If you want to speak of INFINITE possibilities then that is a real possibility. — intrapersona

That is not how it works. Infinite possibilities do not entail that anything and everything is a real possibility. There are infinitely many possible triangles, but none of them have four or more sides.

I would of thought that when we discovered that red is a certain wavelength of the EM spectrum that is exuded by the type of material light is reflected from it would've meant that we did away with thinking "redness" is something instantiated universally by objects, that it is a thing in itself rather than just a physical occurrence. ?? — intrapersona

Yes, well we can make distinctions between different sorts of properties. If we go the dualist route, we can plausibly say that there are primary and secondary qualities. Primary qualities are things like mass, volume, shape, distance to/from, velocity, etc. Secondary qualities are things like color, magnitudes of experience, etc.

"Red" is not an EM wave with wavelength 620-740 nm. That is what red is caused by, but the experience of red is something different. Again under a dualist schema. Red is not a property of an object, but rather a property that an object causes us to experience.

Primary qualities are things like mass, volume, shape, distance to/from, velocity, etc. — darthbarracuda

So how do we experience motion illusions under this kind of property dualism?

That is not how it works. Infinite possibilities do not entail that anything and everything is a real possibility. There are infinitely many possible triangles, but none of them have four or more sides. — aletheist

But it is a real possibility. Btw what is the difference between something being possible and it being a possibility?

If you are going to make that statement you better have evidence that aliens don't own pineapple guns and plan to invade earth within 3.5 seconds. Or any other process for that matter by which I may turn in to a pineapple. It is not physically impossible for the molecules in my body to rearrange in to a pineapple somehow, there will be a loss of certain molecular bonds and an excess of atoms of course but it is still possible.

"Red" is not an EM wave with wavelength 620-740 nm. That is what red is caused by, but the experience of red is something different. Again under a dualist schema. Red is not a property of an object, but rather a property that an object causes us to experience. — darthbarracuda

Yes indeed thanks for the correction and that should therefor mean that "redness" is mind dependant and makes no sense for anyone to start talking about properties and universals outside of the experiences in the mind.

So how do we experience motion illusions under this kind of property dualism? — apokrisis

Is this supposed to be one of those knock-down a-HAH! arguments?

Something can be seen to be moving while actually not moving at all. Something can also be seen to be static and yet be quite dynamic.

Something can be seen to be moving while actually not moving at all. Something can also be seen to be static and yet be quite dynamic. — darthbarracuda

So then, is motion a primary quality if what we experience doesn't have to be what is really there?











a-HAH!

So then, is motion a primary quality if what we experience doesn't have to be what is really there? — apokrisis

I mean, illusory experiences happen all the time. What is actually happening need not correspond to what we register, just as wavelength is not identical to color.

I mean, illusory experiences happen all the time. — darthbarracuda

So illusory motion and real motion look the same, but your primary and secondary quality distinction holds?

Sounds legit.

So illusory motion and real motion look the same, but your primary and secondary quality distinction holds? — apokrisis

The appearance of motion is different than the actual motion itself.

Yes indeed thanks for the correction and that should therefor mean that "redness" is mind dependant and makes no sense for anyone to start talking about properties and universals outside of the experiences in the mind. — intrapersona

But it's the case that the wavelength of two instances of light are the same. So one might say that this frequency of light is a universal.

So motion is both a primary and secondary quality?

So you think the discovered facts of reality oughtn't inform contemporary metaphysics? You don't think the truth of things ought to act as a constraint on our speculative ignorance.

Curious. — apokrisis

Whether or not to be a realist or an instrumentalist with respect to scientific discoveries is a philosophical matter that quantum mechanics isn't going to help us with. And if we opt for instrumentalism then these so-called "discovered facts of reality" aren't really the sort of things that can inform our metaphysics.

No, again, motion is primary, but the experience of motion is secondary. All we're registering is a change in our phenomenal world.

No, again, motion is primary, but the experience of motion is secondary. All we're registering is a change in our phenomenal world. — darthbarracuda

Isn't a change in our phenomenal world exactly how we understand motion anyway? Science is an empirical thing, after all.

So what causes the experience of motion if it isn't necessarily actual motion?

Isn't a change in our phenomenal world exactly how we understand motion anyway? Science is an empirical thing, after all. — Michael

Right, but if you don't move out of the way, that baseball is going to hit you. We register that there is a change going on in our phenomenal world, but we make a further assumption when we believe this change correlates to something actually moving outside us.

Apo's strange presentation of optical illusions shows this. We register change when there actually isn't any. There is a disconnect between what is the case and what seems to be the case. What seems to be the case are secondary properties. What is the case are primary properties.

So what causes the experience of motion if it isn't necessarily actual motion? — apokrisis

The experience of motion is more like the experience of changing secondary properties. Sort of like how programs can model three-dimensionally but it's actually just a two-dimensional design with shading.

Right, but if you don't move out of the way, that baseball is going to hit you. We register that there is a change going on in our phenomenal world, but we make a further assumption when we believe this change correlates to something actually moving outside us. — darthbarracuda

This doesn't follow. If our understanding of motion is of a particular kind of phenomena then even if this phenomena is caused by something "beyond" the phenomena, it would be a category error to say that this "something else" is motion. Rather this "something else" is just the cause of motion, with motion just being the particular kind of phenomena. Compare with the colour red and the commonly associated frequency of light. The latter is (usually) the cause of the former, but isn't itself redness.

The experience of motion is more like the experience of changing secondary properties. — darthbarracuda

If the experience of motion is the experience of changing secondary properties then motion is changing secondary properties. Which is consistent with my claim that motion just is the phenomena.

This doesn't follow. If our understanding of motion is of a particular kind of phenomena then even if this phenomena is caused by something "beyond" the phenomena, it would be a category error to say that this "something else" is motion. Rather this "something else" is just the cause of motion, with motion just being the particular kind of phenomena. Compare with being red and having a particular frequency of light. — Michael

I'm not sure I follow.

A ball moves towards me. In reality, this means that the ball is changing locations, traveling distance, in a specific discrete amount of time. But I do not actually experience the ball moving towards me, I experience a reconstruction of the episode, a painting of the real thing.

Consider how, if you cover up one of your eyes, it becomes much more difficult to see depth of field. The ball is still moving, but it's harder to register this because you aren't given enough information. Until it smacks you in the face, that is.

The phenomenal reality we experience everyday is a crude and limited reconstruction of the unknowable world beyond, a world apparently filled with mysterious dark matter and energy, curved space-time, and ruled by probability. Assuming there is such a world at all.

I'm not sure I follow.

A ball moves towards me. In reality, this means that the ball is changing locations, traveling distance, in a specific discrete amount of time. But I do not actually experience the ball moving towards me, I experience a reconstruction of the episode, a painting of the real thing.

Consider how, if you cover up one of your eyes, it becomes much more difficult to see depth of field. The ball is still moving, but it's harder to register this because you aren't given enough information. Until it smacks you in the face, that is.

The phenomenal reality we experience everyday is a crude and limited reconstruction of the unknowable world beyond. Assuming there is such a world at all. — darthbarracuda

What I'm saying is that your very understanding of what it means to move/travel/change locations/etc. is in phenomenal (presumably for the most part visual) terms. Just as your very understanding of what it means to be red is in phenomenal (visual) terms. Of course, as a matter of instrumentalism we talk about things as moving and being red even if they're not being seen, but given how we actually understand motion and colour, this is strictly speaking a nonsensical fiction.

There might very well be stuff going on behind the scenes with a regular causal relation to such phenomena, but such things aren't themselves the motion and the colour that we're familiar with. We might indeed be referring to such things when we talk about things moving and being red even when we don't see them, but in such a case it's more of a metaphorical referencing.

Or we're reifying the mathematical models that are constructed in response to phenomena.

So similar to how we assume there actually is an external world outside of our consciousness, or Hume's skepticism of causality?

This is the "seduction" of metaphysics that speculative realism talks about. Phenomenology is all cool and all, but what's really interesting is what the rest of the world is like, because the rest of the world could be radically different than anything we can imagine.

If you had in mind Planck length or Planck temperature or "the Planck scale," you know what might be a clearer way of communicating that? If you'd write "Planck length," "Planck temperature," or "the Planck scale."

So how about "scale of discovery" or "scale of measurement"? Does that say anything different than just "the Planck scale"?

And what the heck is "everything could be anything" referring to?

And "classical notions" of the principle of identity?? What's a "classical notion" as opposed to modern or postmodern or just "contemporary" or whatever it would be "notion of the principle of identity" (and how is a "notion of the principle of identity" different than just the "principle of identity")?

I did read it. And to deny that multiple things have the same property, is to deny that A=A. You only have 'that instance of A over there', and 'another instance of A here' - but they're not identical. So how can you even retain 'the law of identity' at all? — Wayfarer

With respect to the principle of identity, "A" on the left-hand side of the equality sign isn't referring to something different than A on the right-hand side of the equality sign, is it? They're not multiple things, right, but the same thing. That's just the idea of it.

If we were saying that the different occurrences of "A" refer to different, multiple things, we'd be equivocating.

This is even the case if one were to believe that there can be multiple instantiations of a property that we're referring to--the whole idea would be that each instantiation is one and the same property, not different, multiple properties.

However, that doesn't need to be what we're referring to. We can be referring to something numerically identical, and we can say that something not numerically identical can not in fact be identical. Perhaps with the principle of identity you're confusing use and mention?

If you had in mind Planck length or Planck temperature or "the Planck scale," you know what might be a clearer way of communicating that? If you'd write "Planck length," "Planck temperature," or "the Planck scale." — Terrapin Station

Sorry. I was fooled by your pretence at having some familiarity with the topic in question.

That's a good excuse for flowery, poetic imprecision, yes.

Well we got there in the end. You understand my point. So what was your clear and precise reply?

So you didn't mean the usual Lockean distinction between primary and secondary qualities? :-}

The next step is responding to what follows "so how about" in my second-to-last post to you.

With respect to the principle of identity, "A" on the left-hand side of the equality sign isn't referring to something different than A on the right-hand side of the equality sign, is it? They're not multiple things, right, but the same thing. That's just the idea of it...

Perhaps with the principle of identity you're confusing use and mention? — Terrapin Station

The statement at issue was:

[Nominalists] are denying the reality of multiple things having an identical (in the A=A sense) property. — Terrapin Station

I am saying that if two cars are both Fords, then that is an instance of 'identity'. Put 100 cars in a parking lot, only two of them Fords - one a Meteor, one a Mustang - and ask the question, 'which of those two cars are Fords?' There's only one right answer, and it relies on the fact that each of those two cars is ("=") a Ford. (And I reckon that if nominalism had held sway in ancient Greece, we probably wouldn't have cars, or computers on which to debate the point.)