I am saying that if two cars are both Fords, then that is an instance of 'identity'. — Wayfarer
Not at all - generality is opposed to particularity, and not singularity; the particular is what is replaceable, interchangeable, amenable to generalization, while the singular is not. Singularity (and it's natural 'pairing', universality, which is in turn not generality) cuts across the general-particular dichotomy, such that a general regime may itself be particular. — StreetlightX
Realists on universals claim that properties are identical instantiations of a separately existing universal like this: [diagram] It's important to note that realists on universals are saying that the instantiations are identical, that is "one and the same," in a complete sense, of the universal at hand. Literally, they're not two separate things, but the same thing somehow multiply instantiated. — Terrapin Station
The One can be pretty much be read as the argument for vagueness or Apeiron as the foundation for dichotomous or dialectical being. — apokrisis
And note that the quandaries presented in Parmenides were resolved in the late Sophist in fully triadic fashion. Both sameness and difference, generality and particularity, have being. Dichotomies are separations towards mutually logical limits and so where there is distinctive being, it is the result of a successful process of division. Being needs the emergence of the two ends that thus bound a concrete spectrum of possibility. — apokrisis
For contrarieties to constitute existence, then there must be some deeper symmetry state that they break. The dialogue makes that (triadic/developmental) argument. For there to be flux and stasis, etc, there must be a "prior" state that is neither yet has the potential to be so divided. — apokrisis
there are other forms of realism that do not claim that universals are "separately existing," even while holding them to be real by a different mode of being. — aletheist
As long as we accept that there are properties and particulars that exhibit properties, there are only two possibilities: there are only properties "in" particulars or there are also properties separate from particulars. — Terrapin Station
I am suggesting that both of these statements are correct, but "there are" means two different things. Properties only exist in particulars, but properties are real - i.e., they have another mode of being — aletheist
As long as we accept that properties have ontogeneral status and particulars that exhibit properties have ontogeneral status, there are only two logical possibilities: only properties "in" particulars have ontogeneral status or properties separate from particulars have ontogeneral status, too ... So do you agree that there are only those two possibilities? — Terrapin Station
I honestly have no desire to "haggle," but if "we accept that properties have ontogeneral status," are we adopting realism and rejecting nominalism? — aletheist
The point is to only focus on the logical relationship at the moment. — Terrapin Station
The logical relationship of what, exactly? — aletheist
the form of the particular is the essential properties as well as all the accidentals. — Metaphysician Undercover
I don't think this "triadic/development" is the right direction. What you propose only reinforces the designated status of matter (potential) as unintelligible. it asserts the position of the unintelligible (matter) as more fundamental than the intelligible, placing it out of reach of the intellec — Metaphysician Undercover
This will bring matter (potential) out from the designation of vagueness, the apeiron, into the category of intelligible. — Metaphysician Undercover
The logical relationship between a general property and its individual instantiations is the same as that between a truly continuous line and the discrete points that can be marked on it. Note that the line does not consist of these points, no matter how many of them are marked; rather, between any two actual points, the continuum includes potential points exceeding all multitude, all of which are also real. Likewise, a general property is not merely the collection of its individual instantiations. — aletheist
No--I don't think it would make any difference if space and time were discrete rather than continuous. However, I won't discuss this any further if we don't finish the other thing first.Now - do you agree that nominalism requires space and time (and everything else) to be discrete, rather than continuous? — aletheist
No--I don't think it would make any difference if space and time were discrete rather than continuous. — Terrapin Station
Aren't the potential points separate from the actual points? — Terrapin Station
No--I don't think it would make any difference if space and time were discrete rather than continuous. — Terrapin Station
No, the potential points are continuous with the actual points. — aletheist
One could believe anything constrained by demands for consistency, too. — Terrapin Station
Not everyone has the same views on what's consistent, and folks can rationalize any conceivable belief. — Terrapin Station
whether two "adjacent" potential points are numerically identical. — aletheist
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