So the analogy really tells us nothing about the relationship between language and what's inside, pain, or other feelings whatsoever, "what's in the box". — Metaphysician undercover

Exactly, we are agreed:

The thing in the box has no place in the language-game at all;

Wittgenstien

Yes, showing, for me, that the language game itself is incoherent : the meaning of "beetle" cannot be entirely determined by necessarily private objects.

Wittgenstein is not saying that where everyone could look into each others boxes, that the things inside the box would nevertheless still have no place in a coherent language game with the word "beetle". As you say, the analogy itself is entirely silent on that.

For me we are being invited to conclude that people must be able to show each other their beetles, otherwise "beetle" never gets to really mean anything at all.

More tentatively, I think we are also being invited to reach for a conclusion that where we can all show each other what is inside our boxes, what is inside our boxes cannot vary too much without "beetle" losing its usefulness entirely. But there I meander a long way away from the text.

That's irrelevant, I'm not talking about "anyone", I'm talking specifically about the person whose box is empty. That person would be practising deception, according to the contradiction in the terms of the analogy. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm talking about Wittgenstein's example at §293, in summary:

1. Suppose that everyone has a box with something in it which we call a "beetle".

2. Suppose that no one can ever look into anyone else's box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at his own beetle. Then it would be possible for everyone to have something different in their box.

3. Suppose that the word "beetle" has a use in these people's language nonetheless.

4. Then the word "beetle" would not be as the name of a thing. The thing in the box does not belong to the language game at all. The box could effectively be empty, as this would make no difference to the language game or the meaning/use of the word "beetle".

There is no contradiction here. He doesn't say both that there is something and nothing in the box. He says only that if the word was to have a use in these people's language, then it would have no effect on the language game if the box was empty.

Yes, showing, for me, that the language game itself is incoherent : the meaning of "beetle" cannot be entirely determined by necessarily private objects. — jkg20

Yes it might be the case that this particular language-game, that the meaning of "beetle" is entirely determined by private objects. But it is also the case that the other language-game portrayed, the one in which the private objects are completely irrelevant, is also incoherent. Notice that there are two distinct language-games in this analogy, which are somewhat opposed in principle. Neither is acceptable as each is impossible in its own way.

For me we are being invited to conclude that people must be able to show each other their beetles, otherwise "beetle" never gets to really mean anything at all.

More tentatively, I think we are also being invited to reach for a conclusion that where we can all show each other what is inside our boxes, what is inside our boxes cannot vary too much without "beetle" losing its usefulness entirely. But there I meander a long way away from the text. — jkg20

This might be the case, that we are invited to conclude that the only real language-game is the one in which we are able to show each other our beetles. But this is where the matter gets difficult. Can we actually show each other our beetles? Now deception is relevant. If I can deceive you, then I am not actually showing you my beetle. Furthermore, if any instance of what appears to you as me showing you my beetle might actually be an instance of deception, then I can never actually be showing you my beetle. I am actually doing something else So what am I actually doing, or showing you? It can't be more than a representation of my beetle, which may or may not be an accurate representation. Now we have no real language-game at all, because we are not actually capable of showing to another one's own beetle. We might try, through the use of language, but we are actually incapable.

But your conclusion, that "beetle" never really gets to mean anything is not quite correct, I believe. It's more appropriate to conclude that the meaning is indefinite. Now we're right back to the beginning premise, everyone has a beetle in the box, but with one important difference, not even the person who holds the box can see what's in it. If you could, you could properly represent it and show it to others, and this is what the possibility of deception demonstrates that we cannot do. So we assume that since others appear to have a similar box, then the thing which is within those other boxes might be similar as well. So we seek assistance from others, in an attempt to figure out and understand what is within one's own box.

3. Suppose that the word "beetle" has a use in these people's language nonetheless.

4. Then the word "beetle" would not be as the name of a thing. The thing in the box does not belong to the language game at all. The box could effectively be empty, as this would make no difference to the language game or the meaning/use of the word "beetle". — Luke

These are the questionable statements. This use of "beetle" is something completely distinct from, other than, to refer to the thing in the box. So we have a second definition of "beetle" here, and an invitation to equivocate.

To avoid equivocation we must choose one of the two definitions of "beetle". If we choose the first, then it is impossible that any of the boxes are empty, and "beetle" necessarily refers to the thing in the box. If we choose the second, the entire "beetle in the box" scenario becomes completely irrelevant, because "beetle" has a complete different meaning dependent on some other use, and we know not what that other use is.

There is no contradiction here. He doesn't say both that there is something and nothing in the box. He says only that if the word was to have a use in these people's language, then it would have no effect on the language game if the box was empty. — Luke

Yes there is contradiction because #1 and #3 define "beetle" in incompatible ways, and that is contradiction. Either "beetle" refers to the thing in the box, or it has a meaning prescribed by some other use, but to allow two incompatible definitions of the same word is to allow contradiction.

Look at #1, "beetle" is the name of something in the box. Now look at #4 , "beetle" is not used as the name of a thing. Do you see the contradiction now? #4 is a blatant contradiction of #1. I know that you'll want to excuse the contradiction, saying #4 is some sort of hypothetical, but so is #1 a hypothetical. So we have two distinct, and incompatible hypotheticals, (1&2) vs.(3&4). If taken together as one hypothetical "the beetle and the analogy", this hypothetical is self-contradicting.

3. Suppose that the word "beetle" has a use in these people's language nonetheless.

4. Then the word "beetle" would not be as the name of a thing. The thing in the box does not belong to the language game at all. The box could effectively be empty, as this would make no difference to the language game or the meaning/use of the word "beetle".
— Luke

These are the questionable statements. This use of "beetle" is something completely distinct from, other than, to refer to the thing in the box. — Metaphysician Undercover

Where do you infer this from?


Everyone uses the word "beetle" to refer to some unknown, inaccessible thing inside a box. You seem to accept this. It doesn't matter what the inaccessible thing in a box is, everyone calls it a "beetle" anyway. How does this change if there is nothing in a box? Everyone else's box is inaccessible and everyone would still call whatever is (or is not) in a box a "beetle" anyway. That's how the word is used and that's what it means. Your complaint that the word is supposed to refer to some positive thing and that it cannot refer to nothing carries no weight, because whatever is in a box makes no difference to the meaning or use of the word.

This is the point of the conditional, that if the word has a use in these people's language, then the word "beetle" would not be the name of a thing and this thing does not belong to the language game at all. The word would not be used to refer to anything in particular, but would only refer generally to whatever is in a box, which could include nothing. As Wittgenstein says: "The thing in the box has no place in the language-game at all; not even as a something"

Furthermore, if any instance of what appears to you as me showing you my beetle might actually be an instance of deception, then I can never actually be showing you my beetle.

This is precisely what Wittgenstein has to deny, and it is indeed difficult, but I think he does deny it.

Accepting the antecedent of the inference you make above involves accepting the concealed premise that could be expressed in the first instance as: if there is no difference between the appearance of two things, in this case types of behaviour, there is no real difference in what they are. In itself, of course, that can be denied, since it is just a version of the unwarranted inference from appearance to reality. Nevertheless, if one does deny that inference, i.e. if one does accept that pain behaviour and fake pain behaviour can have the exactly the same appearance but may yet nevertheless be metaphysically entirely distinct phenomena, then the difficult question is to try to explain how we can be fooled into thinking someone is in pain: it seems that there just must be some common denominator between fake pain behaviour and pain behaviour, but if we accept that, then falling back into skepticism about us ever being able to show each other our pain seems inevitable.

This reminds me a little of the difficulties with the disjunctivist repsonses to the argument from halluncination in perception, which I suppose is no accident given that this started out as a thread on idealism.

Incidently, anyone who thinks idealism is dead could do worse than ressurect an old article by Mary Calkins, called "The idealist to the realist" : it is short and freely available on jstor. It dates from the 1920's, but most of the points it makes remain salient.

Everyone uses the word "beetle" to refer to some unknown, inaccessible thing inside a box. You seem to accept this. It doesn't matter what the inaccessible thing in a box is, everyone calls it a "beetle" anyway. How does this change if there is nothing in a box? Everyone else's box is inaccessible and everyone would still call whatever is (or is not) in a box a "beetle" anyway. That's how the word is used and that's what it means. Your complaint that the word is supposed to refer to some positive thing and that it cannot refer to nothing carries no weight, because whatever is in a box makes no difference to the meaning or use of the word. — Luke

You are willfully ignoring what I wrote. The scenario of #4 where there is "nothing in the box", describes a completely different language-game, one completely different, and incompatible with #1, in which it is stipulated that there is something in the box. #4 contradicts #1 and is therefore not a possible scenario under the premise #1. Sure, my complaint "carries no weight" to you, because you are willing to ignore contradiction in an example. That is an indication of undisciplined philosophy. So your statement needs to be qualified, my complaint carries no wait to an undisciplined philosopher.

his is the point of the conditional, that if the word has a use in these people's language, then the word "beetle" would not be the name of a thing and this thing does not belong to the language game at all. — Luke

No, the point of 3 & 4 is stated explicitly as the word "beetle" has a use in these people's language which is other than, to refer to the thing in the box. Therefore the premises of 1&2 describe a language-game in which "beetle" refers to something in the box, and 3&4 describe a completely different, unrelated language-game, within which "beetle" is used in a completely different, unrelated way. And, these two distinct language-games cannot be united into one game, or represented as one game without contradiction.

What we can conclude from this demonstration, is as jkg20 implies, we cannot represent language, as a whole, as a language-game. This concept, that language use as a whole, can be represented as a language-game, is incoherent. We can represent distinct language-games, but since there is contradiction between these distinct games, as demonstrated by Wittgenstein's example, the idea that the distinct games being played, can be represented as one game, is a faulty idea because of this demonstrated incoherency.

As Wittgenstein says: "The thing in the box has no place in the language-game at all; not even as a something" — Luke

The thing in the box has no place in that particular language-game, the one described by 3&4. However, the thing in the box plays an essential role in the other language-game, the one described by 1&2. Therefore the same word, "beetle", is employed in distinct language-games which have been described as incompatible with each other. Accordingly, we cannot say that the use of the word "beetle" is representable as a single language-game. That would be a faulty representation of language use.

Accepting the antecedent of the inference you make above involves accepting the concealed premise that could be expressed in the first instance as: if there is no difference between the appearance of two things, in this case types of behaviour, there is no real difference in what they are. — jkg20

This is not really what I meant to be saying with the antecedent though. I take the possibility of deception for granted. We can say that deception is a real thing which evidently happens, and, due to its nature, we do not know that we have been deceived when it occurs. That is the key point, deception is unidentifiable, because if it is identified it is not deception, only an attempt to deceive. And the other point is that deception occurs. This is what validates skepticism. Since we can never be absolutely, purely, and ideally certain, even if it's only a one in a million chance that I am wrong, I have no way of knowing in which of those million instances I am wrong. If I knew it I would have corrected it. Therefore doubt is warranted in all those instances. Each instance can endlessly be reassessed for the possibility of mistake.

So, we must assume that in every instance there is the possibility of deception. If we could describe the situation as "the person is showing one's beetle", then there would be no possibility of deception. So we cannot describe the situation like that. Therefore we need to describe it in some other way. What is the person doing then, if not showing the beetle?

Nevertheless, if one does deny that inference, i.e. if one does accept that pain behaviour and fake pain behaviour can have the exactly the same appearance but may yet nevertheless be metaphysically entirely distinct phenomena, then the difficult question is to try to explain how we can be fooled into thinking someone is in pain: it seems that there just must be some common denominator between fake pain behaviour and pain behaviour, but if we accept that, then falling back into skepticism about us ever being able to show each other our pain seems inevitable. — jkg20

This is why I proposed "representing" instead. The person is carrying out activity which appears to be "showing one's beetle", but cannot actually be described as such because of the possibility of deception.
So instead of "showing one's beetle" we could describe it as representing one's beetle, and this provides for the medium between what is expressed, and what is inside, allowing for the possibility of deception.

Furthermore, once we allow for this medium between what's inside (the beetle), and the person's actions, we can understand all sorts of possibilities for what the person is actually doing, rather than simply "representing". This idea of "representing" was proposed as a replacement for "showing", and so it was selected as similar to "showing". But once we dismiss "showing", then we have a complete separation between the beetle in the box (1&2 in my discussion with Luke above), and the 'other use' for the word (3&4). Theoretically, this 'other use' might not even be related to the beetle, as in the analogy. So we have a whole range (infinite possibility), of relations between what the person is doing, (representing, hiding, maybe even manipulating the beetle), and the beetle itself. There is nothing to indicate that any specific relation between the actions and the beetle is necessary. And this extends right to the extreme of the analogy, where the beetle might not even be related to what the person is doing. But this would imply nonsensical, random actions, so the extreme expressed in this analogy is doubtful.

The skepticism you refer to is good and healthy. It allows us to get beyond appearances and see things the way they really are. We do not know the relationship between what's inside (the beetle, or "pain" in this case), and our actions. We can talk about some possible relations, such as the actions are showing the inside, or representing the inside, and in morality we say that the inside (intention) has a causal effect on the actions, but we really do not understand these relations. There is no necessity here, in the sense of such and such inside feeling, pain for example, is necessarily expressed in this way. So, if someone claims that the person must be "showing one's beetle", in order that the person could act in a communicative way, it is good to approach such a statement with healthy skepticism, because there are many different relations between the person's actions and the beetle, which are evident in the different forms of communication. No particular relationship is necessary.

Therefore the premises of 1&2 describe a language-game in which "beetle" refers to something in the box, and 3&4 describe a completely different, unrelated language-game, within which "beetle" is used in a completely different, unrelated way. — Metaphysician Undercover

You are overlooking the crucial conditional. Again.

You are ignoring that the word has a use in these people's language.

I don't know whether it's a problem which is peculiar to English, but there is a difficulty in trying to describe the thing in the box without referring to it as a positive "thing", where it instead refers to either a something or a nothing. Yet, this is what the word "beetle" refers to: whatever is in the box, a something or a nothing. What would you call this instead of a "thing"? Is there a more neutral term?

You took issue with my earlier use of "contents" of the box, I suspect because this deflated your argument, but that's really what the word refers to - some unknown quantity, an algebraic 'x', some "thing" which might not be a thing, just whatever it is that is in the box....or not. Whatever is (or is not) inside the box is called a "beetle".

Can you think of a better word than "thing" for the contents of a box which could be anything or nothing; a non-positive synonym for "thing"; a thing which is "not even a something"?

Anyway, that's where I see you going wrong here. Obviously, apart from your complete misunderstanding of all of Wittgenstein's work, including his private language argument. To avoid further repetition, I'll leave it there.

You are ignoring that the word has a use in these people's language. — Luke

No I'm not overlooking that. That is the second language-game referred to in 3&4, in which the word "beetle" is used, but which is completely distinct from the first language-game referred to in 1&2.

I don't know whether it's a problem which is peculiar to English, but there is a difficulty in trying to describe the thing in the box without referring to it as a positive "thing", where it instead refers to either a something or a nothing. Yet, this is what the word "beetle" refers to: whatever is in the box, a something or a nothing. What would you call this instead of a "thing"? Is there a more neutral term? — Luke

The second language game clearly has nothing to do with the thing in the box.

But suppose the word "beetle" had a use in these people's language? --If so it would not be used as the name of a thing. The thing in the box has no place in the language-game at all; not even as a something: for the box might even be empty. — Wittgenstein

See, the people have a use for "beetle", but this use has nothing to do with the thing in the box. The thing in the box has absolutely no relevance in this language-game. "The thing in the box has no place in the language-game at all;..."

You took issue with my earlier use of "contents" of the box, I suspect because this deflated your argument, but that's really what the word refers to - some unknown quantity, an algebraic 'x', some "thing" which might not be a thing, just whatever it is that is in the box....or not. Whatever is (or is not) inside the box is called a "beetle". — Luke

We have absolutely no idea what the word "beetle" is used for in this second language-game. Wittgenstein gives us no indication of this, only that it does not refer to a thing, and that the thing in the box is completely irrelevant to this use.

You're clearly wrong to suggest that the word refers to a thing of any sort. And, I don't see why you would think that the box is relevant to this use at all. We are talking about a completely distinct language-game for the word "beetle". It could refer to someone's mother's behavior for all we know. There is no indication at all of what the word is used for in that second language-game, only that it does not refer to a thing, and that the thing in the box has no place in this language-game (therefore is completely irrelevant to this game).

Can you think of a better word than "thing" for the contents of a box which could be anything or nothing; a non-positive synonym for "thing"; a thing which is "not even a something"?

Anyway, that's where I see you going wrong here. Obviously, apart from your complete misunderstanding of all of Wittgenstein's work, including his private language argument. To avoid further repetition, I'll leave it there. — Luke

The "contents of the box" is completely irrelevant in this second language-game. "Beetle" is used for something completely different. That is exactly what Wittgenstein says, whether you understand it or not. So just forget the idea that the contents, or even the box for that matter, is at all related to the use of "beetle" in this language-game. It is a completely different language-game from the language-game described at 1&2, in which "beetle" refers to something in a box.

304. “But you will surely admit that there is a difference between pain behaviour with pain and pain-behaviour without pain.” — Admit it? What greater difference could there be? — “And yet you again and again reach the conclusion that the sensation itself is a Nothing.” — Not at all. It’s not a Something, but not a Nothing either! The conclusion was only that a Nothing would render the same service as a Something about which nothing could be said. We’ve only rejected the grammar which tends to force itself on us here.

The paradox disappears only if we make a radical break with the idea that language always functions in one way, always serves the same purpose: to convey thoughts — which may be about houses, pains, good and evil, or whatever. — Wittgenstein

Just the thing. Well quoted.

I'm surprised anybody was reading along. Thanks.

That is the key point, deception is unidentifiable, because if it is identified it is not deception, only an attempt to deceive. And the other point is that deception occurs.

I'm not sure about "unidentifiable" here, why isn't a case of deception just a successful attempt to deceive? After all, if each instance of deception were of necessity unidentifiable, no deception would ever be discovered, and so how would the notion of deception ever get a hold? The opposite take from yours would be that deception must be discoverable, and so identifiable, but to be deception it must of course allow for being, as a matter of fact, unidentified. Here we do not need a paradigm of deception in your sense, just the paradigm of sincere behaviour and the idea of an attempt to emulate that behaviour for, at least in some cases, deceitful purposes. So, if all deceptive behaviour must be identifiable as deception, that might entail, with some additional premises of course, that deceptive behaviour does not share a common denominator with sincere behaviour, and so sincere behaviour in the case of pain can really be a case of showing the world what is your box. This still leaves the tricky business of explaining how actual cases of deception work, but perhaps Wittgenstein would just say that it will vary from case to case and that no matter how many examples we produce we will not obtain a general principle that will apply to all cases.
.

Admit it? What greater difference could there be? — — Wittgenstein

I can think of many greater differences than the difference between mock and sincere pain behavoiur, the difference between pain behaviour and smoking calmly in an armchair, for instance. Pain behaviour and mock pain behaviour might be different, but there is also the apparent similarity to account for. If one suggests, quite naturally, that there is a common denominator between mock and genuine pain behaviour, e.g. the bodily movements, including the movements of the larynx and lips, then the question arises, "so what is added in the genuine case to distinguish it from the mock case?" The response, "it is not nothing but it is not something either " or "you are being lead astray by language" then just rings to some like a hollow refusal to engage with the issue.

Exactly, now you're catching on to what I'm saying, Luke. Thanks for the quote. How did you find that?

The "radical break" which Wittgenstein refers to is the second purpose for "beetle". In this second language-game, "beetle" has nothing to do with the thing in the box or even the box itself. When you see it this way, the appearance of contradiction and paradox disappears, and the situation is entirely comprehendible. No longer must "beetle" relate to some mysterious thing in the box which no one seems to have access to, we may dismiss the whole "beetle and box" scenario as completely irrelevant to what "beetle" is now used for.

However, once we make this radical break we cannot start referring back to the contrary premise, that "beetle" is somehow related to a thing in the box. If the thing in the box is reduced to nothing in relation to the meaning of "beetle", then we cannot talk about the meaning of "beetle" as if the thing is something within this use of "beetle". Therefore, in order that we can still talk about the thing in the box, which has already been named "beetle", we must respect that "beetle" has two very distinct, and absolutely incompatible uses, or meanings. If we equivocate we have contradiction. Consequently we have a radical break in "the purpose of language" ("beetle" is used in two incompatible ways), which forces the conclusion that language cannot be described as a single language-game. There are two distinct and incompatible types of "purpose for language"

In jkg20's term of "showing", we can characterize this radical break as honestly showing the beetle, and dishonestly not-showing the beetle. Notice the one kind of "purpose for language", in which the beetle is completely irrelevant (not-showing the beetle) is described as dishonesty. But I am arguing that the relationship between the individual and the beetle cannot be characterized as a matter of showing and not-showing. That relationship is far more complex, involving endless possibilities. The person does not even have access to one's own beetle when the intent is to honestly show the beetle (as is the case when one sees the physician for assistance in understanding one's own feelings).

I'm not sure about "unidentifiable" here, why isn't a case of deception just a successful attempt to deceive? After all, if each instance of deception were of necessity unidentifiable, no deception would ever be discovered, and so how would the notion of deception ever get a hold? — jkg20

I suppose "unidentified" would be the better word then, but it doesn't change the argument. The successful attempt to deceive is unidentified as an attempt to decive. And, the fact that some attempts are identified as deception justifies the claim that there are likely others which go unidentified. If you change "unidentifiable" to "unidentified" you can proceed with the argument.

If we could truthfully describe the situation as "the person is showing one's beetle", there would be no possibility of deception, nothing concerning the beetle could be intentionally hidden or undisclosed, everything would be disclosed in the showing of the beetle, and there would be no such thing as deception. This is why the relationship between the person, and the beetle which is in one's box, cannot be described in these terms of "showing".

Furthermore, there would be the matter of unintentional not-showing which I alluded to in the prior post. But "showing" is an intentional act. The human being experiences all sorts of different feelings and emotions, and "showing" consists of putting words to these, or demonstrating their existence in some other way. Many of the feelings that a person has cannot even be adequately described by that individual. So a person doesn't even really get to see one's own beetle, and what appears like intentional deception may simply be an unintentional misunderstanding of one's own beetle.

Now we get to what I described in the prior post. We must find the means to apprehend our own beetles (internal feelings), if we are so inclined, and we do this by looking to others who have gone before us in this arduous process, for guidance. There is a "body of knowledge" which has been constructed and accumulated for this very purpose of apprehending one's own inner feelings. If, for example, you believe that you might be feeling what is called "pain" inside, you would go to see a physician who has studied the relevant knowledge, for guidance on understanding this feeling.

Pain behaviour and mock pain behaviour might be different, but there is also the apparent similarity to account for. If one suggests, quite naturally, that there is a common denominator between mock and genuine pain behaviour, e.g. the bodily movements, including the movements of the larynx and lips, then the question arises, "so what is added in the genuine case to distinguish it from the mock case?" The response, "it is not nothing but it is not something either " or "you are being lead astray by language" then just rings to some like a hollow refusal to engage with the issue. — jkg20

I don't see this as the issue that Wittgenstein seeks to address with his beetle in the box, which may explain why you find his so-called response(s) as "like a hollow refusal to engage with the issue". Almost (if not) always, Wittgenstein's concern is with language. I consider the beetle in the box to be an extension of his preceding comments on private language.

Quoting from the book Wittgenstein and His Interpreters: Essays in Memory of Gordon Baker, from a chapter by David G. Stern, who writes:

Hacker identifies the target of the beetle story as a form of semi-solipsism: the view that each of us "knows what 'pain' means only from one's own case, for it seems that it is the sensation one has that gives the word its meaning". [...]

[This] construal of the grammar of expression of sensation on the model of name and object, leads to a dilemma: [...]

"If what is in the box is relevant to the meaning of 'beetle' then no one else can understand what I mean by 'beetle'; and if 'beetle' is understood by others, it cannot signify what is in each person's private box." (Hacker 1990) — David G. Stern

I offer this as a more appropriate reading of the issue of the beetle example. Framing the issue as a linguistic concern is also supported by what Wittgenstein immediately goes on to state in his next section:

305. “But you surely can’t deny that, for example, in remembering, an inner process takes place.” — What gives the impression that we want to deny anything? When one says, “Still, an inner process does take place here” — one wants to go on: “After all, you see it.” And it is this inner process that one means by the word “remembering”. — The impression that we wanted to deny something arises from our setting our face against the picture of an ‘inner process’. What we deny is that the picture of an inner process gives us the correct idea of the use of the word “remember”. Indeed, we’re saying that this picture, with its ramifications, stands in the way of our seeing the use of the word as it is. — Wittgenstein

Almost, if not always, Wittgenstein's concern is with language

Well if it were only language Wittgenstein was concerned with, then fine, nothing more need be said. However, I have met so called Wittgensteinians that feel that in being concerned with language Wittgenstein somehow managed to solve metaphysical problems along the way, rather than just avoiding them or, perhaps more charitably, expressing them in a different way.

109. It was correct that our considerations must not be scientific ones. The feeling ‘that it is possible, contrary to our preconceived ideas, to think this or that’ — whatever that may mean — could be of no interest to us. (The pneumatic conception of thinking.) And we may not advance any kind of theory. There must not be anything hypothetical in our considerations. All explanation must disappear, and description alone must take its place. And this description gets its light — that is to say, its purpose — from the philosophical problems. These are, of course, not empirical problems; but they are solved through an insight into the workings of our language, and that in such a way that these workings are recognized — despite an urge to misunderstand them. The problems are solved, not by coming up with new discoveries, but by assembling what we have long been familiar with. Philosophy is a struggle against the bewitchment of our understanding by the resources of our language. — Wittgenstein

Look at it this way Luke. Ask yourself, as Wittgenstein asks, what is the difference between pain-behaviour with pain and pain-behaviour without pain. You should find that the difference is exactly as described, the presence of pain in the one case, and the absence of pain in the other case. The latter we can call deception.

If you understand this, you'll see that the second language-game in the 'beetle in the box' analogy, the game in which the thing in the box is described as completely unnecessary and irrelevant, can be classed as deception, just like pain behaviour without pain is deception.

It is nevertheless a very real purpose for language, and therefore a very real type of language-game, but it is completely incompatible with the other type of language-game within which the thing in the box is an essential aspect. As philosophers we despise that second type of language game, (within which the thing in the box is irrelevant) as dishonest, despicable, and therefore unacceptable.

Pronouncements, no matter who makes them, are not arguments.

As stated in my previous post, I see the issue of Wittgenstein's beetle as attacking the view that each of us knows what 'pain' means only from our own case and that it is the sensation one has which gives the word its meaning. If the issue you are concerned with is of mock vs. real pain-behaviour, then you might need to look elsewhere, but from memory I think Wittgenstein does say somewhere that we can recognise real pain-behaviour when we see it. I will try and find the quote another time.

That we can recognise pain behaviour when we see it is not the issue, of course we can. That Wittgenstein acknowledged this is not an insight of his. The issue that concerns metaphysics and on which Wittgenstein seems silent is embedded in Metaphysician Undercover's question: what makes the difference between mock pain behavoiur and real pain behaviour.

If the issue you are concerned with is of mock vs. real pain-behaviour, then you might need to look elsewhere, but from memory I think Wittgenstein does say somewhere that we can recognise real pain-behaviour when we see it. I will try and find the quote another time. — Luke

If Wittgenstein actually said this, it would just be a false statement, so it wouldn't really matter. But I doubt he actually said that because he's very careful not to make false statements. The fact is that we might, anyone of us, at any time, be deceived by mock pain-behaviour. The statement "I have a pain in my stomach" is pain-behaviour. Whenever someone believes a statement such as this, when it is not true, that person has been deceived by mock pain-behaviour.

The issue that concerns metaphysics and on which Wittgenstein seems silent is embedded in Metaphysician Undercover's question: what makes the difference between mock pain behavoiur and real pain behaviour. — jkg20

The obvious, and very simple answer, is that the difference is found in the difference between the existence, and non-existence of pain. We can begin with the assumption that there is behaviour which is meant to indicate the presence of pain, pain-behaviour. We cannot provide an adequate description which will separate real pain-behaviour from mock pain-behaviour sufficient to completely eliminate the possibility of mistake (deception), therefore the only reliable description is the logical determination, that one is associated with the real presence of pain, and the other not.

Therefore, instead of taking the route which dictates that the existence or non-existence of pain is irrelevant, because we might distinguish real pain-behaviour from mock pain-behaviour without addressing this question, we must address this question of what differentiates the existence of pain from the non-existence of pain.

The fact is that we might, anyone of us, at any time, be deceived by mock pain-behaviour.

This is compatible with the idea that we can nevertheless in some circumstances recognise genuine pain behaviour for what it is, i.e. the manifestation of pain. At least, you would need more argument to show that the mere fact that we can go wrong means that we can never get it right. What it is to get it right, of course, remains open for discussion, but the idea that getting it right means, at least sometimes, being directly confronted with someone's pain and not simply a representative intermediary of it, has still yet to be refuted as far as I can tell.

This is compatible with the idea that we can nevertheless in some circumstances recognise genuine pain behaviour for what it is, i.e. the manifestation of pain. At least, you would need more argument to show that the mere fact that we can go wrong means that we can never get it right. — jkg20

Well, to get it right requires an objective and verifiable definition of "pain". This is why Wittgenstein's whole issue, of whether or not we can know what pain is, from our own experience, is an important issue. And, his presupposed assumption which Luke clings to, that we cannot know what pain is simply from one's own experience, is correct in the first place. But that is because one person cannot decide how we define "pain". I cannot simply turn to what's inside and call whatever is there "pain", because I might be calling what others call pleasure, "pain". So the issue is the consensus as to what feelings fulfill the conditions of "pain.

This is why I argue that the "going wrong" is a lot more complicated than the simple possibility of being deceived by someone else. Far more often, the going wrong is a matter of not understanding what's inside oneself, the matter of not being able to see one's own beetle. Consider the following variation to Wittgenstein's beetle example. We all have something in the box at any time, but I'm feeling pain, you're feeling pleasure, someone else feels grief, another feels joy, and we're all calling whatever we feel by the name "beetle". I think this is what Wittgenstein meant when he said the thing might be continually changing. Clearly, to be able to communicate concerning these inner feelings we need to figure out how to identify and distinguish one feeling from another.

We do not do this by ourselves, one person doesn't simply say, I'm going to call this feeling pain, and that feeling pleasure, etc., we have to learn from others through some sort of empathy, and settle on agreement, or something like that. But then there really is no "correct", objective definition of pain, no genuine manifestation of pain, just whatever we agree is acceptable as deserving the label. This does not mean that the thing in the box is irrelevant though, it means that there is a multitude of things in the box which need to be identified and distinguished from each other and called by the acceptable names. And that's the real problem, we can't just look inside and call whatever is there "pain", as if we could look into the box and call whatever is there "beetle, we need to learn how to distinguish which feelings are called pain, which are called pleasure, etc..

What it is to get it right, of course, remains open for discussion, but the idea that getting it right means, at least sometimes, being directly confronted with someone's pain and not simply a representative intermediary of it, has still yet to be refuted as far as I can tell. — jkg20

You can make that conclusion, but then we're right back to where we started, and that is having to deal with the matter of deception. Since there is no objective "pain", the question as to whether somebody suffers pain or not may be simply presented as an issue of correctly interpreting the person's behaviour, according to the agreed upon conditions of "pain". The acceptable definition of "pain" might be exhibiting such and such behaviour. So we're back to Luke's position where the beetle, (what the person is actually feeling as something separate from how the person is acting), is irrelevant. In your position, the person's actions are the beetle, the beetle is shown in one's actions, and there is nothing hidden in the box.

But, since there is a real, known difference between honestly expressing one's feelings, and deceptively expressing one's feelings, your conclusion has already been refuted. If there was no intermediary between one's pain, and one's expression of pain (pain behaviour) such deception would be impossible. If the intermediary was only added in the cases of deception, for the purpose of deceiving, it would be evident, the person would not be showing the beetle, creating a veil in between, when other times the person would be showing the beetle and there would be no veil. Therefore deception would be impossible.

This is the point of the conditional, that if the word has a use in these people's language, then the word "beetle" would not be the name of a thing and this thing does not belong to the language game at all. The word would not be used to refer to anything in particular, but would only refer generally to whatever is in a box, which could include nothing. As Wittgenstein says: "The thing in the box has no place in the language-game at all; not even as a something" — Luke

The obvious rejoinder to this is dreams. Our own dreams are the equivalent to a beetle in a box as nobody else can experience a dream we have. And yet we can easily communicate dreams we remember to other people.

So how does that work? People do legitimately dream and they do legitimately talk and write about dreams remembered. We can't check their accuracy. But we can certainly understand what is being related, more or less.

And dreams are certainly private. Yes, we have tools today to tell when people are dreaming, more or less. But we can't tell what the content of their dreams are. Maybe someday dreams will be read out by some sophisticated scanner and machine learning software, and posted on Youtube for everyone to see. It won't be exactly the same as having the dream (the original emotions and feeling of the dream is exclusive to the dreamer), but we will at least get to watch them.

But until then, they are beetles in a box of our sleep.

It's too bad The Great Whatever and Landru Guide Us no longer post here as they were two of the premier defenders of idealism and would have had something to say to all the rock kicking going on in this thread. I notice that Wayfarer doesn't even bother anymore. There was another prominent idealist whose name I forget.

That being said, I agree that ontological idealism is false, and tried desperately to argue against their positions in the past when it seemed idealism was the leading metaphysics of the forum at the time. But the scales have decisively tipped in the other direction since their departure.

So to even it just slightly, a problem for metaphysical realism is that it's prone to skepticism, which the simulation and BIV arguments demonstrate. If it's possible the world of perception is somehow an illusion, then idealism is less easy to dismiss. And really it goes back to the ancient problem of perception all the way up to the modern debate over consciousness, with stops along the way at Descartes, Hume, Kant and the more recent indirect/direct realism debate.

But as I've pointed out elsewhere, the very notion of subject/object, "inner and outer worlds," mind and body, etc., already presume an understanding of what it is to be. They themselves operate in the context of an ontology. In the West, at least, that ontology is still very much Greek. Until we understand this point fully, we're operating in a blind alley.

(This is not to say these problems don't exist, or that they're "wrong," by the way.) — Xtrix

This is a good point, but the problems still exist even if you reframe the debate, as you mentioned in parentheses. It doesn't make the fundamental issues with perception, consciousness and language go away.

It's true that I'm part of the world, not a mind ontologically separated from it. But that doesn't mean my experience of the world is some unfiltered omniscient window onto things as they are such that I can dismiss philosophical concerns over knowledge and what exists.

This is a good point, but the problems still exist even if you reframe the debate, as you mentioned in parentheses. It doesn't make the fundamental issues with perception, consciousness and language go away. — Marchesk

Sometimes. But in many cases, it simply causes the question or the problem to disappear. Why? Well take consciousness -- the "hard problem." What's the problem, exactly? Someone has to tell us what "consciousness" is. Likewise with "God's existence." Why is that not a "hard problem"? It certainly was for centuries, but that essentially drifted away.

I think the same is true of the mind/body problem, which serves as the underlying assumption to all "problems" and investigations into perception, language, etc.

What's the problem, exactly? Someone has to tell us what "consciousness" is. Likewise with "God's existence." Why is that not a "hard problem"? It certainly was for centuries, but that essentially drifted away. — Xtrix

It was for centuries when monotheistic religions dominated culture, but now that people are free to argue against God's existence, and there are lots of good arguments at least calling it into question, the problem is not hard for non-believers.

Consciousness is a different matter because we all see colors, feel pains, hear sounds, etc. But those don't form the scientific theories we use to understand the world and the workings of our own bodies.

In neither case is it a matter of definition or word usage. It's rather a matter of what kind of world we live in.

There was another prominent idealist whose name I forget. — Marchesk

You mean that Evolog guy? Maybe the bloke changed his avatar name to something less fancy, and changed his mind about terming things “objective idealism” to terming things “neutral monism”, thinking it to make the same difference anyway. The same way that “non-Cartesian skepticism” and “fallibilism” do. The tyke might still be around, I’m guessing. No offense in calling him a tyke, btw: my own avatar name “javra” translates to “mongrel”, in case it wasn’t known. But, then again, you might have had someone else in mind.