Perhaps the values of the constants are set by natural law. If not, their values are brute fact. The FTA treats them as brute facts that could have differed. — Relativist

The spirit of scientific inquiry should preclude us from ever simply accepting something as a brute fact. Like anything else that we observe in the universe, the particular values of the constants call for an explanation, and the FTA poses the hypothesis of divine creation.

Parsimony entails explaining the available facts with the fewest assumptions, not with entertaing the possibility we are missing some facts. — Relativist

Right, it would be an assumption that laws hold for all time and in all places, rather than holding where and when we know they hold.

, it would be an assumption that laws hold for all time and in all places, rather than holding where and when we know they hold. — Coben

By that reasoning, we shouldn't consider there to be laws of nature at all. That makes no sense. Physics develops theories about laws based on empirical evidence - the laws explain observed regularities.

So we infer a law based on observed regularities, then you say we should assume these aren't really regularities. See the problem?

The spirit of scientific inquiry should preclude us from ever simply accepting something as a brute fact. — aletheist

That is appropriate for scientific inquiry, but metaphysical naturalism entails some sort of brute fact foundation for what exists. Otherwise there's an infinite regress.

That is appropriate for scientific inquiry, but metaphysical naturalism entails some sort of brute fact foundation for what exists. — Relativist

Scientific inquiry employs methodological naturalism, but it is a mistake to convert this to metaphysical naturalism.

Otherwise there's an infinite regress. — Relativist

On the contrary, divine creation is an example of an explanatory hypothesis that avoids an infinite regress.

But my first sentence is talking about the idea that if there is a pattern or constant then it is either eternal or does not change in whatever finite time we have. — Coben

Well, I already explained why "changing laws" are an oxymoron. Laws are revised or retied if evidence calls for it, and not otherwise. Anyway, I won't pursue this further, since this has little to do with the OP.

The spirit of scientific inquiry should preclude us from ever simply accepting something as a brute fact. Like anything else that we observe in the universe, the particular values of the constants call for an explanation, and the FTA poses the hypothesis of divine creation. — aletheist

You have it exactly backwards. Leaving something unexplained (which is what "brute fact" means) leaves the matter open for further inquiry. Contriving a pseudo-explanation such as "divine creation" prematurely forecloses the inquiry.

Leaving something unexplained (which is what "brute fact" means) leaves the matter open for further inquiry. — SophistiCat

On the contrary, a brute fact is something that is deemed to be inexplicable in principle, thus closing off further inquiry as allegedly pointless.

Contriving a pseudo-explanation such as "divine creation" prematurely forecloses the inquiry. — SophistiCat

On the contrary, modern science largely has its roots in cultures that affirmed divine creation and were motivated by this belief to study nature more carefully.

That is appropriate for scientific inquiry, but metaphysical naturalism entails some sort of brute fact foundation for what exists.
— Relativist
Scientific inquiry employs methodological naturalism, but it is a mistake to convert this to metaphysical naturalism.

Otherwise there's an infinite regress.
— Relativist
On the contrary, divine creation is an example of an explanatory hypothesis that avoids an infinite regress. — aletheist

Divine creation is not consistent with methodological naturalism. That hypothesis can only be entertained with a metaphysical scope.

Divine creation is not consistent with methodological naturalism. That hypothesis can only be entertained with a metaphysical scope. — Relativist

I did not state or imply otherwise. Methodological naturalism can only go so far, which is one reason why it is a mistake to convert it to metaphysical naturalism.

Right, I agree.

Well, I already explained why "changing laws" are an oxymoron. — SophistiCat

Sure, given the sense that laws have been conceived in science it has become an oxymoron, but when discussing the issue, either raising the possibility or talking about evidence that in fact what have been called laws, one might speak of such things in the transition to realizing that how we have conceived of these patterns has been incorrect. And as a side note i think law, as in the laws of nature or scientific law, came from the term for human made laws and those can certainly be changed.

Laws are revised or retied if evidence calls for it, and not otherwise. — SophistiCat

Right, though that's generally been conceived of as 'now we realize that the law is actually X.' I was talking about when we realize that what has been called a law - in the modern conception of the term as eternal and universal - may be a more local, in time or space or both - pattern. Obviously evidence should be the criterion for new conceptions, including at the level where one realizes and assumption was made about the concept of these patterns.

Anyway, I won't pursue this further, since this has little to do with the OP. — SophistiCat

OK.

By that reasoning, we shouldn't consider there to be laws of nature at all. — Relativist

I never said anything about not considering it. I even said, though perhaps not to you that it has been an incredibly useful heuristic. I do not assume that there are no patterns that consistant universally and through time.

I am not ruling out it is the case, or true in many cases. I am simply saying that it not more parsimonious to have one less assumption.

So we infer a law based on observed regularities, then you say we should assume these aren't really regularities. See the problem? — Relativist

No, I am not saying that. In fact several times in this discussion, though perhaps not in posts to you I have made it quite clear that of course one does. But one need not, at the level of cosmology or thinking of science in general, assume that just because we notice regularities that this necessarily entails that these are laws - as the idea has been conceived in science - as something that holds true everywhere and always. That tendency - which is more or less an ontological position - need not be assumed. That's all. And since there has been some evidence that this is in fact not the case, that laws and constants may have been different earlier in time even in our local (though huge) home area, it's good to consider this ontological position and note that it is there. I have also been pointing out in response to one person who thought the law of parsimony meant that laws are eternal that it is in fact an assumption one need not have, when one notes regularities, to assume that we now know an eternal univerals rule. I actually think, as I have said, that it is a great heuristic and has been very useful. But that doesn't mean it is necessarily true nor does it make it more parsimonius.

"Incorrigible= not able to be corrected or reformed. That applies here. This is not an arbitrary assumption we pull out of thin air. No one has to be talked into it. Perhaps you've talked yourself out of it, but the only basis seems to be that it's possibly wrong. Possibility is not a defeater of belief. If you treat it as such, then you can have no beliefs other than analytic trurhs. — Relativist

No, not a defeater of belief, just of certainty. I’m okay with that, fwiw. Possibility leaves the door open for correction and reformation. Just because it’s comforting or easy to swallow, doesn’t make it absolute. I recognise existence as a dynamic state of inequilibrium - that I lean towards change and you towards stability, is just part of the dance...

Possibility leaves the door open for correction and reformation. — Possibility

I'm fine with that.

On the contrary, a brute fact is something that is deemed to be inexplicable in principle, thus closing off further inquiry as allegedly pointless. — aletheist

No, this is just completely divorced from reality. In every scientific theory there are brute facts: they are the assumptions and postulates of the theory, be they laws, constants or whatever. That doesn't mean that scientists, the scientific community are committed to treating them as eternal, unchanging truths. For one thing, there are many theories, and their postulates are not entirely compatible with each other, or else a postulate in one theory may actually be obtainable as a result in another theory (e.g. the 2nd law of continuum thermodynamics is more-or-less reducible to statistical mechanics).

Besides, it would be absurd to deny that theories have evolved and continue to evolve in response to new findings and new thinking, and that certainly goes for fundamental physics. The so-called fine tuned constants of the standard particle physics and Big Bang cosmology, which are seen as unsatisfactory by some theoretical physicists, have prompted a search for better accounts that would replace these constants with something more 'natural'. Of course, whatever theories come next will have their own unexplained postulates - it is only a question of which postulates are more epistemologically or metaphysically satisfactory.

On the contrary, modern science largely has its roots in cultures that affirmed divine creation and were motivated by this belief to study nature more carefully. — aletheist

That is a questionable interpretation of the history. One could instead make a case that natural philosophy has always had to struggle against religious dogma and conservatism. In any case, this is irrelevant. The fact is that, as I explained above, scientific postulates are not on the whole treated as dogmas. The entire process of scientific research is set up expressly in order to promote change. One can hardly publish a paper or obtain a grant without the promise of finding something new or at variance with what is already known. But a religious dogma is, well, a dogma. If a thing is postulated to be a divine creation as a matter of faith, that isn't going to change in a hurry.

In every scientific theory there are brute facts: they are the assumptions and postulates of the theory, be they laws, constants or whatever. — SophistiCat

We evidently have different definitions of "brute fact." For what it might be worth, Wikipedia states, "In contemporary philosophy, a brute fact is a fact that has no explanation. More narrowly, brute facts may instead be defined as those facts which cannot be explained (as opposed to simply having no explanation)." The whole point of formulating scientific and metaphysical hypotheses is to explain the facts.

On the contrary, modern science largely has its roots in cultures that affirmed divine creation and were motivated by this belief to study nature more carefully. — aletheist

One could instead make a case that natural philosophy has always had to struggle against religious dogma and conservatism. — SophistiCat

I suggest that both of these statements are true.

We evidently have different definitions of "brute fact." For what it might be worth, Wikipedia states, "In contemporary philosophy, a brute fact is a fact that has no explanation. More narrowly, brute facts may instead be defined as those facts which cannot be explained (as opposed to simply having no explanation)." The whole point of formulating scientific and metaphysical hypotheses is to explain the facts. — aletheist

I don't think that we have different definitions of "brute fact." It is just that by its nature, science is pluralistic and dynamic. There isn't a single coherent and unchanging scientific picture of the world; instead, there is a patchwork of theories that are only partly compatible with each other, and those theories keep evolving. What that means for brute facts is that they exist within the context of a particular theory, and that they are not carved in stone. Philosophy is not any different in that regard.

In any case, whether we are talking about science or philosophy, it is a truism that nothing of any substance can be explained away without residue. Any explanation takes some things as given, the explanation essentially consisting in reducing everything else to those things.

In religious explanations the brute facts are the dogmas of theology and sacred history. That God made the universe just so is a brute fact.

In any case, whether we are talking about science or philosophy, it is a truism that nothing of any substance can be explained away without residue. — SophistiCat

Apologists claim that God's metaphysical necessity subsumes the residue. Of course, this doesn't explain his contingent choices.

Divine creation is not consistent with methodological naturalism. That hypothesis can only be entertained with a metaphysical scope.
— Relativist
I did not state or imply otherwise. Methodological naturalism can only go so far, which is one reason why it is a mistake to convert it to metaphysical naturalism. — aletheist

You brought up supernaturalism when you said divine creation avoids an infinite regress. That enlarged the scope of analysis to metaphysics. If we're entertaing metaphysical solutions to an infinite regress, then we can also consider solutions consistent with metaphysical naturalism. Right?

If we're entertaing metaphysical solutions to an infinite regress, then we can also consider solutions consistent with metaphysical naturalism. Right? — Relativist

As long as we acknowledge that metaphysical naturalism is no more "scientific" than theism.

I agree.