The Principle of Universal Perception

A Christian Philosophy

Problem: David Hume (non-verbatim) says doing metaphysics is impossible because what is beyond the physical cannot be perceived.

Solution: The Principle of Universal Perception (PUP) states that if a large majority of subjects perceives the same object, then it is reasonable to conclude that the object perceived is objectively real. It links the metaphysical with perceptions. [Note that even though I came up with the name, this principle has been used implicitly before by philosophers like by C.S. Lewis and Peter Kreeft.]

To illustrate the principle: imagine you are stranded on a desert with a friend. You eventually perceive an oasis in the horizon. You wonder if the perception is true or false, i.e. if the oasis is real or merely an hallucination. You can verify this by asking your friend what he sees. If he also perceives an oasis, then it is either that the oasis is real, or else that you have a collective hallucination; but what are the odds that you are hallucinating about the same thing, with the same details, at the same time, located at the same place? Now let’s add a third observer, then a fourth, and so on… The more subjects there are that perceive the same object, and the more reasonable it is to conclude that the object is real.

Explanation: Our perceptions of an object are either true or false. Knowing nothing else about it (such as not being able to cross-check with our other senses like sight, hearing and touch), the two are equally possible. But if there are numerous subjects, and they all perceive the same object, then the only two possible explanations are that the object perceived is real, or else that we have a collective hallucination. As the first explanation is simpler than the second one, by the Principle of Parsimony (aka Occam’s Razor), it is the most reasonable one and becomes the Prima Facie.

A few more details about the PUP:

A large majority of subjects, say ≥95% as opposed to 100%, is sufficient. Outliers can exist. Some observers may be blind, and thus would not see the oasis; but these cases are expected to be rare.
The PUP is a principle of “reasonableness”, not of certainty. Collective hallucination remains a logical possibility; but the PUP makes it an unreasonable one.
This is NOT the principle of universal belief or opinion. It wouldn’t be reasonable to believe the Earth is flat just because a large majority believed it to be so. Beliefs and opinions, when not about things that are directly perceived, can be false for many other reasons: incorrect premises, incorrect deductions, etc. Perception on the other hand is direct information from the object to the subject, with only one point of failure being hallucination.

Do you think this principle is valid?

Gnomon

David Hume (non-verbatim) says doing metaphysics is impossible because what is beyond the physical cannot be perceived. — Samuel Lacrampe

Yes & no. It's true that anything non-physical cannot be perceived via our physical sensory organs. Yet Metaphysics (at least in my definition) is not about Perception but Conception. By using our power of conception (to give birth to novelties), we can create mental images (abstractions) of things that are not there, and we can "see" into the future by conceptually projecting current trends. So metaphysics may be impossible for lower animals, but humans do it all the time.

Other than that quibble, your PUP is a practical definition of scientific Objectivity. It combines multiple subjective impressions into a statistical approximation of ultimate Truth or Fact. Ironically, PUP is also used by religious believers to confirm their faith in cases of mass delusions or apparitions.

Conception : The power or faculty of apprehending of forming an idea in the mind; the power of recalling a past sensation or perception; the ability to form mental abstractions. An image, idea, or notion formed in the mind; a concept, plan or design.
https://www.yourdictionary.com/conception

Perception : In psychology and the cognitive sciences, perception is the process of getting, interpreting, selecting, and organizing sensory information. It includes the collection of data from sense organs through to the interpretation made by the brain. ... Perception is a lot more than just "information coming in".

Metaphysics : Physics refers to the things we perceive with the eye of the body. Meta-physics refers to the things we conceive with the eye of the mind. Meta-physics includes the properties, and qualities, and functions that make a thing what it is. Matter is just the clay from which a thing is made. Meta-physics is the design (form, purpose); physics is the product (shape, action). The act of creation brings an ideal design into actual existence. The design concept is the “formal” cause of the thing designed.
http://blog-glossary.enformationism.info/page14.html

Objectivity : Agreement in different subjects’ judgments is often taken to be indicative of objectivity. Philosophers commonly call this form of agreement “intersubjective agreement.”
https://www.iep.utm.edu/objectiv/

Religious Mass Perceptions : What you see sometimes depends on what others say they see.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Our_Lady_of_Medjugorje

unenlightened

You wonder if the perception is true or false, i.e. if the oasis is real or merely an hallucination — Samuel Lacrampe

That's not what anyone sensible wonders in a desert. What they wonder is whether or not what they see is a mirage, which is a form of illusion, not a hallucination. Any number of people can see the same illusion, because to put it very shortly, an illusion is a trick of the light, whereas an hallucination is a trick of the mind. Specifically, what happens in the desert is that the differential expansion of different layers of air turn the atmosphere into a kind of lens that distorts images such that things can appear where they are not.

Which rather undermines your principle, I'm happy to say. The idea that reality is to be decided by a vote is repugnant.

Frank Apisa

I agree with unenlightened.

Don't even need a desert for this.

On a hot day with a stretch of roadway in front on you...almost everyone looking will see the distortion or illusion, unemlightened, mentioned. You could get a hundred people seeing the illusion of water on the roadway...and and all one hundred would be wrong.

Nagase

I don't see the relevance of the principle to the problem. If something can't be perceived, then no one can perceive it, so, ipso facto, there will be no "majority" who perceives it.

A Christian Philosophy

↪Gnomon

Hello.
Yes, this "intersubjective agreement" is very much what I am trying to describe in the PUP.

A Christian Philosophy

↪unenlightened

↪Frank Apisa

Hello.

What they wonder is whether or not what they see is a mirage, which is a form of illusion, not a hallucination. — unenlightened

This is missing the point (which admittedly with hindsight is unsurprising when using the desert example). We could have used the perception of a unicorn in a room instead. If I am the only subject, then I would second-guess my perception, but if many subjects perceive the same unicorn, then it is reasonable to suppose that it is real, until given a reason to believe otherwise.

Furthermore, the case of a mirage does not work against the PUP. First, if there is a mirage of an oasis, then the oasis must still exist. Second, different subjects are not expected to perceive the mirage-oasis in the same fashion if they are seeing it from different locations. Third, is it not still more reasonable to believe the perceived oasis is real, if given no reason to believe it is caused by a mirage? Remember the PUP gives reasonableness, not certainty.

A Christian Philosophy

↪Nagase

Hello.
But some things CAN be perceived. And the PUP connects the perception to conclusions about reality, which is metaphysics.

Nagase

↪Samuel Lacrampe

Sure, but Hume is not denying that some things can be perceived, nor he is denying that there is a connection between perception and reality. So, again, your principle seems to be irrelevant to his worries, at least in the way you formulated them in the OP.

A Christian Philosophy

↪Nagase

I think he is in fact denying there is any connection between perception and reality. To him, making any claims about metaphysics is impossible.

Frank Apisa

Samuel Lacrampe
777
↪unenlightened ↪Frank Apisa Hello.

What they wonder is whether or not what they see is a mirage, which is a form of illusion, not a hallucination.
— unenlightened
This is missing the point (which admittedly with hindsight is unsurprising when using the desert example). We could have used the perception of a unicorn in a room instead. If I am the only subject, then I would second-guess my perception, but if many subjects perceive the same unicorn, then it is reasonable to suppose that it is real, until given a reason to believe otherwise. — Samuel Lacrampe

I apologize for this next response in advance, but these are desperate days, and ...well...

If you are in a room with many others and all of you perceive a unicorn...

...you ought really to ask the group leader for a group-therapy break...so everyone can take their medication.

(Hey, I did apologize in advance!)

Nagase

↪Samuel Lacrampe

Well, according to you, he is saying that what is not perceivable is not physical, which seems a pretty strong connection between perception and reality...

unenlightened

This is missing the point (which admittedly with hindsight is unsurprising when using the desert example). We could have used the perception of a unicorn in a room instead. — Samuel Lacrampe

True story.
As it happens, in my mis-spent youth, I spent an hour or so with a friend who was having an animated conversation with what seemed to me to be an empty armchair. As they were both, it seemed to me, ignoring me, particularly the occupant of the armchair, who neither spoke to me nor made himself visible, I should probably have concluded that I was an imaginary being. However, I stubbornly maintained that it was the person in the armchair that was the hallucination, and my friend was having the hallucinations.

Again democracy fails us, because if one can hallucinate a unicorn, one can surely equally hallucinate a crowd of other people shouting "Bloody hell there's that damn unicorn again, shitting on the lawn and having it off with the last virgin in the country."

A Christian Philosophy

↪Frank Apisa

Still missing the point. Let's tweet the story some more.
Replace unicorn with horse; replace room with "field on the other side of the fence" (so that you cannot verify its existence by touching it). You still wouldn't believe it is real?

A Christian Philosophy

↪Nagase

No. He claims that you cannot draw conclusion about reality from perception.

Nagase

↪Samuel Lacrampe

But then, how can he justify that what is beyond the physical cannot be perceived? Surely this a metaphysical claim about the nature of whatever it is beyond the physical? Anyway, I would like to be clearer about what exactly is the position you're attributing to Hume before considering whether what you are proposing is or is not an answer to it.

A Christian Philosophy

↪unenlightened

That is some Sixth Sense stuff right there! You may relax and know you are real because Cogito Ergo Sum. Even Bruce Willis was real; just not visible.

if one can hallucinate a unicorn, one can surely equally hallucinate a crowd of other people — unenlightened

True. Unless you have confirmed before that the crowd is real (through interacting with them in the past, or seeing, hearing and touching them, etc). Let's say that's the case here.

Also, if stuck on the unicorn idea due to it being inconceivable, then let's use a horse instead. Is it more reasonable to believe that the horse is real, or that it is an hallucination along with everyone else in the room and everything else you know in this world?

The idea that reality is to be decided by a vote is repugnant. — unenlightened

I agree only when it comes to votes based on opinions without reason. Otherwise, we do this all the time, and reasonably so. If 9 out 10 cancer experts claim you have cancer, is this not grounds to take the claim more seriously than if it was 1 out of 10?

Echarmion

But some things CAN be perceived. And the PUP connects the perception to conclusions about reality, which is metaphysics. — Samuel Lacrampe

It's only metaphysics if you specify non-empirical reality, because empirical reality is the domain of physics, no meta involved.

The problem with your argument (which itself would count as metaphysics) is that you never reference anything beyond the phenomena. You say a collective hallucination is "less likely" but what is that judgement based on? If you're basing it on empirical research on hallucinations, then you're just referencing another phenomenon, which might be just as illusory as any other.

Humes problem was that he couldn't find a way to anchor our perceptions to something beyond perception. Adding more perceptions doesn't help.

Echarmion

But then, how can he justify that what is beyond the physical cannot be perceived? Surely this a metaphysical claim about the nature of whatever it is beyond the physical? — Nagase

I think it's just a matter of definitions. The physical is that which can be perceived.

Frank Apisa

Samuel Lacrampe
781
↪Frank Apisa
Still missing the point. Let's tweet the story some more.
Replace unicorn with horse; replace room with "field on the other side of the fence" (so that you cannot verify its existence by touching it). You still wouldn't believe it is real? — Samuel Lacrampe

I will answer your question seriously this time, Samuel. But in order to do so, I must take issue with the word "believe" here.

My answer would be, "NO, I do not 'believe' there is a horse there. I KNOW there is a horse there."

Please treat this the way you would if I wrote "I do not 'believe' 2 + 2 = 4 in base 10...I KNOW it does."

It is not a minor consideration.

A Christian Philosophy

↪Echarmion

Hello.

You say a collective hallucination is "less likely" but what is that judgement based on? If you're basing it on empirical research on hallucinations, then you're just referencing another phenomenon, which might be just as illusory as any other. — Echarmion

I think I understand your point, that to quantify the likelihood or probability of hallucination demands a reference that must be more certain. But rather than using Probability, I am using Complexity of the explanation to appeal to the Principle of Parsimony. Regardless of the probability, the explanation that the object is real is simpler than the explanation of collective hallucination, because it would also need to explain where the hallucination comes from, and how come it is so consistent among all subjects etc.

Another example of using complexity instead of probability for reasonableness: If an object looks and sounds like a duck, it is more reasonable to conclude it is a duck than to conclude it is a robot piloted by an alien. This is not because we know the probability of that explanation, but its level complexity.

A Christian Philosophy

↪Frank Apisa

This is admittedly nitpicky, but doesn't "knowing" imply certainty? Math is indeed certain. But for the horse story, there is the alternative possibility of collective hallucination (though of course nobody in their right mind would choose it I think).

That aside, whether we use the word belief or knowledge, it sounds like it is a yes. Now consider 2 scenarios with 10 subjects trying to determine if there is a horse in a field:
(1) 9 out of 10 subjects see a horse; the other 1 does not.
(2) 1 out of 10 subjects see a horse; the other 9 do not.

In which of the 2 scenarios is it more reasonable to believe the horse is real?

A Christian Philosophy

Anyway, I would like to be clearer about what exactly is the position you're attributing to Hume before considering whether what you are proposing is or is not an answer to it. — Nagase

It seems I have trouble clarifying to you what I think Hume is saying. But in a way it is not relevant, for the point of the OP is not to determine if I answer Hume's problem, but if the PUP is a valid principle.

Nagase

↪Samuel Lacrampe

Well, I thought that you wanted your principle as a solution to a problem described in the OP. If the relation between them is irrelevant to you, ok, I'm happy to leave matters as they are.

Wolfman

Problem: David Hume (non-verbatim) says doing metaphysics is impossible because what is beyond the physical cannot be perceived. — Samuel Lacrampe

This is a strawman.

In an Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Hume starts off by saying we “must cultivate true metaphysics with some care, in order to destroy the false and adulterate," but he then goes on to describe a problem that has less to do with metaphysics -- as we ordinarily understand it -- as it does our ability to perceive actual objects. Hume notes that the only things we can perceive are perceptions (i.e. internal and perishing existences), but the vulgar confuse perceptions with actual objects; that is, they confuse representations with what is actually represented.

A Christian Philosophy

↪Nagase

Yeah sure. That "problem" line was more of an intro to present the principle.

A Christian Philosophy

↪Wolfman

Hello.

Hume notes that the only things we can perceive are perceptions (i.e. internal and perishing existences), but the vulgar confuse perceptions with actual objects; that is, they confuse representations with what is actually represented. — Wolfman

Sounds good; I accept the correction on Hume's position. Then the PUP also solves that new problem; that the actual objects can reasonably be predicted if the perceptions are consistent among the subjects.

Echarmion

I think I understand your point, that to quantify the likelihood or probability of hallucination demands a reference that must be more certain. But rather than using Probability, I am using Complexity of the explanation to appeal to the Principle of Parsimony. Regardless of the probability, the explanation that the object is real is simpler than the explanation of collective hallucination, because it would also need to explain where the hallucination comes from, and how come it is so consistent among all subjects etc. — Samuel Lacrampe

Two problems:

First, the principle of parsimony cannot deal very well with hallucinations. "I'm hallucinating" is a very simple explanation, and while I am hallucinating, perhaps I am also hallucinating the people that agree with me. Are more complex hallucinations also more complex theories?

The bigger issue is that you haven't justified the principle of parsimony. Why is the less complex explanation closer to reality? Is reality obligated to be simple and parsimonious?

The reason we can use the parsimony as a principle in the scientific method is because we're concerned with making predictions, which means making working models of reality. A simpler, more inclusive model is more useful than a complex, less inclusive one. But it's a tool for of practicality, not objectivity.

Wolfman

Sounds good; I accept the correction on Hume's position. Then the PUP also solves that new problem; that the actual objects can reasonably be predicted if the perceptions are consistent among the subjects. — Samuel Lacrampe

This doesn’t avert Hume’s attack, because his very point is to highlight the insufficiency of perception in representing external objects. As such it makes little sense to invoke probability or numerics as a solution. Hume would simply say more people -- the vulgar as he terms them -- are mistaken. Hume is agnostic about the existence of external objects, but if they do exist, we could never know it since all we can perceive are our perceptions.

Frank Apisa

Samuel Lacrampe
786
↪Frank Apisa
This is admittedly nitpicky, but doesn't "knowing" imply certainty? Math is indeed certain. But for the horse story, there is the alternative possibility of collective hallucination (though of course nobody in their right mind would choose it I think).

That aside, whether we use the word belief or knowledge, it sounds like it is a yes. Now consider 2 scenarios with 10 subjects trying to determine if there is a horse in a field:
(1) 9 out of 10 subjects see a horse; the other 1 does not.
(2) 1 out of 10 subjects see a horse; the other 9 do not.

In which of the 2 scenarios is it more reasonable to believe the horse is real? — Samuel Lacrampe

I will give you the answer you want...and then give the answer I would give if I were not being accommodating, Samuel. #1!

Now...the answer I would much prefer. Neither! I do not do "believing"...by which I mean I NEVER EVER say that I "believe" anything.

If you were asking, "Which would I be more inclined to suppose to be correct?"...I would respond, "I would be more inclined to suppose #1 to be correct"...that there is, in fact, a horse in the field. Any hesitation to do so would be occasioned by MY not being able to see it myself.

So...your point is?

unenlightened

Now consider 2 scenarios with 10 subjects trying to determine if there is a horse in a field:
(1) 9 out of 10 subjects see a horse; the other 1 does not.
(2) 1 out of 10 subjects see a horse; the other 9 do not.

In which of the 2 scenarios is it more reasonable to believe the horse is real? — Samuel Lacrampe

Well call me an arrogant twat, but if I can see the whole field and see that there is no horse in it, I will trust my eyes over the talk of 9 people. Because I know that people lie, that people see what they want to see, and that people conform. See also The Emperor's New Clothes.

The Principle of Universal Perception

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