This is a spin-off from another thread starring Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889 - 1951), an imposing figure in modern philosophy if only because he claimed that philosophical problems were pesudoproblems generated by miscomprehension of language.

To begin with, I must confess my poor understanding of his concept of language games and his belief that meaning is use is still unclear to me. That being said, I have a relatively better grasp of what Wittgenstein means by family resemblance with regard to words and his rope analogy, which some forum members were kind enough to remind me, seems not too complicated for the likes of me.

I'll start off with what I claimed I know (Wittgenstein's family resemblance and rope analogy) and build up my case against Wittgenstein's ultimate claim that referential meaning is flawed or even wrong and refute the obvious conclusion that follows from his views viz. that there are no philosophical problems.

Family resemblance: Let's take Wittgenstein's own example - the word "game". He, or perhaps someone else, asserts that the word "game" has a problem with its definition for it applies to quite a many activities, recreational or professional, but, as Wittgenstein rightly points out, there is no one feature/characteristic that runs through, is common to, all these various activities. Had such common characteristics existed we would've identified the essence of what a game is. A good way to illustrate this is to consider some hypothetical games e.g. games J, K, and L such that

1. J has features A, B
2. K has features, B, C
3. L has features A, C

Some feature is common to any two games but no feature is common to all games. Thus, J, K, and L constitute the Wittgensteinian family resemblance. The word "game" refers to all three of them but the meaning of the word "game" is determined on the basis of shifting intension - sometimes it's feature A that determines what a game is, other times it's feature B that does that and there are times feature C decides what is a game or not. The bottom line is the absence of an essence - no universally common theme - that unites J, K, and L.

This is a problem for philosophy because, if I'm correct, philosophers are in the business of finding the essence of a word's meaning - that common thread that runs through all usages of that word - and then philosophizing on that essence and here we have Wittgenstein, telling us that some words, and herein lies the rub, including philosophically important words, may lack such an essence. No essence to a word and the word becomes a slippery customer for we can't get a fix on its meaning. How does one philisophize about a word whose meaning we haven't yet figured out? It may not be impossible but disagreements wil be the rule rather than the exception.

That said, let's return to the games J, K and L but before that a remark on what a definition is: a definition basically lists both the sufficent and necessary features of things the word refers to.

1. J has features A, B
2. K has features B, C
3. L has features A, C

When we conclude that J and K are games, we're, in fact, making two claims: the feature B is sufficient to infer both J and K are games AND that the feature B is also necessary for the same. The first claim is a no-brainer; the second claim is somewhat harder to notice (for me) but suffice it to say that without the feature B, there's no family resemblance and so the one (either J or K) lacking the feature B would NOT be a game . The same logic applies to all other combinations, (J & K), (J & L) (K & L), the two claims about sufficient and necessary applying to the features B, A, and C, respectively.

This implies A + B + C, being all sufficient and necessary features for something to be a game, is the definition of "game". How then is J or K or L a game? After all each one of them seems to lack a feature (J lacks feature C, K lacks feature A and L lacks feature B) and we just said a game is when A + B + C are present. This is best explicable as a misuse of the word "game": all people aren't philosophers or logicians and the rules of both philosophy and logic are relaxed in ordinary conversation and this has the net effect of words being misused in the sense that definitions are only applied in bits and pieces. For instance, when "game" actually means features A + B + C altogether, people willingly, although erroneously, accept things that possess only a part of A + B + C as games. This is the reason why we have what Wittgenstein calls family resemblance.

It then becomes clear that seeking an essence - the feature in common - in games J, K, and L would require for the word "game" (A + B + C) to have been applied correctly and were this so, the essence would jump out at us as A + B + C.

However, the word "game" is actually misused and erroneously applied to J, K and L - only some, not all, features are taken into consideration and this then became the basis of calling J, K, and L games. This automatically makes searching for an essence in these instances where the word "game" has been misapplied, a wild goose chase - bound to end in failure.

Thus, it follows that Wittgenstein makes a mistake by supposing J, K, and L are actually games (that the word "game" applies to them) when they are not and this leads him to the erroneous conclusion that meaning is use and not referential.