One thing I don’t get about antinatalism is how the same arguments for it aren’t also arguments for suicide, or even arguments for mass euthanasia. If life is suffering and nothing can fundamentally be done to improve that, and nothing else is worth putting up with it, then best to end all life as quickly and painlessly as possible, no? If not that conclusion, then something in the arguments leading to it must be wrong. — Pfhorrest

I think hidden in these sorts of questions is the assumption that if life isn't miserable enough to lethally harm yourself, then it's worth procreating. This is an incredibly low standard to hold for the quality of a life worth starting. Regardless, there is a fundamental distinction between continuing a life, and starting a life for another. Those of us living are already caught up in the world, embedded within a social and political structure. We have friendships and familial relations (who, presumably, would be negatively affected by ones suicide). The living, in most cases, also have their own ends and aims, desires and wants. Most people have things they want to see and do - things to look forward to. And more fundamentally, the evolutionary ingrained instinct to live and survive is embedded deep within our psyche, and requires a desperate suffering to overcome. These all bind one to the world, keeping us caught up in the striving-towards that characterizes our lives. Whereas the unborn (in my view), are unburdened by these binds.

You've characterized the antinatalist as inhabiting a sort of suicidal despair, which (for the most part), I think is not the case. It's not all gloom and doom - living has it's goods and pleasures, it's moments of significance and meaning. The problem is that these are set against a backdrop of dissatisfaction, an incompleteness, a 'never-quite-satisfied' - all of which drive an ultimately aimless striving, one that culminates in aging, sickness, and death (if a violent act or accident doesn't kill you first). Recognizing that the unborn want and lack for nothing, what good or benefit is it to be burdened with the same bodily, social, and existential needs that befall us already here?

As you might remember I am hardly a antinatalist, and I don't think I can be classed as a pessimist, but I am right with you in this thread. These guys are trying to do an end run around actually making arguments against one of your arguments. They have shifted to a meta-argument. Antinatalism includes the presence of emotion X, or antinatalism is caused by a preponderance of mood/attitude/emotion X, so we can class it as irrational. There are two problems with this: one you've pointed out and I agree entirely...all philosophical other revelant positions and ethical stances include emotions and values. The other point being that essentially this is all ad hom. They are focused on your emotions rather than your arguments.

As you might remember I am hardly a antinatalist, and I don't think I can be classed as a pessimist, but I am right with you in this thread. These guys are trying to do an end run around actually making arguments against one of your arguments. They have shifted to a meta-argument. Antinatalism includes the presence of emotion X, or antinatalism is caused by a preponderance of mood/attitude/emotion X, so we can class it as irrational. There are two problems with this: one you've pointed out and I agree entirely...all philosophical other revelant positions and ethical stances include emotions and values. The other point being that essentially this is all ad hom. They are focused on your emotions rather than your arguments. — Coben

Yes, excellent job explaining exactly what is going on here.

I think hidden in these sorts of questions is the assumption that if life isn't miserable enough to lethally harm yourself, then it's worth procreating. This is an incredibly low standard to hold for the quality of a life worth starting. Regardless, there is a fundamental distinction between continuing a life, and starting a life for another. Those of us living are already caught up in the world, embedded within a social and political structure. We have friendships and familial relations (who, presumably, would be negatively affected by ones suicide). The living, in most cases, also have their own ends and aims, desires and wants. Most people have things they want to see and do - things to look forward to. And more fundamentally, the evolutionary ingrained instinct to live and survive is embedded deep within our psyche, and requires a desperate suffering to overcome. These all bind one to the world, keeping us caught up in the striving-towards that characterizes our lives. Whereas the unborn (in my view), are unburdened by these binds.

You've characterized the antinatalist as inhabiting a sort of suicidal despair, which (for the most part), I think is not the case. It's not all gloom and doom - living has it's goods and pleasures, it's moments of significance and meaning. The problem is that these are set against a backdrop of dissatisfaction, an incompleteness, a 'never-quite-satisfied' - all of which drive an ultimately aimless striving, one that culminates in aging, sickness, and death (if a violent act or accident doesn't kill you first). Recognizing that the unborn want and lack for nothing, what good or benefit is it to be burdened with the same bodily, social, and existential needs that befall us already here? — Inyenzi

Wow Inyenzi, another powerful and insightful post. Very well-stated and gets to the heart of the philosophical pessimist stance.

I thought it was in this thread, but I can't find the post to respond to now, so I'll just reply at the end here.

Someone said that if life was intrinsically worth living, then we would be satisfied with just existing. From experience, I know that that is sometimes the case, but it occurs to me it's also easy to illustrate that it could be the case, for those who have never experienced it first hand.

Imagine someone has an unlimited slow drip of some drug that gave them a constant nice little high, maybe an opiate of some kind, such that, in the absence of all other stimuli, just sitting or laying around somewhere, they just feel this slightly warm happy feeling and are just content doing nothing, happy just to lay there and feel good from the drug. They will eventually get hungry, and the hunger pains will eventually overpower the pleasure of the drug, and drive them to go get some food, but once their appetite is sated they'll go back to just having that nice slightly warm happy feeling and being content doing whatever. Likewise, all their other bodily needs. Meanwhile, other activities can still bring them even more pleasure, so they have motive to go and do other pleasurable things when they can. But so long as their basic needs are met, they don't need constant new stimulation, because they've always got this constant little bit of pleasure feeding into them from this little drug drip.

All such drugs mimic substances that the body produces naturally; that's why we have receptors that react to them the way that our brains do. Your body is capable of producing "drugs" from inside itself that can put you in exactly such a state, where merely existing is enjoyable in and of itself, not in some catatonic drugged-out way but in a way that you're happy just continuing to be alive and don't need for unlimited entertainment or something. Some people's bodies produce more of these "drugs", others produce less of them, and both genetics and life experiences can affect how much the body makes.

I think most children are born in a state where just existing is inherently enjoyable, though of course there are pains that can overpower that, and other pleasures that can be had beyond that. I remember being that way when I was young, and I think I probably somehow managed to stay that way much later into life than many other people, and also had plentiful experiences of that taken up to 11, the so-called "mystical" or "religious" experiences of meaningful wonder and bliss about nothing in particular. Life experiences, the pains and pleasures thereof, had largely beaten that out of me, and I think do the same for most other people, seemingly much faster for many others than for me.

So if a child can be raised in a way that will spare them that roller-coaster of a life that leaves them without the joy of just existing -- that ontophilia -- that they were born with, then it will have been worth bringing them into the world. They will probably still die eventually, but they'll probably look back and say it was worth it. It may be very hard to spare anyone such a roller coaster of pains and pleasures and preserve that ontophilia, maybe even as hard as keeping them alive forever, but "very hard" doesn't mean "impossible". It is therefore an individual, case-by-case calculation about whether any particular life is more probably worth bringing into the world than not. It may still be the case that in many, many cases it reasonable is not worth it -- I don't have kids for precisely the reason that I don't think I can give them a life worth living -- but you can't make a blanket proclamation that it is always better not to exist than to exist.

Honestly, I think you know that, Shawn.. It sounds like you are trolling me.. Trying to argue for arguing's sake rather than have much to say about it. You called me out, you wanted me to argue with you.. Here I am.. But why did you single me out on this one? Seems like trollish behavior, not in good faith, but to simply antagonize for antagonizing's sake.. but that's just a hunch at this point.. I'd like to see posts that show otherwise, but I'm afraid it's going to be tit-for-tat one-upsmanship and not a productive conversation.. But please prove me wrong. — schopenhauer1

Let me be brief and simply state what seems apparent about philosophical pessimism. Namely the slippery confirmation bias that a person might hold towards the world and it's structural features in regards to a sad existence.

Inherently, philosophical pessimism only makes sense when your sad IFF it really is based on a mood. Now, get this, does a philosophical pessimist implode when they feel happy. How do you rationalize THOSE happy feelings?

How do you rationalize THOSE happy feelings? — Shawn

I'm not going to talk to you on this as you have ignored all previous posts related to this topic, from those of myself and others on here. I've noticed this odd pattern with you.. You did it on another thread. I don't see you arguing in good faith, but arguing to argue. I'm not sure if anyone else sees this, but that's how I see it.

Well, I'm not aware of a legitimate answer since, and feel free to call me a troll or whatever, you paint the issue with a large brush (gross overgeneralization). And I can legitimately use that term as emotions stand in high regard towards the issue of philosophical pessimism.

See all the posts I wrote first. Look at what Inyenzi wrote. Already answered this sufficiently. What else are you looking for? But you see, nothing is going to answer to your satisfaction because you will always say it is from mood or emotion. I'm not sure what else you are going to need to your satisfaction, because I don't think there will be and it would be useless arguing further in that case. You either specifically pick out what I wrote in response throughout the thread or not. But I'm not discussing further unless you address what I said, really try to understand it, and then really try to understand the answers. Also, what is your motivations to even care about this issue. If you don't agree with the premises of the model, why does it concern you so? Thus does protest too much. Go find another issue if this is so beneath you as just a mood. Doesn't make sense except again, if your goal is to troll in your boredom or whatnot, on this site.

I think of it as an aesthetic understanding of the world.
— schopenhauer1

Aesthetics? As in deriving joy in a position that discounts life itself? — Shawn

@schopenhauer1, please address this, as it was foreshadowing my recent questions.

OK, I'll try and address the issue of philosophical pessimism and emotions. I mean, how can you talk about philosophical pessimism without referring to emotions? Is that even possible? How do you address this facet of phil. pessimism?

OK, I'll try and address the issue of philosophical pessimism and emotions. I mean, how can you talk about philosophical pessimism without referring to emotions? Is that even possible? How do you address this facet of phil. pessimism? — Shawn

This is the last time, otherwise I am not responding to you on this thread. Look at all my answers throughout the thread. Also take a look at Inyenzi's thread, as I mentioned before.

This is the last time, otherwise I am not responding to you on this thread. Look at all my answers throughout the thread. Also take a look at Inyenzi's thread, as I mentioned before. — schopenhauer1

Yes, excellent job explaining exactly what is going on here. — schopenhauer1

OK, so I will address what @Coben has said and which you agree with.

Namely, two points:

1. Treating philosophical pessimism as a meta-ethical issue.
2. Regarding treating emotions themselves as a means to ridicule or some pejorative towards the speaker him/herself.

Regarding, point 1, I have to say that this seems unavoidable if philosophical pessimism is based on emotions. And, if it isn't based on emotions, then I must have, either, am misinformed or comitted some logical fallacy.

Regarding, point 2, I believe that there's nothing wrong with addressing emotions as a source of power towards the notion that life is brutish and harsh, which I myself accept. Just recently, I started wondering why can't humans develop tolerance towards depression, which might as well be the first question I will ask God once I die.

Let me be brief and simply state what seems apparent about philosophical pessimism. Namely the slippery confirmation bias that a person might hold towards the world and it's structural features in regards to a sad existence. — Shawn

Any attitude or emotion you have towards life will result in this same issue. However, I tend to disagree that sadness is necessary to be a philosophical pessimist, as your title suggests. I would argue that all that is needed is to recognize prevalence of suffering in life, and that due to our mortality, it is unavoidable. This is similar to the roots of Buddhism. Philosophical pessimism is the result of acknowledging this truth about life, and attempting to find a solution to the problem, but ultimately failing to do so. Therefore, all that can be done is to resign yourself to the position that life has put you in.

rg

Regarding, point 1, I have to say that this seems unavoidable if philosophical pessimism is based on emotions. And, if it isn't based on emotions, then I must have, either, am misinformed or comitted some logical fallacy. — Shawn

1) he presents arguments, so these must be defeated. If a specific argument depends on an emotion, then one can criticize that step in the argument, at least potentially. But we are humans who have tendencies, so even including emotions as a step might be justified, if one could show that this is a general reaction. 2) you'd need to demonstrate that your philosophy is not based on emotions. And despair can drive one, for example, to an optimistic philosophy, which one then clings to to hold that emotion at bay. People turn to religion, Stoicism, Buddhism, pollyanish philosophies as a way to get out of despair. They may howeve present perfectly argued positions on things and their positions need to be focused on. 3) you'd also need to demonstrate that the philosopical position did not lead to the pessimism. IOW what is causal here? Emotions caused the philosophical position or rational assessment of X led to pessimism.

Regarding, point 2, I believe that there's nothing wrong with addressing emotions as a source of power towards the notion that life is brutish and harsh, which I myself accept. Just recently, I started wondering why can't humans develop tolerance towards depression, which might as well be the first question I will ask God once I die. — Shawn

That's great but not quite relevant here. It's all to the man, ad hom. You have a metacritique of his philosophy based on an ad hom. And you have a kind attitude towards people who are depressed, which is also to the man, though here appropriately since it is focused not on arguments.

Depression and pessimism are not the same thing by the way. You can be pessimistic without being depressed. And even a depressed person can mount an extremely good argument.

That's great but not quite relevant here. It's all to the man, ad hom. You have a metacritique of his philosophy based on an ad hom. And you have a kind attitude towards people who are depressed, which is also to the man, though here appropriately since it is focused not on arguments. — Coben

Uhh, I think everyone has emotions, so it seems appropriate here as far as I know. The question seems to me to be about the emotions that invalidate pessimism. Such as happiness or joy?

Uhh, I think everyone has emotions, so it seems appropriate here as far as I know. — Shawn

You think what is appropriate?

Such as happiness or joy? — Shawn

So, you are arguing that those emotions invalidate pessimism. This means that emotions can lead on to rational conclusions, which is the opposite of the OP's position.

It seems to me the OP is a way to avoid dealing with S's arguments. Hej, guys can't I just ignore his positions since they are based on emotion.

So, you are arguing that those emotions invalidate pessimism. This means that emotions can lead on to rational conclusions, which is the opposite of the OP's position. — Coben

Well, there's this term is cognitive science called 'emotional reasoning' that deserves a mention here in my opinion.

I'm not sure if every emotion leads to the right conclusions, but it seems that getting along in or with life in terms of non-dysphoric attitudes results in what philosophers call a good life. Hope that made sense.

Your mind is always, already, and forever coloured. — Banno

@schopenhauer1

Firstly, one major flaw of discussing on an online forum is, I think, a lot of things get lost in translation. I will again run the risk of being misinterpreted, unless my post entails further counter-arguments. Also, I'll try, as much as I can, to stay relevant to the topic at hand, which is:

Does my mood determine what philosophical stance I hold or in other words does my psychological state of being at any given time distort my perception of that which is actual (I think, these two are the same questions because my philosophical view of the world at any given point should ideally correlate directly with my perception of what actually is)?

The mind is coloured, yes. Which is to say, the mind is conditioned. It has, since the day it was born, taken in very keenly everything that it has been fed. That constitutes the image a person assumes. I am what I associate myself with. I am a doctor, professor, scientist. I am a pessimist, optimist, nihilist. I am a communist, socialist, capitalist. I am smart, dull.

Now, what triggers mood change? My mood changes when there is conflict, when there is an attack on my image, my ego. I consider myself smart, someone calls me dumb, my mood changes. I have a world view, someone comes along and says your world view is full of holes, my mood changes.

So, anything that challenges our ego changes our moods. Now, as long as there is an ego it will get hurt. In the same way, if there is no ego, there is nothing left to get hurt. Is it possible to get rid of my ego, my self? Practically, no.

Now, for the sake of arguement let's consider a person, A, who has no ego i.e, no sense of self and another person, B, whose ego or self is very active. A can never get hurt. Can A be a pessimist? Sure, by definition of pessimism, he can be a pessimist. But, he's not a pessimist because he was hurt or traumatized or bullied; he's incapable of being hurt or traumatized or bullied. He's a pessimist because his mind is not conditioned and hence allowing him to see things as they really are. His pessimism doesn't defend his ego, his pessimism is universal. He sees that the world is full of suffering, pain and hardship but, is not in any way moved by that. He sees that there is death, disease and degradation but he accepts those things as normal, as the law.

Person B on the other hand is hurt. He is traumatized, he has suffered enough. He has been rendered depressed by all that is ugly in this world. His ego is hurt. He didn't expect the world to be like this. His image of the world was flowery and that has been hurt. Out of that he's a pessimist. His pessimism will continue to haunt him thoroughout his life, because, there will always be this conflict with his image of himself and his ideal world and how the world actually is.

So, in conclusion, yes pessimisim may be a product of one's mood. But, that shouldn't always be the case.

I think your argument is to the point.

Well, there's this term is cognitive science called 'emotional reasoning' that deserves a mention here in my opinion. — Shawn

If he is reasoning emotionally, then demonstate it. That would be a step or steps in his argument. What you are going in this thread is just labeling what he is doing without engaging with it. It is certainly a valid topic, but again, you specified him AND you linked him to the thread.

Do you ever wonder what you might be doing by doing that?

IOW you are talking about someone in front of and to others, in a public space.

What are the emotions driving that? To Schopenaur it amounts to... Hey, I wanted you to know that I am asking others if we can just dismiss your arguments without interacting with them.To other people it amounts to...Hey guys, there this guy here who reasons emotionally. I can just dismiss his arguments, right?

Given your responses here, that all seems rather passive aggressive, another psychological term that might deserve a mention here, to paraphrase you.

If the topic is can people be having emotional reactions that they then project onto reality, sure.

If his reasoning is faulty - which the cognitive science definition of emotional reasoning entails - then that is where the philosophical focus should be if you are involved someone you are criticising.

You could also have a thread discussing emotional reasoning, which is a peachy topic.

I'm not sure if every emotion leads to the right conclusions, but it seems that getting along in or with life in terms of non-dysphoric attitudes results in what philosophers call a good life. Hope that made sense. — Shawn

Any emotion could be involved in a strong argument. Any emotion could be involved in a poor argument. And likewise regarding conclusions.

Look, you asked, I responded. some of my points you haven't responded to. The one about how you should be able to refute his arguments if they are based on emotional reasoning, you haven't directly responded to. IOW I could read your postt and not even be sure you read mine carefully at all. I can see how parts of this last one might be a response to my previous post, but not necessarily.

Anyway, I'm done.

1) he presents arguments, so these must be defeated. If a specific argument depends on an emotion, then one can criticize that step in the argument, at least potentially. But we are humans who have tendencies, so even including emotions as a step might be justified, if one could show that this is a general reaction. 2) you'd need to demonstrate that your philosophy is not based on emotions. And despair can drive one, for example, to an optimistic philosophy, which one then clings to to hold that emotion at bay. People turn to religion, Stoicism, Buddhism, pollyanish philosophies as a way to get out of despair. They may howeve present perfectly argued positions on things and their positions need to be focused on. 3) you'd also need to demonstrate that the philosopical position did not lead to the pessimism. IOW what is causal here? Emotions caused the philosophical position or rational assessment of X led to pessimism. — Coben

Great points. Can't add much else.

That's great but not quite relevant here. It's all to the man, ad hom. You have a metacritique of his philosophy based on an ad hom. And you have a kind attitude towards people who are depressed, which is also to the man, though here appropriately since it is focused not on arguments. — Coben

This is the heart of what is so wrong with this whole thread and argumentation. Again, well-stated.

Depression and pessimism are not the same thing by the way. You can be pessimistic without being depressed. And even a depressed person can mount an extremely good argument. — Coben

This is another good point. You can have depressed people that are not philosophical pessimists. You can have relatively happy people that are philosophical pessimists. Either Shawn doesn't care what the actual position of philosophical pessimism is, or again, arguing in bad faith. Either way, his arguing becomes more and more suspect the less he acknowledges this and tries to dodge pointed questions and responses.

So, you are arguing that those emotions invalidate pessimism. This means that emotions can lead on to rational conclusions, which is the opposite of the OP's position. — Coben

Good point!!

If he is reasoning emotionally, then demonstate it. That would be a step or steps in his argument. What you are going in this thread is just labeling what he is doing without engaging with it. It is certainly a valid topic, but again, you specified him AND you linked him to the thread.

Do you ever wonder what you might be doing by doing that?

IOW you are talking about someone in front of and to others, in a public space.

What are the emotions driving that? To Schopenaur it amounts to... Hey, I wanted you to know that I am asking others if we can just dismiss your arguments without interacting with them.To other people it amounts to...Hey guys, there this guy here who reasons emotionally. I can just dismiss his arguments, right? — Coben

Yes, this looks to be exactly what is going on here. Well explained. I called it not arguing in good faith earlier, but this is a very clear explanation of the kind of thing I'm talking about. If he wants to look at my arguments, do so. But he's got to stop with just ad homing.

Given your responses here, that all seems rather passive aggressive, another psychological term that might deserve a mention here, to paraphrase you. — Coben

Yep. Again, astute observation.

Look, you asked, I responded. some of my points you haven't responded to. The one about how you should be able to refute his arguments if they are based on emotional reasoning, you haven't directly responded to. IOW I could read your postt and not even be sure you read mine carefully at all. I can see how parts of this last one might be a response to my previous post, but not necessarily. — Coben

Yes, he did that to me too. He started this thread, and does not appear to be reading any of the answers- one's which I pointed him to. He is either not getting the answers he wants, or is looking to troll and not have a real conversation. I called it arguing in bad faith, or not arguing in good faith, but you have articulated in more detail what seems to be going on here. Again, excellent and astute observations.

:smile: And for the record I am not an antinatalist. I would find it hard to say if I am a pessimist or optimist, certainly I am a blend. My philosophy is extremely dark in many places, though I think it would have to be classed as optimistic. But then about myself, woh, lots of pessimism, with optimism the dark horse in that race. But saying this I am saying that I am not defending someone because I share their positions. I am just focused on what is happening in the thread and the position the OP and some other posts seemed to imply or state about the lack of need to consider his arguments.

And Coben, I also recognize you don't agree with certain positions of antinatalism/pessimism. If I remember, you are vehemently against certain things. Sometimes it is the kind of argument that you can disagree with, not necessarily the position itself.

yes, I suppose part of the hope we each have is we get better at explaining and justifying things, calling out bs, and a verbal jujitsu in general. Converts are rare if that's why we're here. And 'the truth' is more likely to be found face to face with another human or training a squid to count, say. Experiences really challenge our positions in ways words on a screen rarely do.

yes, I suppose part of the hope we each have is we get better at explaining and justifying things, calling out bs, and a verbal jujitsu in general. Converts are rare if that's why we're here. And 'the truth' is more likely to be found face to face with another human or training a squid to count, say. Experiences really challenge our positions in ways words on a screen rarely do. — Coben

Yeah I'd tend to agree.

Any attitude or emotion you have towards life will result in this same issue. However, I tend to disagree that sadness is necessary to be a philosophical pessimist, as your title suggests. I would argue that all that is needed is to recognize prevalence of suffering in life, and that due to our mortality, it is unavoidable. This is similar to the roots of Buddhism. Philosophical pessimism is the result of acknowledging this truth about life, and attempting to find a solution to the problem, but ultimately failing to do so. Therefore, all that can be done is to resign yourself to the position that life has put you in. — Pinprick

Yes, excellent point. I'm just going to respond by reiterating so far one of the best reiterations I've seen of philosophical pessimism:

You've characterized the antinatalist as inhabiting a sort of suicidal despair, which (for the most part), I think is not the case. It's not all gloom and doom - living has it's goods and pleasures, it's moments of significance and meaning. The problem is that these are set against a backdrop of dissatisfaction, an incompleteness, a 'never-quite-satisfied' - all of which drive an ultimately aimless striving, one that culminates in aging, sickness, and death (if a violent act or accident doesn't kill you first). Recognizing that the unborn want and lack for nothing, what good or benefit is it to be burdened with the same bodily, social, and existential needs that befall us already here? — Inyenzi

Also, I'd like to separate some of my own reasonings from others:

Arthur Schopenhauer: All is actually Will. We are living in a sort of maya (illusion) of Representation, that is nonetheless part of the scheme of Will. It strives, but for nothing. It is manifested via time, space, causality into individuated events or objects. Will, from the subjective viewpoint leads to frustration, boredom (when one is not occupied with goals that seem to provide relief but really don't), and survival instincts. The way to diminish the suffering of unrequited striving, is to diminish one's own will-to-live to approaching 0. That is to say "deny the will-to-live". For him, this amounts to being an extreme ascetic. Only certain people with the characters to do this, will probably achieve this (he was sort of an essentialist about people's innate character). Suicide would not be the appropriate response, because it is using one's will to fight will, and that is still using will, so will not work.

David Benatar: There is no overarching scheme of metaphysics here (like in Schopenhauer). There is no unfolding of reality to a subject of understanding about the nature or reality. Rather, it is a very discreet form of ethics that combines some deontology but mainly based on negative utilitarianism. Rather, the focus is on maximizing good while alive but minimizing pain by not having future people. While it is best to maximize pleasures if already alive, one has no duties to make happy people. Rather, we do seem to have a duty to prevent suffering people. His main argument is what he sees as an asymmetry for considering future people. If we consider having a child, that "potential" that could exist, does not exist yet to suffer, which is ALWAYS a good thing. However, that "potential" that could exist, does not experience pleasure/good which is NOT a bad thing (or good thing) because that potential "person" does not actually exist to be deprived of the goods of life to begin with. Thus it is ALWAYS better to prevent harm, even though there is no person who might exist to appreciate this.

My ideas: So I have sort of a combination of both in my philosophy. I agree much with Schopenhauer's view that reality does seem to be striving-but-for-nothing.
1) I add to this the idea of the absurd. It is the absurd repetition that also adds to the suffering

2) I add to this the idea of three major categories of existence: Survival (production/consumption/labor/shelter, etc. in some sort of system- whether hunting-gathering on one side or advanced industrial on the other, it doesn't matter), comfort (not necessarily survival but our tendency to pursue comfort.. warmth, cleanliness, orderliness, maintenance, etc.), and entertainment (anything not survival or comfort related that keeps our minds occupied so as not to think of existential problems, like boredom or the absurdity, or why, etc. To find some sort of meaning or flow states, etc. ). These categories are kind of an elaboration of the striving-for-nothing Will of Schopenhauer's original conception. It is just parcing it out.

3) Due to our own needs of survival, comfort, entertainment, humans together can't help but create the epiphenomena of socio-political-economic systems which in turn use us. We are used by society, as much as we are using others for our needs. Then through enculturation, the system itself perpetuates itself by creating more people to perpetuate the system itself. People then work for the system. We don't even know what we are trying to do anymore when we have more people in the world, as they are simply more workers, more laborers, more society-maintainers. We say we want people to pursue their happiness, but is it just pursuing the epiphenomnenal goals of society instead? Etc. etc.. these and other ideas I have added to the general talk of pessimism.

4. The idea of contingent vs. necessary suffering. Necessary suffering is the striving that Schopenhauer talked about. It cannot be taken out of what it means to be a typically functioning human being. The contingent aspect is all the external things that by contingent circumstances of time, place, and cause/effect occur to a person (disease, disaster, frustrations, all the usual harms we think of).

However, in no way have I ever denied that we can experience happiness, good, etc. I've even explained that many times before what I believe to be the handful of goods many people hang their optimistic jackets on, and again refute that this is enough impetus for having children, or making a characterization of life as thus a good enough situation in the first place.

@Coben @Zeus

Lol, I'm being called a troll over defending my own position. C'est la Vie.

If he is reasoning emotionally, then demonstate it. — Coben

Don't take it from me. I'll let Hume have his say in the matter.

“Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions.” “In our reasonings concerning matter of fact, there are all imaginable degrees of assurance, from the highest certainty to the lowest species of moral evidence.