What I'm saying is that given the same circumstances, a computer would always make the same choice. Free will is the idea that given an absolutely identical situation, two agents could choose differently.

What I'm saying is that given the same circumstances, a computer would always make the same choice. — Cidat

Let's say I played a game of chess; I started at 11:47pm, last Saturday. I was playing against my friend on a computer. It was a rainy night. I opened E4. So you're saying, now, what? That if I play again with my friend at 11:47 next Saturday, I might open with D4 instead? That's no different from the FFW of the computer using a PRNG. Surely you don't mean that last Saturday at 11:47pm, despite my having chosen E4, I can choose to having had chosen D4, right?

No, I think you mean something like, if we go back in time, and now it's 11:47pm, last Saturday, and I play again, then I could play D4. But that's a bit fake, because if I "go back in time" I'll remember doing so. To really be the same circumstance, it would have to be 11:47pm last Saturday. Which means, it's the time at which I played E4. There will never have been a time I played D4 last Saturday at 11:47pm.

Do you see what the problem is? It's easy to say those words, but what do they mean?

Those situations aren't absolutely identical down to atom level since they are different days, and on different days you have different levels of experiences and memories. Free will means that if you were to somehow revert the state of the universe back to last Saturday, before the beginning of that chess game, down to atom level, you could choose to open with D4. As I said, it's an absolutely identical situation. Literally.

if you were to somehow revert the state of the universe back to last Saturday, — Cidat

So the chess playing program that uses a TRNG has free will?

Randomness and free will are different things. Freely willed actions are consciously chosen, so in theory you could choose the same every single time you're given the exact same situation. But you're not obliged to do that. Randomness cannot choose its outcome. And to be fair, TRNGs would generate an identical result if you willed absolutely identically since they rely on physical processes.

Freely willed actions are consciously chosen, so in theory you could choose the same every single time you're given the exact same situation. — Cidat

So, what makes you think a rational decision could be different all circumstances being the same? Is rationality arbitrary?

Randomness and free will are different things. Freely willed actions are consciously chosen, — Cidat

I don't think you're aware of how this actually works in practice. We don't make decisions "consciously", at least as a matter of course. We make decisions and become conscious of them. On some rare occasions, we deliberate, but most of the time we just act. The more habituated the action is, the more consciousness is "optional" for it. Also, the "us" in the we is the "subject" of consciousness, not the "object" of it; by which I mean, what you are self-aware of isn't your entire self... it's just a fraction of your self. Any notion of free will that we're actually likely to have must fit into this. And any sensible theory of free will requiring responsibility needs to account for the fact that the guy generating these actions most of the time isn't aware of them while generating them, but is still nevertheless the guy who did them. Otherwise, you're just going to invent a fiction of folk theory. As a curious free will agnostic, I'm more interested in the kinds of free will we might actually have.

So, what makes you think a rational decision could be different all circumstances being the same? Is rationality arbitrary? — Heiko

TBH I'm kind of wondering about a similar issue... how this works in terms of moral choice. I made a terrible decision last Saturday at 11:47pm; it was a bad thing to do. But now I realize it, and am a better person. Free will means I can go back to that state, down at the atomic level and make a different choice... perhaps a better one. But, now, it's not really identical, because the second time around, I am the "better" person... the first time, I was a "worse" person... so the "revert time" version really isn't as identical as it's being made out to be. Apparently, though, I have to be exactly as terrible as I was last Saturday at 11:47pm, and make a different decision, to have free will. If I make the same decision, being the exact level of blameworthiness as I was last Saturday at 11:47pm, then I don't have free will and therefore cannot be blamed?

To open up a dilemma:
The technicians being on duty in Chernobyl during the meltdown were really just technicians. They were trained for normal operation of the reactor. When things got critical they followed the procedures they were given for certain lights blinking. Which didn't help. It is quite possible that an enigineer that designed the reactor could have circumvented the disaster. Of course the question is not if they were physically unable to press a few buttons. So - are they responsible for the catastrophe and why not?

Interestingly, would one of them just have paniced and started to press buttons wildly it is possible this could have been successful. But no one would put that man back on duty.

If I make the same decision, being the exact level of blameworthiness as I was last Saturday at 11:47pm, then I don't have free will and therefore cannot be blamed? — InPitzotl

Why would one need the concept concept of free will then to blame someone? This can only be done on rational grounds. The manifestation of free will is understood as a decision based purely on the rational subject itself. This, such a decision can only be based on values set by reason from within itself. As reason is universal such values must be also universal, too. From this the identity of free will and duty follows logically: Freedom lies in the call of duty and the pursuit of universal values common to all rational beings.

Why would one need the concept concept of free will then to blame someone? — Heiko

I've been trying to figure that out for a long time; the PAP folk swear by this.

Your version of free will is much more coherent to me.

I personally wouldn't define it as the ability to act differently but even if that was the definition it would still imply free will. Normal definition of free will would be us having a choice between this or that. However, I'll use your definition. We can act differently. Suppose I drive home from a place and I take the same route. At times I did act differently. Sometimes the normal route I took had construction and it was closed. Other times, I felt like driving a different way just for a different scenery or whatever. I simply acted how I wished for whatever reason because sometimes not acting differently can be boring. One can even choose to be happy over being sad. It's often taught as a coping mechanism or changing your point of view of how you perceive things. Let me explain. When I lost my grandma I was a wreck. It affected my education and work. When my other grandma died I decided not to repeat the cycle. I took a quick day of grief and focused on positive things. I was up in good spirits planning a party. Since then I prefer to limit how long I remain sad, worried, and all other negative things.

Will is free a-priori. It cannot depend on preference, personal properties or external factors, as those aren't chosen. In fact, if it would depend on anything it would not be "will" but an effect of that property. Being uninfluenced by totally everything is what makes it free and why "will" is always free.
It's freedom leads to the conclusion that only values-in-itself can be a freely chosen end as only those are still valuable when all influences are eliminated. These values bear an intrinsic dignity - which also means that, because of this intrinsic value, these are always a necessary end of the free will.

In fact, if it would depend on anything it would not be "will" but an effect of that property. — Heiko

I don't know about that:

Being uninfluenced by totally everything is what makes it free and why "will" is always free. — Heiko

This has a flaw... if an action is uninfluenced by totally everything, then you cannot have willed it. So will necessitates at least influence of the actor; otherwise, in what sense is it will at all? So there must be influence for there to be will. With that crack in the door, though, the rest becomes questionable; if an effect is a result of properties, but those properties make you who you are, then there's no difference between your acting of your own will and the actions being a result of those properties... they are the same thing. The conflict here would be illusory, something analogous to the fallacy of the single cause.

Heey all,

The simplest way to describe my thoughts are as follows: I (my body) consists of tissue which are cells which are molecules which are atoms and those atoms are made of sub-atomic particles, perhaps even smaller. They are bound by the laws of nature, so so are we. If free will exists we should be having control over those laws. And I believe we don't. All we are is energy. I believe we are truly one and the same.

There have been a few experiments and articles made on this subject. All point toward unfree will. If anyone is interested I can look them up. Sometimes researchers could predict someone's choice before they were even consciously aware of this choice.

This helped me accept things in my life and the world. I do feel responsible but I don't believe I could have acted otherwise in the past (so yes, I would accept this as a definition of free will).Most people believe in right and wrong and credit for achievements and blame for wrongdoings.

Clearly there must be a evolutionary reason for the existence of our 'ego'. But I no longer believe my thoughts or take them too seriously.

I actually feel best when I'm not thinking at all and act intuitively. Sort of caught up in the moments.

Feedback and criticism always welcome

You are your cells and atoms. How are you constricted by you?

I don't understand what you mean. How I am made narrow by myself?

This has a flaw... if an action is uninfluenced by totally everything, then you cannot have willed it. So will necessitates at least influence of the actor; otherwise, in what sense is it will at all? — InPitzotl

I guess "will" cannot be taken as a thing different from the subject. It is part of it's being. A mode of existence. After all, when you do something, the "doing" is just you in a special mode.
So it is my will, my willing, me willing.

With that crack in the door, though, the rest becomes questionable; if an effect is a result of properties, but those properties make you who you are — InPitzotl

But in this case I'd not be a subject anymore but an object. Not even a "who" but a mere "what" (those properties). How degrading. I guess you meant to say something else.

then there's no difference between your acting of your own will and the actions being a result of those properties — InPitzotl

The difference is that one holds dignity, the other does not.
Don't be cheap with your will. Most things are not worth it.

Not even a "who" but a mere "what" (those properties) — Heiko

Why are those mutually exclusive? Who you are is what you are works fine for me.

But in this case I'd not be a subject anymore but an object. Not even a "who" but a mere "what" (those properties). How degrading. I guess you meant to say something else. — Heiko

Again, only if those things are mutually exclusive. Otherwise, you would be a what that is a who. Who you are is what you are, but not all what's are who's.

The difference is that one holds dignity, the other does not.

I don't buy that.

You're starting with a picture of us as being elevated to a certain level, and x (where x is being a "what" or "properties"... I'm abstracting because this is generic) as being lower. With that in mind, when you hear the suggestion that we are x, you picture that as (a) lowering us from our level to the level of x. But that is an artificial perspective, and it is completely unnecessary. There are at least two other ways of looking at the same thing: (b) it elevates x, (c) it elevates x when x is us.

For x being properties, I take the (c) perspective, not the (a) perspective.

In my opinion people are as free (willed or otherwise), as the consequences they are "willing" to accept.

Why are those mutually exclusive? Who you are is what you are works fine for me. — InPitzotl

Yes. Your aren't me. That's a no-brainer. But the question is not "what works". There were many things that kinda "worked" but weren't right either.

Again, only if those things are mutually exclusive. — InPitzotl

To Do and Being done. No difference?

Otherwise, you would be a what that is a who. Who you are is what you are, but not all what's are who's. — InPitzotl

A "what" is never free. Things are involved in external relations defining them and putting them in place. This would contradict free decisions.

With that in mind, when you hear the suggestion that we are x, you picture that as (a) lowering us from our level to the level of x. But that is an artificial perspective, and it is completely unnecessary. There are at least two other ways of looking at the same thing: (b) it elevates x, (c) it elevates x when x is us. — InPitzotl

There is no "us" in final things. The point is that either I am a free subject in a decision or I am not.
I decide. This is where I am free.

But the question is not "what works". — Heiko

For me, it absolutely is. The alternative to this is that the question is, "what is my favorite pet theory"? I prefer the Feynman path: "I can live with doubt and uncertainty and not knowing. I think it's much more interesting 'not knowing' than to have answers that might be wrong."

To Do and Being done. No difference? — Heiko

A lot of people tend to want to view things as if there are two kinds of things... a subject, and an object; a me, and a world. Why? How come you can't just be part of the world?

A "what" is never free. Things are involved in external relations defining them and putting them in place. This would contradict free decisions. — Heiko

I think you need to try again. You're trying to convince me that there's some sort of a problem with us being a what, but all I'm getting from this is that you have a term free that you define a certain way and another compound term free decision that you define a certain way, and what's don't really fit the definition too well. Okay, sure, but what should I make out of that outside of it being a linguistic exercise applied to your vocabulary?

Okay, sure, but what should I make out of that outside of it being a linguistic exercise applied to your vocabulary? — InPitzotl

You either get the distinction between subjects and objects or don't.

To quote M.Heidegger (Being and Time)

The essence of Dasein lies in its existence. Accordingly those characteristics which can be exhibited in this entity are not 'properties' present-at-hand of some entity which 'looks' so and so and is itself present-at-hand; they are in each case possible ways for it to be, and no more than that. All the Being-as-it-is [So-sein] which this entity possesses is primarily Being. So when we designate this entity with the term 'Dasein', we are expressing not its "what" (as if it were a table, house or tree) but its Being.

Or with Descartes: Ego cogito, ergo sum