity that undergoes it. — John
Rigid designators are about the criticism of the theory of descriptions. "Aristotle is the author of Metaphysics" is contingent. Aristotle could not have written Metaphysics. This implies that descriptions might not be the contents of names. "Aristotle is Aristotle" is necessary. Aristotle could not have failed to be Aristotle himself. — mosesquine
This implies that the contents of names are the referents themselves. — mosesquine
The title of the book written by Kripke is 'Naming and Necessity'. It's about naming and necessity. Suppose that I name someone as 'Fred'. Then, subsequent uses of the name by me continuously refer to the same person in every possible world. The first is naming, and the second is necessity. — mosesquine
Rigid designators are about the criticism of the theory of descriptions. — mosesquine
"Aristotle is Aristotle" is necessary. — mosesquine
Suppose that I name someone as 'Fred'. Then, subsequent uses of the name by me continuously refer to the same person in every possible world. — mosesquine
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