Do you understand what an essential feature is? You made a big fuss about sufficient and necessary features in the OP. — Luke

Maybe I do and maybe I don't know what "essential" means for I could be misusing philosophical terminology but that's the point isn't it? Not that there's another valid meaning of "essential" which I'm fully justified to use as part of my language game but that there's a correct definition that the word "essential" has which must be adhered to if this conversation must amount to something.

The point is that an anchor is not needed.

But games do have essential, defining, features; — TheMadFool

You are assuming this. It just need not be so.

Nuh. Re-think it.

You are assuming this. It just need not be so. — Banno

The point is that an anchor is not needed. — Banno

Nuh. Re-think it. — Banno

I gave it my best shot.

Below is another attempt at proving that Wittgenstein's core assumption - that all uses of a word are correct - is false.

Suppose a word "dox" and that the following family resemblance holds for "dox"

a. "dox" applies to R (R is a dox) because of features A, B
b. "dox" applies to S (S is a dox) because of features B, C
c. "dox" applies to T (T is a dox) because of features C, D


1. All uses of the word "dox" are correct (Wittgenstein's claim) [Assume for reductio ad absurdum]
2 . If all uses of the word "dox" are correct then R is a dox AND T is a dox
3. R is a dox and T is a dox (1, 2 modus ponens)
4. If R is a dox then A is an essential feature of dox
5. If T is a dox then A is not an essential feature of dox
6. R is a dox (3 simplification)
7. T is a dox (3 simplification)
8. A is an essential feature of dox (4, 6 modus ponens)
9. A is not an essential feature of dox (5, 7 modus ponens)
10. A is an essential feature of dox AND A is not an essential feature of dox (8, 9 conjunction) : contradiction
Ergo,
11. Not the case that all uses of the word "dox" are correct (1 to 10 reductio ad absurdum)

The conclusion (11) basically exposes the contradiction lying hidden in Wittgenstein's theory of language games. It can't be that all uses of the word "dox", or any other word for that matter, are correct

An essential feature of games is that you win or lose.

"In ball-games, there is winning and losing; but when a child throws his ball at the wall and catches it again, this feature has disappeared."

Wittgenstein's core assumption - that all uses of a word are correct - is false. — TheMadFool

This is not a 'core assumption of Wittgenstein', which you would know if you actually had even a passing familiarity of the view you are trying to 'critique'.

It's one of the reasons Witty qualifies use as use in a language game, and not just use as such - one of the unfortunate elements which is lost when people shorten the quote to "meaning is use", which in turn leads to completely nonsense threads like the OP.

Questionable if that's really a game. I say it is, though. In a loose sense the child has the objective of retrieving the ball, and if he/she doesn't it's a failure or a "loss " I do believe all games have a common feature.

This discussion doesn't really revolve around the fallibility of the word "game," though.

If you accept Catch as a counterexample, then what is the essential feature that all games share?

I can't accept it as a counter example. I can accept it at times as a game (sometimes just practice,) but then there is still the objective of catching the ball. No one is keeping score, necessarily, but the success or failure still lingers. That it's posited as a game guarantees that.

A game can be something where you fail yourself as well, I suppose. But if you consider something a game I can't imagine a scenario where it's not a question of success or failure.

Catching the ball means winning the game?

Catching the ball means winning the game? — Luke

A game would require the concept of a successful performance. Does not have to mean winning.

@nonspectraltoast claimed earlier that "An essential feature of games is that you win or lose."

Nevertheless, what about a game such as truth or dare. Is that a game? If so, what counts as successful and unsuccessful performance?

Nevertheless, what about a game such as truth or dare. Is that a game? If so, what counts as successful and unsuccessful performance? — Luke

Generally I agree with what your position is. But it does seem that a language game has to convey something and not just be gibberish.

We weren't talking about language games, but games in general, and whether all games must contain some common essential feature. Wittgenstein rejects this idea, claiming that games share in a family of similar features, but without there being one essential feature that every game must contain.

We weren't talking about language games, but games in general, and whether all games must contain some common essential feature. Wittgenstein rejects this idea, claiming that games share in a family of similar features, but without there being one essential feature that every game must contain. — Luke

Right.

I would say truth or dare can be a game. And termed as such is still a matter of success or failure, yes. There is an objective. It's kind of a foggy objective, but an objective nonetheless.

It's still a matter of feeling like a success or failure. I suppose completely embarrassing yourself would be a failure, as opposed to successfully surviving the truth or dare.

Me murdering someone also has a built-in element of success or failure. It's quite the fun game.

As does me cooking fried rice of course. Delicious game.

It's still a matter of feeling like a success or failure. I suppose completely embarrassing yourself would be a failure, as opposed to successfully surviving the truth or dare. — neonspectraltoast

I wouldn't consider "surviving" the game or preventing embarassment to be the point of the game of truth or dare. Why can't it just be for fun? It is seeming to require more and more contortion in order for you to maintain that success/failure is a necessary feature of all games.

If the objective of a game is to have fun, then you're a success if you have fun and a failure if you don't. And Truth or Dare can go either way, which is why it's a game. It's a matter of personal success or failure. You can feel brave and win, or you can chicken out and lose.

Even though no one says "You lost the game" you still come away either with satisfaction or anxiety.

This is not a 'core assumption of Wittgenstein', which you would know if you actually had even a passing familiarity of the view you are trying to 'critique'.

It's one of the reasons Witty qualifies use as use in a language game, and not just use as such - one of the unfortunate elements which is lost when people shorten the quote to "meaning is use", which in turn leads to completely nonsense threads like the OP. — StreetlightX

You maybe right you know. I did admit that I could be mistaken.

Let's assume that I'm wrong and that

[1. All uses of a word are correct]

wasn't a core assumption in Wittgenstein's theory.

If that's true then what means Wittgenstein by language games? Surely, now that I have a relatively better grasp of the issue, he means to validate the different meanings of words as determined by use in any and all the language games they take part in. For instance, being Wittgensteinian about the word "game" means its meaning when used in the sentence, "chess is a game" is equally justified as the meaning of "game" in the sentence "life is a game". For Wittgenstein, neither of the two meanings of "game" is better/worse; they're both true in the particular language game they're a part of. This is exactly what statement 1 claims.

If this isn't the case, them the contradictory of statement 1 must be true and that statement is: [2. Some uses of a word are incorrect], and the immediate consequence of 2 is that there can be no such thing as language games for the simple reason that 2 implies that there's one correct meaning of the word "game" and that is precisely what Wittgenstein is denying by claiming that meaning of a word is use-dependent and can vary, without any problem at all, with the language game the word participates in.

they're both true in the particular language game they're a part of. — TheMadFool

No, this has nothing to do with truth.

Forget 'correct' meaning. There is meaning, or there isn't meaning (something is meaningful, or meaningless), that's it.

No, this has nothing to do with truth.

Forget 'correct' meaning. There is meaning, or there isn't meaning (something is meaningful, or meaningless), that's it. — StreetlightX

If I were to say "dog" means a block of ice with a straw wouldn't that be false? Isn't this the incorrect meaning of "dog"?

If I were to say "dog" means an domesticated canine wouldn't that be true? Isn't this the correct meaning of "dog"?

:chin:

Yes, and? What does that have to do with Wittgenstein?

Yes, and? What does that have to do with Wittgenstein? — StreetlightX

Everything in my humble opinion for Wittgenstein is claiming that there is no such thing as an incorrect meaning - every use of the word is perfectly ok in the language game the word partakes in.

But one can be mistaken about the meaning of a word: this speaks to someone's lack of knowledge - it is a comment on the person using the word, not the institution of meaning.

Moreover, nothing is stopping you from employing 'dog' to mean 'block of ice with a straw': but you'd better be consistent about it, and you'd better be clear that this use has nothing to do with what anyone else refers to as 'dog'.

"Correct" and "incorrect" are "language-game relative": 'inside' a language-game, one can use or not use a word correctly: but those terms lose applicability once you start comparing across different language-games. The rules of chess don't apply to checkers - but this doesn't mean that one can move one's King in any which way. Neither does it mean that checkers is 'wrong' in any sense.

Questionable if that's really a game. — neonspectraltoast

Yeah, it's obviously a true Scotsman.

...Wittgenstein's core assumption - that all uses of a word are correct... — TheMadFool

What?

No, don't bother.

But one can be mistaken about the meaning of a word: this speaks to someone's lack of knowledge - it is a comment on the person using the word, not the institution of meaning. — StreetlightX

:ok: I agree.

Moreover, nothing is stopping you from employing 'dog' to mean 'block of ice with a straw': but you'd better be consistent about it, and you'd better be clear that this use has nothing to do with what anyone else refers to as 'dog'. — StreetlightX

This is a vital piece of information for me. There is no necessary connection between a word and its meaning by which I mean a word could've been given any definition at all. So, while it isn't true that "dog" means a block of ice with a straw hat, it could've been given that meaning but, as you noted, we'd have to be consistent and therein lies the rub.

Why do you warn me to be consistent with my word usage? I reckon it's because if I use the word inconsistently i.e. misuse the word, confusion will result. For an inconsistency in usage to go unnoticed, it must be be so subtle that the correct usage and the incorrect usage should possess a family resemblance[Wittgenstein] that masks the inconsistency. It's a real possibility then that what Wittgenstein calls family resemblance comprises of inconsistent usages the differences between them being so fine as to be imperceptible to the untrained eye (most people).

Given all of the above, the specter of word misuse continues to threaten Wittgenstein's theory of language games because family resemblance of a word could be nothing more than a list of inconsistent uses of that word. Said differently, words do possess perfectly working referential meanings but these are hidden from view by a thick overgrowth of pesudo-referents generated by extremely subtle but still inconsistent word usage.

"Correct" and "incorrect" are "language-game relative": 'inside' a language-game, one can use or not use a word correctly: but those terms lose applicability once you start comparing across different language-games. — StreetlightX

Correct! But bear in mind that Wittgenstein is claiming all uses of a word are correct (in the setting of particular language games)