And then it just dawned to me, why shouldnt someone use such a device for himself and then ask the question: "do I have free will now ? Whose free will is it now ? " — Nicky665

Well, if to have free will is just to have been able to do otherwise then having one's decisions determined by a quantum number generator (and assuming that the inability to predict the outcome isn't just because of a fundamental epistemic limit) then yes, in such a scenario you would have free will.

However, this doesn't quite seem to fit the intuitive notion of what it means to have (libertarian) free will. Having (libertarian) free will seems to require that the self is some sort of homunculus which is able to causally influence bodily behaviour but which isn't itself compelled (in the irresistible sense) by some external force (whether the effect this force has on the self is random or not). In which case no, in the scenario you describe you wouldn't have free will.

I just realised that what I said is an actual experimental proof of the free will theorem (Kochen -Conway) that says that with certain assumptions we have as much free will as subatomic particles. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Free_will_theorem

Rather it says that subatomic particles have as much free will freedom as us.

But the notion of freedom that this theorem uses is simply "present behaviour is not a function of the past". This isn't anything like libertarian free will. It's more like free will in the sense of random behaviour. So don't mistake it as saying that particles make choices.

Edit: actually, looking again at the terminology, it does seem that "libertarian free will" is consistent with the notion of free will being an impersonal, random thing. Perhaps the term I should have been using is "naive free will"?

Well...considering the theorem established the fact that a yes/no choice we make isnt a function of the past , its truly indeterminate, and you said to not make the mistake to say particles make a choice, then how de we define "make a choice " ?

Isnt the definition of "make a free choice" enough to be " indeterminate yes/no action" ?

Rather it says that subatomic particles have as much free will as us. — Michael

That would be ridiculous!

What the FWT demonstrates is that IF we possess free will, then fundamental particles possess a TINY amount of the same thing.

But the notion of free will that this theorem uses is simply "present behaviour is not a function of the past". This isn't anything like libertarian free will. It's more like free will in the sense of random behaviour. — Michael

The definition of free will they employ is the common sense one - that under certain circumstances humans can decide what will happen. In particular they assume that a human can choose which button to press.

In their own words:

The free will we assume is just that the experimenter can freely choose to make any one of a small number of observations.

And, they go to great lengths to distinguish randomness from freedom. The result has nothing to do with randomness.

So don't mistake it as saying that particles make choices. — Michael

As they point out, it's not strictly the particles, but more precisely "the universe in the neighbourhood of the particles".

Well...considering the theorem established the fact that a yes/no choice we make isnt a function of the past , its truly indeterminate, — Nicky665

It does nothing of the sort. The ASSUMPTION is that humans have the property of being able to choose which button will be pressed.

The definition of free will they employ is the common sense one - that under certain circumstances humans can decide what will happen. In particular they assume that a human can choose which button to press. — tom

In their own words: "To say that A’s choice of x, y, z is free means more precisely that it is not determined by (i.e., is not a function of) what has happened at earlier times (in any inertial frame)".

And the actual theorem is "The axioms SPIN, TWIN and MIN imply that the response of a spin 1 particle to a triple experiment is free—that is to say, is not a function of properties of that part of the universe that is earlier than this response with respect to any given inertial frame."

Certainly nothing there about particles deciding/choosing what will happen.

That would be ridiculous!

What the FWT demonstrates is that IF we possess free will, then fundamental particles possess a TINY amount of the same thing.

Given what they mean by freedom as stated above, how exactly does this allow for quantifying freedom? Is it that its response is only somewhat not a function of what has happened earlier (but also that it somewhat is)?

And, they go to great lengths to distinguish randomness from freedom. The result has nothing to do with randomness.

I don't think they do. They just seem to say that "the free will of neither [particles nor humans] is accounted for by mere randomness". But I fail to see how their definition of freedom as the response not being a function of the past makes it out to be something other than stochastic.

Last night someone said robots cant have preferences since they're machines. So I suggested that we might associate a quantum random number generator to it and make the robot take certain decisions based on the outcome of the quantum random generator. No natural law can predict the choice.

And then it just dawned to me, why shouldnt someone use such a device for himself and then ask the question: "do I have free will now ? Whose free will is it now ? "

What does it mean to "use the device"? How can an effective causal connection be established between the device and the action? What prevents you to break the rule when you don't like the "choice" of the device?

The theorem does seem to be a misnomer. It calls itself the free will theorem, but it's actually a freedom theorem. The theorem isn't "if we make free choices then particles make free choices" but "if we make free choices then a particle's response is free". There's a distinct difference between making a choice and being free, given that they say "A's choice of x, y, z is free if..." and not "A chooses x, y, z if...". Nowhere do they show that particles make choices, and given that to have free will is to make free choices, nowhere do they show that particles have free will.

So it's equivocation.

But given that they define freedom just as "not being a function of the past", it's perhaps more accurate to call it the Spontaneity Theorem.

... — Babbeus

One uses the device to decide between yes or no to an action ( do i floss my teeth now , do i answer the phone, do i go there today) . Something like that. He substitutes his will for the indeterminate result of the quantum randomness. Nothing prevents him to break the rule.

One uses the device to decide between yes or no to an action ( do i floss my teeth now , do i answer the phone, do i go there today) . Something like that. He substitutes his will for the indeterminate result of the quantum randomness. Nothing prevents him to break the rule.

In this case there would be an element of free will when the persone choses wheter to actually accept the device's suggestion or break the rule.

But that means you're starting with the assumption that the person has free choice.

you said to not make the mistake to say particles make a choice, then how de we define "make a choice " — Nicky665

We could reduce "making a choice" to "behaving a certain way", and so do away with any notion of consciousness/intention, in which case we can say that particles make choices, but such a reduction seems to lose something important. Or we can understand making a choice as involving conscious intention, in which case we have to argue either that particles have conscious intentions (something that Conway denies), or accept that particles don't make choices (and so don't have free will).

Or, if one wants to avoid any notion of dualism, we could say that making a choice is a particular kind of complex behaviour that only occurs in certain macroscopic objects, but then of course it's still the case that particles don't make choices.

And then it just dawned to me, why shouldnt someone use such a device for himself and then ask the question: "do I have free will now ? Whose free will is it now ? " — Nicky665

The paradox of free will is its ultimate incoherence, but also its necessity in making the world coherent. It is incoherent because it seems not to be refuted simply by determinism, but by causation more generally, meaning that indeterminism offers no solution. That is, if I choose to shoot Michael in the face (damn, should have said gonads because that's funnier), it seems I bear as little responsibility for my act whether it was determined by the eternal predictable chain of causation or whether it was caused by a sudden spontaneous indeterminate cause.

We generally hold that those who are most responsible are those who are best guided by reason, and those who lack the ability to reason, lack free will. This idea postulates some sort of being who can choose the rational guidance presented to him or who can reject it. That is, the external forces at play might sway our decisions, but they don't control it, leaving the final decision to the supposedly autonomous decision maker. So, in the OP's example, I don't see how abandoning a resort to reason to determine the best course of action somehow would result in an exercise of free will.

I'd also point out that the OP's example is overly confusing in its introduction of a quantum random number generator. It would make no difference whether we used that or whether we used the toss of coin or whether we used the daily average outside temperature to make our decision. In each instance, we're just letting our decision be made by something other than our own reason. That is to say, our decisions are being based on something arbitrary, and it's irrelevant whether that arbitrary event is randomly generated.

The difference is that a coin toss or the weather is in principle determinate and predictable . A computer with enough data about initial conditions can predict it.

But when a photon hits a semi-transparent mirror , there is no principle that can predict if its reflected back or not.

So it's equivocation ... it's perhaps more accurate to call it the Spontaneity Theorem — Michael

Yep. :)

And the human brain is as far from being a memoryless process as you can get. So any residual spontaneity is going to be highly constrained.

So freewill is instead about intelligent future prediction.

It is because we have such a "past-constrained" view of each passing moment that we can see into the future of what is thus definitely possible. Choice results from already knowing what could be.

Constraints are the source of our useful freedom.

The difference is that a coin toss or the weather is in principle determinate and predictable . A computer with enough data about initial conditions can predict it. — Nicky665

Not so fast. Even a classical system - especially when it involves non-linearity or feedback - is not completely determinate because initial conditions can never be measured with complete precision. And even if you plug definite numbers into your computer, there is still going to be round-up error at each step of any calculation.

Folk claim that "in practice" you can still predict the trajectory of a chaotic system. The shadowing lemma allows you to argue that many cases are not going to stray enough from a cluster of trajectories for you to be that wrong.

But still - for the purposes of metaphysics - hardline determinism can't be taken for granted. Even in nature, uncertainty can be constrained, but not eliminated. There is always going to be residual noise in the circuits of existence.

Yes, but the percentage is low enough so that for all intents and purposes its predictable, especially if we can put in new fresh current data.

You cant take for granted absolute determinism, but from what I know thats precisely because of what you can take for granted: quantum indeterminism