although hopefully we are more likely to believe what is true — Banno

That's what I meant and I would guess that as a consensus, we are. If we jump to certain metaphysical issues this might seem wrong, but when one realizes that we deal with millions of much smaller beliefs - how to use spoons, what happens if you run out in the road without looking enough times, how to put on socks, how to turn on the cold water....and so on, most people have, via parenting and school grown up accepting a vast number of consensus beliefs without ever looking into the justifications - though often gaining justification for many as one works from that belief.

But truth and belief are quite different things — Banno

Sure, nothing I said goes against this.

Believing something does not, except in specific circumstances, render it true — Banno

Nor this. My question was whether true statements, when we think of the vast array of them we send around each day are more likely to be convincing and thus become consensus. Given that a true statement is true, it ought to fit reality better and while many will be counterintuitive, many will not be, perhaps more of the latter. That being true is more likely to make a statement sticky.

You might do well to believe the consensus, if only for the sake of a quiet life. — Banno

Yes, this also can be true.

Why would one think we never have access to the truth, direct or otherwise? We have access to lots of truths. — Banno

A true statement
A six-word statement. Or 'a sentence in Russian' or 'A sentence written in blue ink.'

I think that compound adjective in the second phrase is one we can directly assess. We count the words. The statement is enough. We don't have to look elsewhere to decide if the adjective is correct. True, in the first phrase, is an adjective that we must go through a process to see if the adjective is one we want to accept. We look at the justification. If we like that, then we can accept the adjective is a good one.

I did not mean that you and I have no way to find out, by going to the library, say, what the name of the bones in the foot are, or how far Australia is from AFrica. We certainly have direct access in that sence or access. It is not about you and me going and collecting some truths.

My point that true statement don't glow green or something, thus showing their truth. You have to dig. And what you dig into is justification.

We may already feel like we have the justification in us. So a statement that is true may seem obviously correct. That means we've undergone that process already.

A true statement may not be a true statement later on. It may be revised. Or better put 'what we consider a true statement today' might not be considered that later, when better justification comes along for something else. What we have access to is justification and experience. The latter being, in relation to this issue, part of the former.

SO you are saying something like that the more "perceived potential information of a subject" there is, the more true it is? — Banno

No, I’m saying that theoretically we can obtain a more accurate view of truth - that’s definitely not the same as saying ‘the information is more true’.

If you see what looks like an oasis, and everyone else around you also says that what they see looks like an oasis, then you can confidently assert that... what you see looks like an oasis. It is in the information which specifically differs from our own perspective that we obtain a more accurate view of truth.

Now that seems a bit odd. You and I agree that this thread is in English, I presume; and we do this as a result of having read the thread - that is, as a result of having made certain observations. Why balk at the claim that, that this thread is in English is an objective fact? IT's not, after ll, based on some individual preference in the way subjective facts are... — Banno

Why call it objective? It seems fairly obvious that there is no "thread" as an object "out there". Everything we do with the text (that's not actually stored as text anywhere outside our minds) is a mental exercise.

I already said I had no issue with using the term objective like you propose here, unless it's a discussion specifically about epistemology or metaphysics.

So back to the keys. You agree, I assume, that getting the keys out of the car does not consist in getting everyone to believe that the keys are out of the car... It's not the consensus that makes the fact true? So some how knowledge is consensus-based, but truth isn't? — Banno

Getting the keys is an action. Presumably, you can both feel and touch the keys. You don't need other people to tell you what you see and touch.

What's the fact you want to establish? That there are objectively (in the strict sense) keys in the car? I believe that to be impossible, on account of there being no objective source of information. If you want to ask "where (physically) are my (physical) keys", then the answer is whatever you conclude based on the available evidence. Theoretically, everyone with access to the same evidence should arrive at the same conclusion, but in case they don't, the consensus opinion would be most likely to have the desired result.

Again, it's not the consensus that leads to a statement's being true, though, is it? Although it might lead to our believing it to be true. — Banno

Depends on what your definition of true is. If I want a theory that will produce accurate results regardless of who applies it, that does depend on a consensus. If something works for me, but everyone else says it fails for them, then what I have is something subjective.

My position is that insofar as our knowledge about reality is based on experience, it's not objective.....

.....It stands to reason that the common elements in the experiences of different subjects are the result of objective reality asserting itself.....

......so the conclusion I arrive at (...) is that our knowledge about phenomenal, physical reality is indeed consensus-based. — Echarmion

The major: agreed, all empirical knowledge is grounded in experience, which is always subjective;

The minor: agreed, there is no reason to think, and it is counterproductive to suggest, that which appears to the sensibility of a plurality of perceiving subjects is not the same for each of them;

The conclusion: does not follow from the premises, in that consensus-based becomes the condition for the premises, rather than consensus alone being a valid judgement given from them.

A plurality of congruent individual knowledges is merely an agreement, and such commonality in itself cannot be sufficient reason for the knowledge, for it then becomes possible for agreement to be the ground of knowledge, which contradicts the major.

I may very well have direct experience, hence knowledge, of what I am told, but I still may not have the direct experience of what I am told about. This is the standing argument against “....the arrogant pretensions of the schools, which would gladly retain, in their own exclusive possession, the key to the truths which they impart to the public....”

Of no particular import, I know. But still.....gotta separate the subjective concept of knowledge from the objective domain of learning.

Yep, you don't have a concept of a subject. It figures. So what is your internal perspective then? If you're not a subject, what are you? — Echarmion

So, a subject is a view? Are you saying that is all that you are - a view of the world? The "internal vs. external" is a product of the same problem as the "physical vs. non-physical" - dualism. I am not just my view of the world. I am a human being - an organism of which my view is only one part.

Actually the problem is just as bad because no causal process to explain qualia has been discovered. If everything is objects, there'd have to be some physical process that converts, say, electric charge into feelings. You talk as if this process was common knowledge, but it's not, and you haven't provided any. — Echarmion

That' because you keep thinking in terms of physical vs. non-physical. You don't seem to be paying attention to what I'm saying. You seem to want to only promote your view as if it is objective - as if it is the case for not only you, but everyone else. Why do you think you keep trying to get me to agree and see things how you see them? What is the purpose of that?

I asked you how you move your "physical" arm with your "non-physical" mind? You need to show me the same respect that I have shown you and answer my questions. Do you agree or disagree that there is a causal relationship there? Do you disagree that there is a causal relationship between imagining flying to the Moon and the existence of "physical" rockets that fly human beings to the Moon? Could human beings travel to the Moon without first having imagined it and then imagined the plans for the design of a rocket ship to get them to the Moon?

Are you at all familiar with the whole "existence is not a predicate" argument? — Echarmion

The concept, "existence" is implied by the concept of "property".

First, anything I say wouldn’t be purely subjective, that being reserved for what I think. Second, for whatever I say, the use of it by others is up to them. — Mww

It seems to me that you can only talk about what you think and in talking about what you think, you are talking about part of the world. Subjectivity comes about by confusing what your mind is with what the rest of the world is.

If the use of what you say is up to others, what is the use of you saying it, for you? Why do you say anything if not for others to find the same use as you?

Generally, in philosophy the concept of objective is reserved for knowledge that refers to what is outside the mind of the subject. It can be forced to mean that in introspection the mind is both subject and object, but this is an exception to the rule that should be emphasized so as not to create confusion. — David Mo

Other minds are outside of my mind, and my mind is outside of their minds. So how do you reconcile the facts that you are a subject from your perspective but an object from other's perspective when we all share the same world?

You're talking about truth, right? Subjective truth versus intersubjective truth versus objective truth? If that's the case, then it's subjectively true that ice-cream tastes good, but objectively true that ice-cream tastes good to me. — Hanover

How can it be true that ice cream tastes good, if it doesn't taste good to others? It can only be true if it tastes good to you. There is no such thing as a subjective truth. A subjective truth is a category error.

You're talking about truth, right? Subjective truth versus intersubjective truth versus objective truth? If that's the case, then it's subjectively true that ice-cream tastes good, but objectively true that ice-cream tastes good to me. — Hanover

How can it be true that ice cream tastes good, if it doesn't taste good to others? It can only be true if it tastes good to you. There is no such thing as a subjective truth. A subjective truth is a category error.

The shift is towards that which results in greater survivability. The bee sees the world in a way that leads to his survival. Those who smell garbage as sweet probably don't survive well, regardless of what garbage really smells like, whatever that means. — Hanover

Think about how shit smells to dung beetles.

How can it be true that ice cream tastes good, if it doesn't taste good to others? It can only be true if it tastes good to you. There is no such thing as a subjective truth. A subjective truth is a category error. — Harry Hindu

So, if I taste ice cream, and it tastes good to me, but it doesn't taste good to you, and I say "Ice cream tastes good to me," is that statement true or false? You've claimed it can't be true, so all I'm left with is false. So ice cream doesn't taste good to me even though I think it does?

I think you replied too hastily. Read what I said again.

I said that "ice cream taste good to you" is [objectively] true. This is a case where you didn't confuse some property of your mind with some property of the ice cream. You are explicitly stating something about the state of you, not the ice cream.

In saying "ice cream is good", you are not explicitly stating something about you, but about the ice cream.

Is "good" a property of you when tasting ice cream, or the ice cream without having been tasted?

So how do you reconcile the facts that you are a subject from your perspective but an object from other's perspective when we all share the same world? — Harry Hindu

Reconcile? It's a fact that I'm an object for others. Two points:
The perception of the other as someone who looks at me implies that I perceive them as another consciousness in the same world.
And we can feel that we have a common existence in the fact that we can share the same project. That is, in practice.

Therefore, intersubjectivity is not a feature of consciousness alone, but of human existence as a whole. It begins with language and continues in acts. Or vice versa.

Reconcile? It's a fact that I'm an object for others.

Two points:
The perception of the other as someone who looks at me implies that I perceive them as another consciousness in the same world.
And we can feel that we have a common existence in the fact that we can share the same project. That is, in practice.

Therefore, intersubjectivity is not a feature of consciousness alone, but of human existence as a whole. It begins with language and continues in acts. Or vice versa. — David Mo

If you refer to yourself as a "subject", and others refer to you as an "object", are we both talking about the same thing, or are we talking past each other?

It seems to me that you can only talk about what you think — Harry Hindu

Of course; whatever is said is first thought, yes.

Subjectivity comes about by confusing what your mind is with what the rest of the world is. — Harry Hindu

If you prefer, so be it. I do not. Mind is a human construct given from pure reason, subjectivity being nothing but the consequence of such construction. It is hardly a confusion, insofar as the rest of the world cannot be blamed for human intellectual error, so theoretical subjectivity was invented to take the fall, and speculative epistemological philosophy was invented to, if not correct the fall, at least to make the fall less painful.

If the use of what you say is up to others, what is the use of you saying it, for you? — Harry Hindu

Your subtlety is well-noted. Irreducibly? For me? To assuage the ego, of course. What else? Not the blatant uncontrolled “I’m right, you’re a farging moron” ego, just the half-assed reclusive, take it or leave it, I don’t really care ego. Transcendental rather than Freudian.

Mind is a human construct given from pure reason, subjectivity being nothing but the consequence of such construction. It is hardly a confusion, insofar as the rest of the world cannot be blamed for human intellectual error, so theoretical subjectivity was invented to take the fall, and speculative epistemological philosophy was invented to, if not correct the fall, at least to make the fall less painful. — Mww

Your subtlety is well-noted. Irreducibly? For me? To assuage the ego, of course. What else? Not the blatant uncontrolled “I’m right, you’re a farging moron” ego, just the half-assed reclusive, take it or leave it, I don’t really care ego. Transcendental rather than Freudian. — Mww

So, then we are not to take your previous quote seriously, as if it bears some truth, or is representative of of some state-of-affairs independent of you thinking it? Your words aren't about the world, but are about your ego?

I guess "intersubjective reality" is a metaphor. — David Mo

If I’m interpreting you correctly: I know this would be a vast debate on its own. Feel free to disagree, of course. But for me, “reality” is merely the noun form of the adjective “real” which, in turn, is intended to signify “actually existing or occurring - rather than fictional”. My recollection of a dream I had last night would, given this semantic, be real - and, by extension, would thereby be a part of my intra-subjective reality: one experience among others which actually exists or occurs for me but for no one else. If this dream was real and I’d express it to you, I’d express a truth; if unreal, I’d express a falsehood. In the same general way, because English (by which I include all semantics particular to the English language) is an actual, rather than fictitious, medium via which English speakers communicate, and because the English language is not the intra-subjective reality of one individual but is, instead, an actuality whose very occurrence necessitates commonality among a plurality of beings, the English language will then hold an intersubjective reality - i.e., will be intersubjectively real.

This usage of “realtiy” is in keeping with common usage, as in, “they live in a different reality than we do” - as can be affirmed for the flat earth society. Here is not implicitly referenced objective reality - which “reality” is most often employed to express - but, instead, a belief structure of what is real via which individuals interpret the objective world and act within it. Differently exemplified, those who are Young Earth Creationists will hence dwell in a different intersubjective reality than those who accept the validity of biological evolution - the two cohorts' belief structures in essence make each inhabit a vastly different (interpretation of) cosmology relative to the other - yet both cohorts will nevertheless inhabit and be bound by the same objective reality. The YEC doesn’t deny the presence of dinosaur fossils, for example, this being a facet of objective reality - but does (I presume) believe that they were placed here by God to test their faith in their notion of God … this latter shared belief then being a facet of the YEC’s intersubjective reality.

Yes, there could be countless intersubjective realities. The reason I used the singular so far is that I was concerned with the idealised "human" intersubjective reality, i.e. what would result if there were no bias, mistakes etc. While that will never practically be the case, it serves as my baseline for what could be called "practical reality". — Echarmion

The case could be also made that each species of animal shares its own species-specific intersubjective reality. A human, a dog, and an ant will interpret the objective reality of a rock differently, given the species-specific proclivities of perception and interpretation peculiar to each. But, here again, there would not be existent just one species-specific intersubjectivity, but a multitude of these; each one relative to a different species of life. All the same, I now understand what you were getting at.

It'd be more a question of what you think the order is: do the objects develop subjectivity, or do the subjects develop objects? — Echarmion

In case this question wasn’t rhetorical: My own understanding of ontology addresses this question in horrendously complex manners. Currently, I’d rather be remain a mute about it - though I will simplistically express that, to me, subjectivity is ultimately conditional on objectivity.

So, then we are not to take your previous quote seriously, — Harry Hindu

I posted one quote concerning the “pretensions of the schools”; treat it as you wish, hopefully in context.

Your words aren't about the world, but are about your ego? — Harry Hindu

Depends. If the topic has empirical predicates the words will be about the world, conditioned by the pure intuitions and having natural law as its irreducible ground. If the topic has rational predicates, the words will be about speculative manifestations of the intellect, conditioned by pure reason and having the ego as its irreducible ground. And n’er the twain shall meet. The value of expressions in words to one mind, cannot be determined by the origination of them in another.

In this Platonic pseudo-elenchus we got goin’ on here....if you are Socrates, which interlocutor might I be?

I can't verify firsthand that your subjective experience of English is the same as my own. The backbone of your statement is that it must be objectively true that we're communicating, but one could doubt even this. Neither does the fact that I'm using what I believe to be English tell me anything about what English actually is. I'm certainly not objective about it; I'm tied in to my own experience of it.

The major: agreed, all empirical knowledge is grounded in experience, which is always subjective;

The minor: agreed, there is no reason to think, and it is counterproductive to suggest, that which appears to the sensibility of a plurality of perceiving subjects is not the same for each of them;

The conclusion: does not follow from the premises, in that consensus-based becomes the condition for the premises, rather than consensus alone being a valid judgement given from them.

A plurality of congruent individual knowledges is merely an agreement, and such commonality in itself cannot be sufficient reason for the knowledge, for it then becomes possible for agreement to be the ground of knowledge, which contradicts the major. — Mww

You're right, the conclusion as written contradicts the major. I think I have unnecessarily doubled up on the knowledge part. It should actually be the other way round: the a consensus of individual knowledge forms our shared physical reality.

So, a subject is a view? Are you saying that is all that you are - a view of the world? The "internal vs. external" is a product of the same problem as the "physical vs. non-physical" - dualism. I am not just my view of the world. I am a human being - an organism of which my view is only one part. — Harry Hindu

The view still has to be explained though. If the universe is just a bunch of objects strung together by cause and effect, how is it possible for some object to have an internal perspective?

Why do you think you keep trying to get me to agree and see things how you see them? What is the purpose of that? — Harry Hindu

This is a philosophy forum. I am not saying there isn't anything objective or true.

I asked you how you move your "physical" arm with your "non-physical" mind? You need to show me the same respect that I have shown you and answer my questions. Do you agree or disagree that there is a causal relationship there? — Harry Hindu

My physical brain is moving my physical arm. Whatever the mind does beyond the physical I don't know. The physical phenomena are representations of the non-physical reality. So the mind is not strictly speaking in a causal relationship with anything physical.

Do you disagree that there is a causal relationship between imagining flying to the Moon and the existence of "physical" rockets that fly human beings to the Moon? Could human beings travel to the Moon without first having imagined it and then imagined the plans for the design of a rocket ship to get them to the Moon? — Harry Hindu

That's a good point. The imagination does seem so be necessary to cause the following developments. But if you were to look at the chain of events that led from, say, the evolution of humans to spaceflight, where would you find the imagination? Could it be described?

we deal with millions of much smaller beliefs — Coben

It's good that you draw attention to this. Overwhelmingly, folk share the same beliefs. We just tend to spend more time on the stuff about which we disagree.

Hence the Principle of Charity; interpret the utterances of others so as to maximise agreement.

My question was whether true statements, when we think of the vast array of them we send around each day are more likely to be convincing and thus become consensus. — Coben

One might suppose so. The confusion, which we have apparently avoided, is to think that it is the consensus that makes some utterance true.

Of course there are trivial exceptions: "Most folk think Trump is dangerous" will be true if and only if most folk think Trump is dangerous; in such cases the consensus is what makes the utterance true.

My point that true statement don't glow green or something, thus showing their truth. You have to dig. And what you dig into is justification. — Coben

Hmm. Well, some statements do sort of glow green. I'm thinking of Moore's "Here is a hand"; statements which it makes little sense to doubt. And hereby hang many philosophical issues.

One might suppose so. The confusion, which we have apparently avoided, is to think that it is the consensus that makes some utterance true. — Banno

Yes, I don't believe that to be the case. I mean, I agree with you. The consensus sure can be wrong.

Of course there are trivial exceptions: "Most folk think Trump is dangerous" will be true if and only if most folk think Trump is dangerous; in such cases the consensus is what makes the utterance true. — Banno

It could also hold for value judgments. If everyone thinks it's rude to put your elbows on the table, well, it is.

Sure. I am not saying that one should doubt them. Though you might be dreaming. But my point is not so much how one should act in the world or to create some radical doubt or brain in a vat type 'really going on thing'. In the situation with the hand this statement is one where we have vast experience, an internal automatic justification. We intuitively 'look at the justification'. And I think I actually would have a tiny pause if someone said that to me. IOW I might even notice my justification flash through my mind when I finally decided he was asserting the obvious (to me because of my experiential base). It's an odd thing to say. I'd be searching for the context. Though that's tangential for my own amusement.

theoretically we can obtain a more accurate view of truth — Possibility

Not too sure what you are doing here. Is it that the more "perceived potential information of a subject" there is, the better our definition of "true"?

It is in the information which specifically differs from our own perspective that we obtain a more accurate view of truth. — Possibility

Of what is true, ir of what "true" is? De dicto or de re?

It seems we are in a philosophical somewhat tedious state of agreement...

My apologies.

Why call it objective? It seems fairly obvious that there is no "thread" as an object "out there". — Echarmion

That's an odd thing to say. There is a thread that I see, you see, Coben sees,

Now it can't just be in your head, since both Coben and I also see it. And further we each see the same thread - and post to it.

SO I'd go so far as to say that here you seem to be wrong.

That's alright. We have @Echarmion.

If you want to ask "where (physically) are my (physical) keys", then the answer is whatever you conclude based on the available evidence. — Echarmion

That seems to be wrong, too, as a general rule. WE do after all make incorrect conclusions from the available evidence.

What I want to emphasis here is that the evidence does not make something true; rather the evidence leads it our belief.

That is, that belief and truth are quite distinct.