I intended none, not least because I do not know what panpsychism is. The other fellow had mentioned an historical aspect of the idea, and I ran with that. I will "attend" to see if anyone will say simply what the idea behind pansychism is. If it means the intelligence is in the Universe, then that seems obvious, after all, I'm here. If it means my cat is intelligent, no argument, because I have watched my cat do smart things, as have most pet owners with their pets.

If it means that trees are intelligent, hmm. There is evidence of something, but this veers into areas where intelligence must be defined, and then tested to see if the definition fits observation. If it means anything at all living is intelligent, then that's along the lines of the greek idea. But there is a difference between saying that something is intelligent and on the other hand presupposing it. The claim needs support and evidence. As presupposition, does it work?

The rocks and stones intelligent? That requires definition and evidence.

The universe itself intelligent? Same objections.

Intelligence based/not based in matter? What is matter? What is "based"? And so on.

To be candid, "Panpsychism" sounds whackdoodle to me. So I will observe to see if it's me who needs to learn something.

To be candid, "Panpsychism" sounds whackdoodle to me. So I will observe to see if it's me who needs to learn something. — tim wood

Gotcha, I actually recommend starting with that SEP article on it that Banno provided. That gives a good background. Basically, most of the arguments are something to the effect that if we want to NOT posit a dualism (mind and physical let's say), then you have to bite the bullet somewhere, because even if "mind" "emerges" from the physical, the emerging from one type of realm (the physical), into a completely different kind (the subjective, internal, "feels like", qualia, mental) state needs to then be explained in non-dualist terms.

To be clear, most scientific views would not posit a dualism in the world. Everything is physically manifested in some way whether matter/energy and time/space. Thus positing a mind that is emergent from matter, though seemingly appropriate (as emergence is assumed in the physical sphere), would inappropriate as it posits a dualism at some point.

So a sophisticated panpsychist might point out that if a cognitive scientists were to say "At X time, in this part of the brain, there is an "integration" that is happening which causes the emergence of consciosness".. the part about "causing emergence" becomes its own explanatory gap that needs to be explain. What is this emergence of consciousness itself besides that of being correlated with the integration of brain states?

if "mind" "emerges" from the physical, the emerging from one type of realm (the physical), into a completely different kind (the subjective, internal, "feels like", qualia, mental) state needs to then be explained in non-dualist terms. — schopenhauer1

And what would such an 'explanation' look like? How would you recognise that some proposition constituted an 'explanation'? I ask because such avoidance seems to dog these kinds of discussions. Some physical relationship is proposed by the (non-panpsychic) physicalist, and the 'hard problem' crowd will inevitably respond with "but that's just a description of how, not an explanation accounting for it". What I've yet to hear is a reasonable definition of what such an explanation should be like.

We can do how - neurons firing seem to cause what we experience as thoughts.

We can do why - having the experience of thoughts seems to help integrate information better than letting individual circuits act independently.

What's missing?

We can do how - neurons firing seem to cause what we experience as thoughts. — Isaac

I don't think that's a how. I think it's an observation of a correlation. The explanation of this correlation is still wide open.

The explanation of this correlation is still wide open. — bert1

As I asked @schopenhauer1, what would an 'explanation look like? What properties of an explanation are missing from "neurons firing seem to cause what we experience as thoughts"?

If you want to be a panpsychist, the best way to do so is to attack emergentism as hard as you can. If you can say that emergentism isn't true, and that consciousness is real, then you can say that consciousness is fundamental. — Pneumenon

I think it's right to place emergentism as the antithesis of panpsychism. I also think it is right that difficulties with emergentism are the main philosophical reasons for embracing panpsychism. Parsimony is another philosophical reason. There are perhaps other non-philosophical reasons, for example, some personal mystical experiences might suggest panpsychism for some, others feel they perceive agency in the actions of other things, but these are of less interest to philosophers (except those philosophers who prefer to criticise panpsychism on the basis of its perceived non-philosophical motivations).

@Pfhorrest said that the three basic options are:
1) Nothing is conscious (eliminativism)
2) Some things are conscious (emergentism)
3) Everything is conscious (panpsychism)

I agree. All these positions have problems. For me, eliminativism is clearly false (by introspection). Emergentism is fatally problematic. Panpsychism has difficulties, but they seem to me to be much more easily solvable. As I have said many times, following Churchill, "Panpsychism is the worst theory of consciousness apart from all the others."

As I asked schopenhauer1, what would an 'explanation look like? What properties of an explanation are missing from "neurons firing seem to cause what we experience as thoughts"? — Isaac

Lets take a less problematic example and compare it. "Neurons firing in such and such a way seem to cause walking." In this example, we can detect the firing of neurons. We can detect the walking just by looking at the behaviour of the body. We can do this because walking is defined as nothing other than a certain behaviour of the body. The firing of neurons and the walking of the body is the same kind of thing. It's physical stuff doing something we can observe. We can see both ends of the correlation and how they are related.

Compare this with "Neuron's firing in such and such a way cause experiences, thoughts, feelings, and so on." We can detect the neuron's firing. We can detect certain behaviours, such as screaming, crying, speaking words that explain a complex thought, and so on. But these behaviours are not the definition (unless you are a behaviourist) of thoughts and experiences. The definition of thoughts and experiences involves something other than a behaviour. So we have a difficulty, the two ends of the correlation are not each behaviours, and the relationship between them is not transparent in the way that the relationship between neurons and walking is (at least to someone who understands muscles and nerves and what have you).

these behaviours are not the definition (unless you are a behaviourist) of thoughts and experiences. — bert1

Right. So why not adopt a behaviourist position as the simplest model?

The definition of thoughts and experiences involves something other than a behaviour. — bert1

This seems to be the problem. You define thoughts as something ineffable and then act surprised that there's no physical explanation for them. It's the inevitable consequence of such a definition. If thoughts just are neurons firing, the problem is dissolved.

But, notwithstanding the above, the thing I really want to focus on here is how you would know that you have your sought after 'explanation'. What would it do that 'neurons firing' doesn't?

What properties of an explanation are missing from "neurons firing seem to cause what we experience as thoughts"? — Isaac

I think the difficult thing is intention and anticipation of the future, doing something for a purpose. How does "neuron-firing" account for the capacity to predict and manipulate the future? The neuron-firing would have to have the capacity to direct itself toward desired ends, which is the same problem which all materialism and physicalism encounters.

You define thoughts as something ineffable and then act surprised that there's no physical explanation for them. — Isaac

It's not just me though, it's every dictionary.

But, notwithstanding the above, the thing I really want to focus on here is how you would know that you have your sought after 'explanation'. What would it do that 'neurons firing' doesn't? — Isaac

I don't think an explanation is possible in this case, where we think of 'explanation' as explaining one thing in terms of another (walking in terms of neurons firing and muscles contracting etc). It would place consciousness at a point in nature that doesn't generate the problems associated with emergence. For me, the only sensible point is somewhere that doesn't require explanation in terms of something else. That is to say, at a fundamental level of brute fact where explanations (in the above sense) are not required.

Right. So why not adopt a behaviourist position as the simplest model? — Isaac

Because consciousness, as a matter of definition, is not behaviour.

Because consciousness, as a matter of definition, is not behaviour. — bert1

OK, so what is the definition of 'conciousness' then, if not behaviour?

OK, so what is the definition of 'conciousness' then, if not behaviour? — Isaac

Sentience, awareness, the capacity to feel, the capacity to experience.

And what would such an 'explanation' look like? How would you recognise that some proposition constituted an 'explanation'? I ask because such avoidance seems to dog these kinds of discussions. Some physical relationship is proposed by the (non-panpsychic) physicalist, and the 'hard problem' crowd will inevitably respond with "but that's just a description of how, not an explanation accounting for it". What I've yet to hear is a reasonable definition of what such an explanation should be like.

We can do how - neurons firing seem to cause what we experience as thoughts.

We can do why - having the experience of thoughts seems to help integrate information better than letting individual circuits act independently.

What's missing? — Isaac

I have to say, @bert1 is doing a good job laying out the problems and basically point to his arguments. The problems I see is the physicalists (presumably elimitavists/functionalists) are often switching the causes of mental states with the explanations of metaphysical equivalence of how physical states are indeed mental states. A cause implies emergence, but emergence means what exactly in this case? Everything is physical in the universe and then when we get to a certain arrangement, we have mental states? That to me seems like dualism.

It is also tricky due to what I said earlier with Pneumonon:

Me: This does make sense. Emergence is its own inexplicable alchemy. The reason is the next level is assumed in the previous one. — schopenhauer1

So properties themselves are an odd thing. As I stated:

Are properties something inhering in matter or is it presumed to have something that gives the measurements property? I mentioned the possibly arbitrary divide in Locke between primary and secondary qualities, for example. But what are properties really without experiential knowledge? Properties seem to be something that are observed, not necessarily an actual "real" thing out there. — schopenhauer1

So if you are a skeptic regarding how properties inhere in physical states, this is definitely problematic. Liquidity without an observer is just and odd thing to say. Physical states of water (e.g. arrangements of molecules qua molecules) does not seem odd to say in a non-observer world. What is this state of experience, which itself gives properties to other things?

But even if you are not a properties skeptic, however, it is odd that this type of "property" (experience), is so oddly different than all other properties. It is the one that gives states of internal feeling, experience, sense, and internal states of feeling in general.

Sentience — bert1

That doesn't help, I'm afraid. It's not more clearly identifiable than 'conciousness'. You said it's not a behaviour, so it needs to be identifiable something else. Giving alternative words for it which are equally nebulous isn't going to get us there. If we're going on a hunt for the cause of something we're going to need to know what the something looks like, otherwise anything and nothing might be causes.

If I said "the activity of neurons is Sentience" you'd want to deny that, right? So on what grounds, that's what I'm trying to get at.

awareness — bert1

As in 'appears to respond to stimuli'? Still sounds behavioural to me.

the capacity to feel — bert1

Feel what?

the capacity to experience — bert1

And 'experience' here means? Is it the same as awareness? Does a rock 'experience' being dropped from a cliff? I'd say it doesn't because it is not aware of the event, but you offered this in addition to awareness, so I'm guessing you mean something more?

Psychism is just what happens when anything encounters a foreign environment. The subtle distinction between what you are and the information that is interacting with you. This is the creation of mind, and every particle has it, as they are all forced to distinguish themselves from outside interference.

I am a panpsychist, as I believe all matter is aware on this subtle level...that all matter distinguishes itself from all other matter. I believe this creates an awareness.

The problems I see is the physicalists (presumably elimitavists/functionalists) are often switching the causes of mental states with the explanations of metaphysical equivalence of how physical states are indeed mental states. — schopenhauer1

What I'm struggling to understand is the distinction you're both drawing between A causes B and 'a description of of how A causes B'. What does 'a description of of how A causes B' contain that is not just more A causes B type explanations?

If I asked what causes a car to go, someone might say "give it some gas and release the clutch". If I asked how that caused the car to go, they'd say "the gas enters the chamber, explodes, causes the crankshaft to turn, which connects to the gears, which drive the axle which turns the wheels". It would still be a series of A causes B type propositions.

I could say "but how does the turning of the axle turn the wheels?". I might get something in terms of friction causing neighbouring molecules to transfer momentum.

"But how does friction cause neighbouring molecules to transfer momentum?". I might get something I probably wouldn't understand about the inter molecular forces, but nonetheless...

"But how does the-thing-I-don't-understand-about-molecular-forces cause neighbouring molecules to transfer momentum under friction?"

... And so on.

How is the issue of conciousness any different from any other investigation. Why the need for 'the hard problem' epiphet, dualism, panpsychism, all these ideas which require us to add totally new, otherwise unjustified, concepts to our world-views.

If, not understanding how clouds cause rain, I postulated an entire realm of existence, or suggested we rethink what it means to 'rain' to include all effects clouds have, I think most people would accuse me of over-reacting.

That doesn't help, I'm afraid. It's not more clearly identifiable than 'conciousness'. — Isaac

Indeed, all I can offer in terms of ideas and words are synonyms. 'Consciousness' is impossible to define except by appeal to consciousness, unfortunately. Synonyms like 'sentience and 'awareness' might help some. For a kind of ostensive definition, an act of introspection is required. I'll try to offer instructions for this. Attend to an object. Then attend to your awareness of the object. Then notice that there is a capacity in you to so attend and be aware, regardless of what the object of that attention is. That capacity is consciousness. Not sure if that helps at all.

If I said "the activity of neurons is Sentience" you'd want to deny that, right? So on what grounds, that's what I'm trying to get at. — Isaac

Yes, I'd want to deny that on the grounds that their definitions are different. The activity of neurons is the activity of neurons. Sentience is sentience. If you want to say that, despite definitions, these two things are, in actual fact, the same thing, you need a theory that connects them. Because the definitions, as they stand, don't connect them. The onus, it seems to me, is on the person who asserts that two things which have different names and definitions, are in fact that same thing.

Clearly distinguishing theory from definition is important, in so far as that is possible. We need definition to agree what it is we are talking about. Then we theorise about the details of what that phenomenon is, what causes it, whether it is caused at all, its structure, its function, and so on. Once the theory is settled, then the definition might change to include the theory. This is a bit like the definition of water changing after we discovered it was H2O, or the definition of 'life' changing once biologists settled on a bunch of observable criteria.

As in 'appears to respond to stimuli'? Still sounds behavioural to me. — Isaac

No, 'sentience' as in 'consciousness'. Sorry for the appalling circularity, but I think it goes with the territory. All I have are synonyms and reflexive introspection.

Feel what? — Isaac

Anything, or nothing. To get the idea of consciousness, we have to abstract it from awareness of some particular thing. Otherwise we might be conscious when we are tasting an orange, but not when tasting an apple, which would be absurd. [funtionalist hat] If I were a functionalist (I'm not) I could express this abstraction by saying that there are general characteristics of brain function when someone is experiencing that remain the same no matter what someone is experiencing, be it an apple or orange or whatever. It is those general features that constitute consciousness. Any any system that is instantiating those functions is conscious. [/functionalist hat]

And 'experience' here means? Is it the same as awareness? Does a rock 'experience' being dropped from a cliff? I'd say it doesn't because it is not aware of the event, but you offered this in addition to awareness, so I'm guessing you mean something more? — Isaac

It means 'awareness', 'subjectivity' (to add another one) and the other things I said. These are all more or less synonyms, perhaps with slight differences of emphasis, but I think they are all pretty much the same concept.

For the record I do think that the rock feels something, is aware of something, is a subject, has an experience, when dropped off a cliff. What it feels I don't think is important or interesting in the same way that what a person feels when dropped off a cliff is important and interesting. Although I know there are Rights for Rocks groups that would find this offensive.

How is the issue of conciousness any different from any other investigation. Why the need for 'the hard problem' epiphet, dualism, panpsychism, all these ideas which require us to add totally new, otherwise unjustified, concepts to our world-views. — Isaac

Because the hard problem only applies to emergentism. I agree the hard problem is horrible. But the only way to make it go away is to ditch emergentism. This is intellectually rather unsatisfactory, as it's saying "Stop trying to figure this out. Lets give up and just add another property to the list of fundamental properties." It seems lazy and unprofessional. However I think there are enough reasons now to do that with some confidence. Not that I want to put people off trying to find a coherent emergentist account of the causation of consciousness - if they think they can do it, by all means have a go.

A panpsychist (at least not my kind of panpsychist) would never say 'such and such causes consciousness'. It's important to distinguish consciousness (as the capacity to experience) and a particular experience itself. To have an actual experience, you need consciousness PLUS something happening to that conscious something. While consciousness itself is not caused by anything, the exact nature of the experienced is very much caused by what is going on. So in humans, WHAT we experience is totally dependent on what are bodies are doing in the world. It makes total sense to speak of causes when one is speaking of the contents of experience, but not experience itself, which is just a property of all matter like charge and spin and mass and so on.

'Consciousness' is impossible to define except by appeal to consciousness, unfortunately. — bert1

Nonetheless, I appreciate the effort.

Attend to an object. Then attend to your awareness of the object. — bert1

Here I get stuck. How do I know I've successfully attended to this 'awareness of the object' if I don't know what it is I'm looking for? I could be attending to absolutely anything, how do I know it's an 'awareness of the object'? I can convert the properties of the object into words, recall images of similar objects, I get a desire to act sometimes (if the object is desirable or offensive), sometimes I perceive changes in my physiology in response to it. Pretty much all of these things can also be observed (in a rudimentary way) in the brain. I'm not getting anything particularly difficult to explain yet. Is any of that what you're calling 'awareness'?

The activity of neurons is the activity of neurons. Sentience is sentience. If you want to say that, despite definitions, these too things are, in actual fact, the same thing, you need a theory that connects them. — bert1

When we interfere in any way with one we get a corresponding effect in the other. It's not conclusive but I think it's pretty sound theory as to why we might consider the two are the same. It's either that they're the same, or that they're linked intricately. The former theory can exist within the rest of science, the latter requires a whole universe of forms, concepts and features which would otherwise not be required. What would possibly stop us from presuming the simpler explanation for now?

I will "attend" to see if anyone will say simply what the idea behind pansychism is. — tim wood

Panpsychism simply assumes that Mind is more fundamental to the real world than Matter. Since my own worldview is similar to ancient notions of Panpsychism, I could go into great detail to explain to you why it is a necessary assumption to make sense of the mental phenomena (e.g. Consciousness) of the world. But as an introduction, I'll just link to an article by philosopher Phillip Goff. :nerd:

Panpsychism is crazy, but it's also most probably true : "But many widely accepted scientific theories are also crazily counter to common sense"
https://aeon.co/ideas/panpsychism-is-crazy-but-its-also-most-probably-true

I'll just link to an article by philosopher Phillip Goff. — Gnomon

Question to you, Gnomon: Are you an endorser and apologist for the substance of this article by Goff? Do you stand for him? It's short enough to reproduce here, where we could dismember it - a tedious exercise. But unless you or someone will represent him, not a best use of time. Or do you have something better?

From Stanford.edu, and by Goff as it happens; the first sentence: " Panpsychism is the view that mentality is fundamental and ubiquitous in the natural world." I invite you to find in that article a coherent definition - or even a coherent description - of "the natural world." I see in it a reference to "smallism," opposed by presumably "bigism" although that latter not so-named. And so forth.

In short, I find lots and lots of problems with the idea and the presentation of it. All soluble in a solution of reasonable sense. Let's not, then, if we can avoid it spend time on straw problems. As advocate, you present its best case in brief and simple language, and we'll both see how it goes. Is this a plan?

What I'm struggling to understand is the distinction you're both drawing between A causes B and 'a description of of how A causes B'. What does 'a description of of how A causes B' contain that is not just more A causes B type explanations?

If I asked what causes a car to go, someone might say "give it some gas and release the clutch". If I asked how that caused the car to go, they'd say "the gas enters the chamber, explodes, causes the crankshaft to turn, which connects to the gears, which drive the axle which turns the wheels". It would still be a series of A causes B type propositions.

I could say "but how does the turning of the axle turn the wheels?". I might get something in terms of friction causing neighbouring molecules to transfer momentum.

"But how does friction cause neighbouring molecules to transfer momentum?". I might get something I probably wouldn't understand about the inter molecular forces, but nonetheless...

"But how does the-thing-I-don't-understand-about-molecular-forces cause neighbouring molecules to transfer momentum under friction?"

... And so on. — Isaac

I think this is a misreading of the problem I am suggesting with physicalist answers of causes. So physical events presumably have physical answers, and thus all the answers about gas causing the car to go are legitimate as they are all in the same realm (physical). But here is something different.

You see, it is also how radically different you consider mental states. There is a radical break between matter in various processes and arrangements and observers/internal states/feeling/awareness. To say that one just "pops out" or "emerges" of the former would be to claim to be a dualism whereby a very different realm is occurring- that of experiencing (but only under certain circumstances). So what can you do with this? Well, what happens is you keep pushing the Cartesian Theater back until you realize it was homunculus all the way down.

Simple behaviors of neurono-chemical interactions and physical properties creating states of awareness just seems to beg the question. We already know experience exists. We already know it is associated with neural/biological systems. We don't know how neuro-biological systems themselves are the same as experience.There is a gap there. No gap is present for why gas causes the car to go. More explanations can add detail, but if you were to say gas pouring into a chamber and exploding, etc. IS some sort of feely, awareness thing really.. well that indeed would be an explanatory gap. Now a physical thing is causing this internal state of awareness- a radical different state altogether. T

That is the equivalent of what is being claimed of neuro-biological processes. You see.. physical, chemical, physical chemical physical chemical, more physical chemical physical chemical. WHAM!!! EXPERIENCE!!! Something is not right there.

And then HERE is where someone chimes in and say NO it's the INFORMATION that is experiential :roll:.

Does panpsychism imply a piece of rock is self-aware? :chin:

It's obvious that brain states aren't the same as experiences, for the sheer fact that we are more than our brains.

The body isn't encapsulated in the brain.

Does panpsychism imply a piece of rock is self-aware? — jgill

At https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/panpsychism/

"2.1 The Definition of Panpsychism
The word “panpsychism” literally means that everything has a mind. However, in contemporary debates it is generally understood as the view that mentality is fundamental and ubiquitous in the natural world. Thus, in conjunction with the widely held assumption (which will be reconsidered below) that fundamental things exist only at the micro-level, panpsychism entails that at least some kinds of micro-level entities have mentality, and that instances of those kinds are found in all things throughout the material universe. So whilst the panpsychist holds that mentality is distributed throughout the natural world—in the sense that all material objects have parts with mental properties—she needn’t hold that literally everything has a mind, e.g., she needn’t hold that a rock has mental properties (just that the rock’s fundamental parts do)." Italics added.

Isn't that great? Rocks are just so dumb! But the parts of them are smart.

OK. That makes more sense. a rock is not self-aware, only its fundamental particles are.

Oh oh. What about the virtual particles within the rock? How can they be aware if they are merely ripples in a field? Or worse, only mathematical entities without any sort of corporal existence?

Philosophy is truly a difficult discipline. :worry:

There is a radical break between matter in various processes and arrangements and observers/internal states/feeling/awareness. — schopenhauer1

So you declare dualism in your definition and then claim that physicalists have failed to answer the question you set within your non-physicalist framework?

I'm assuming there's no radical break between matter in various processes and arrangements and observers/internal states/feeling/awareness. So, just for now, don't assume there is, I'm asking how you've arrived at the conclusion that there is. If it's just axiomatic for you that there is such a break, then there's no argument to be made. It's not surprising physicalists (eliminativists) reach a different conclusion to you, they have a different axiom.

What I'm trying to get from you and @bert1 is how you got to that point (assuming it isn't just axiomatic).

How do you know that what you're calling an 'experience' is, in fact, anything at all.