Not really. If you have a passage you're thinking specifically about, please direct me to it.
Heidegger often says that time, "temporality," is the horizon for any understanding of being. That's a difficult sentence to get your mind around, but since we're essentially caring, temporal beings (human beings), and we have an understanding of being, it is only through temporality that something like "being" can be understood. — Xtrix
I don't quite understand what you're getting at here. How does the second sentence relate to the first? And what does the second mean? — Xtrix
Drama queen, you make me ill. — neonspectraltoast
It seems that our understanding of being as presence stems from a certain kind of care. — waarala
I think for H. it is a question about some enduring whole amidst the change. That is, if there shall be Dasein and its truth.
— waarala
I don't quite understand what you're getting at here. How does the second sentence relate to the first? And what does the second mean? — Xtrix
I am just trying to understand what H. means (in B&T) with the "authentic existence" and how it relates to History (Geschichte, not historie as science) as H. understands it. — waarala
speculating about nature in the field of science and physics is done only to look for insight and clues that can lead to deeper discovery, otherwise they're putting the horse before the cart. — VagabondSpectre
Science is entirely based on the empirical validity of induction. — VagabondSpectre
That is to say, experimental consistency with respect to prediction is the actual driver of scientific knowledge. — VagabondSpectre
What do you mean by "speculating about nature"? — Xtrix
Says who? — Xtrix
You present this as if you've stumbled on the true definition of science. But in reality, it's not at all clear what drives scientific knowledge -- especially if we don't know what science really is. — Xtrix
You seem to be responding to my initial post -- but the rest of what you've written has almost nothing to do with it. I'm interested in the ontology of what's called "science," which seems to me to be bound up with a conception of nature. Thus I track the idea through history, to the Greeks and the word phusis (translated into Latin as natura and the root of "physics") -- which is in my title: φθσισ. The point is to explore this ancient Greek sense of phusis, as this was their word for being, and to see how it differs from our modern conception of being in science ("nature," the "cosmos," etc).
Talking about the inductive method isn't relevant here. — Xtrix
The analysis of this concept is very important indeed to understand our current scientific conception of the world, and therefore the predominant world ontology (at least non-religious, or perhaps simply the de facto ontology ). Does anyone here have an analysis to share, original or otherwise? Full disclosure: I am particularly struck by Heidegger's take, especially in his Introduction to Metaphysics. But other analyses are certainly welcome. — Xtrix
Imagining the way the world could be, could work, has been, or will be, without conducting a single experiment to validate those imaginations. — VagabondSpectre
But we *do* know what science is (it's a body of concepts and models with sufficient experimental predictive power). We even know what it really is (induction via empiricism). — VagabondSpectre
You're free to suppose science as continuous and emergent thing, tracing roots through ancient times (and ancient fallacies), but its evolution is much more discretized than that. — VagabondSpectre
Before the notion experimental validation is how we should test scientific models really took hold, — VagabondSpectre
I have given you a compressed definition of what "nature" means in terms of modern science. Nature is the way things are as revealed by controlled and repeated experimentation and testing (consistent observations and predictions) — VagabondSpectre
Importantly, nature is the thing science is attempting to model; — VagabondSpectre
it cannot reason from nature or appeal to nature (the naturalistic fallacy). — VagabondSpectre
Speculating about the nature of things (meaning to say, making untested or unstable assumptions) is one of the cardinal differences between a primitive and error prone ontology like Aristotelian teleology (haphazardly assigning qualities, functions, purposes, etc...) and the modern scientific method. — VagabondSpectre
The move from philosophical speculation to more strict empiricism is why modern science actually got somewhere. — VagabondSpectre
I don't say this facetiously, it's the very crux of science itself: make no starting assumptions about what something is or the way things are, — VagabondSpectre
Predictive power is ultimately the only signal of truth that we have. Comparing this to the sciences of old, much of it is comforting self-delusion and window-dressing derived to fit metaphysical prior assumptions. — VagabondSpectre
"Roughly you'd say, that science is what we know and philosophy is what we don't know. Questions are perpetually crossing over from philosophy into science as knowledge advances. All sorts of questions that used to be labeled philosophy are no longer so labeled." —
Galileo didn't conduct any experiments besides thought experiments — Xtrix
His work marked another step towards the eventual separation of science from both philosophy and religion; a major development in human thought. He was often willing to change his views in accordance with observation. In order to perform his experiments, Galileo had to set up standards of length and time, so that measurements made on different days and in different laboratories could be compared in a reproducible fashion. This provided a reliable foundation on which to confirm mathematical laws using inductive reasoning.
No, we don't. It's just not so simple, otherwise there wouldn't be work in the philosophy of science. — Xtrix
To say that it's just a matter of empirical observation and experimentation does little good -- that's natural philosophy, too. The Greeks were doing that as well. Is archeology not a science because it doesn't have "sufficient experimental predictive power"? What about genetics or evolutionary biology? — Xtrix
And when was that, exactly? When did this notion take hold? The 17th century? 18th? 19th? Are you really so certain it was this notion that drove progress? So what was happening in the Late Middle Ages and Renaissance? Or the Islamic Golden Age? Or Ancient Greece? Or even in Mayan astronomy, Babylonian mathematics, and Egyptian engineering? Was all this activity non-science? — Xtrix
Not really -- because we don't know what "it" really is. What's evolving, exactly? If you believe something, some discrete "enterprise" or "activity" has evolved which we label "science," then that's one way to look at it -- but again we're left with "What is science?" Well, if we take a look at the beginning of modern "science," in Copernicus and Galileo, and even in Newton, you'll find lessons that don't fit your current conceptions very well at all. Take Liebniz, even -- was he not a scientist? Was he a philosopher?
Remember, these categories didn't exist to Liebniz, Newton, or even Kant. They certainly didn't matter to Democritus, Archimedes, Aristarchus, or Euclid. — Xtrix
Speculation" about things -- thinking about them, trying to understand them, formulating hypotheses, making guesses, conducting creative thought experiments, etc. -- are simply what human beings have been doing for millennia. They go down many blind alleys, they're often wrong, theories get overturned and adapted, etc. This is true today as well -- we're no doubt wrong about many, many things. The Standard Model, quantum mechanics, mathematics, atomic theory, the Big Bang, not to mention neurology, psychology, and sociology, will go through many changes in the centuries to come. To look back on the Greeks and dismiss them as primitive, along with their "error-prone ontology" (whatever this means), is simply a common mistake. It's one you can make only if you truly believe there's a discernible and clearly-defined boundary between OUR "science" and superstitious speculations of the past.
Again, it's simply not that easy -- and completely unsupported by historical evidence. — Xtrix
Eh, this is nonsense I'm afraid, and you know it. Just think about it for a minute. Take an example I gave: Aristarchus. Was he wrong? Was that not science? Was that superstition? Or maybe just "luck"? Was that not "getting anywhere"? What about Democritus's theory of atoms? Was Euclid a superstitious man? Did the Phoenician sailors, using the stars as navigation, get lucky in their calculations? Ditto the Egyptians, with their elaborate constructions of the pyramids, or the Sumerians and their ziggurats?
All these primitive, superstitious people -- without our modern sensibilities and "method" of science -- seemed to "get somewhere," I'd say. In fact they laid the foundations for much of what we currently know. — Xtrix
Science has no starting assumptions? That's just nonsense. See below. — Xtrix
What "science of old" are you referring to, exactly? — Xtrix
This is a ludicrous assertion. He conducted many thought experiments, yes, and he even got stuff wrong, but he was also a champion of observation and the application of maths to those observations. — VagabondSpectre
No, we don't. It's just not so simple, otherwise there wouldn't be work in the philosophy of science.
— Xtrix
There's no work in the philosophy of science. It's already a matured school, and scientists at large hardly even use it. — VagabondSpectre
Why didn't the Greeks get anywhere interesting beyond apriori mathematics and some masonry skills? — VagabondSpectre
They had some bright people, but the limited information they had - the limited observations they could make - resulted in a worldview that was perforated with bull shit. — VagabondSpectre
Archeology is an interesting field, and archeologists readily accept that the inductions they make are more precariously hinged on available evidence (like the ancient Greeks they have much more limitations, but unlike the Greeks they understand this fact and refrain from bullshitting before the evidence arrives. — VagabondSpectre
And when was that, exactly? When did this notion take hold? The 17th century? 18th? 19th? Are you really so certain it was this notion that drove progress? So what was happening in the Late Middle Ages and Renaissance? Or the Islamic Golden Age? Or Ancient Greece? Or even in Mayan astronomy, Babylonian mathematics, and Egyptian engineering? Was all this activity non-science?
— Xtrix
Some of it may have been downright scientific, but if we're talking about the modern body of scientific knowledge, then it all needs to be checked by modern standards. — VagabondSpectre
I don't have the answer to exactly when modern science was developed; — VagabondSpectre
It's like you're objecting to the existence of a discrete contemporary organism by pointing to an evolutionary lineage of predecessors.Yes, science evolved, no, modern science is not constrained by its prototypical origins. — VagabondSpectre
When a good empiricist speculates, they do it for practical reasons, and they do not go on to accept the speculation without adequate experimental validation. — VagabondSpectre
Yes we get things wrong, but you're fundamentally misunderstanding (or just not perceiving) that the modern science is an observation/experiment/prediction demanding crucible compared to the science of old. — VagabondSpectre
What are your intentions in trying to compare modern scientific standards to ancient ones? They're vastly different. — VagabondSpectre
Yes, the problem of induction is a thing. "How do we know that just because something has given us predictive power in the past that it will give us predictive power in the future"?... This is not a question that concerns me... — VagabondSpectre
What "science of old" are you referring to, exactly?
— Xtrix
Specifically, pertaining to the method itself, where rigid testability and reproducibility standards do not exist (i.e: where speculation reigns)... — VagabondSpectre
How could it be otherwise? Of course he was a champion for observation, calculation, and precise reasoning. This has nothing to do with the myths of dropping balls from Pisa or experimenting with a frictionless plane, for example. I find it odd that you declare it a "ludicrous assertion" yet don't provide one example of a Galileo experiment, even in your citing Wikipedia. If he performed one, that's fine -- maybe he did. But the major breakthroughs he made were mainly thought experiments. This is not meant as a criticism of Galileo.
But more importantly, this statement of mine was in response to your claim about experimentation, and so I think you're very much missing the point. — Xtrix
here's plenty of work in the philosophy of science, even today, as you know. There's things published all the time. Whether "scientists at large" (not sure what this means) "use it" (use what, exactly?) is irrelevant: I'm talking about the philosophy of science. That would indicate it's a job for philosophers, not scientists. I realize most scientists regard philosophy with a great deal of contempt, in fact, so it wouldn't surprise me if they don't bother with the philosophy of science at all. — Xtrix
? Masonry skills? "Apriori mathematics"? What are you talking about? Your history is very confused. — Xtrix
So they were just like us, in other words. Plenty of bullshit everywhere -- as many scientists admit freely -- that we're simply not yet aware of.
But we have "some bright people," too. — Xtrix
I'm not saying that thought experiments have no place in doing science, I'm saying that the crux of modern science (again, why it has been successful) is the demand for actual observable experiments to confirm the prior speculations. — VagabondSpectre
If modern science was full of shit, then satellites would fall out of the sky, smart phones would stop working, vaccines would not work, the new Tesla autopilot would crash more often than humans, etc... — VagabondSpectre
The whole point is to reduce the bull-shit; that's the scientific shtick. Making a relativistic comparison to ancient bull-shit and saying "oh sure, everything we know now is probably bull shit" is fine, but the evidence is stacked against you. — VagabondSpectre
And that's where we stand currently. If science interprets "all there is" (being as a whole) as, essentially, "physical nature," then that's a very definite worldview -- a very important ontology. It's opposed, say, by Christian ontology where all that is, all of being, is "creation" and "God." — Xtrix
So my point is: let's look at the words and see if their history through the ages gives us an clues or illuminates our current, powerful (and dominant, at least among educated people) understanding of being. Maybe it does, maybe it doesn't. I personally think it does, and helps us become a little less dogmatic and guards against the pitfalls of "scientism" and, more importantly, a kind of nihilism that Nietzsche analyzed and warned us about. Why is this, in turn, important? I've already written enough, so I won't bore you further, but it turns out this has definite real-world consequences which we all are currently living in — Xtrix
Perhaps it's true we get less wrong now, but that's not what scientists tend to think — Xtrix
hey acknowledge that there is still much we don't know, we're probably on the wrong track, that hundreds of years from now what we know currently will be outdated, etc — Xtrix
You're not describing a modern scientific attitude or position though (science accepts that the jury is still out on "all there is"). Asking for some kind of grand definition for everything is not a scientifically coherent question. — VagabondSpectre
It's not a very definite worldview.... — VagabondSpectre
You keep suggesting that modern scientists "conception of being" hinges on the developmental history of science, — VagabondSpectre
So my point is: let's look at the words and see if their history through the ages gives us an clues or illuminates our current, powerful (and dominant, at least among educated people) understanding of being. Maybe it does, maybe it doesn't. I personally think it does, and helps us become a little less dogmatic and guards against the pitfalls of "scientism" and, more importantly, a kind of nihilism that Nietzsche analyzed and warned us about. Why is this, in turn, important? I've already written enough, so I won't bore you further, but it turns out this has definite real-world consequences which we all are currently living in — Xtrix
but what if someone creates a brand new theory of matter? In order to understand the cutting edge, do we actually need to examine the hilt or the pommel? In the case that modern models deviate entirely from models of old, we don't actually need the models of old to comprehend the new, but we absolutely need to examine the new in and of itself. — VagabondSpectre
Perhaps it's true we get less wrong now, but that's not what scientists tend to think
— Xtrix
Of course it's what scientists tend to think. If scientists did not believe they could get less wrong in the future, they would not believe in that science could progress. — VagabondSpectre
All scientists believe that we get less wrong now than in the past (or at least, what we got wrong in the past, we get less wrong today). — VagabondSpectre
Think about this for a second... If science has no progressed since Aristotle, how pathetic does that make modern science and scientists? — VagabondSpectre
hey acknowledge that there is still much we don't know, we're probably on the wrong track, that hundreds of years from now what we know currently will be outdated, etc
— Xtrix
What do you mean "probably on the wrong track"? — VagabondSpectre
Are you aware of the empirical tracks that science at large is presently mapping? — VagabondSpectre
You're making an almost purely relativistic comparison. "Science today is not perfect, science yesterday was not perfect, therefore science does not progress, it will always be the same, and what we know now is just as wrong as when we read the portents from sheep guts". — VagabondSpectre
You're not describing a modern scientific attitude or position though (science accepts that the jury is still out on "all there is"). Asking for some kind of grand definition for everything is not a scientifically coherent question. — VagabondSpectre
No one is asking for a "grand definition of everything." Nor have I said that -- not once.
It's not a very definite worldview.... — VagabondSpectre
It most certainly is, as I have repeatedly explained. — Xtrix
But your notion that science "progresses" is itself a picture that isn't really justified. In some ways it does, in others it doesn't. But in any case, the best scientists are well aware that theories today will morph and adapt in the future -- that's just basic. It's pure hubris to assume otherwise. — Xtrix
That being said, to say we get "less wrong now" than in the past is impossible to measure, so there's no sense talking about it. Were Humphry Davy, Faraday, and their contemporaries "less wrong than right" compared to our contemporaries today? Who knows. In fact it's almost certain there are far more hypotheses that aren't confirmed by the data in today's world simply by the sheer amount of what's being undertaken. But who cares? That's not how science is judged. The activity of trying to understand the world rationally continues, regardless. — Xtrix
No, they don't. In fact the statement is borderline incoherent. See above. — Xtrix
Yes, if one thinks of the "progress" of science as akin to climbing a mountain or filling out a crossword puzzle -- as "accumulation" of some kind. True, that's how the history of science looked for nearly 300 years until Einstein, and I'm sure you'll find many who still think that way. But that doesn't mean we have to take it seriously. — Xtrix
Just what I said. To take one example, quantum mechanics and relativity will doubtlessly in the future be either brought together or re-interpreted somehow, or subsumed under a newer theory. And so on forever, really. Much of all of this has to do with the questions we ask, the problems we face as human beings -- and that in turn is dependent on our values, our goals, our interests, etc. — Xtrix
Depends on what "empirical tracks" are, and what field you're talking about — Xtrix
Well needless to say I don't believe any of that, as you know. If you made even a slight effort to understand by taking a few moments to think, instead of reacting, you'd see that fairly easily. In fact your apparent emotional reaction and frustration with all of this is in itself interesting. — Xtrix
Here is where I get turned around. First you aver that scientists admit a god of nature as some kind of serious and relevant sentiment that can help us understand modern science (as if it is an operant world-view; as if it contextualizes the entirety of it).... — VagabondSpectre
But you actually are trying to say that modern science must be the same thing that the ancients were engaged in, because there is inquiry involved in both, and because there are some etymological relationships.... — VagabondSpectre
I think I understand what you're trying to do: you are trying shed light on the inherent epistemological limitations (the doubts) of modern science by showing how it is similar to previous and falliable phases of human inquiry. — VagabondSpectre
Science in its modern incarnation started with an admission of said uncertainty. — VagabondSpectre
But your notion that science "progresses" is itself a picture that isn't really justified. In some ways it does, in others it doesn't. But in any case, the best scientists are well aware that theories today will morph and adapt in the future -- that's just basic. It's pure hubris to assume otherwise.
— Xtrix
I can basically defeat this sentiment merely by saying "computers". By what standard has modern science not progressed? — VagabondSpectre
The entire thread seems to sniff in this direction though... That science isn't so great — VagabondSpectre
Remember, modern science is cardinally focused on understanding the world through empirical evidence and predictive power, not mere "rationality"; that's what Descartes did. — VagabondSpectre
Yes, if one thinks of the "progress" of science as akin to climbing a mountain or filling out a crossword puzzle -- as "accumulation" of some kind. True, that's how the history of science looked for nearly 300 years until Einstein, and I'm sure you'll find many who still think that way. But that doesn't mean we have to take it seriously.
— Xtrix
Einstein did not overturn Newton... Can't stress this enough... — VagabondSpectre
Just what I said. To take one example, quantum mechanics and relativity will doubtlessly in the future be either brought together or re-interpreted somehow, or subsumed under a newer theory. And so on forever, really. Much of all of this has to do with the questions we ask, the problems we face as human beings -- and that in turn is dependent on our values, our goals, our interests, etc.
— Xtrix
You're looking at it backward actually. QM and GR are "in our face" phenomenon that we cannot deny. — VagabondSpectre
The next breakthrough will not overturn them, it will encompass them. — VagabondSpectre
I've been sensing a bit of an attitude from you as well... Curious...
Normally my posts start out pretty dryly, and I end up reciprocating... Curiouser... — VagabondSpectre
It turns out that φῠ́σῐς (phusis) is the basis for "physical." So the idea of the physical world and the natural world are ultimately based on Greek and Latin concepts, respectively.
So the question "What is 'nature'?" ends up leading to a more fundamental question: "What is the 'physical'?" and that ultimately resides in the etymology of φῠ́σῐς and, finally, in the origins of Western thought: Greek thought. — Xtrix
Hi. Excuse me if this is somewhat obvious but it may be worth remembering "science" isn’t a single entity to be analyzed using identical systems following identical rules. There may only be one "true" reality of everything, but our current scientific understanding necessitates the deployment of different paradigms for different areas of research. — Zophie
It’s possible this may have something to do with the potentially irreconcilable disagreement I’m seeing here. Apologies in advance if I'm saying nothing new or interesting. — Zophie
Postpositivism, which prioritizes predictive power, is a typically physicalist approach marrying the formal and physical sciences. Constructivism-interpretivism is a more lenient approach suiting the cognitive and social sciences. To a postpositivist, most hypothetical links from φυσις to modern science would be implausible because we can’t conduct a survey collecting testimonials of dead people, and that’s just too bad. (Lol.) To a constructivist-interprivist, however, it’s possible to sufficiently ground a hypothesis by extracting common themes and standpoints in the literature. For φυσις, this may invoke the "natural elements" of Indo-European mythology as an effort to properly bookend an account and thereby make it robust enough to be considered scientific. But even if it’s given that mythology is early evidence of proto-science as I contend, the notion is still, clearly, highly tentative. I mention this because, judging from post histories, paradigms haven't been given much mention, though I personally think they bring a lot of clarifying power to any discussion. Hopefully that can be appreciated here to at least some degree. — Zophie
As for the question of φυσις being some kind of weird non-divine driving force of science, it may actually be a question of what one thinks science is supposed to do. — Zophie
If science tells us how, then φυσις is probably an antiquated and superstitious container of convenience which is probably no longer relevant. If science tells us why, though, then I’m afraid the spectre of φυσις is transformed into what are mysteriously now known as the "Laws of Nature" (not "Natural Laws"), which appear to serve as a kind of “known-unknown” foundation for coherent scientific explanation despite being.. somewhat ad hoc. — Zophie
I never stated anything about a "god of nature." — Xtrix
Most of today's scientists will claim to assume "naturalism" in their endeavors. Someone famous once said that "I believe in God, I just spell it n-a-t-u-r-e." I've heard this a lot from the likes of Sagan, Dennett, Dawkins, Gould, and many others -- especially when contrasting their views with religious views or in reaction to claims that science is "just another religion."
It's worth remembering that science was simply "natural philosophy" in Descartes' day, Newton's day and Kant's day. This framework and its interpretation of the empirical world dominates every other understanding, in today's world, including the Christian account (or any other religious perspective, really). Therefore it's important to ask: what was (and is) this philosophy of nature? What is the basis of its interpretation of all that we can know through our senses and our reason? — Xtrix
No, because neither you nor I know what "modern science" is. We can't pinpoint when it begins. We can only speculate as to what makes it 'distinct' from any other rational inquiry. So far, its successes in technological advances and some kind of "method" has been offered. I don't find that very convincing. — Xtrix
I have no trouble with saying modern science is different in many respects with whatever the Greeks were doing. As I said before, it's undeniable that many things have changed. But when you look at what's going on, at its core, it seems like what we call "doing science" is actually something that's been with us (as human beings) for a long time indeed. — Xtrix
It's just not so simple -- and who really cares, anyway? — Xtrix
"Remember, modern science is cardinally focused on understanding the world through empirical evidence and predictive power, not mere "rationality"; that's what Descartes did." -Vagabond
You say this, and yet a moment earlier talked about "induction." Is logic and reason involved in "science" or not? — Xtrix
To repeat: the very fact that Newtonian physics turned out to be "wrong" not in terms of calculation but in the bigger picture led to a remarkable re-evaluation of the history of science. See David Hilbert, et al. — Xtrix
The claim that "modern science is cardinally focused..." is so far totally unsupported. Says who? — Xtrix
Stop trying to demarcate science — Xtrix
That's a completely meaningless statement.
Both are scientific theories. They're not "read off" from nature without any contribution of the thinking mind; there's nothing "backwards" about this. — Xtrix
I never stated anything about a "god of nature."
— Xtrix
I don't mean a god over nature, I mean god from nature; the god of nature... It's what you said in your opening post so I'm not sure why you're not interpreting this correctly. — VagabondSpectre
It's worth remembering that science was simply "natural philosophy" in Descartes' day, Newton's day and Kant's day. This framework and its interpretation of the empirical world dominates every other understanding, in today's world, including the Christian account (or any other religious perspective, really). Therefore it's important to ask: what was (and is) this philosophy of nature? What is the basis of its interpretation of all that we can know through our senses and our reason?
— Xtrix
No, because neither you nor I know what "modern science" is. We can't pinpoint when it begins. We can only speculate as to what makes it 'distinct' from any other rational inquiry. So far, its successes in technological advances and some kind of "method" has been offered. I don't find that very convincing.
— Xtrix
I have no trouble with saying modern science is different in many respects with whatever the Greeks were doing. As I said before, it's undeniable that many things have changed. But when you look at what's going on, at its core, it seems like what we call "doing science" is actually something that's been with us (as human beings) for a long time indeed.
— Xtrix
I'm having a hard time comprehending which of the above positions you actually occupy. — VagabondSpectre
Do we not know what modern science is, and therefore cannot say how it differs from what ancient Greeks were doing? — VagabondSpectre
Or are there obvious differences between what ancient Greeks were doing and modern science? — VagabondSpectre
If so, what are those obvious differences? (hint: predictive power and a focus on experimental methodology). — VagabondSpectre
If you want to try and get at *the very core of human inquiry and knowledge*, then you have no reason to refer to the problem of induction as irrelevant. The thing we and the ancients share is that we both lived or live in worlds that appear to have causal consistency. We observe things, use those observations to formulate an idea or an action, and then we observe the effects of those ideas and actions. In general, we want our actions to create more desirable observations. The only real signal we have to refine our ideas and actions is the observable results of those actions. The ancients kinda knew this, but they did not seem to realize that instead of focusing on how elegant an idea sounds in and of itself (or how persuasive it may be to the rational mind), we should be forced to reject it if experimental evidence controverts it, and beyond this, that we can never actually test the validity of such speculative ideas unless they can actually generate predictions that can be tested. — VagabondSpectre
With these last two sentences, we have a robust definition of the scope of science (being concerned with observable phenomenon and falsifiable models) that does depart from the more full blown realm of philosophical inquiry that the ancients were engaged it. It's a drastic departure from the focus of those ontic schools that instead presupposed some anthropically biased/pleasing framework. — VagabondSpectre
It's just not so simple -- and who really cares, anyway?
— Xtrix
I thought you wanted to comment on modern science via commenting on ancient science. Am I wrong? — VagabondSpectre
You're equivocating between the epistemological foundations of modern science (it's the inductive method), and other schools which are less strict. — VagabondSpectre
Gaining knowledge using predictive power as a confidence signal IS induction. — VagabondSpectre
So when I say "science relies on the inductive method, not mere rationality", I'm actually pointing to the specific form of "logic" (induction) that scientific proofs require as their literal standard for truth and knowledge. — VagabondSpectre
To repeat: the very fact that Newtonian physics turned out to be "wrong" not in terms of calculation but in the bigger picture led to a remarkable re-evaluation of the history of science. See David Hilbert, et al.
— Xtrix
What was the picture being described by the laws of motion? — VagabondSpectre
So when Newtonian physics turned out to be "wrong", what you should actually be saying is that we found a more accurate/reliable/robust model which encompasses the Newtonian model. — VagabondSpectre
The claim that "modern science is cardinally focused..." is so far totally unsupported. Says who?
— Xtrix
Interesting question, but appealing to authority is not scientifically sound. — VagabondSpectre
We would have to do a random sampling of active or historical scientific inquiries, and then do quantitative and statistical analysis to determine whether or not they were heavier on evidence gathering and predictive modeling, or heavier on making unfalsifiable hypotheses.
Once we have gathered and preprocessed the data, we could make a null hypothesis like "we expect to see an even distribution of the predictive model approach vs the untested hypothesis generating approach". Then when we actually crunch the numbers, assuming our sample is sufficiently large, if we see large deviation in one direction or the other, we then have a potentially significant signal that tells which direction to lean regarding the claim "modern science is cardinally focused on understanding the world through empirical evidence and predictive power, not mere "rationality"; (what Descartes did)".
You might want to say "correlation is not causation" and that would indeed be very astute. We could take our analysis to completion by gathering additional data of factors which we think might impact cardinal focus of individual scientific inquiries. Using something like muti-variate regression analysis, we could potentially generate a model between the relationships of circumstantial factors and the cardinal focus of scientific inquiry in general. We could then use these relationships to create a statistical model that tells us what the most likely cardinal focus of a given scientific inquiry is if we are given the specific factors that we checked in our analysis. If our model generates predictions with very high or useful precision and accuracy then we call it robust. — VagabondSpectre
Stop trying to demarcate science
— Xtrix
Stop trying to couple it with non-science. — VagabondSpectre
That's a completely meaningless statement.
Both are scientific theories. They're not "read off" from nature without any contribution of the thinking mind; there's nothing "backwards" about this.
— Xtrix
The experimental evidence is in our face phenomenon... — VagabondSpectre
You're looking at it backward actually. QM and GR are "in our face" phenomenon that we cannot deny. — VagabondSpectre
Our thinking minds tend to want to reject these things as spooky and unintuitive nonsense, and it is only the experimental evidence that manages to persuade us in the end. — VagabondSpectre
It turns out that φῠ́σῐς (phusis) is the basis for "physical." So the idea of the physical world and the natural world are ultimately based on Greek and Latin concepts, respectively. — Xtrix
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.