although I feel I should disagree with the last sentence: "...not reducible to physical systems" — TheMadFool

Right. And let me suggest why: because the strong consensus in our culture is to believe that everything is reducible to physical systems. That is what we make the world out to be: that which is understandable in physical, or natural, or scientific terms. Whatever is not thus understandable is subjective or private or personal - right?

That's great, now answer how. — schopenhauer1

I already did. Brain activity (something physical) both sufficient and necessary for qualia . :chin:

Right. And let me suggest why: because the strong consensus in our culture is to believe that everything is reducible to physical systems. That is what we make the world out to be: that which is understandable in physical, or natural, or scientific terms. Whatever is not thus understandable is subjective or private or personal - right? — Wayfarer

Right but I fail to see what follows.

A different way to illustrate the problem (the explanatory gap / mind conundrum) could be to ask:
Can you derive what a bat's echolocation is like by examining the bat?
Can you derive those special formats of experience (qualia) from looking at an (alleged) experiencer?
We can guess and correlate of course; is that the extent of it?
Either way, I cannot experience your self-awareness, since then I'd be you instead. — jorndoe

The hard problem of consciousness is the bedrock for all arguments for dualism for it addresses the issue of qualia directly, without resorting to imagined scenarios. Refute it and you undermine the significance of qualia and do that and all qualia-based arguments fall.

Right but I fail to see what follows. — TheMadFool

That's because you need to look at your assumptions, not just through them.

That's because you need to look at your assumptions, not just through them. — Wayfarer

Most valuable comment so far. :up:

My premises, based on known facts of sleep and awake states, are:

1. Brain off -> no qualia
2. Brain on -> yes qualia

3. yes qualia -> brain on (contrapositive of 1)

4. brain on is sufficient for qualia (from 2)

and

5. brain on is necessary for qualia (from 3)

Ergo,

6. Brain on is both sufficient and necessary for qualia (from 4 and 5)

1 is false. If you’re asleep you’re still perfectly capable of feeling - the brain is not off, that would correspond with anesthesia or coma. Which proves nothing. If you’re asleep and someone pours cold water on you you’ll experience qualia aplenty.

1 is false. If you’re asleep you’re still perfectly capable of feeling - the brain is not off, that would correspond with anesthesia or coma. Which proves nothing. If you’re asleep and someone pours cold water on you you’ll experience qualia aplenty. — Wayfarer

Only if I wake up :chin:

But if your brain really was off - and I do wonder - then you wouldn’t. :razz:

But if your brain really was off - and I do wonder - then you wouldn’t. :razz: — Wayfarer

:up:

??? :chin:

The scientific revolution of the 17th century, which has given rise to such extraordinary progress in the understanding of nature, depended on a crucial limiting step at the start: It depended on subtracting from the physical world as an object of study everything mental – consciousness, meaning, intention or purpose. The physical sciences as they have developed since then describe, with the aid of mathematics, the elements of which the material universe is composed, and the laws governing their behavior in space and time.

We ourselves, as physical organisms, are part of that universe, composed of the same basic elements as everything else, and recent advances in molecular biology have greatly increased our understanding of the physical and chemical basis of life. Since our mental lives evidently depend on our existence as physical organisms, especially on the functioning of our central nervous systems, it seems natural to think that the physical sciences can in principle provide the basis for an explanation of the mental aspects of reality as well — that physics can aspire finally to be a theory of everything.

However, I believe this possibility is ruled out by the conditions that have defined the physical sciences from the beginning. The physical sciences can describe organisms like ourselves as parts of the objective spatio-temporal order – our structure and behavior in space and time – but they cannot describe the subjective experiences of such organisms or how the world appears to their different particular points of view. There can be a purely physical description of the neurophysiological processes that give rise to an experience, and also of the physical behavior that is typically associated with it, but such a description, however complete, will leave out the subjective essence of the experience – how it is from the point of view of its subject — without which it would not be a conscious experience at all.

Thomas Nagel, The Core of "Mind and Cosmos"

Does that specific entity have an internal state or How do I know other people have internal states? — schopenhauer1

I guess solipsism and the gap are related, proving one impacts the other. I wonder if, say, Searle's "Chinese room" and Jackson's "Mary's room" are impacted as well.

The hard problem of consciousness is the bedrock for all arguments for dualism for it addresses the issue of qualia directly, without resorting to imagined scenarios. Refute it and you undermine the significance of qualia and do that and all qualia-based arguments fall. — TheMadFool

Substance dualism simply declares "mind stuff" (irreducibly) fundamental or without any explanation in other terms, even in principle. An easy answer.

• say, some sort of physicalism (or maybe speculative realism) and qualia do not contradict, rather neither entails the other, hence the gap
• placing qualia (or whatever aspects of mind) as basic/fundamental/irreducible does not explain mind, but rather avoids explanation by said placement, thereby disregarding some things we already do know about mind

Maybe we can at least account for the gap rather than bridge it.


Plenty evidence pointing in one direction ...

• Brain makes decisions before you even know it (Kerri Smith; Nature; Apr 2008)
• Brain Scanners Can See Your Decisions Before You Make Them (Brandon Keim; WIRED; Apr 2008)
• Mind-reading program translates brain activity into words (Ian Sample; The Guardian; Jan 2012)
• Scientists Use Brain Waves To Eavesdrop On What We Hear (Peter Murray; Singularity Hub; from the Public Library of Science (PLoS) Biology; Feb 2012)
• Neural Decoding of Visual Imagery During Sleep (Horikawa, Tamaki, Miyawaki, Kamitani; Science AAAS; Apr 2013)
• Researcher controls colleague’s motions in 1st human brain-to-brain interface (Rajesh Rao, Andrea Stocco; University of Washington; Aug 2013)
• Brain decoding: Reading minds (Kerri Smith; Nature; Oct 2013)
• Mind-Reading Computer Instantly Decodes People’s Thoughts (Tia Ghose; LiveScience; Jan 2016)
• Device that can literally read your mind invented by scientists (Ian Johnston; The Independent; Apr 2017)
• After 15 years in a vegetative state, nerve stimulation restores consciousness (Cell Press via AAAS; Sep 2017)
• Computer system transcribes words users “speak silently” (Larry Hardesty; MIT News Office; Apr 2018)
• Amazing New Brain Map of Every Synapse Points to the Roots of Thinking (Shelly Fan; Neuron via Singularity Hub; Aug 2018)
• Our brains reveal our choices before we're even aware of them, study finds (Lachlan Gilbert; University of New South Wales; Mar 2019)

An easy solution to the problem of how objective brain states produce subjective mental states:

The vast variety of different kinds of neurons and glia in the brain may be an indication of why there are such widely varying classes of qualia - visual, aural, olfactory, gustatory, tactile, and so on - a gigantic miscellany in possibilities for additive electromagnetic quantum resonance.

Each unique arrangement of biochemical ingredients is comprised of different qualia, just like differing matter is of different sizes, shapes and colors.

Each unique arrangement of biochemical ingredients is comprised of different qualia, just like differing matter is of different sizes, shapes and colors. — Enrique

That answers the easy problem, not the hard problem.

Matter doesn't merely generate or correlate with qualia, it is qualia. Next problem!

You're not addressing 'the problem'. You think your misunderstanding of it constitutes an answer. A lot of people do that.

The problem was the explanatory gap, not the distinction between traditional explanations. Subjective substance collapsed with objective substance resolves the explanatory gap. Doesn't mean counseling or expression in language is any less reasonable than or independent from neuroscience.

The hard problem is not that something cannot be explained, but that it hasn't been. Your OP is mainly assertions that the brain covers subjective experience. But that is not an explanation of how consciousness arises within otherwise non-experiencing matter - as many physicalists think of it.

Saying that the brain is all one needs does not solve the hard problem.

I already did. Brain activity (something physical) both sufficient and necessary for qualia . :chin: — TheMadFool

That doesn't explain the how.

You are arguing in favor of a monist physicalism. That's not the hard problem, that's a different issue.

I also don't think your argument holds, even for that. We do have subjective experiences in sleep. We can even have the experience of non-dreaming sleep. We don't remember that, generally, but memory is a specific cognitive function. Brute experiencing may not need to make memories.

Subjective substance collapsed with objective substance resolves the explanatory gap. — Enrique

Except that it doesn't. It means you're not addressing the problem. Here are some examples of what David Chalmer's calls 'the easy problem of consciousness':

• the ability to discriminate, categorize, and react to environmental stimuli;
• the integration of information by a cognitive system;
• the reportability of mental states;
• the ability of a system to access its own internal states;
• the focus of attention;
• the deliberate control of behavior;
• the difference between wakefulness and sleep.

All of the suggestions made above, including yours, address the 'easy problem'. It's because you are still dealing with the problem in objective terms.

Chalmers uses the word 'experience' to differentiate the hard from the easy problem, as follows:

The really hard problem of consciousness is the problem of experience. When we think and perceive, there is a whir of information-processing, but there is also a subjective aspect. As Nagel (1974) has put it, there is something it is like to be a conscious organism. This subjective aspectis experience.

Here, I don't agree with his terminology. 'This subjective aspect' is broader than experience - it is being. A being is the subject of experience; one of the hallmarks of beings is that they are subject of experience. And it is the 'nature of the subject' that eludes objective description - for reasons that really ought to be obvious.

Then maybe we need a new term: how about subobtive experience? lol

However, I believe this possibility is ruled out by the conditions that have defined the physical sciences from the beginning. The physical sciences can describe organisms like ourselves as parts of the objective spatio-temporal order – our structure and behavior in space and time – but they cannot describe the subjective experiences of such organisms or how the world appears to their different particular points of view. There can be a purely physical description of the neurophysiological processes that give rise to an experience, and also of the physical behavior that is typically associated with it, but such a description, however complete, will leave out the subjective essence of the experience – how it is from the point of view of its subject — without which it would not be a conscious experience at all.

I never completely understood Nagel's point. His argument rests entirely on the subjective-objective distinction and it appears to be that he's implying that science being objective and consciousness being subjective make it impossible for science to study consciousness.

Look at the following excerpts on subjectivty/objective that I picked up from wikipedia:

1. Philosophical objectivity: Objectivity is a philosophical concept of being true independently from individual subjectivity caused by perception, emotions, or imagination.

2. Scientific Objectivity: Objectivity in science is an attempt to uncover truths about the natural world by eliminating personal biases, emotions, and false beliefs. It is often linked to observation as part of the scientific method.

3. Subjectivity: A subject's personal perspective, feelings, beliefs, desires or discovery, as opposed to those made from an independent, objective, point of view

As you can see, 2 (scientific objectivity) doesn't contradict 3 (subjectivity); after all where's the contradiction in being scientifically objective about a subjective experience unless Nagel's implying that before we can be objective about anything an observation needs to be made and in the case of consciousness this isn't possible because consciousness is subjective and inaccessible for observation. This interpretation matches two other definitions of subjective/objective I found; they're listed below:

4. Subjective = private

5. Objective = public

:chin: :chin:

Saying that the brain is all one needs does not solve the hard problem. — Coben

Where does one look for an explanation for something aside from the sufficient and necessary conditions for it?

Substance dualism simply declares "mind stuff" (irreducibly) fundamental or without any explanation in other terms, even in principle. An easy answer.
say, some sort of physicalism (or maybe speculative realism) and qualia do not contradict, rather neither entails the other, hence the gap
placing qualia (or whatever aspects of mind) as basic/fundamental/irreducible does not explain mind, but rather avoids explanation by said placement, thereby disregarding some things we already do know about mind
Maybe we can at least account for the gap rather than bridge it. — jorndoe

:up: Thanks.

Where does one look for an explanation for something aside from the sufficient and necessary conditions for it? — TheMadFool

If you don't know the mechanism or cause of consciousness, you can't claim to know what the necessary conditions are or the sufficient conditions are. You can make arguments as you did that brains are enough, but the hard problem is precisely how does it arise. And we don't know that? We don't even know where it isn't. We do not places where it is. And those places are able to do all sorts of cognitive functions, like remember, and generally report. But we have no idea if these functions are necessary for raw experiencing. So, I see two problems with the OP: it doesn't actually address the hard problem - which is how does consciousness arise? and then since it doesn't address the how, we can't even know where to limit consciousness to.

The hard problem of consciousness is the problem of explainingwhy and how sentient organisms have qualia or phenomenal experiences—how and why it is that some internal states are subjective, felt states, such as heat or pain, rather than merely nonsubjective, unfelt states, as in a thermostat or a toaster.

You're arguing against dualism, say. That's not the same issue. It's related, but it doesn't solve this problem.

If you don't know the mechanism or cause of consciousness, you can't claim to know what the necessary conditions are or the sufficient conditions are. You can make arguments as you did that brains are enough, but the hard problem is precisely how does it arise. And we don't know that? We don't even know where it isn't. We do not places where it is. And those places are able to do all sorts of cognitive functions, like remember, and generally report. But we have no idea if these functions are necessary for raw experiencing. So, I see two problems with the OP: it doesn't actually address the hard problem - which is how does consciousness arise? and then since it doesn't address the how, we can't even know where to limit consciousness to. — Coben

I agree that it's very likely that I'm completely mistaken here. I have a simple request: Can you give me synopsis of your views on what explanations are?

It depends on what you are trying to explain, iow not simply the specific thing you are trying to expain, but what kind of explanation. If we are trying explain why we believe brains are necessary for consciousness, we might use the examples of being knocked unconscious or brain death or chemical effects on the brain. If we want to know how the matter in the brain has interiority (an experiencer) we have to do some other kind of explaining. Since I have no idea what that is, I can't give an example.

Explain why water has surface tension....

The water molecules attract one another due to the water's polar property. The hydrogen ends, which are positive in comparison to the negative ends of the oxygen cause water to "stick" together. This is why there is surface tension and takes a certain amount of energy to break these intermolecular bonds.

The cohesive forces between liquid molecules are responsible for the phenomenon known as surface tension. The molecules at the surface of a glass of water do not have other water molecules on all sides of them and consequently they cohere more strongly to those directly associated with them (in this case, next to and below them, but not above). It is not really true that a "skin" forms on the water surface; the stronger cohesion between the water molecules as opposed to the attraction of the water molecules to the air makes it more difficult to move an object through the surface than to move it when it is completely submersed. (Source: GSU).

Other molecules in the water are being pulled all directions, whereas the ones on the surface are forming bonds, based on the positive and negative parts of the water molecules towards the sides, more than other directions. This means they cohere more. This means they resist being separated more that others and water has a high surface tension, compared to other liquids because its molecules are very dipolar.

That's getting into the how and why, which is what the hard problem is about. Why does and how does consciousness arise in brains - so even if it is a physicalist monism, how does it arise? You're not answering this. You are trying to rule out dualisms. I don't think your argument works, but it's not dealing with the hard problem. It can be viewed as a kind of explantion, sure. But it's not explaining the answer to the hard problem.

The hard problem of consciousness is the problem of explainingwhy and how sentient organisms have qualia or phenomenal experiences—how and why it is that some internal states are subjective, felt states, such as heat or pain, rather than merely nonsubjective, unfelt states, as in a thermostat or a toaster.

(Nagel) is implying that science being objective and consciousness being subjective make it impossible for science to study consciousness. — TheMadFool

You can study consciousness through cognitive science and psychology. That's why I keep saying the question really is about the nature of being - 'what it is like to experience [x]', or what it means to be the subject of experience.

As you can see, 2 (scientific objectivity) doesn't contradict 3 (subjectivity); after all where's the contradiction in being scientifically objective about a subjective experience unless Nagel's implying that before we can be objective about anything an observation needs to be made and in the case of consciousness this isn't possible because consciousness is subjective and inaccessible for observation. This interpretation matches two other definitions of subjective/objective I found; they're listed below:

4. Subjective = private

5. Objective = public — TheMadFool

Getting close to the nub of the problem.

Remember the previous exchange:

I feel I should disagree with the last sentence: "...not reducible to physical systems" — TheMadFool

Right. And let me suggest why: because the strong consensus in our culture is to believe that everything is reducible to physical systems. That is what we make the world out to be: that which is understandable in physical, or natural, or scientific terms. Whatever is not thus understandable is subjective or private or personal - right? — Wayfarer

The point is that in the culture of the scientific west, there's a view that humans are part of this objective order, which is why it is believed that they - we - can be completely understood through the perspective of evolutionary biology and brain science, even if in practice it is very difficult to fill in all the details.

Nagel and Chalmers are both arguing that this view is mistaken in principle, and not simply as a matter of lack of detail. Chalmers lays it out in terms of the 'hard problem of consciousness', which refers to Nagel's earlier essay 'what is it like to be a bat?'. And then Nagel's 2012 book, Mind and Cosmos, elaborates on this point in some detail. (You know this was nominated as most despised book of 2012, right? Because it questions the strong consensus.)

With all due respect, I feel you are assuming the scientific/western perspective in pretty well everything you write. Please don't take this as a personal pejorative, but a philosophical critique (and hope you can appreciate the distinction.) But that's why I said we have to learn to look at this perspective, and not simply through it - which is extraordinarily difficult to do, because of the strong consensus.

Ok. Here's a hypothetical scenario to consider. Imagine that for the last couple of months a person, say X, hasn't been getting his sleep on more than a just a few nights. X is troubled by this and seeks an explanation for his insomnia. In order to do that X makes a record of all his activities on nights he slept well and on nights he didn't get his shuteye. On examining his record he discovers that on each sleepless night he had drunk coffee and on nights he slept well, he hadn't had coffee. X's sleep record clearly indicate that coffee was both sufficient and necessary for his inability to sleep well; in other words the explanation for his sleep problems was to be found in the coffee.

Compare the above scenario to the fact that when there's brain activity, there's qualia and when there's no brain activity, there's no qualia. Brain activity is both sufficient and necessary for qualia just as the coffee was both sufficient and necessary for X's sleep issue. That suggests that the explanation for qualia is to be found in the physical, in brain activity.

With all due respect, I feel you are assuming the scientific/western perspective in pretty well everything you write — Wayfarer

Mea culpa!

Please don't take this as a personal pejorative, but a philosophical critique (and hope you can appreciate the distinction.) But that's why I said we have to learn to look at this perspective, and not simply through it - which is extraordinarily difficult to do, because of the strong consensus. — Wayfarer

Will try and heed your advice although I must say I haven't been making a conscious effort to be scientific. Just shows how a person can be oblivious to his/her own biases.

Here's a hypothetical scenario to consider. — TheMadFool

Which is just the kind of problem that Chalmer’s describes as ‘the easy problem’.

a person can be oblivious to his/her own biases. — TheMadFool

I’m not accusing you in particular of bias, I’m making an observation about the accepted wisdom.

Which is just the kind of problem that Chalmer’s describes as ‘the easy problem’. — Wayfarer

Some people are of the opinion that the hard problem's solution will be found in solutions to the "easy" problems although how exactly is beyond me.

It seems Chalmers did consider the difference between wakefulness and sleep. One of his "easy" problems is:

the difference between wakefulness and sleep. — wikipedia

Perhaps it was an oversight on Chalmer's part, although I'm more inclined to think that I am in error (as is usual), to not have seen the full implication of the difference between sleep and wakefulness. Applying basic principles of causal logic, we're in fact forced to conclude, from the difference between sleep and wakefulness, that brain activity is both sufficient and necessary for qualia, making brain activity suitable enough as an explanatory platform for qualia. In effect that means an explanation of qualia is within the reach of the physical.

At this juncture Nagel's use of the subjective-objective distinction needs to be given attention. All this distinction does is prove that scientific objectivity is incapable of studying subjective consciousness. It doesn't, and this is the key point to note, prove that qualia are not physically effected. That I have a poor climbing equipment doesn't imply that there are no cliffs and rockfaces to climb. Likewise, that scientific objectivity is a poor tool to investigate subjective consciousness doesn't make qualia automatically nonphysical.

All of the above taken into account, the takeaway here is that qualia or other subjectivity based arguments most assuredly do not entail dualism. At best they expose limitations of the scientific method and at worst they're conflating a shortcoming in the scientific method with a problem in the area of inquiry, to wit consciousness.

Please take note that I'm not denying the existence of an explanatory gap but I am denying that this gap entails dualism, specifically dualism that hypothesizes a nonphysical mind substance distinct from the brain.

Thanks for your valuable comments.

Some people are of the opinion that the hard problem's solution will be found in solutions to the "easy" problems although how exactly is beyond me. — TheMadFool

Daniel Dennett, who is Chalmer’s most obvious opponent, doesn’t believe there’s any hard problem whatever. But then, he can’t, because if there is one, then his life’s work is up the chimney (which is where it belongs, in my view.)

Amusing anecdote: One of Dennett’s early books was called ‘Consciousness Explained’. It was almost immediately re-titled ‘Consciousness Ignored’ by many of his learned critics.

All of the above taken into account, the takeaway here is that qualia or other subjectivity based arguments most assuredly do not entail dualism. — TheMadFool

What is it about dualism that you so desperately want to avoid? What’s the matter with it?

Oh, and thank you for being such a polite interlocutor.

that scientific objectivity is a poor tool to investigate subjective consciousness doesn't make qualia automatically nonphysical. — TheMadFool

Not non-physical, perhaps, but certainly not objective, nor capable of being treated as objects.

Incidentally, I regard ‘qualia’ as a nonsense word. It is only ever used by a clique of American academic so-called ‘philosophers’ in this very specific debate, and its use demeans the subject which it is ostensibly about.

I googled the word and came up with the Wikipedia article, which commences:

In philosophy and certain models of psychology, qualia (/ˈkwɑːliə/ or /ˈkweɪliə/; singular form: quale) are defined as individual instances of subjective, conscious experience. The term qualia derives from the Latin neuter plural form (qualia) of the Latin adjective quālis (Latin pronunciation: [ˈkʷaːlɪs]) meaning "of what sort" or "of what kind" in a specific instance, such as "what it is like to taste a specific apple, this particular apple now".

This is nonsense, absolute bollocks, and typical of the debasement of the subject of philosophy by American materialist ‘philosophers’. What is really at issue is quality of being, what quality being entails or enjoys, and what it means. And that is a profound question, but to speak about it in terms of pseudo-intellectual nonsense terms such as ‘qualia’ debases the conversation.

One of Dennett’s early books was called ‘Consciousness Explained’. It was almost immediately re-titled ‘Consciousness Ignored’ by many of his learned critics. — Wayfarer

I did hear about Dennett's impressively titled book and how poorly received it was by scholars and ordinary people alike. I think he's the type who has the courage of his own convictions but I fear that doesn't help in making his case.

What is it about dualism that you so desperately want to avoid? What’s the matter with it? — Wayfarer

Truth be told, I'm probably like many others who are troubled by the possibility that everything is just physical, for reasons that range from simple curiosity to a wish and hope for meaning, something that the mere physical generally fails to satisfy. However, I value truth and rationality enough to recognize wishful thinking isn't going to make my wishes/hopes come true. Consider me a fan of dualism, cheering for physicalism but only to coax my side to play better.