Ok.

Wittgenstein's point is not that it is impossible to define "game", but that even if we don't have a definition, we can still use the word successfully. — wikipedia

Is this right? Not that there is no definition but despite that our ability to use words accurately enough :chin:

Give us an example of a word being used without a referent? — TheMadFool

There are of course plenty of examples in most sentences. That doesn't mean reference isn't the main game.

Yep. I wrote it.

Yep. I wrote it. — Banno

:rofl: with the sole purpose of causing mental mayhem for people like me

I am correct. you are wrong. look, if you guys want personal attacks I can dish them out too. Okay, tough guy?

I would not read Wiki to learn about Wittgenstein.

The notion that "red" refers to something leads to a metaphysics of perceptions, tying one's thinking in knots of phenomenology. — Banno

Please cite the text of Wittgenstein where he says that. Thanks.

"Give" us "an" "example" "of" "a" "word" "being" "used" "without" "a" "referent". — StreetlightX

To be fair, "example", "word", "used" and "referent" also want scratching, here.

I take your point that examples abound.

Both W and A said things like this, but the meaning is different. W is mainly concerned (and is right to be concerned) to deny the need for an ideal language.

every day language is not, for Wittgenstein, alright - that view would be better attributed to Austin. — Banno

I prefer Austin, myself. I think him easier to understand, possibly because he took the trouble to write what he thought, something the later Wittgenstein avoided, and so we have the work of his students/interpreters. But judging from the Tractatus, perhaps that was a good thing. All those proclamations relentlessly marching down the pages.

I prefer Austin, myself. I think him easier to understand, possibly because he took the trouble to write what he thought, something the later Wittgenstein avoided, and so we have the work of his students/interpreters. — Ciceronianus the White

The Philosophical Investigations is his own text.

So "red" means... one or more red things? — Banno

I think Heidegger wrote something about being able to encounter The Nothing only when suspended in red. Or was it something else?

Perhaps we must be suspended in something in order to encounter The Red.

The Philosophical Investigations is his own text. — jacksonsprat22

Damnation. I must be thinking of The Blue and Brown Books, then.

I think Heidegger wrote something about being able to encounter The Nothing only when suspended in red. Or was it something else?

Perhaps we must be suspended in something in order to encounter The Red. — Ciceronianus the White

Wittgenstein was attacking platonism. We have a red patch which is called "red." Problem solved.

if you guys want personal attacks — jacksonsprat22

Dude, asking for the source is not making a personal attack. You said Wittgenstein in the PI said metaphysics is incoherent. That's at odds with my reading of him, so I asked you to back up your claim. I pointed out that the only two references to metaphysics in the PI do not back up your claim.

Now I did say that you were unimpressive. That's an analysis, based on the facts, and for which you have just provided further evidence.

So far as I'm concerned your claim is wrong and that's an end to it until you provide some suport.

You won't be the first person to have misunderstood Wittgenstein.

Please cite the text of Wittgenstein where he says that. Thanks. — jacksonsprat22

PI. §58,

As was Austin. Here's his defence of ordinary language:

Our common stock of words embodies all the distinctions men have found worth drawing, and the connexions they have found worth marketing, in the lifetimes of many generation; these surely are likely to be more numerous, more sound, since they have stood up to the long test of the survival of the fittest, and more subtle, at least in all ordinary and reasonably practical matters, than any that you or I are likely to think up in our arm-chairs of an afternoon - the most favoured alternative method.

The article in the OP praises Wittgenstein's writing style.

I guess it's clear enough, if one compares it to other Germanic philosophers.

But Austin - luscious writing. Full of Oxford pretence.

:grin:

...despite that our ability to use words accurately enough — TheMadFool

Early on, Wittgenstein encourages us not to think about, but to look at, how words are used. This is for me his main attack on the referential theory of meaning. We (philosophers, and the general populace also) are in the thrall of a theory of language that quickly dissipates as one looks at how folk actually do use words.

Take a couple of casual conversations you participate in today and note how little of it is about stating facts.

Yet for some reason philosophers take statements as the prime example of language.

I don't know what the definition of "shrub" is. If pushed I would say something like "small and tree-shaped". I don't need an exact definition in order to ask were they are located at the plant shop.

The definition of "red" has taken endless pages in forums such as this, with very limited agreement. But that does not stop us buying red shirts.

This change in perspective is one of the reasons philosophers have to be grateful to Wittgenstein.

Dude, asking for the source is not making a personal attack — Banno

Okay, dude.

[reply="Ban
no;407069"]

No, I meant, make your argument about the specific text. Are you new to philosophy?

As was Austin. Here's his defence of ordinary language:

Our common stock of words embodies all the distinctions men have found worth drawing, and the connexions they have found worth marketing, in the lifetimes of many generation; these surely are likely to be more numerous, more sound, since they have stood up to the long test of the survival of the fittest, and more subtle, at least in all ordinary and reasonably practical matters, than any that you or I are likely to think up in our arm-chairs of an afternoon - the most favoured alternative method. — Banno

True, ordinary language embodies a lot of history, all of humanity's history actually. But if you link logic to language as Wittgenstein does, then this means that you can examine, by studying language, the logic that people used in various historical periods. Which would make linguists the authorities in logic, and in philosophy as well.

I would not read Wiki to learn about Wittgenstein — jacksonsprat22

What should I read for Wittgenstein?

What should I read for Wittgenstein? — TheMadFool

Philosophical Investigations. Also, a great reference for philosophy is the SEP, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/wittgenstein/

https://thephilosophyforum.com/profile/discussions/341/sam26

:ok:

Just want to run this by you...

To begin with, I concede to the claim that referential meaning forms only a [small] part of word usage. Take Wittgenstein's example "water": it could refer to, as we usually assume, H2O but, it could aslo be, among many things, a command to fetch water, an urgent warning that the water is laced with poison, an expression of fear of drowning, a question, and so on. A person's intent determines the meaning of a word in a given conversation and that intent is conveyed in the way the word is used - whispered "water" will have a different meaning from a screamed "water".

However, that words can carry different meanings depending on how we use it doesn't imply that referents don't exist, does it? For instance, continuing with Wittgenstein's water example, "water", first and foremost, refers to H2O. Any other use-based meaning is just added on to this meaning of water. Likewise, words used in philosophy too refer to something, that something is the main trunk [of the meaning tree] from which the various use-determined meanings branch out from.

For instance, continuing with Wittgenstein's water example, "water", first and foremost, refers to H2O. — TheMadFool

Right. You give a good analysis. The problem I have is using H2O as a universal.
Is the lake and ocean both H2O? Not exactly. The ocean is salty and a lake is not. You can drink lake water but not ocean water.

The first paragraph, yep; with a footnote that meaning is not wholly the speaker's intent.

To the second paragraph, interesting trunk analogue, but I don't buy it. The assumption that all words refer to something just doesn't hold up. But some words refer - or better, are used to refer.

..."water", first and foremost, refers to H2O — TheMadFool

A non-chemist does not need to know the chemical composition of water in order to make use of the word. So for them, water does not refer to H₂O. We all use the word perfectly well before we learn chemistry. And before the chemistry was developed, folk spoke of water. So it could not be true that the word "water" has it's meaning by referring to H₂O...

A further counterpoint to the trunk-and-branch comes from the discussion of the word "game". Are you familiar with it? If so, here's a game for you: for every definition of "game" that someone offers, think of a new game that does not fit that definition.

The rope analogy from PI is perhaps closer; think of the meaning of a word like a rope. Each thread forms a part of the rope, but no thread runs through the whole thing. "H₂O" is part of the meaning of water, but not the whole of it.

And then there are family resemblances. Each person shares some characteristics with others in their family, but no set of characteristics is common to them all. Yet they do form a unity.

But you seem to be getting the gist.