In another possible world people play Tetris all day. They are otherwise physically and psychologically healthy people, but they make the decision to play Tetris, in a room by themselves, for 10 hours per day. Now, this decision doesn't seem to harm their mind or body, nor the minds or bodies of anyone else; however, making the decision to play Tetris all day doesn't seem like the sort of decision we would normally categorize as "moral" either. But by the lights of your own theory, we would have to do that. How would you account for that? — Wolfman

Are there any choices that aren't fundamentally moral choices? The decision to choose milk in coffee instead of plain coffee might not seem moral, but calculating the consequences of the choice, it has moral ramifications in many directions. What are the consequences of playing Tetris 10 hours per day, how does that affect them outside of those hours? How does it affect the rest of the world? And so one. It becomes a moral choice since the only choice that isn't moral is a choice made outside of a human mind, but such a choice can't be made since we first need a human mind to make a choice and by making a choice in a human mind it affects the self and others.

I fail to see how any choice isn't a moral choice. It depends on the perspective and scale of how you look at the consequences of a choice.

1. A technical impossibility: human affairs are not predictable. You cannot objectively predict effects from causes as in physics. If these were the case it would be awful. Imagine predictable tools in Hitler's hands. Human slavery would be warranted.
2. There is not logical contradiction in preferring the falling of the whole world before I have a toothache. That is to say, you cannot deduce "to ought" from "to be". Unless you scientifically establish that the lowest good of the highest number is preferable to the highest good of the lowest number. And with what yardstick do you measure the greater or lesser good. But the utilitarians have been trying to solve this question for centuries, without success so far.

That is why I am afraid that in ethics we will always find approximate answers that will convince more or less good people. — David Mo

This is the foundation for my thinking. That we cannot find what is good or bad moral acts. So how can we be morally good? We can be so by having a mindset of tackling moral questions that maximize the probability of making a good choice based on definitions outside of ourselves and our biases. That the act of calculating what choice to make is the morally good thing to do, not the act as a result.

Your second point is the tricky one. It has to do with the definitions that are used as a foundation for the scientific mindset to build upon. How do we define the well being and harm definition? I would argue that it's a form of priority. First, humanity, then the self, then the other. Meaning, well being of yourself cannot come before humanity, but it can come before another person. So you cannot propose well being for yourself over humanity, you can do so over another person as long as that doesn't also set your well being before humanity. That way, killing another person to save yourself can happen and be good, since it was an act to also preserve the well being of the group (humanity) as you are a part of it, but killing someone else for your gain cannot be done since you act against the well being of the group (humanity) which the other is also a part of.
By defining when well being can be broken we have a more clear definition of well being and harm and can use that definition as a foundation about how to test our hypothetical moral choice in any given situation.

So, it isn't about defining the morally good by the act and choice we make, but by how we figure out what choice and act to make. The act of figuring out, by method of bypassing biases and understanding consequences through a set of definitions about harm and well being, is what defines us as morally good or bad, not the act or choice we arrive at in the end.

My answer is, you don't, you calculate the probability of a good choice/act and that calculation is what is morally good — Christoffer

Let me get this straight. The method that one uses to arrive at a moral decision is what morality is about and not the moral decision itself for reasons I can only guess as having to do with the lack of a good moral theory.

Wow! That's news to me although such a point of view resembles virtue ethics a lot - Aristotle, if virtue ethics is his handiwork, seems to have claimed that the highest good lies in being rational - the method, rationality, is more important than the what is achieved through it. That said, if one is rational, a consequence of that would be making the right decision, whether moral or otherwise, no? Unless of course morality has nothing to do with rationality which would cast doubt on your claims. How would you make the case that rationality can be applied to morality? Is being moral rational? I believe the idea of the selfish gene, which subsumes, quite literally, everything about us, points in a different direction.

Let me get this straight. The method that one uses to arrive at a moral decision is what morality is about and not the moral decision itself for reasons I can only guess as having to do with the lack of a good moral theory.

Wow! That's news to me although such a point of view resembles virtue ethics a lot - Aristotle, if virtue ethics is his handiwork, seems to have claimed that the highest good lies in being rational - the method, rationality, is more important than the what is achieved through it. That said, if one is rational, a consequence of that would be making the right decision, whether moral or otherwise, no? Unless of course morality has nothing to do with rationality which would cast doubt on your claims. How would you make the case that rationality can be applied to morality? Is being moral rational? I believe the idea of the selfish gene, which subsumes, quite literally, everything about us, points in a different direction. — TheMadFool

I see your point about virtue ethics, but that has more to do with replicating those with virtue to be good, not to use a method of thinking and reasoning in order to be good? The foundation for the method isn't about virtues, but about how we define harm and well being. Virtue is more about characteristics and it's a very loose slippery form of ethics I'm not so sure works very well.

And using the rational method of thinking still needs to be combined with the foundation of well being and harm, otherwise, you could rationally argue for very immoral things. It needs to have a framework to be a method of good morals.

My argument focuses on this specific form of thinking as a defined morally good way to live. Not by replicating vague virtues or just being rational without a framework around it.

OK, I didn't think you would bite the bullet on that one. But let me say more:

How does this theory escape some of the traditional criticisms leveled at utilitarianism. Imagine a world where 95% of the population believes slavery is a good thing. By enslaving the 5% minority they are able to develop their civilization to new heights and usher in a period of prosperity that has lasted for the last several hundred years. Industry and commerce are booming, people report being happier overall, and health and life expectancy are at an all time high. Most everything that can ordinarily be said of a successful society is happening here, and none of this would have been possible without slavery because the majority is extremely lazy.

How would you respond to this criticism? How can we not say that people in this society value their way of life, and how can we not say that they do not benefit from it? You go on to talk about scientific method and beliefs supported by evidence, but it isn't at all clear how any of that is sufficient to show why this style of living is morally impermissible.

The foundation for the method isn't about virtues, but about how we define harm and well being. Virtue is more about characteristics and it's a very loose slippery form of ethics I'm not so sure works very well. — Christoffer

So how do you define well-being, Christoffer? And how does well-being compute, if at all, into what you are proposing? TMF is quite right to point out some similarities between what you are proposing and virtue ethics, but I'm trying to see you flesh out your position more and take it to its logical conclusion.

How does this theory escape some of the traditional criticisms leveled at utilitarianism. Imagine a world where 95% of the population believes slavery is a good thing. By enslaving the 5% minority they are able to develop their civilization to new heights and usher in a period of prosperity that has lasted for the last several hundred years. — Wolfman

How do they come to the conclusion that enslaving the 5% follows the framework of avoiding harm to humanity? It harms 5% of humanity, it might harm further by the consequences of slavery in form of civil wars in later years. The justification for slavery falls flat by using the proposed method of thinking.
And even if it only harms the body of a few to give a utilitarian good for the others for many years to come, what about the harm of the mind? Aren't we still tackling harm to the mind by the resulting culture of what came after the slave culture in US? A society can prosper on the bodies of the few, but it's questionable or even certain (by historical records) that the well being of the people with the knowledge of the historic slavery as the foundation for their society will have maximized well being. To choose to enslave 5% is a choice to speed up the development of a capitalistic society. Wouldn't it be better to change the society's foundation of economics if the goal is to improve society fast and then prosper, minimizing the harm to 5% and include them into the well being of the entire group (humanity)?

I just applied the method to the question of which utilitarianism would just settle on a yes.

The counter-argument you present here ignores the foundation of well being and harm you build your rational thinking upon. And using a scientific mindset is about exhausting all possible outcomes of a choice and excluding your biases, so it would be impossible to see the benefit of slavery over the benefit of other solutions.

How do they come to the conclusion that enslaving the 5% follows the framework of avoiding harm to humanity? It harms 5% of humanity, it might harm further by the consequences of slavery in form of civil wars in later years. The justification for slavery falls flat by using the proposed method of thinking. — Christoffer

I think your defense is one step removed from where it needs to take place. It doesn't matter how their way of life came to be. The point is that it's already happening, and it's working for them now. On what grounds do you tell them to stop?

So how do you define well-being, Christoffer? And how does well-being compute, if at all, into your idea? TMF is quite right to point out some similarities between what you are proposing and virtue ethics, but I'm trying to see you flesh out your position more and take it to its logical conclusion. — Wolfman

This is the tricky one, I agree. The foundation is the "Asimov law of robots" for this argument, to prevent the rational method going bonkers. Virtue ethics is more about replicating the good characteristics of a person, while mine is more about method, so that's where I see the difference between them.

At this time of the work on this argument, I define well being and harm through their basic definition applied to humans in priority of three: humanity (group), then the self, then the other. So you can act for your gain as long as you don't act against the group of humanity and you can act against another person as long as you don't attack that person as part of the group. If that person attacks you, he himself attacks the group (since you're part of it) and defending yourself is defending the group.
All of this through harm and well being of the mind and body, so you can't harm the body just to get well being of the mind and vice versa. You can harm the body if it's necessary for the well being of the mind, meaning if the harm of the mind is so severe that harming the body is necessary for reducing harm to the mind, it is justified within harm/well being.

So

Reduce harm to the body/mind
Maximize well being of the body/mind
Doing harm to any of them is justified in proportion to the harm of the other. (so operating a body to heal the mind is harm to the body in proportion to the harm of the mind by not doing it).

Set within a priority of act against/towards
Humanity (group)
Individual Self
Individual Other (as long as not against going against the first (humanity)

I think your defense is one step removed from where it needs to take place. It doesn't matter how their way of life came to be. The point is that it's already happening, and it's working for them now. On what grounds do you tell them to stop? — Wolfman

I tell them to stop since they are harming 5% of humanity and do not have a rational argument built upon the foundation of not harming 5% of humanity. If they don't agree to that point, they aren't morally good, I am.

I tell them to stop since they are harming 5% of humanity and do not have a rational argument built upon the foundation of not harming 5% of humanity. If they don't agree to that point, they aren't morally good, I am. — Christoffer

But they do have a rational argument. Their society is experiencing a boom in industry and commerce, health and life expectancy, more aggregate happiness, and so on and so forth. How is that not a rational argument? Let's charitably grant that their original decision to adopt slavery was initially suboptimal from a mathematical standpoint. Maybe there was only a 40% chance of success and 60% chance of failure. But they went on with adopting slavery anyway. Against the odds, slavery turned out to work great for them. So while you might say their original plan was suboptimal, nothing in your theory says their decision to continue their way of life is immoral/suboptimal, because it has been found to work for them, and it has withstood the test of time for the last several hundred years.

Here it seems your theory cannot address such a notion because it is entirely explicated from the perspective one takes prior to making a moral decision, and cannot make sense of the intuitively repugnant consequences that follow as a result of following through on a decision procedure that was initially suboptimal but turned out to be optimal. By the lights of your own theory, nothing says slavery in this case is immoral. Actually, it even looks like its moral. You might want to give your own supplemental reasons for why slavery is wrong, but if it contradicts the supreme principles of your theory then they can be of only secondary importance.

But they do have a rational argument. Their society is experiencing a boom in industry and commerce, health and life expectancy, more aggregate happiness, and so on and so forth. How is that not a rational argument? — Wolfman

Because when framing the argument through my moral theory, they are acting immoral and have ignored other types of ways to prosper that don't require 5% of humanity to be slaves. They have not respected the foundation of well being and harm and they haven't done any unbiased rational thinking to arrive at their conclusion, objections I listed a few of in the earlier post.

Let's charitably grant that their original decision to adopt slavery was initially suboptimal from a mathematical standpoint. Maybe there was only a 40% chance of success and 60% chance of failure. But they went on with adopting slavery anyway. Against the odds, slavery turned out to work great for them. So while you might say their original plan was suboptimal, nothing in your theory says their decision to continue their way of life is immoral/suboptimal, because it has been found to work for them, and it has withstood the test of time for the last several hundred years. — Wolfman

Your reasoning here require that we divide humanity before making it logical, but you break the morality of it before trying to make it logical, meaning, you can't break the foundation of the method, you cannot harm 5% of the group. You can only harm 5% of the group (humanity) if the other option was unproportional suffering for the entire humanity. And even by that reasoning, you need to rationally support why other methods aren't better. Like, if humanity faced extinction, then arguing for the joint effort of everyone to help against and that a few of the group will suffer because of this, is not the same as enslaving people for it. But in your example, it's about capitalistic commerce prosperity, ignoring any other possible prosperity method that includes the 5% with the ones getting the well being out of it.

There's no way to spin your argument without breaking against the moral method I proposed, they will never be able to support slavery if applying this moral method to it. If they don't use the method, they aren't acting morally, so their choice was immoral however we look at it.

Here it seems your theory cannot address such a notion because it is entirely explicated from the perspective one takes prior to making a moral decision, and cannot make sense of the intuitively repugnant consequences that follow as a result following through on decisions turned out to have good odds after all. — Wolfman

You ignore the foundation of well being and harm here. You cannot reason without it and ignoring it to argue against the method is ignoring a huge part of the argument. You are essentially ignoring Asimovs law of robots to argue that a robot would kill a human. Which makes that argument flawed as you ignore the specifics of the theory.

By the lights of your own theory, nothing says slavery in this case is immoral. — Wolfman

Yes, harm to the group (humanity). You cannot start by reasoning the probability of good with harm to the group, you start with no harm to the group or self and then reason for a solution. How can you reason for slavery without breaking the foundation of the method?

This method has the foundation and the rational reasoning as two parts that need to exist together, you cannot ignore the foundation and you cannot act without reasoning. Your conclusions about slavery don't survive either of them. Either you harm humanity (since the 5% is part of that group) or you fail to reasonably falsify your justification for slavery since you ignore other possible ways to prosper.

At the moment it seems you are grasping for straws, so I hope you look at the details of the method first. Right now you conclude the method to support slavery by ignoring a big factor that isn't in compliance with such a conclusion.

I see your point about virtue ethics, but that has more to do with replicating those with virtue to be good, not to use a method of thinking and reasoning in order to be good? The foundation for the method isn't about virtues, but about how we define harm and well being. Virtue is more about characteristics and it's a very loose slippery form of ethics I'm not so sure works very well.

And using the rational method of thinking still needs to be combined with the foundation of well being and harm, otherwise, you could rationally argue for very immoral things. It needs to have a framework to be a method of good morals.

My argument focuses on this specific form of thinking as a defined morally good way to live. Not by replicating vague virtues or just being rational without a framework around it. — Christoffer

As far as I can tell, and I'm sure you know this like the back of your hand or inside and out (take your pick), every extant moral theory is flawed in some way or other making them hopelessly inadequate as a fully dependable compass when navigating the moral landscape. Given that our moral compass is defective, what course of action do you recommend? Each and every moral problem we face can't be solved by the simple application of a moral rule for there are no moral theories that covers all moral problems. Given this predicament, it isn't complete nonsense to suggest that when faced with moral problems we should do what a rational man would do and this is virtue ethics. I think Aristotle had his suspicions about moral theories - none seem to work perfectly.

As far as I can tell, and I'm sure you know this like the back of your hand or inside and out (take your pick), every extant moral theory is flawed in some way or other making them hopelessly inadequate as a fully dependable compass when navigating the moral landscape. Given that our moral compass is defective, what course of action do you recommend? Each and every moral problem we face can't be solved by the simple application of a moral rule for there are no moral theories that covers all moral problems. Given this predicament, it isn't complete nonsense to suggest that when faced with moral problems we should do what a rational man would do and this is virtue ethics. I think Aristotle had his suspicions about moral theories - none seem to work perfectly. — TheMadFool

This is the basics I try to build past. Because moral theories focus on how to act more than how to figure out how to act. I try to take a step back in the process, proposing that morality comes a step before what the moral theories usually aims at.

Take the trolley problem for example, in terms of utilitarianism you need to pull the lever. The theory demands this action. The method I propose does not say what action you take, it's a method of finding out the action. The use of the method to find out the action to take is the good moral. If you choose something based on this method, you have already acted morally good before pulling or not pulling the lever. It doesn't mean the action is 50/50 good or bad, it means you used a method to calculate the probability of a good choice to the best of your ability and that choice of thinking/reasoning is what is morally good. And the method can't be corrupted to your gain or will either, it respects you and the group (humanity), so you can't abuse it, like the example above with slavery for the greater good.

So what I mean is that since we can accept that all moral theories have flaws, that moral landscapes shift through time and it's impossible to objectively give people answers on what actions to take in moral dilemmas. We can only propose a method used for each moral dilemma dynamically. If the method always leads to a probability of good choices, it is a moral obligation to use such a method in order to act morally good.

Interesting topic. I notice the issue of practicality has been raised. I wonder how people feel about a hypothetical global human survey which somehow qualifies what the majority of humans take to be moral? Could this data form a legitimate basis for our opinions? If so, this would be a scientific basis.

Interesting topic. I notice the issue of practicality has been raised. I wonder how people feel about a hypothetical global human survey which somehow qualifies what the majority of humans take to be moral? Could this data form a legitimate basis for our opinions? If so, this would be a scientific basis. — Zophie

Sure, but it would be a flawed foundation for morals based on opinion and tradition instead of universal. This is why a method that has a foundation that implies doing no harm to humanity and the self works better to stop reasoning immoral actions as moral.

Of course. Science is about discovering what is the case, not what should be the case. Obviously it's not perfect. But it's at least empirical. To my mind law is about as certain as ethics can get, so maybe you'll accept a legal parallel in the notion of common law, where standards are slightly more malleable and descriptive in pursuit of what I'll tentatively call "the least unusual and most popular".* The hypothetical scientific survey I proposed, which gives everyone on the planet some input, would follow a similar intention in order to establish a normative notion of universal morality, or as I would prefer to call it, kindness. Science doesn't do prescriptive knowledge; that's chiefly the job of philosophy.

*This is a very simplified version which omits judges and contrasts slightly with civil law.

Because when framing the argument through my moral theory, they are acting immoral and have ignored other types of ways to prosper that don't require 5% of humanity to be slaves. They have not respected the foundation of well being and harm and they haven't done any unbiased rational thinking to arrive at their conclusion, objections I listed a few of in the earlier post. — Christoffer

As far as I can tell you are just arbitrarily saying we can't hurt the minority, and this conclusion doesn't follow from any of the principles you supplied in the OP. Additionally, you sprinkle the term "well-being" into your responses in some vague fashion, as if that will solve anything. You make no mention at all of well-being in your OP, by the way, and that was supposedly where you were defining your moral terms :roll: You have a ways to go before your half-baked theory makes any sense.

Of course. Science is about discovering what is the case, not what should be the case. Obviously it's not perfect. But it's at least empirical. — Zophie

Just to be clear, my idea of scientific method or mindset is about borrowing the method into a framework of though at any given moral dilemma. So my theory is not directly using scientific method, but a guidance of thought by it.

To my mind law is about as certain as ethics can get, so maybe you'll accept a legal parallel in the notion of common law, where standards are slightly more malleable and descriptive in pursuit of what I'll tentatively call "the least unusual and most popular".* — Zophie

Law can only follow moral philosophy. Law can never be ahead of philosophical definitions of morality. We base laws on the morality we have decided is correct. This is why laws are always changing, both through time and by consequences being analyzed by philosophy.

The hypothetical scientific survey I proposed, which gives everyone on the planet some input, would follow a similar intention in order to establish a normative notion of universal morality, or as I would prefer to call it, kindness. Science doesn't do prescriptive knowledge; that's chiefly the job of philosophy. — Zophie

What someone ought to do as a good moral choice based on a normative notion of universal morality, is only as good as the knowledge the people creating that statistical norm. I would argue that a democracy voting forth a president like Trump shows how badly asking the people will grant you norms that are objectively good. And what about shifting tides in world views? In 2035 it's proposed that the world consists of 50% atheists. That means that if we do a survey right now, a lot of the morality norms will come from religious scripture, but in 2035 we will have much less of it. So we can't get norms as the norms are shifting, we can only get a method based on commonalities of what is good through time.

As far as I can tell you are just arbitrarily saying we can't hurt the minority, but this conclusion doesn't follow from any of the principles you supplied in the OP. Additionally, you sprinkle the term "well-being" into your responses in some vague fashion, as if that will solve anything. You make no mention at all of well-being in your OP, by the way, and that was supposedly where you were defining your moral terms :roll: You have a ways to go before your half-baked theory makes any sense. — Wolfman

That's because the argument is a work in progress, as I state in the last sentence of the OP. The discussion following throughout is part of the process to make the argument clearer and better. I haven't updated the OP yet. I see the discussion as the philosophical dialectic to improve the argument, to review it and I'm thankful that you and the others do this.

I have earlier made a remark that there are flaws in the argument based on how people have answered it, you included. That especially the part of value morality is not working at all etc.

So you are right that the OP is flawed, that's why the discussion is important. I'm pretty convinced that the theory will hold up, but it's very vague and needs changes that makes it crystal clear. The slavery argument didn't hold up against it, but I need to change the OP argument to show clearly why, if you get what I mean? :smile:

Yeah, norms change which is why surveys may be repeated. Ideally maybe like once a year. Until then I'm afraid the concept of "morality" is likely to remain an intransitive, incommensurable spectre.

Yeah, norms change which is why surveys may be repeated. Ideally maybe like once a year. Until then I'm afraid the concept of "morality" is likely to remain an intransitive, incommensurable spectre. — Zophie

I think it always will be, which is why the only thing we can decide on, in order to hack the It-Ought problem (Hume), is to find the Is in common basic good and bad things, such as well-being and harm and combine them with the Ought, in order to calculate the best possible choice or act in any given situation. Any other attempt at finding an objective morality or trying to settle on what is a moral will fail. And I don't think a survey will hold up, even if we do it every year. It could lead to a shift in morality that could really be harmful to a lot of people just because civilization had "a bad day" that year of the survey.

This is the basics I try to build past. Because moral theories focus on how to act more than how to figure out how to act. I try to take a step back in the process, proposing that morality comes a step before what the moral theories usually aims at.

Take the trolley problem for example, in terms of utilitarianism you need to pull the lever. The theory demands this action. The method I propose does not say what action you take, it's a method of finding out the action. The use of the method to find out the action to take is the good moral. If you choose something based on this method, you have already acted morally good before pulling or not pulling the lever. It doesn't mean the action is 50/50 good or bad, it means you used a method to calculate the probability of a good choice to the best of your ability and that choice of thinking/reasoning is what is morally good. And the method can't be corrupted to your gain or will either, it respects you and the group (humanity), so you can't abuse it, like the example above with slavery for the greater good.

So what I mean is that since we can accept that all moral theories have flaws, that moral landscapes shift through time and it's impossible to objectively give people answers on what actions to take in moral dilemmas. We can only propose a method used for each moral dilemma dynamically. If the method always leads to a probability of good choices, it is a moral obligation to use such a method in order to act morally good. — Christoffer

:up:

That we cannot find what is good or bad moral acts. — Christoffer

I'm not sure what you mean. A definition of "morality" is possible by picking up the common usage of "moral good"; a strict/scientific determination of how this definition applies is impossible.

Morality is an adjective that applies to the acts and rules that define a specific type of good: the moral rule is regulatory of human relations, informal, universal and unconditional. That is, it is applicable without conditions to everyone in the same circumstances. It is not moral good if is useful in order to obtaining something else and does not admit other exceptions that the rule itself admits.

A typical feature of the moral rule is the distinction between private and common interests. A moral rule excludes any act exclusively directed to private interests without taking into account the interests of others. Even the theory of rational egoism rejects behavior that does not incorporate common interests as part of rational morality.

So much for the definition. In practically any culture you will be considered a good person if you behave according to these conditions.

Now, some problems of appliacability.

I would argue that it's a form of priority. — Christoffer

You're partly right. If moral rules imply two different interests, mine and others', a major problem is proportion. It's easy to determine where the ends of the line are. It's more difficult to establish the borderline between the moral and the immoral. This is the vanishing point when many morals deflate in the face of selfishness. Albert Camus, one of the most famous moralists of the 20th century said: "If I have to decide between my mother and justice, I choose my mother. There may be a problem-trap in Camus' words, but it is complicated.

A second problem is the hierarchy of values. Not all values have the same value. It would be immoral to put my personal whim above a human life. It is not so clear that we do not make this choice many times in our lives in a less dramatic way.

I do not believe that there is a scientific yardstick for these uncertainties. Rational debate on them is advisable; scientific solutions are not possible. If you have this yardstick, I would like to know it. It would alleviate many of my daily concerns.

NOTE: And we have not yet entered into a particularly vexing case: what do we do with the cynic who refuses to follow any moral standards? Phew.

We can only propose a method used for each moral dilemma dynamically. If the method always leads to a probability of good choices, it is a moral obligation to use such a method in order to act morally good — Christoffer

I agree. There's no magic moral solution. What is moral are the conditions that make a moral choice possible. What are those conditions?

So much for the definition. In practically any culture you will be considered a good person if you behave according to these conditions. — David Mo

But we are discussing ethical philosophy. Just like scientific theory doesn't have the same definition as theory in common tongue, a moral act or defining morally good acts in ethical philosophy is not the same as how it's commonly used in language outside of the philosophical dialectic.

You're partly right. If moral rules imply two different interests, mine and others', a major problem is proportion. — David Mo

You have taken that out of context. The priority I provided had to do with which order you think about harm and well-being through the method I proposed.

I do not believe that there is a scientific yardstick for these uncertainties. Rational debate on them is advisable; scientific solutions are not possible. If you have this yardstick, I would like to know it. It would alleviate many of my daily concerns. — David Mo

Not sure that you fully understand what I argue for in this thread. I recommend that you read my posts to get more insight into the theory.

And we have not yet entered into a particularly vexing case: what do we do with the cynic who refuses to follow any moral standards? Phew. — David Mo

I haven't proposed any moral standards. I've proposed a theory for a moral method of calculating moral acts. So if someone doesn't follow moral absolutes or standards it's irrelevant to this theory since I dismiss moral standards in favor of the method. There are no standards, only ways to figure out what is good in case to case. Someone who doesn't do this is epistemically irresponsible and immoral. What we do with them depends on what they are immoral about.

I agree. There's no magic moral solution. What is moral are the conditions that make a moral choice possible. What are those conditions? — David Mo

Again, recommend you to read the comments and posts in this thread if you want to understand the theory of method i propose. If you mean that the conditions are the foundation on which the method is used, then I've listed them eariler.

Not sure that you fully understand what I argue for in this thread. — Christoffer

You take everything I write as replicas of your writings. I don't. I usually present ideas of my own. Rather than repeat that you have not said that, it would be good if you said where you disagree with my comment, in the assumption you have understood it. If what I say is not in contradiction with what you write or if you agree I suppose there is no need to say it.

For the rest, I believe that the concept of morality that I have suggested includes the definition of the different ethical schools as well. That's why I mentioned rational egoism that might seem contrary to my definition. It is one thing for them to differ in the justification or explanation of morality and another thing to start from the same (or similar) concept of morality.

I'll add something else about your "method" when I have time.

I haven't proposed any moral standards. I've proposed a theory for a moral method of calculating moral acts. — Christoffer

Objection: You cannot qualify an act as moral if you do not have a concept of what is moral and what is not. You cannot put a moral act prior others (the human community over the personal interest, for example) if you do not have a criterion of priority or hierarchy of some over others in the form of a rule (Choose x before y). You cannot claim to have an objective method for deciding which act is moral and which is a priority if you have not defined the objective validity of those criteria. And this implies a universal or a priori rule, as Kant would say.

This time you have reason to feel that you are being referred to.

ADDED: Whether you establish this by imagining situations in which you would act in one way or another is irrelevant to the theory. Dis/agreement of your theory with your acts is a subject that follows the fixation of the ethical theory you defend.

I usually present ideas of my own. — David Mo

I'll add something else about your "method" when I have time. — David Mo

Sure, but why are you using this thread for this? Why not start your own thread about morality? This discussion is about this method, so the time spent here should be about that, not different subjects.

Objection: You cannot qualify an act as moral if you do not have a concept of what is moral and what is not. You cannot put a moral act prior others (the human community over the personal interest, for example) if you do not have a criterion of priority or hierarchy of some over others in the form of a rule (Choose x before y). You cannot claim to have an objective method for deciding which act is moral and which is a priority if you have not defined the objective validity of those criteria. And this implies a universal or a priori rule, as Kant would say. — David Mo

But you object by presenting a moral absolutist concept when I reject moral absolutism entirely.
There is no morally good or bad acts that can be defined, only a method to find a probability of the best morally good choice. To have a framework for that method, you need a foundation that guides the reasoning and that foundation is well-being and harm. The reasoning built on top of that foundation will then find the parameters of well-being for any given situation based on the current knowledge zeitgeist.

This is why I urge you to read through this thread first. Because you seem to miss that I do not propose an objective way to act, but an objective way to calculate moral and propose that ethics philosophy will never find any solutions if it tries to create a framework of acts, it needs a framework of reasoning and that is the only way to come close to an objective moral way to live.

Why not start your own thread about morality? — Christoffer

Let's clear up some confusion because you look a little confused:

1. Subject of the thread you proposed: if a scientific method ("scientific mind") can objectively establish which acts are morally better ("priority").
I have explained to you in my last comments why your proposal is incomplete and unconvincing. Therefore, I have not set the subject aside. It seems that you have not understood what I was saying. I will give you a summary of my opinion.

2. To know which acts are better than others you need to know what makes a good act and what makes a bad act. In other words, what you mean by "good" in a moral sense. Just as you need to give a quality label to a product or study which product is better than another, you need to define what "quality" is.
Not only have you not done so, but you say you don't need to do so. Incomprehensible.

3. If that method you propose is scientific and objective, it will be based on a set of observable and quantifiable "good" properties. I don't think I need to explain to you what objectivity is and that science is based on observation and measurement. Otherwise your method will be neither objective nor scientific. It would be like proposing a quality criterion for a product based on the subjective tastes of the sellers. You have not given a single observable and measurable characteristic that allows you to decide that an act is good.

4. Any concept of quality, including morality, depends on a set of characteristics that are combined in different ways. That is, in different proportions. If you want to evaluate which acts are better than others in a scientific way, you must establish a quantification of that distribution of traits. A typical case in moral philosophy is the combination of the lesser good for the greater number and the greater good for the lesser number. In my opinion this problem has no scientific solution. If you are able to provide it, you should do so. Which you haven't done.

Consequently, I am not asking you to define an absolute moral good (a metaphysical claim that few defend today outside the sphere of religion), but to point out a number of serious shortcomings in your proposal. Instead of pretending that I don't understand it without saying why -a too obvious rhetorical flaw-, I would appreciate it if you would provide the answers to my objections. That would get our debate back on track.