What is the nature of non-existent fictional characters in a work of fiction? — bongo fury

Certainly not the basis or all we can see, taste, hear, feel, and imagine.

Everyone recognizes that characters in books are fictional. Trying to convince us that other people are fictional is a different matter. — neonspectraltoast

I wasn't. I only said the alleged film show and theatre and audience are all fictional.

What is the nature of non-existent fictional characters in a work of fiction?
— bongo fury

Certainly not the basis for all we can see, taste, hear, feel, and imagine. — schopenhauer1

I don't see why actual fictions (such as the actual reporting of non-existent fictional film shows in non-existent fictional theatres with non-existent fictional audiences) can't be the basis for perfectly good inferences about the actual world, and about it's actual inhabitants who do actually report their actual experiences in fictional terms, but actually make the perfectly good inferences. (As well as some wrong ones.)

But the nerve firings actually happen. Your inner film show doesn't. That's what I'm saying, anyway. — bongo fury

But you only know of nerve firings thanks to your "inner film show". To even relate the mind to an "inner film show" means that there is something about the mind that is like an external film show. To talk about your mind, what are you talking about? How do you know that you have a mind? How do you know you have thoughts?

Your thoughts take some form from your perspective (qualitative), and a different form from my perspective (quantitative). Maybe the problem is that we are looking at the same thing from different perspectives and end up with different representations of the same thing. A representation is a kind of correlation and we make these correlations between neural states and mental states - from our different perspectives.

It sounds as if you are a naive realist - explaining the world as if it is how you experience it - with brains and nerve firings and all. Is a p-zombie a naive realist or an indirect realist? If our minds model the world, then brains are models of other minds and indirect realism would be the case. We claim that the world is "physical" because of how we experience it, but then that term doesn't apply to the experience itself. If we what we mean by "physical" is "mental model", then "physical" is just an idea, not the actual nature of the world. So instead of saying the world is "physical" which you would only do so if you had a mind that models the world as bounded objects in an inner film show, we could say that the world is processes or relationships that are modeled by the mind (which is just another process or relationship) as "physical" bounded objects. This is how we model the process of other minds as "physical" bounded objects called "brains".

So the illusion isn't the qualitative quality of mind that is a process, rather it is the world as composed of quantitative, physical, bounded objects, that is the illusion.

But you only know of nerve firings thanks to your "inner film show". — Harry Hindu

I would have to disagree. I know of them thanks to sitting my actual self in an actual theatre and watching an actual film show.

To even relate the mind to an "inner film show" means that — Harry Hindu

But I'm questioning both, of course.

I would have to disagree. I know of them thanks to sitting my actual self in an actual theatre and watching an actual film show. — bongo fury

Then nerve firings are a kind of film show? I don't get it.

I'm questioning both, of course. — bongo fury

Both of what?

Your inner film show doesn't. — bongo fury

Why did you use the term "film show" to refer to something that supposedly doesn't happen?

It seems to me that you are saying that the illusion is how we see ourselves from the inside (qualitative experience), not the outside (brains with nerve firings)? You're saying that you see how I truly am from your perspective (as a body with a brain with nerve firings), but how I see myself is an illusion (as a film show), yet the film show is the form the nerve firings and brains take.

Then nerve firings are a kind of film show? I don't get it. — Harry Hindu

It was a film about nerve firings.

Both of what? — Harry Hindu

Mind and an inner film show, as actual non-fictional things.

Why would you call it a "film show"? — Harry Hindu

If the "it" here refers to the projections onto a screen in the lecture hall I sat in, then "film show" just seems the appropriate description. If the "it" refers to some brain-shivers then we could discuss whether "film show" is an appropriate way to describe them; I would think not. Wasn't me. If the it refers to a thing you call "a mind", or some "mental images", then we have to deal with our disagreement about what we are talking about, because I don't accept the existence of such things. So again, not me, calling that thing a film show.

I should clarify: "inner film show" I did identify with "mental images", but only to explain that I don't accept either of them as actual non-fictional things. Which is to say, again, there are no mental components to describe (appropriately or not) as a film show.

I should clarify: "inner film show" I did identify with "mental images", but only to explain that I don't accept either of them as actual non-fictional things. Which is to say, again, there are no mental components to describe (appropriately or not) as a film show. — bongo fury

Your argument is as faulty as saying "I am not writing these words right now". The fact that we "think" we have illusions has to be explained. It is a fact that there appears to be mind happening. That is the illusion itself. That phenomenon is the thing to be explained.

If the it refers to a thing you call "a mind", or some "mental images", then we have to deal with our disagreement about what we are talking about, because I don't accept the existence of such things. — bongo fury

Then this is the result one would expect when a non-p-zombie attempts to communicate the concept of "mind" to a p-zombie. You are a p-zombie and I am not, hence your lack of understanding of what I am talking about.

Your argument is as faulty as saying "I am not writing these words right now". — schopenhauer1

That may be, but is it faulty in the same way? Is something I said false for the same reason your statement (or the token of it you were then writing) is false?

The fact that we "think" we have illusions has to be explained. — schopenhauer1

I want to say I agree with that, but there's a danger we then misunderstand each other. I agree the fact that we think that, or entertain the illusion that, we have mental images does deserve explanation, yes. Hence my attempt at that. On the other hand, I can't agree that it's a fact that we have mental illusions in the form of mental images.

It is a fact that there appears to be mind happening. — schopenhauer1

Again, I agree that there do appear words and brain-shivers preparing words to that effect. I disagree that something called a mind makes an appearance on some scene.

That is the illusion itself. — schopenhauer1

Again, two ways to take this. "That" is the psychological account we are disputing? The hypothesis about some internal illusion or film show? Or is "that" the disputed internal images themselves? You want to conflate the two, and so you think that I'm admitting an internal, mental illusion/film-show, and no wonder you're incredulous when the next moment I deny that. But I wasn't admitting that, at all.

Then this is the result one would expect when a non-p-zombie attempts to communicate the concept of "mind" to a p-zombie. You are a p-zombie and I am not, hence your lack of understanding of what I am talking about. — Harry Hindu

I suppose that is a plausible sci-fi scenario. I think a more realistic one would restrict "p-zombie" to creatures un-afflicted, or un-gifted, with the symbolic, referential skills that create the illusion of an internal illusion.

that we think that, or entertain the illusion that, we have mental images does deserve explanation, yes. — bongo fury

What is this entertaining of the illusion.. You are just pushing the goal-post and playing with language by saying "entertain the illusion" rather than "illusion". Either way the phenomenon has to be explained.

The hypothesis about some internal illusion or film show? Or is "that" the disputed internal images themselves? — bongo fury

It doesn't matter because the "hypothesis" is not the "feeling of" of the images.. That "feeling of thinking of the images" is the thing to be explained. Whether you assign the causes for this feeling to some illusory thing of neurons, is a different question, though related.

Do I honestly need to point out that even if you're watching a film about neurons, it's still composed entirely of internal images?

I was recently talking to a friend of mine, who was explaining the position of illusionism with regards the qualitative character of mental states, i.e. that we only believe we have such states, but actually this is an illusion. A way to gloss this position is that we are all actually philosophical zombies, only most of us don't know it, and even those who do can't shake the belief we aren't. — RolandTyme

This just doesn't feel right. What exactly does it mean to say that what you call "qualitative character of mental states" (I'll call this qualia for convenience) is an "illusion"?

It makes complete sense to discredit qualia if you want to say everyone is a p-zombie and you or someone else has done that by claiming qualia are "illusions" but the problem is that you couldn't, can't, ignore the fact of qualia and so, for that reason, you have to claim qualia are illusions instead of directly claiming qualia don't exist. What's happened is clear: an eyewitness [qualia] has come forward claiming to have seen bigfoot [dualism] and you, being unable to prove the nonexistence of bigfoot [unable to show that dualism is false], has resorted to character assassination of the witness [qualia], by calling the eyewitness an illusion.

By the way, what exactly do you mean by "qualitative character of mental states" is an "illusion"? What could this possibly mean? The easy answer seems to be that "qualitative character of mental states" isn't real. The only sense I can make of it is if "qualitative mental states" is considered a "mind" phenomenon, as distinct from the physical, and that that is being put into doubt by suggesting that the "qualitative character of mental states" maybe brain-generated. However, this is begging the question - it's exactly what physicalism has to prove to undermine dualism.

Illusionists, in this philosophical sense, certainly have one problem, somewhat of their own making: that of explaining how it is that we are supposedly victims of an illusion when we think, if we do think, that mental states have phenomenal qualities. They also have the problem, in that context, of explaining why it is that the illusion they claim we have has the character it does, rather than some other possible characteristics it could have had, and specifically why it is that the illusion that we do have is recalcitrant to illiminativist theories, for even illusionists will have to admit that their position is on the fringes of the philosophy of mind, and it is nigh impossible to convince many people of it.
Suppose I awake one day and I ask for some toast for breakfast and someone tells me that I am subject to a bread illusion because nobody has ever baked bread, bread has never been a staple in any national diet, and I could not ever have eaten it in any shape or form. As unlikely as I would find this, it is very easy to imagine being shown around the world I have awoken to and end up being convinced that all the mnemonic evidence I have for my conviction that I should be able to get some toast is in fact illusory. Faced with the breadless world facts, my problem will no longer become "what is wrong with the bread illusion theory" but "what is wrong with me". However, an analogous tale for the "mind illusion", i.e. one I would accept as reversing the burden of the problem, seems to be missing. Why is that? This might also be thought of as part of the problem illusionism has generally, but it is a detail that is not given a great deal of importance.
In any case, what illusionists tend to do in reponse to all their problems, is drag us through the mud of representational theories of mind. One already has to buy into that general approach in order to be really bothered by what illusionism has to say. My suspicion, and I openly acknowledge that currently it is just that at the moment, is that the real problem is with some very clever people having been very deeply confused about the notions of representation and representing.

I suppose that is a plausible sci-fi scenario. I think a more realistic one would restrict "p-zombie" to creatures un-afflicted, or un-gifted, with the symbolic, referential skills that create the illusion of an internal illusion. — bongo fury

It seems like we are saying the same thing - that you are un-afflicted and I am. What would I be afflicted with if you say that what I'm afflicted with isn't happening?

Do I honestly need to point out that even if you're watching a film about neurons, it's still composed entirely of internal images? — neonspectraltoast

Exactly, what is the relationship between the film show and the neurons if not a relationship of representation?

If I asked you to draw a picture of neurons, then where would you be getting your image from to duplicate with paper and pencil? What does the final picture look like? What would it resemble?

How did camouflage evolve if organisms don't have visual experiences?

What are dreams?

It seems like we are saying the same thing - that you are un-afflicted and I am. — Harry Hindu

No. Like you, I'm gifted with symbolic/referential skills, and hence afflicted with the temptation to believe I experience internal illusions and images. We disagree over whether to accept that these internal things exist.

We agree that brain shivers happen. Perhaps we can agree to call them "thoughts". Where we then diverge is on the question how these thoughts relate to images (e.g. visual ones). Tradition and common sense suggest we identify thoughts directly with actual images swimming in some mysterious extra-physical medium called a mind. I identify them with adjustments in the disposition of the organism to select among actual images and objects, these adjustments habitually but not inevitably accompanied by thoughts that maintain the traditional myth. My original post was a suggestion how to begin to form more realistic habits of thought about one's thoughts.

Do I honestly need to point out that even if you're watching a film about neurons, it's still composed entirely of internal images? — neonspectraltoast

You need to explain it, too, I'm afraid. "Internal" thus far has meant intra-cranial. The film was composed of images on a screen several metres away.

Exactly, what is the relationship between the film show and the neurons if not a relationship of representation? — Harry Hindu

Well, sure. That was my point. That's how I learnt about the neurons. And?

If I asked you to draw a picture of neurons, then where would you be getting your image from to duplicate with paper and pencil? — Harry Hindu

I don't store and retrieve images, though. (You're excused for assuming I do, as it was the standard model of brain function before the neural network revolution.) I train myself to select among and produce actual, external images to be appropriate representations of (actual) objects.

as it was the standard model of brain function before the neural network revolution

There was never a standard model of brain function, at least not anything analogous to the standard model of particle physics. Consequently, there was never a "neural network revolution" to over throw it.

What is this entertaining of the illusion.. You are just pushing the goal-post and playing with language by saying "entertain the illusion" rather than "illusion". — schopenhauer1

I was only trying to explain that on previous occasions when you might have thought I was committing to mental entities, I wasn't.

It doesn't matter because the "hypothesis" is not the "feeling of" of the images. — schopenhauer1

So... it does matter. Fair enough, you are committed to the existence of mental images as such.

:ok:

There was never a standard model of brain function, at least not anything analogous to the standard model of particle physics. — jkg20

Haha, yes I was being a tad sweeping there, wasn't I.

I still haven't been corrected on my neurons reference either...

I don't think your neurology is the problem, it's your philosophy.

Ok.

What are dreams? — Harry Hindu

I hoped you wouldn't ask that one :confused:

So... it does matter. Fair enough, you are committed to the existence of mental images as such. — bongo fury

This is not something I have to be committed to.

Fair enough, you are committed to the existence of mental images as such.
— bongo fury

This is not something I have to be committed to. — schopenhauer1

Also fair enough. Are we then back to here,

Then why are we even talking of pictures in the head?
— schopenhauer1

For my part, I thought they were included among your alleged "mental components"? — bongo fury

?

Do you need to commit to mental components?

Do you need to commit to mental components? — bongo fury

No, you just experience.

One already has to buy into that general approach in order to be really bothered by what illusionism has to say. — jkg20

That's what's bothering me.

Do you need to commit to mental components?
— bongo fury

No, you just experience. — schopenhauer1

Okydoke, I shouldn't have taken this,

The hard question goes beyond this and asks "How are the physical components equivalent to mental components". How is what you are saying addressing that? — schopenhauer1

... too literally.

What are dreams?
— Harry Hindu

I hoped you wouldn't ask that one :confused: — bongo fury

Why? Is it a stupid or difficult question?

I don't store and retrieve images, though. (You're excused for assuming I do, as it was the standard model of brain function before the neural network revolution.) I train myself to select among and produce actual, external images to be appropriate representations of (actual) objects. — bongo fury

Would you say that dreams have images? If so, where do the images come from? If you had a dream about a brain, could you draw a picture of it after you wake up?

But the external image itself is an object (a picture, polaroid, drawing, etc.) that represents other objects. How did your brain learn to represent things if it is't something that it already does?

Would you say that a computer that performs facial recognition has an image in its working memory that it measures and compares to the measurements of other images in it's long-term memory?

Think about your view of the world. The world seems located relative to your eyes. The view is a structure of sensory information - of the world relative to the eyes, but the world isn't located relative to the eyes. So the structure is simply a model that we call a "view" as if we see the world as it is through a clear window, or watching a film show (naive realism).