By "moral value" I mean breaking the golden rule of ethics: do onto others as you would want them to do onto you. This rule is simple enough that most people can correctly judge what is morally right and wrong; and this removes the possibility of honest rational mistake about moral judgements.Someone who cheats on their spouse thus either honestly thought that the pleasure it brought them was more important than the other consequences of it, and acted according to that judgement, in what they felt was a justified, and therefore moral — Pfhorrest
Once judged that cheating is morally wrong, then they can freely choose between moral value or pleasure (picture the angel and demon on each shoulder like in cartoons). If they ended up cheating from choosing pleasure, then the act was intended, willed. If they chose the moral good but somehow ended cheating anyways (say they were drugged), then the act indeed happened against their will; but free will must exist for something to go against it.or else they thought that they should act out of more consideration for those other consequences than for their own pleasure, and yet did not act that way, doing something they thought was wrong ought of weakness of will. — Pfhorrest
That is not a compelling argument. That you can intend to move demonstrates volition. That you have no choice by definition rules out free will. Essentially, you're conflating free will with volition, then arguing that you aren't by conflating free will with volition. You can call anything by any name you like, but when most people refer to free will it involves making some kind of a choice; and there are plenty who believe there is no such thing as free will, who have no problem whatsoever with volition. So if you want to speak the same language as these people, free will requires choice of some sort; and volition per se doesn't demonstrate it.I don't think a choice in outcome is necessary for free will. ... this would not take away my free will, because I can still intend to move. — Samuel Lacrampe
Okay, so let's back track. Banno says:"Does Free Will violate the Principle of Sufficient Reason?"
I don't believe so. — Samuel Lacrampe
Your response to that was:It's double slit experiments - nothing causes the photon to go left instead of right. It's atomic decay - nothing causes this uranium atom to decay now, but not that one. The list goes on. — Banno
I'm a bit curious then. If it's a logical fallacy to say that nothing causes the photon to go left instead of right, how is it not a logical fallacy to say that nothing causes me to pick vanilla instead of chocolate?I would accept the claim "we don't know what causes [...]", but "nothing causes [...]" is a logical fallacy.
It goes against the Principle of Sufficient Reason; which is one of the four Laws of Thoughts. — Samuel Lacrampe
Sure. But what's your point with regards to this discussion? — Samuel Lacrampe
Premise P1: Everything that is physical is determined, as per the laws of physics.
Premise P2: Free Will enables some of our acts to be freely chosen, and therefore not fully determined.
• An act is called freely chosen when it is voluntary, intended, willed, as opposed to being accidental, fully caused by external forces outside our control.
• Note: for this discussion, we are assuming this premise to be true. Hey, it’s a simple argument.
Conclusion C: The part of us that possesses free will is not physical.
• This non-physical part is what is typically referred to as the Soul.
What do you think? — Samuel Lacrampe
and it's not just virtual particles. It's double slit experiments - nothing causes the photon to go left instead of right. It's atomic decay - nothing causes this uranium atom to decay now, but not that one. The list goes on.
And again, what is salient is that intelligent, practical folk accept these uncaused events as part of the mechanism that allows all our electronic devices to function. — Banno
Reduce the stream to a single particle every minute. Send through a particle. It goes left. What caused it to go left, and not right? — Banno
Premise P1: Everything that is physical is determined, as per the laws of physics. — Samuel Lacrampe
It's weird because in french, "free will" is translated as "volonté libre", and "volition" as "volonté". Be that as it may, a choice is still present as long as you have the choice to intend one way or another. Intentions must be free and have multiple choices, otherwise they would be no intentions at all. And if you tie me up so that I am immobile, we say this was done "against my will", that is, against my intention, my consent.That you can intend to move demonstrates volition. That you have no choice by definition rules out free will. Essentially, you're conflating free will with volition — InPitzotl
Alright. You pick vanilla because vanilla tastes better than chocolate for you, and since this choice in taste is not voluntary, it must come from psychological history; and everyone with the same history would do the same. Now if that was the whole story, then indeed positing free will would be superfluous. But let's add to the example that vanilla is more expensive than chocolate. You then have to choose between two conflicting values: taste and money. And choosing between values is voluntary, and so is caused by our power of free will (or volition if you prefer).If it's a logical fallacy to say that nothing causes the photon to go left instead of right, how is it not a logical fallacy to say that nothing causes me to pick vanilla instead of chocolate? — InPitzotl
Why? The vast majority of humans have a unique genome. Human brains it's rumored have 100 trillion neural connections. And human males seem to find female humans attractive significantly more often than they find female turkeys attractive. So, yes; humans indeed are a highly social species, so nurture (for which "psychological history" is longhand) is very significant. But nature is also very significant; and even if you count development (phenotype from genotype) entirely in the nurture camp, there's plenty of nature to go around to explain different behaviors.Alright. You pick vanilla because vanilla tastes better than chocolate for you, and since this choice in taste is not voluntary, it must come from psychological history; and everyone with the same history would do the same. — Samuel Lacrampe
But that's a false dilemma, because for reasons mentioned above it cannot be the full story anyway. To make this argument you would have to prove a point you don't even believe... that we are tabula rasa.Now if that was the whole story, then indeed positing free will would be superfluous.
Making preferences complex isn't impressive. AlphaZero learned to play chess with no heuristics and, though there's still a tad bit of controversy about some particulars, it seems to have bested the prior best chess engines. Many chess experts who have seen sample games recognize the games that AlphaZero plays as "beautiful" compared to typical engines, FWIW. Now I'm not going to argue that AlphaZero is conscious or sentient, or on par with human agency (because, quite frankly, I don't believe it), but... imagine AlphaZero "choosing" which chess piece to move in a particular game; weighing variables that it literally "invented" a way to even valuate (read up on how it works if you're curious). AlphaZero is a program; it runs on a deterministic machine (I don't know; it could use entropy, but even if it does it could in principle run off of a CSPRNG). I've no idea how many variables of this self-learned valuation AlphaZero uses, but compared to my "choosing" to get vanilla versus chocolate, preferring the taste of chocolate, but weighing it against price; since AlphaZero can definitely beat the best human players hands down, I don't quite think that choice is as impressive as you're making it out to be.But let's add to the example that vanilla is more expensive than chocolate. You then have to choose between two conflicting values: taste and money.
I've no problem with choice, and no problem with volition; I just make a distinction between these two things. I'm agnostic on the free will question, though I can't take libertarian free will too seriously without new physics (and some better argument for why we should buy it than I've heard). That's not the problem here, though.And choosing between values is voluntary, and so is caused by our power of free will (or volition if you prefer).
The Golden Rule is an absolute; here's why. Fairness is defined as treating everyone equally; no discrimination. Nobody in their right mind can judge that being unfair is morally good, and that being fair is morally bad. And unfairness necessarily results when breaking the Golden Rule.If someone assesses an action as violating the Golden Rule, but also thinks that they should do it anyway for some other reason, then that means they think there are (at least) exceptions to the Golden Rule, and it isn't always morally binding. — Pfhorrest
Yes I agree with this when it comes to beliefs; but not when it comes to morality. You make it sound like the way people act is always out of the honest belief that the act is morally good. But this is absurd for a couple of reasons.Consider beliefs for comparison. [and the rest of this post] — Pfhorrest
I am inclined to agree with you that calling the result "determined" as per some clockwork model of the universe, isn't supported by current science. — Echarmion
the laws of physics are descriptive — Echarmion
Perhaps they are not prescriptive, but they are predictive. — Banno
I agree that when we say "physical things obey the laws of physics", it is merely an expression to say there is uniformity or consistency in causality, and the laws of physics describe that uniformity. That's also all I meant in P1. — Samuel Lacrampe
But there appears to be a discrepancy with our meaning of the term "determined". My understanding of "determined" is that a given Cause A will consistently result in Effect B; not necessarily that we can know with certainty what Cause A and Effect B are. Do you mean something else by it? — Samuel Lacrampe
You make it sound like the way people act is always out of the honest belief that the act is morally good. — Samuel Lacrampe
I'm not sure about this one though. Ideas like unicorn indeed do not reflect reality, but they might still be caused by our perception of reality in the first place. I don't think determinism and imagination are incompatible.As I said earlier, another fact is that we can act on ideas that do not reflect reality...therefore we are not marionettes being played by the world around us. — Chester
I like the first one better, as it is simpler and thus easier for me to follow.
You are correct that the argument can only go as far as proving that we have a non-physical part, and that the claim that this is the soul is an add-on at the end. That's okay, I think the hard work is in the first part for most people. After that, it is not great effort to connect this part which is non-physical and has free will, to what is commonly referred to as the soul — Samuel Lacrampe
That's fine. The point was that to explain our resulting taste, nature and nurture are sufficient without having to bring in free will.humans indeed are a highly social species, so nurture (for which "psychological history" is longhand) is very significant. But nature is also very significant; — InPitzotl
It's not about complexity. I'm okay with computers making highly complex decisions and still being fully determined. It's about how we all feel we freely chose our values; which once chosen, determine the rest of our behaviour accordingly.Making preferences complex isn't impressive. — InPitzotl
I still don't understand the distinction between volition and free will. How can intentions truly exist if they are not freely chosen? To contrast, AlphaZero, being nothing but a program that goes through the motions, has no intentions.I've no problem with choice, and no problem with volition; [...] I'm agnostic on the free will question — InPitzotl
That sounds to me like an ad hominem attack. Are you objecting because there is a flaw in my reasoning, or merely because it seems I am telling God what to do?(1) You're telling God what to do, [...] (1) comes into play with how you argue that physics is fully determined; it must be, "laws of thoughts" demand it to be. That to me sounds not so much like an argument as it does an excuse not to give one. — InPitzotl
This is a misunderstanding. Laws of Thoughts, specifically the Principle of Sufficient Reason, does not allow for random causality. This therefore leaves two possibilities for causality. Free Will, and Determinism for things which don't possess free will. Neither of these possibilities violate the Principle of Sufficient Reason, as far as I can tell. But if it does, let me know.(2) You want to have your cake and eat it too. [...] when it comes to how we behave, this rule suddenly gets thrown out the window; "laws of thoughts" demand physics to be fully determined; "free will" demands us to not be. That's (2). — InPitzotl
No objection; just thinking out loud. What you describe indeed does not fit determinism, and yet a probability distribution still implies some sort of order. It is odd that it is not fully ordered, yet not fully random... For some reason, I would be more willing to accept full absence of order over partial order.Particles don't have fixed positions, they instead have probablity distributions. So you have cause A and then 50% chance for effect B, 20 % chance fo effect C etc. — Echarmion
That seems to me simply the result of Central Limit Theorem; where the macro scale averages out the inconsistencies. If so, then I'm pretty sure it's quantifiable with some confidence interval.This does not normally occur on the macro scale, but the jury is still out on exactly when this breaks down into determined effects. — Echarmion
This poses a difficulty. I am fairly sure that the Scientific Method is founded on the Principle of Sufficient Reason; and any scientific theory that goes against its founding principles would be self-defeating, like sawing off the branch it's sitting on.There is of course the "hidden causes" line of argument that claims this apparent probablity distribution is just dues to lack of knowledge. But so far experimental results have not backed it up. I think there have actually been a number of experiments that make "hidden causes" seem less likely. — Echarmion
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