But when they get attached to truth and reality and such, they take us up the garden path. — Banno

May be that the problem is not in the concepts, but in the ideas we link to them.
Or maybe the problem of truth is complicated in itself.

This thread is just a collective stream of consciousness. How can consciousness be objective? — emancipate

Well... here is the thread...(pointing)

The thread is not subjective...

Again, I am arguing that it's wrong to suppose that each thing - thread, rock, concept, idea... must be either objective or subjective.

Or maybe the problem of truth is complicated in itself. — David Mo

I think that truth is quite easy. Indeed, simple. Un-analysable .

I think T-sentences tell us pretty much all there is to know about truth. But there's another bunch of threads.

I think T-sentences tell us pretty much all there is to know about truth. — Banno

"T-sentences"?

"p" is true iff p

"p" is true iff p — Banno

I don't understand anything. Could you explain it a little more?

Because truth and belief are connected. Sure, you can have a notion of "objective truth" that is completely divorced from whatever anyone thinks about the world. But by that same token, it'd be completely empty. If there is no way to establish truth, then judging things as true or false is pointless. — Echarmion

This is a point which is in danger of being lost in the weeds, so I wanted to re-raise it.

@Banno is (as he did last time we discussed this) trying to use the likelihood of a shared set of stimuli to for an argument about the meaning of a term.

Banno's 'thread' and my 'thread' seem likely to come from the same shared source. Without such a thing we couldn't even talk about the differences between our subjective versions, but the mere existence of such a thing does not constitue proof that the word 'truth' refers to that thing, nor even that it should.

He's making a reference to logic. He's trying to show that logic can generate objectively true statements.

That's the thing, isn't it - what counts as an object depends on the conversation.

If I am playing word games, it's because that's what much of philosophy is. So let's do it self-consciously - Sort through the word games and see which ones make sense.

Words like objective and subjective have a useful place in some conversations. But when they get attached to truth and reality and such, they take us up the garden path. — Banno

But all along you were the one insisting objects are "out there" and that they are there regardless of beliefs. Now you're saying that they are just an element in a language game, and what matters it whether it makes sense. But "making sense" is something mental, and doesn't reference anything objective.

So I am confused what your position is now

T-sentences were developed by Tarski and retargeted by Davidson. Not really that relevant here; except that they are exactly right. The "p" is a reference, a name for the statement p on the right; and the one will be true if and only if the other is true.

If I may.....

The formula is the new-fangled, analytic, thinks-it’s-better way of stating the continental version which claims, “...the definition of the word truth, to wit, the accordance of the cognition with its object...”. The formula relates to the criterion of the truth for propositions while the definition relates to the criterion of truth for human thought which is, of course, responsible for the construction of such propositions in the first place.

We commonly speak in propositions, but can and do communicate by other means that are not propositions, re: signing, Morse, etc., but we do not consciously think by means of any of those. It would seem a better test of truth to restrict its universal form (the definition) to our method of cognition, rather than the universal form (the formula) in the use of it, for it is quite clear ultimately all truths are our own judgements necessarily, even if we must still rely on something else other than ourselves merely to sustain or reject such decision. It follows that propositions may very well show error in composition or finality, but can never show error in origin, and as a rule, we wish to know, not that we were wrong about something, but how it is we came to be wrong.

No, he's not.

If there is no way to establish truth, then judging things as true or false is pointless. — Echarmion

Absolutely. I’d even go one step further, to wit: is impossible. Still, pointless works, because if it’s pointless, being impossible doesn’t make all that much difference.

But all along you were the one insisting objects are "out there". — Echarmion

Yeah. I'm adopting the terminology of the OP in order to undermine it. We can reject the language of the homunculus.

Now you're saying that they are just an element in a language game, — Echarmion

Language games take place in the world, and involve stuff. So drop the "just". The keys are both part of a language game and the things you start your car with. "Making sense" involves both; better, the distinction is a metaphysical error. Stuff in the world is always, already, interpreted; but it is also still stuff.

I posted one quote concerning the “pretensions of the schools”; treat it as you wish, hopefully in context. — Mww

I was talking about your quote in the same post, here:

Mind is a human construct given from pure reason, subjectivity being nothing but the consequence of such construction. It is hardly a confusion, insofar as the rest of the world cannot be blamed for human intellectual error, so theoretical subjectivity was invented to take the fall, and speculative epistemological philosophy was invented to, if not correct the fall, at least to make the fall less painful. — Mww

Is this quote about all minds and speculative epistemological philosophy, or about your [mind's] ego's need to put scribbles on a screen?

Depends. If the topic has empirical predicates the words will be about the world, conditioned by the pure intuitions and having natural law as its irreducible ground. If the topic has rational predicates, the words will be about speculative manifestations of the intellect, conditioned by pure reason and having the ego as its irreducible ground. And n’er the twain shall meet. The value of expressions in words to one mind, cannot be determined by the origination of them in another.

In this Platonic pseudo-elenchus we got goin’ on here....if you are Socrates, which interlocutor might I be? — Mww

I'm not clear on your distinction between empirical predicates and rational predicates. This might be a product of the false dichotomy of empiricism vs. rationalism. In my mind, they are inseparable. Your rationality takes the same form as your "empirical" thoughts. Thoughts are about things, and can't be grounded in anything except what they are about.

Language games take place in the world, and involve stuff — Banno

This is one of these sentences that can mean everything and nothing.

The keys are both part of a language game and the things you start your car with. "Making sense" involves both; better, the distinction is a metaphysical error. — Banno

But even if I were to accept that there is no distinction, it still seems that the language game about the key, as a "thing" is different from the keys as a "thing". The language game doesn't start the car.

Stuff in the world is always, already, interpreted; but it is also still stuff. — Banno

I agree with the first part. Not sure what the second part is supposed to say. Stuff is stuff, but also still stuff?

The view still has to be explained though. If the universe is just a bunch of objects strung together by cause and effect, how is it possible for some object to have an internal perspective? — Echarmion

I thought we had reached some sort of an agreement that it might be processes/relationships all the way down, not objects which would imply the "physical vs. non-physical" dichotomy I was trying to stay away from. You might need to re-read our previous exchanges.

If you refer to yourself as a "subject", and others refer to you as an "object", are we both talking about the same thing, or are we talking past each other?

This is a philosophy forum. I am not saying there isn't anything objective or true. — Echarmion

You don't try to get people to agree with you, and see things how you see them outside of a philosophy forum, like in everyday life? Being on a philosophy forum or not has no bearing on how you use words to communicate ideas about the world.

My physical brain is moving my physical arm. Whatever the mind does beyond the physical I don't know. The physical phenomena are representations of the non-physical reality. So the mind is not strictly speaking in a causal relationship with anything physical. — Echarmion

Then your mind has no purpose?

How can "physical" stuff represent "non-physical" stuff, and vice versa, except by causation?

That's a good point. The imagination does seem so be necessary to cause the following developments. But if you were to look at the chain of events that led from, say, the evolution of humans to spaceflight, where would you find the imagination? Could it be described? — Echarmion

Imagining stems from the brain's ability to form concepts and goals. The goal in the mind is just as imaginary as Santa Claus. It doesn't exist in the world outside of the mind. But it drives the behavior of the body to change current conditions to reach that goal - so that world and mind are in sync - homeostasis.

He's making a reference to logic. He's trying to show that logic can generate objectively true statements. — Cidat

Not really that relevant here; except that they are exactly right. — Banno

I still don't know what this is about. Especially if you add that it has nothing to do with this.

Anyway Tarski's definition of truth refers to the formal conditions of truth, which have little to do with truth as a relationship of the subjective and the objective. About exactitude of formal sciences we have a lot of theories. Our problem is our natural languages with their distinction objective-subjective. Science, for example.

The formula is the new-fangled, analytic, thinks-it’s-better way of stating the continental version which claims, “...the definition of the word truth, to wit, the accordance of the cognition with its object... — Mww

Yes, correspondence theory of truth. Aristotle.
But limiting itself to the pure form of the proposition. If we do not epistemologically analyze what the object may be, we are not going anywhere in this thread at least.
Tarski's formula: P it is true if and only if p
The statement "The snow is green" is true if and only if the snow is green, is a banality from the point of view of knowledge of the world.

Absolutely. I’d even go one step further, to wit: is impossible. Still, pointless works, because if it’s pointless, being impossible doesn’t make all that much difference. — Mww

Covid-19 kills people.
Does it?
We don't care if it's true or not?

I suggest that a theory about truth is neither impossible nor pointless.

I would say that strict objectivity is possible. An example would be chess strategies, or even just strategy in general. No one argues that humans are better players than computers nowadays; computers just have the better strategies and this has been demonstrated repeatedly to the point where it's no longer even an argument.

I'm aware that chess is a construction, or, in other words, an invention. Yet the strategies within chess are objective - they exist regardless of whether a mind grasps them or not. The physical component of chess isn't relevant either: Chess can be played without a physical board and without physical pieces. In a nutshell, chess or war or poker maybe "constructions" or "inventions" but the strategies utilized within these frameworks can either be better or worse and this is not a matter of subjective opinion.

There's no way it's possible. Not really. We have five frail senses. All we can know is that "something" exists. We can't discern what that something is. I believe in an objective reality, but from a human perspective we know very little about it.

You just asserted an objective truth, implying that we can indeed be objective. Your assertion of the lack of objectivity is thus limited in scope.

Mind is a human construct given from pure reason (...)....
— Mww

Is this quote about all minds and speculative epistemological philosophy, or about your [mind's] ego's need to put scribbles on a screen? — Harry Hindu

Yes, it’s a paraphrased conclusion having to do with human minds in general, given from certain pertinent tenets of a particular epistemological theory. It says here what minds are; what they do is elsewhere. And no, it isn’t a need, indicating some particularly beneficial inclination; it’s an interest, indicating merely some arbitrary persuasion.
——————-

I'm not clear on your distinction between empirical predicates and rational predicates. This might be a product of the false dichotomy of empiricism vs. rationalism. In my mind, they are inseparable. — Harry Hindu

The false dichotomy is long-since reconciled, again, theoretically, and under all objectively real conditions, they are necessarily inseparable. Nevertheless, the human cognitive system is fully capable of pure thought, of which nothing empirical is cognizable because the conceptions are self-contradictory (an unextended body), or, that of which empirical cognition is possible but iff we can construct objects corresponding to the conceptions (a straight line connecting two points). To say nothing of moral dispositions, for which the actions are necessarily empirical, but the causality for them is given from pure thought alone.

In a nutshell, chess or war or poker maybe "constructions" or "inventions" but the strategies utilized within these frameworks can either be better or worse and this is not a matter of subjective opinion. — BitconnectCarlos

Really? What is better? For some 'better' is winning in the shortest amount of moves possible. For others 'better' is the ingenuity of play. If you mean 'better' as simply winning the game, then isn't that merely the performance of a logic that is fundamentally a subjective framework? Winning a game invented by humans; whereby the semantics and rules are collectively agreed upon, acting as a kind of subjective constraint.

And like I said, I believe in an objective reality we know next to nothing about. To say that it's an objective truth that we know little about reality isn't self-defeating.

You just asserted an objective truth, implying that we can indeed be objective. Your assertion of the lack of objectivity is thus limited in scope. — Cidat

It seems like you both made assertions, but actually it was just his opinion and your post was just your opinion. Clearly your opinion differs from that of neonspectraltoast, doesn't this difference therefore point away from objectivity?

And like I said, I believe in an objective reality we know next to nothing about. To say that it's an objective truth that we know little about reality isn't self-defeating. — neonspectraltoast

How can you know nothing about reality and also know that it's objective?

He's trying to imply that because we can be objective about knowing little, we can be objective about knowing a lot, which obviously makes no sense.

I said I believe in an objective reality. I can't prove the existence of one. No one can.