I still don't understand the distinction between volition and free will. — Samuel Lacrampe

Suppose there's a classic, old, voodoo style zombie (not a p-zombie) hanging around. The zombie's master orders him to clean the troughs; the zombie complies. The zombie's actions in cleaning out the trough are not involuntary... this zombie isn't having tics or shaking from a siezure, for example; it's identifying the shovel, intentionally grabbing it, and performing the commanded act. That's volition. But the zombie has no freedom not to obey the master's commands; so it has no free will.

It's not about complexity. — Samuel Lacrampe

That's fine, but your example took something like a desire (preference for vanilla), and added a second variable to it (cost). What is the purpose of having two variables involved in the choice? This is what I took away from what I read... my response to optimizing two variables was the fact that AlphaZero makes decisions among multiple variables. Loosely, if AlphaZero can deterministically judge multiple variables, then pointing out that I judge two doesn't demonstrate a break in determinism (i.e., this is solely about the argument... maybe my choices aren't deterministic, but we certainly didn't demonstrate it by saying that I'm weighing two variables... if that was not your intent, tell me what you think really implies there's indeterminism happening).

Are you objecting because there is a flaw in my reasoning, or merely because it seems I am telling God what to do? — Samuel Lacrampe

Yes, a flaw in your reasoning. The phrase is a reference (Einstein: "God does not play dice with the universe." Bohr: "Don't tell God what to do.") The error is in specifying how the universe should behave a priori, because you imagine it to be "logical"; what's really happening when you do this is that you're prescribing your preconceived notions onto the universe... hence, "telling God what to do". There is no solid a proiri reason that the universe must fit our preconceived notions of how it works.

Laws of Thoughts, specifically the Principle of Sufficient Reason, does not allow for random causality. — Samuel Lacrampe

I have no idea what random causality means, so I'm just going to substitute "random indeterminism". Determinism is the notion that for every effect there is a sufficient antecedent cause. PoSR is almost identical to this definition; it differs only that it allows "reason" to be used instead of "cause". But let's grant a charitable interpretation of free will here... compatibilist free will does nothing for your argument so we need LFW. To be sensible we'll invoke the notion of "original cause"; an agent having free will implies that the agent is an original cause of some event E. Again, charitably speaking, we might say this fits the PoSR; it's "allowed" if you will. But there's still the same conflict I told you about... if I, a conscious sentient agent, can be an original cause; how come a photon cannot be an original cause, or a radioactive atom?

Suppose there's a classic, old, voodoo style zombie (not a p-zombie) hanging around.[...] — InPitzotl

So you would say the original command to go clean the troughs is not intended by the zombie, but everything else in that set of acts is intended with the goal of cleaning the troughs, is that correct? Would this therefore be different than a computer program which only goes through a programming code line by line with no intentions involved? Genuinely asking.

That's fine, but your example took something like a desire (preference for vanilla), and added a second variable to it (cost). What is the purpose of having two variables involved in the choice? [...] — InPitzotl

Right. The reason I added the second variable was because my position is that free will doesn't apply for the taste example only, but does apply if we have conflicting values. I'll try again.

In a situation with only one type of value, like choosing between chocolate or vanilla, then free will is not really involved; because free will or not, everyone would simply pick their preferred flavour, and that's that. Free will only applies at the "very beginning", when it comes to ranking our values in order of priority. E.g. ethics #1, safety #2, pleasure #3. Then in a situation where several values are in conflict, then our intentions are directed with the end of achieving the higher values over the lower ones. Note, I acknowledge I did not defend why that is; because as per the OP, this free will is assumed to be true for this discussion.

[...] There is no solid a proiri reason that the universe must fit our preconceived notions of how it works. — InPitzotl

Sure there is. The Laws of Thoughts are also called Laws of Logic. Take the Law of Non-Contradictions. If two propositions contradict, then at least one of these is necessarily false. This not only means that we made an error in our reasoning, but more importantly it means that one of these propositions is not reflective of reality. If this wasn't the case, then these Laws would serve no purpose.

[...] if I, a conscious sentient agent, can be an original cause; how come a photon cannot be an original cause, or a radioactive atom? — InPitzotl

Yes, we can also entertain the hypothesis that photons have free will. But I think the OP argument would still hold, because this power of free will still cannot be physical if science has determined that no antecedent physical cause exist.

So you would say the original command to go clean the troughs is not intended by the zombie — Samuel Lacrampe

Not really; quite the opposite. As the zombie carries out the command, he is indeed intending it. The zombie picks up the shovel in order to clean the troughs. The goal of his action is to clean the troughs. That is the intention.

Would this therefore be different than a computer program which only goes through a programming code line by line with no intentions involved? Genuinely asking. — Samuel Lacrampe

Yes; it would be different. The zombie is an agent; it has to navigate a complex environment that it doesn't have full knowledge about. Imagine master without his zombie, but instead he is a master engineer, and wants to build a wind-up doll. The wind-up doll will go through the exact actions needed to clean the troughs; all built-in. Doesn't that sound a bit tough, and fragile even? If you accidentally have the doll rotated half a degree from where it has to be to clean the troughs, it will completely fail to; if the troughs are an inch off, you could have complete failure. An unplanned for cat running in your doll's path and it's again a complete and total failure. Someone hangs the shovel on the wrong peg, and you have to reprogram the entire wind-up doll. The zombie, by contrast, can pull this off quite easily, because the zombie's actions are oriented towards the goal state. That's what an agent is, and what a goal is.

The computer program you describe, insofar as it is just following the programming, isn't exhibiting goal oriented behavior; the "environment" it "navigates" by following its programming is insanely simple. This symbol goes in, clock ticks, this has to happen. That symbol goes in, clock ticks, that has to happen. There are no shovels on the wrong pegs to figure out are on the wrong pegs and adjust behaviors for, at that level. Now put the computer into a robot and have it clean troughs, and you might have to deal with goal oriented behaviors (at least, if you want the robot to be effective, and you're not prescient enough to solve the problem with the programmatic equivalent to "wind-up dolls").

I take the time to explain this because I think one of your listed premises is a bit confused.

In a situation with only one type of value, like choosing between chocolate or vanilla, then free will is not really involved; because free will or not, everyone would simply pick their preferred flavour, and that's that. Free will only applies at the "very beginning", when it comes to ranking our values in order of priority. — Samuel Lacrampe

But that just sounds like AlphaZero building its own valuation system, which it does deterministically.

The Laws of Thoughts are also called Laws of Logic. Take the Law of Non-Contradictions. If two propositions contradict, then at least one of these is necessarily false. — Samuel Lacrampe

Let me make this a bit more clear. I present the following dilemma to you:
1. At time T=0, the universe is in state A.
2. At time T=1, the universe evolves to state B.
3. At time T=k, the universe evolves back to state A.
4. At time T=k+1, the universe evolves to state C.
5. B!=C

This must be logically consistent, according to you, because it is logically possible. Specifically, it is logically possible if state A includes a being that has free will. However, you're also saying that physical laws must be deterministic, which this certainly does not describe. Let's represent that thusly:

6. State A involves the physical.

Now, 1 through 5 is logically consistent. But 1 through 6 is presumably logically inconsistent. Why? Incidentally, I read the phrase "The Laws of Thought are also called Laws of Logic" as demanding the burden of a logical proof... so, what is the logical proof that 1 through 6 is a contradiction?

Yes, we can also entertain the hypothesis that photons have free will — Samuel Lacrampe

You misunderstand. Free will => original causation does not entail original causation => free will. If a photon has just original causation, then it's not fully determined. We need never have photons with free will.

As the zombie carries out the command, he is indeed intending it — InPitzotl

Oh okay. So "intention" means "aiming towards a goal", not necessarily choosing that goal. I will think a bit more about this definition; to see if true intentions can exist without freely choosing them.

The zombie is an agent; it has to navigate a complex environment that it doesn't have full knowledge about. [...] The wind-up doll will go through the exact actions needed to clean the troughs; all built-in. — InPitzotl

A simple wind-up doll, fine. But what if we add sensors to the doll, so it can see, hear, feel, smell, and taste, like the zombie; and make the program a lot more complex such as "if shovel not found at location A, then search for it", etc. At this point, is there still a difference between the zombie and the doll-with-sensors-and-complex-program?

But that just sounds like AlphaZero building its own valuation system, which it does deterministically. — InPitzotl

I thought we agreed that computers, being nothing but programs, cannot have intentions. People on the other hand can have intentions, and intentionally choose our own ranking of values. Now for the tricky part: maybe there is such a thing as "deterministic intentions", that is, we always aim towards the goal which results in the greater value for us. But by this definition, then intention towards values themselves must be different than deterministic intentions.

6. State A involves the physical. — InPitzotl

Does this mean State A is fully physical or merely that some of it is physical? I hope the two syllogisms below cover both options.

P1.1. All that is fully physical is determined, so that state A will always evolve to state B.
P1.2. State A is all physical.
C1. State A will always evolve to state B.

or

P2.1. All that is fully physical is determined, so that state A will always evolve to state B.
P2.2. State A does not always evolve to state B.
C2. State A is not fully physical.

If a photon has just original causation, then it's not fully determined. We need never have photons with free will. — InPitzotl

One of the expressions of the PoSR is that "every change (or event) necessitates a sufficient cause".
If photon A always causes effect B, then that's sufficient. But if sometimes photon A also causes effect C, then there is a change between causation A-B and causation A-C, and this change necessitates a cause other than photon A alone.

But what if we add sensors to the doll, so it can see, hear, feel, smell, and taste, like the zombie; — Samuel Lacrampe

Well, let's slow down a bit. Consider actually building a robot that does things the "right" way (that is, it's not tough and fragile). Now take just "see"; we could define that as ability to sense light; namely, "pixels" in a camera. That's obviously not enough though; we need it to be able to recognize things it's looking at, and not only that, but to recognize those things in real time. We do that when we see, for example. However, for our robot, we don't really need much more than this; the robot need not be conscious for example. So although we're conscious agents, the robot doesn't really need to be one to do this.

But as part of the mechanics of this robot, to make its actions effective, it does need to orient itself towards the high level goal state "clean the troughs". That requires a particular kind of relating of the things it "sees" to the goal, and its actions to attempting to attain the goal, and some basic world modeling such that it can avoid cats running before it, and so on. So the "what if" is that we can have goal oriented behaviors (like a stable version of "clean the troughs) with precisely this minimalist sense of "seeing"; it's more than just having access to camera pixels, but doesn't require the whole shebang of our visual experience. (In fact, there's a human analog; the rare person with blindsight can carry out intentional actions involving "seeing" in a not quite conscious way).

I thought we agreed that computers, being nothing but programs, cannot have intentions. — Samuel Lacrampe

No, we didn't agree on that. We agreed that computers, in following a program line by line, are not carrying out intentions by doing so at that level. (See example below with the shaky people).

People on the other hand can have intentions, and intentionally choose our own ranking of values — Samuel Lacrampe

The robot in cleaning up troughs is different than the computer in following its program line by line. The zombie in cleaning out the troughs is probably different than the robot, too; a hired servant or contractor that cleans up the troughs would be different still.

I know people who shake; there's nothing wrong with them, they just aren't "steady"... you wouldn't want them operating on you but beside that they're just fine. Maybe you would even say that have free will; they can certainly intentionally drive a car, while their hands are shaking.

But the wind-up doll, the person whose hands shakes, and the computer executing a computer program line by line have something in common... none of those things are exhibiting goal oriented behaviors in doing these things. Likewise, the zombie in cleaning out troughs, the robot in cleaning out troughs, and the shaky person in driving a car, all have something in common... all of these entities are exhibiting goal oriented behaviors.

Does this mean State A is fully physical or merely that some of it is physical? — Samuel Lacrampe

It means what it means exactly; if it's not specified, it doesn't mean it. That's why you can't possibly maintain an inconsistency in 1 through 5; it's your model of human action... namely, humans have free will which implies they are not fully determined (your words) which requires non-physical souls. But other than having non-physical souls, it's implied that you agree humans can actually exist.

P1.1. All that is fully physical is determined — Samuel Lacrampe

I think you misunderstand. You're trying to prove that physics is fully determined; you can't just hold that as a premise. That's begging the question.

But let me just try this a different way. I'll grant that we have free will, and we're not fully determined. So now we're good. I'll grant your premises too, and your argument; since we're not fully determined, and all things physical must be fully determined, then we're not physical. So the conclusion you want is, we have some non-physical thing, called a soul.

Banno, however, has raised an objection to this. He has identified a photon (and radioactive atom) as being not fully determined. Here's the problem... there's nothing to disagree with. What's good for the goose is good for the gander... a photon isn't fully determined? No problem! All physical things are fully determined? Okay, fine. There's no contradiction here; rather, we simply apply your second syllogism and wind up proving the photon isn't physical. Same with the radioactive atom decaying... it's not fully determined. Is that allowed? Of course it is, if the radioactive atom isn't physical. So, same thing... now photons and radioactive atoms are not physical.

In all honesty, I don't see a problem with this, except that you're going to have really long discussions with people who want to call photons and radioactive atoms physical. And to avoid such strange language barriers, might I suggest instead of using the word "physical", since all you really mean by that is apparently "fully determined", that you just use that word... determined.

But on the off chance that you do have a problem with it, I'd like to see a logical proof that photons are physical.

The robot in cleaning up troughs is different than the computer in following its program line by line. — InPitzotl

So my question is, how are they different, such that a robot can have intentions? I'm fairly sure a robot is nothing more than a computer executing a program line by lines, with sensors attached.

[...] it's your model of human action... namely, humans have free will which implies they are not fully determined (your words) which requires non-physical souls. But other than having non-physical souls, it's implied that you agree humans can actually exist. — InPitzotl

?? Sorry; I don't understand the point of this whole paragraph, or the previous demonstration with steps 1 through 6 anymore. How does this fit with the original objection about the laws of thoughts?

You're trying to prove that physics is fully determined; you can't just hold that as a premise. — InPitzotl

That's not what I was trying to prove with the previous syllogisms. These were merely a response to your 6-step objection, which admittedly I apparently have misunderstood.

I thought we already showed that the physical is determined: PoSR. Let's loop back. I think there are only 2 alternatives to determinism: randomness and free will. PoSR disallows for randomness, and I believe you already dismissed the hypothesis that photons have free will. This only leaves determinism.

But let me just try this a different way. [...] now photons and radioactive atoms are not physical. — InPitzotl

This is really straining away from common sense. Of course photons are physical; why wouldn't they be? And even if they weren't, this doesn't mean they are undetermined. As per above, the only alternative to determinism is free will, and this goes for all things, regardless if they are physical or not.

So my question is, how are they different, such that a robot can have intentions? — Samuel Lacrampe

Words are our slaves, not our masters. The robot I described is the minimal system for which it makes sense to say that it is trying to do something. If you want to add other criteria for "intentions", that's fine; but I find one thing very, very interesting... using this robotic minimal version of intention, I can distinguish between voluntary actions and involuntary actions in humans. Voluntary actions are those for which there's a goal driving behavior like that robot has; involuntary actions are the rest. Using this criteria I can tell the difference between my hand shaking due to a tic and my hand shaking because I'm trying to shake it.

I'm fairly sure a robot is nothing more than a computer executing a program line by lines, with sensors attached. — Samuel Lacrampe

Not a problem. The robot has a computer in it, and that computer is executing a program line by line. But there is no sense in which that computer is trying to execute a program line by line; there's no "attempt" to "attain a goal" of executing programs line by line, because there's no representation of what it's doing at this level, no observation of how things are occurring, and no calculated adjustment towards "execute the instruction". It's just a wind up doll. There is by contrast a sense in which the robot, with the same computer in it, is trying to clean the troughs; there is a representation of what it's doing at this level, an observation of how things are occurring, and a calculated adjustment towards "cleaning the troughs". Or if you don't follow that, fine; look at the shaky person driving the car. There is nothing in that shaky person trying to shake his hands. But in the same person, even with the same hand still moving, insofar as it is reaching towards a gear shift and shifting it, there is something in that shaky person that is trying to shift the gears. There is no more a contradiction between the computer program following a program line by line not intentionally doing so and yet the same computer trying to clean troughs, as there is in the shaky person having their hands shake not intentionally shaking them and yet the same shaky person shifting a gear trying to shift.

How does this fit with the original objection about the laws of thoughts? — Samuel Lacrampe

You're arguing that physical things must be fully determined, because logic; that humans aren't, because free will (which gets them a logic-pass to not be fully determined); and therefore, humans are not physical. This argument applies different yardsticks to humans than it does to physical things. You opened a thread here to discuss this, so here I am... to my eyes, it looks like you're rigging the game to reach your goal.

These were merely a response to your 6-step objection, which admittedly I apparently have misunderstood. — Samuel Lacrampe

The 5 statement thing and the 6 statement thing are meant to emphasize that if you have a problem with the logic of how physical things work, then it would be inconsistent to say that it is with the 1 through 5 things... that it must be with thing 6. And all thing 6 does is invoke the word "physical". You yourself gave two syllogisms; one to argue that physical things are fully determined, the other to argue that if something isn't fully determined, then it's not physical.

This is really straining away from common sense. — Samuel Lacrampe

You can't meet the burden of logic by appealing to common sense.

Of course photons are physical; why wouldn't they be? — Samuel Lacrampe

By your argument. If we look at photons and find out that they cannot be fully determined, we just apply syllogism 2, and we get that they aren't physical. I mean, it's pretty straightforward... your syllogism is a recipe for proving something non-physical and, like it or not, that recipe applies to anything we show is not fully determined.

As per above, the only alternative to determinism is free will — Samuel Lacrampe

So, photons have free will? (Incidentally, since you mentioned logical fallacies, how does appeal to personal incredulity and false dilemma sound here?)

ETA: Let me cut to the chase for you. There are two main ways you can talk about things: (a) prescriptively, and (b) descriptively. When you're using method (a), you're basically specifying all of the properties that a thing has to have to be the thing you're talking about. When you're using method (b), you're basically referring to a thing, and you use the referent to try to figure out what kinds of properties the thing has. The problem with your approach of the physical is that you're trying to do both of these things at the same time. You want to refer to photons, but prescribe their mechanics.

There is no more a contradiction between the computer program following a program line by line not intentionally doing so and yet the same computer trying to clean troughs, as there is in the shaky person having their hands shake not intentionally shaking them and yet the same shaky person shifting a gear trying to shift. — InPitzotl

I think there is. If A is nothing but B which is doing nothing but C, then A is doing nothing but C. If a robot is nothing but a program which is doing nothing but executing lines, then the robot is doing nothing but executing lines. The robots' "intentions" is thus only an expression for what we perceive it is doing, and points to nothing in reality.


As for the rest of the discussion, let's clean it up by summarizing where I think we are.

(1) There are only 3 possible explanations for all events: determinism, free will, and randomness, as so:
(2) Determinism: Cause A always gives Effect B.
(3) Free Will: Cause A may give different effects; and this is explained by Cause A having free will.
(4) Randomness: Cause A (including "nothing") may give different effects; but this is not explained by Cause A having free will.
(5) The PoSR disallows for randomness. This only leaves determinism and free will for possible explanations for all events.

(6) From observation, it appears everything that is physical (ie matter and energy) is determined, with perhaps the exception of photons and humans.
(7) Photons: Science states events with photons have no physical cause.
(8) But PoSR demands a sufficient cause.
(9) So they must have a non-physical cause, which could be free will or other.
(10) If free will, this proves that free will is non-physical.
(11) If other, then the cause is both non-physical and determined.
(12) In both cases, it follows that everything that is physical is determined.

(13) Humans: Humans have free will (assumed in the OP).
(14) Humans have a part that is non-physical.

You all seem to gloss over the notion of identity. It's a real thing. You don't choose it, but it is you. It isn't determined, either.

Hello.
I believe the notions of determinism and free will only apply to the topic of causality, not the topic of identity. But do you think identity is relevant to the discussion?

Yes, I do.

If A is nothing but B which is doing nothing but C, then A is doing nothing but C. — Samuel Lacrampe

It's pretty difficult to find A's that are nothing but B's. Generally, either A and B have to be identical or B has to not only be a superclass of A but one that necessarily entails all things about it. My house key, for example, is an object that is shaped in such a way that it allows me to open the door. It is also a flat metallic object that maintains an electric current as a result of changes in the surrounding electromagnetic field, a lump of mass that exerts a gravitational influence on Jupiter, and a lot of other things.

If a robot is nothing but a program which is doing nothing but executing lines — Samuel Lacrampe

A robot is not even a program, much less nothing more than one. Robots and programs are different things.

let's clean it up by summarizing where I think we are — Samuel Lacrampe

Okay, let's take this in a different direction. I'll just pick on (6) through (8).

What, then, do you have to say about Bell's Theorem ("cliff note" version by Derek/Veritassium)?

Ok. And how so?

A robot is not even a program, much less nothing more than one. Robots and programs are different things. — InPitzotl

But a robot is essentially a program + mechanical parts; and if a robot is going to have volition, it's going to be through its program and not through its mechanical parts. No?

I'll just pick on (6) through (8). What, then, do you have to say about Bell's Theorem ("cliff note" version by Derek/Veritassium)? — InPitzotl

Me? Nothing. I failed to see the relation with my summary. But it's your objection; not mine. What then do you have to say about it with regards to the summary?

But a robot is essentially a program + mechanical parts; — Samuel Lacrampe

More or less, sure.

and if a robot is going to have volition, it's going to be through its program and not through its mechanical parts. No?

Actually, no. It is going to involve those mechanical parts, critically so. The robot must actually act in the world and achieve a "real" goal state in the world. To do that by means that don't involve magic, it must model the world via sensors, model the effects of potential actions, use the action-models to select actual actions that attempt to attain the goal states, monitor the actual results of actions through the sensors in order to compare the predictions to the actual results, and make adjustments as necessary as the actual results differ from the goal state it is directing itself to attain. The modeled goal state, the fact that the behaviors are directed towards that modeled goal state, and the fact that this modeled goal state is a result of modeling the sensed world as opposed to just simulating something, collectively are what make it meaningful to say that this robot is trying to attain a goal. Without those pieces you lose this meaning. To have those pieces, you need all three of the program, those mechanical parts, and that world.

I failed to see the relation with my summary. — Samuel Lacrampe

Point (8): PoSR demands a sufficient cause. Bell's Theorem: Under reasonable presumptions of classical mechanics, a "conspiracy" to yield particular results (i.e., whether there are sufficient causes for the results) in families of experiments would suggest probabilities that conflict with standard quantum mechanics; in particular, with the probabilities predicted by the Born Rule for such experiments. The conflict between these two things provides an experimental way to test which is true, and the experiments conflict with any classical results. Bell's Theorem is in essence the death nail of hidden variable theories in quantum mechanics.

I have to be blunt... I'm having an incredibly difficult time taking you seriously when you say that you fail to see the relationship between this and your summary. And when I see this:

But it's your objection; not mine. What then do you have to say about it with regards to the summary? — Samuel Lacrampe

...I can't help but think that you're just bluffing.

It is going to involve those mechanical parts, critically so. — InPitzotl

But if all you mean by "volition" is "respond to external information to achieve a goal", then mere programs without mechanical parts can do this too. There exists programs which goal is to win at a game of chess for example.

The conflict between these two things provides an experimental way to test which is true, and the experiments conflict with any classical results. — InPitzotl

It may disprove classical mechanics, but not the laws of thoughts, and so does not conflict with the PoSR. As per my summary, there can be a non-physical cause, which is not necessarily empirically detectable, and if so, then falls outside the realm of science; but not of philosophy.

I'm having an incredibly difficult time taking you seriously when you say that you fail to see the relationship between this and your summary. — InPitzotl

The guy in the video says that one of the two explanations given by physicists is that "entangled particles can signal each other faster than light" which would be a sufficient cause. So I did not see any real objection to my summary.

Also as a general rule, giving links to other sources is not an argument. Ideally one would formulate an argument, and may add a link for additional, but non-necessary, information. Part of the onus of proof is to do the ground work for it.

But if all you mean by "volition" is "respond to external information to achieve a goal", — Samuel Lacrampe

You're confused. You're both choking on this and ignoring it: "The robot must actually act in the world and achieve a "real" goal state in the world." That statement is a specification for the robot not a definition of volition. Volition is still goal oriented behavior, not an achievement. The type of goal is described by that specification... it's describing something like cleaning troughs. Attaining that goal doesn't even require goal oriented behaviors; rather, goal oriented behaviors involve orienting behaviors towards those types of goals. So take cleaning troughs as an example... that involves manipulating the state not of a robot, or an output device, but a trough:

then mere programs without mechanical parts can do this too.

...mere programs without mechanical parts are not going to clean troughs.

There exists programs which goal is to win at a game of chess for example.

...not the right type of goal, and not the right type of behavior. If May and Joe play chess in the park, May, too, may lead with E4. But May plays this move by carrying out a series of voluntary actions that manipulate a physical chess piece... that white king's pawn... such that it moves to a specified location... the E4 square. That manipulation of the world states is the voluntary behavior that May is exhibiting; that is the thing that requires May to invoke a series of voluntary actions... you know, moving the arm with intention as opposed to having tics or seizures. E4 is just abstract shorthand for this concrete behavior. Note that May neither is a white king's pawn, nor has a white king's pawn; the state of the board after May's play is not a state of May; it is a state of something in the world that isn't May.

As for the other topic, let's take this side track. First this tiny bit:

does not conflict with the PoSR — Samuel Lacrampe

...you're confusing "conflict with" with "contradict". Now let's take a bigger side track, much more important:

It may disprove classical mechanics ... there can be a non-physical cause ... is not necessarily empirically detectable ... giving links to other sources is not an argument. ... Part of the onus of proof is to do the ground work for it. — Samuel Lacrampe

Your epistemic approach is all messed up here. The burden you place on having your beliefs is virtually non-existent; and the burden you place on discarding them is not only too high, but you're placing that burden on me. It's not my job to fix your false beliefs; you're the one who has them. Mine is just to fix my own false beliefs.

You're applying debate semantics here... that's quite popular but it's a fool's errand. Debates are worse than useless... they are counter-productive to truth. In a debate, two sides go in with an opinion, two sides go out with the same opinion they went in with, both sides think they won, and both sides delude themselves into becoming more confident because they "won". Opinions are the real problem; everyone has opinions, and people disagree with each other, so trivially a lot of those opinions are wrong. You are a person, therefore, it's reasonable to suspect you have a lot of false opinions yourself. But your epistemic approach is one that favors clinging to whatever false opinions you have for as long as you possibly can, which is the exact opposite strategy you should have if you want to believe in as few false things as possible. You want to get rid of your own false opinions... the lower the amount of time between your forming a false opinion and your rejecting it, the better. To do this, you should be looking honestly for all of the ways in which your opinions might be wrong, not could still be true. To summarize, debating is a bad epistemic approach... what you want to do on these forums, instead, is discuss. When you do debate, however, know fully well that it's just a game.

I'm not even interested in "proving you wrong". My beef with you is that you're confusing your opinions with logic.

The guy in the video — Samuel Lacrampe

Derek.

says that one of the two explanations given by physicists

Don't take Derek too seriously here; there are more than two intepretations, and the FTL one doesn't even have that much representation among physicists. The random view is one of the mainstream ones; the others are are quantum logic (QL) and many worlds (MW), neither of which mesh well with your confuse-your-intuitions-with-logic approaches.

MW, however, does grant determinism; not only that, it has locality. And it might be true. But to think it's true because you developed an opinion that it "has to be" is still wrong... it might be false, after all. And you don't want to believe false things.

Volition is still goal oriented behavior — InPitzotl

So volition is goal oriented behaviour with acts in the world. So far so good?
And a wind-up doll, who is a simple program (ie wind-up system) with mechanical parts, does not have volition.
And a robot, who is a more complex program with mechanical parts, has volition.
And so would you say the critical part to volition is complex programming?

Debates are worse than useless... they are counter-productive to truth. — InPitzotl

Debates are formal discussions in which arguments are put forward; and the function of (sincere) arguments is to find truth; therefore debates lead to truth. All the discussions in this forum are debates, minus the formality part.

In a debate, two sides go in with an opinion, two sides go out with the same opinion they went in with, both sides think they won, and both sides delude themselves into becoming more confident because they "won". — InPitzotl

That's precisely the type of problems that rules such as "Fulfilling the Onus of Proof" aim to resolve. Both sides cannot "win" if one side has not fulfilled the onus of proof when it applies to them.

My beef with you is that you're confusing your opinions with logic. — InPitzotl

Which part in the summary is nothing but an arbitrary opinion?

Don't take Derek too seriously here [...] — InPitzotl

Ok, so if I understand correctly, your intent of bringing up the video was neither to attack or defend the points made in the summary, but only to show that it was related; is that right?

And a robot, who is a more complex program with mechanical parts, has volition.
And so would you say the critical part to volition is complex programming? — Samuel Lacrampe

No, the critical part is not how complex the programming is... the critical part is having the right kind of system. That system involves a continuous monitoring of world states by developing world models based on sensory inputs, a representation of a goal state in terms of the world model, and the use of said world model (and action models) to guide the robot towards the manipulation of the world states in accordance with said goal. This in place, there's a causal correlation between world states and the state of the world model, and another causal correlation between modeled goal states and the counterfactual world states that would represent attainment of the goal. Likewise, there's a world model for the robot's actions and a corresponding world in which the robot is actually acting. So the system here isn't just the computer in the robot... it is the robot interacting with the world in this type of way. By the way, we, too, interact with the world... continuously. That is what makes us agents. We also initiate voluntary actions of precisely this sort. We do a lot more things as well... the robot simply reflects the simplest level that can be meaningfully called intention.

Debates are formal discussions in which arguments are put forward; and the function of (sincere) arguments is to find truth; therefore debates lead to truth. — Samuel Lacrampe

Well let's sanity check this idea. You're talking about free will, mechanics, and the existence of the soul. Your position is that by debating this you're going to find truth. People have been debating this for over two millennia... did they find the truth? What are you doing different than them?

Which part in the summary is nothing but an arbitrary opinion? — Samuel Lacrampe

Well, let's start by how you qualify that very question. We went from "opinion" to "nothing but an arbitrary opinion". So let me offer you another opinion (I'll fake it, because I don't really have one on this)... Banno is correct (<- do you see why I even started this line now?); experiment supports that the universe is indeed random. If we add the evidence-supported premise that the universe is random to your summary, we get a contradiction. Having a contradiction implies that one of the premises is wrong. My opinion is that premise (5) is wrong. Having gone through this, let me turn this question back to you. Which part of that rebuttal is nothing but and arbitrary opinion?

Ok, so if I understand correctly, your intent of bringing up the video was neither to attack or defend the points made in the summary, but only to show that it was related; is that right? — Samuel Lacrampe

It was to get your opinion on Bell's Theorem, which is obviously related. FTL is incredibly whacky, by the way. MW, though it is deterministic and local, is a lot more counterintuitive to most people than randomness. And that is what I think your (5) premise really is... it's not logic, it's just your intuition.

Volition: Alright, I think I'm getting the gist of it. Where I'm going with these questions, is that it sounds like the volition of the robot "supervenes" on its physical parts and interaction with the world, as opposed to being a power of the mind or consciousness.

Your position is that by debating this you're going to find truth. People have been debating this for over two millennia... did they find the truth? — InPitzotl

He who's arguments have not been refuted is the closest to knowing the truth. That is in fact the entire purpose of sincere arguments. If the pro-souls debaters over the millennia were not refuted and their opponents were, then the pro-souls were indeed closer to knowing the truth (and vice versa of course). But don't worry too much about other people, as truth is not found by consensus. What matters is whether my summary argument can be refuted or not.

Which part of that rebuttal is nothing but and arbitrary opinion? — InPitzotl

I don't see one. You started with an opinion, namely that Banno is right (about not all physical things being determined), and defended it with a reason. That's good. This is by the way the definition of an argument: a position (or opinion) defended by a reason.

And that is what I think your (5) premise really is... it's not logic, it's just your intuition. — InPitzotl

I feel we are finally having a productive debate. So then, what do you say is wrong with premise (5)? That the PoSR disallows for randomness, or that the PoSR is simply not true?

it sounds like the volition of the robot "supervenes" on its physical parts and interaction with the world, as opposed to being a power of the mind or consciousness. — Samuel Lacrampe

Exactly.

He who's arguments have not been refuted is the closest to knowing the truth. — Samuel Lacrampe

Wrong. There are invalid arguments for true things and irrefutable arguments for false things. To know a truth requires aligning your beliefs according to those things that would make it true. So if you want to get close to knowing truth, what's critical is not whether or not you have won arguments or how many you have won... those things are weak indicators at best. Rather, what's critical is what things justify your belief and whether or not they are affected by the veracity of the thing.

I don't see one. — Samuel Lacrampe

Okay, good. But you do realize that both you and Banno cannot be correct, right? But both of your views are not "nothing but abritrary opinions".

I feel we are finally having a productive debate. — Samuel Lacrampe

Oh I hope not; that would be the most unproductive thing I can think of. You might feel it makes progress towards truth but that's illusory.

So then, what do you say is wrong with premise (5)? That the PoSR disallows for randomness, or that the PoSR is simply not true? — Samuel Lacrampe

Neither of those are particularly problematic. What's problematic is this:

"nothing causes [...]" is a logical fallacy.
it goes against the Principle of Sufficient Reason; which is one of the four Laws of Thoughts. — Samuel Lacrampe

Put it this way. Banno's view is logically consistent, and supported by evidence, legitimately. It may or may not in the final analysis be correct, but it's certainly not fallacious.

A lesser problem with your use of PoSR isn't that it suggests determinism, but that it allows for free will, which specifically in this context means libertarian free will. LFW of the sort you discuss necessitates the Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP). Given I choose A among options A and B out of LFW, PAP demands B is possible. PoSR demands there be a sufficient reason for A, suggesting B is not possible, because A both happened for that sufficient reason and that reason was sufficient for A to happen.

An even lesser more sophisticated possible objection, should you find some way to justify PoSR free will, would be that your list of determinism, randomness, and free will may not be exhaustive.

There are invalid arguments for true things — InPitzotl

Yes but you wouldn't be closer to knowing the truth; where knowledge means "justified true belief".

and irrefutable arguments for false things — InPitzotl

How would you know this if the arguments cannot be refuted? :wink:
More seriously though, an "irrefutable argument" is also called a "proof", which gives truth with certainty.

Rather, what's critical is what things justify your belief and whether or not they are affected by the veracity of the thing. — InPitzotl

Right; justified true belief. But what do you mean by "justified", if not that the position is defended by a valid reason? Because this is also the definition of a valid argument.

Okay, good. But you do realize that both you and Banno cannot be correct, right? But both of your views are not "nothing but abritrary opinions". — InPitzotl

I would not be arguing if I thought both our views were compatible. And so if contradicting, then one (or both) of us must have made an error: Inasmuch as math does not contradict math, reason does not contradict reason.

Banno's view is logically consistent, and supported by evidence, legitimately. It may or may not in the final analysis be correct, but it's certainly not fallacious. — InPitzotl

It is not logically consistent if it contradicts a law of logic that is the PoSR.

Given I choose A among options A and B out of LFW, PAP demands B is possible. PoSR demands there be a sufficient reason for A, suggesting B is not possible, because A both happened for that sufficient reason and that reason was sufficient for A to happen. — InPitzotl

Both options A and B are possible, AND there is a sufficient reason for choosing A over B: free will. Where do you see a contradiction?

your list of determinism, randomness, and free will may not be exhaustive. — InPitzotl

It is. Due to the Law of Excluded Middle: Either p or not-p is true.
Either "Cause A always gives Effect B" (Determinism) or "Cause A does not always give Effect B".
And if the latter, it is either because there exists in Cause A the power to choose the effect (ie Free Will), or there does not (ie Randomness).

Yes but you wouldn't be closer to knowing the truth; where knowledge means "justified true belief". — Samuel Lacrampe

Closer when? By what metric? What is it you imagine is happening? You advance an invalid argument for some true thing S. Your opponent refutes your argument. Then... what?

Let me propose something to you, because you sound horribly confused. At the time that I type this, there is a plastic cup sitting on my desk to the right of my mouse pad. That cup is either a red cup or it is a blue cup, and it is not both. Now consider what you would need to do to get to the truth of the question: "What color is that cup?"

What I'm hearing you propose is that one person forms an opinion of the cup, then finds an opponent. The two debate. The guy whose opinion that the cup is red puts a burden on his opposition to disprove his opinion for him. They keep going until one proves the other wrong. The one not proven wrong has not been refuted, and therefore, must be correct. To me, this sounds horribly misguided and ridiculous... the entire exercise. Even forming the original opinion is ridiculous. Having formed one, finding an opponent with an opposing opinion before you change yours, is ridiculous. Having found them, placing the burden on them to prove you wrong, is ridiculous. Having "exposed" the flaw in their argument, using that as confirmation of your opinion, is ridiculous. The entire thing, end to end, is a bunch of nonsense... but this is what you're proposing as how we get to truth. There is no part here that has anything to do with the color the cup.

The only way to figure out the color of the cup is to do something relevant... something that involves forming a belief about the cup's color based on what that cup's color actually is. You know, like looking at it? And yes, you might debate after that with nimwits who form random opinions, but your confidence only comes from that relevance.

More seriously though, an "irrefutable argument" is also called a "proof", which gives truth with certainty. — Samuel Lacrampe

No, an irrefutable argument is simply one that cannot be refuted. A proof establishes an argument is valid. Valid arguments do not entail truth; sound arguments do.

How would you know this if the arguments cannot be refuted? — Samuel Lacrampe

Because I can construct contradictory arguments that are irrefutable.

But what do you mean by "justified", if not that the position is defended by a valid reason? Because this is also the definition of a valid argument. — Samuel Lacrampe

No, this is an amphiboly. "Valid reason" is just a reason recognized as relevant. "Valid argument" is a term of art referring to an argument that follows from its premises. Besides, you're not proposing the use of justification to get to truth... you're proposing debating. I could just mix these two chemicals and see what happens, but no, I have to form an opinion of it, find an opponent, and tell my opponent that he has to prove my opinion is wrong.

And so if contradicting, then one (or both) of us must have made an error — Samuel Lacrampe

Why? Both arguments can be valid. At most one can be sound.

It is not logically consistent if it contradicts a law of logic that is the PoSR. — Samuel Lacrampe

You're begging the question. PoSR is unnecessary to presume for logic. It is a premise.

Both options A and B are possible, AND there is a sufficient reason for choosing A over B: free will. Where do you see a contradiction? — Samuel Lacrampe

The term sufficient has a meaning. To say that X is a sufficient reason for A is to say that if X is present, A manifests. To say that A has a sufficient reason is to say that A manifests for some reason X such that if X is present it will manifest. If A manifesting excludes B, as in this case, and A manifests for reason X, and X is sufficient for A, then B is impossible. That's simply what that word sufficient means... that is the S in PoSR.

It is. Due to the Law of Excluded Middle: Either p or not-p is true.
Either "Cause A always gives Effect B" (Determinism) or "Cause A does not always give Effect B".
And if the latter, it is either because there exists in Cause A the power to choose the effect (ie Free Will), or there does not (ie Randomness). — Samuel Lacrampe

"Cause A does not always give Effect B" is bordering on gibberish; importing causality where it doesn't belong. Technically we can have a cause leading to random effects, but I don't think that is what you mean here. If you talk about states and evolution it becomes more coherent... (1) State A always evolves to State B, or (2) State A does not always evolve to State B (still clumsy; what's meant is that it doesn't always evolve to the same state, but it'll do). So let's focus on scenario 2. Random roughly means unpredictable. So if we have randomness, it's something like (2a) State A leads to an unpredictable state in the set States B where B has cardinality of at least 2. Without appealing to free will just yet, how about... (2b) State A leads to predictable states in the set States B where B has cardinality of at least 2. (2c) State A leads to semi-predictable states in the set States B where B has cardinality of at least 2. In fact, free will actually involves something like (2c), with an agent. But somehow you want 2c to only count as a possibility if it has an agent. Recall the discussion we had with the photon being an original cause? Well, it sounds to me like you're not just failing to exhaust the possibilities, but that you're intentionally constraining them.

Closer when? By what metric? What is it you imagine is happening? — InPitzotl

Knowledge is "justified true belief", where "justified" means you have sound argument for why it is true. If you believe something that is true for the wrong reasons, then you have not acquired any knowledge.

Now consider what you would need to do to get to the truth of the question: "What color is that cup?" [...] — InPitzotl

Relax. I said the purpose of debates is to find truth. I did not say it was the only way to find truth. Of course your method of looking at the cup is a sufficient way... At least to make your opinion the Prima Facie, and thus the burden of proof is shifted to the other side. Here's what I mean:

You claim the cup is red because it looks red to you (this is an argument by the way: position defended by a reason). But I claim it is in fact white, and the reason you see it red is because you are wearing glasses with red lenses, and once you remove them, you will see the cup as white. You then remove the glasses, and indeed you now see the cup as white. I have refuted your original argument, and the Prima Facie has shifted to the other side. This was a debate, and we got closer to knowing the truth.

No, an irrefutable argument is simply one that cannot be refuted. A proof establishes an argument is valid. — InPitzotl

I would have said that a proof needs to be sound, not just valid. But fine; minor disagreement.

Because I can construct contradictory arguments that are irrefutable. — InPitzotl

Can you give an example? I claim it is not possible.

Both arguments can be valid. At most one can be sound. — InPitzotl

Sure. I meant sound then.

You're begging the question. PoSR is unnecessary to presume for logic. It is a premise. — InPitzotl

I personally believe it is a law of logic, but for the sake of argument, let's suppose it is merely a premise. Okay, but it is a premise we have accepted as true. So if Banno's demonstration contradicts a true premise, then there is an error.

To say that A has a sufficient reason is to say that A manifests for some reason X such that if X is present it will manifest. If A manifesting excludes B, as in this case, and A manifests for reason X, and X is sufficient for A, then B is impossible. — InPitzotl

Why do you say "A manifesting excludes B"? B can still manifest later.
Are you perhaps conflating the terms "impossible" with "not actual"? E.g. Both options A and B are possible. Before I choose, A and B are non-actual (or in potential). Once I choose A, A becomes actual (what you call manifest), and B remains non-actual, but still possible.

Random roughly means unpredictable. [...] — InPitzotl

Sorry, I just don't understand what you are saying in this whole section. I don't get your states 2b and 2c. Additionally, random is not equal to unpredictable. Things could be fully determined, and yet remain unpredictable if we cannot observe the cause. But as you originally said this was only a minor objection, maybe we can just drop it?

where "justified" means you have sound argument for why it is true. — Samuel Lacrampe

Justified means you have good reason to think a thing is true; having a justified belief doesn't guarantee truth. That's why we talk about knowledge as JTB's instead of just JB's.

Relax. I said the purpose of debates is to find truth. I did not say it was the only way to find truth. — Samuel Lacrampe

You can debate all you like. That's not going to tell you what color that cup was.

Here's what I mean: — Samuel Lacrampe

...and here is what I mean. Going to simple quotes mode (with italics added for clarity):

"You claim the cup is red" ...I never did that, so the whole thing is moot. But let's continue, as a hypothetical: "But I claim it is in fact white" ...why? Did you just guess? "the reason you see it red is because you are wearing glasses with red lenses ..." ...how did you know, did you even know? "You then remove the glasses" ...how come I was so dense I didn't realize I was wearing them? "indeed you now see the cup as white" ...lots of problems so far, but when I look at the cup and see its color is white, that would give me justifiable reason for believing it's white. "I have refuted your original argument" ...unless you knew, you didn't refute it... you were just insanely lucky... so lucky that we cannot possibly take this into consideration in our how-to-obtain-truth toolkit. And if you knew, you didn't come to this conclusion because you formed an opinion, or debated it; you came to this conclusion because you were justified... because you formed a belief in such a way that the actual truth of the claim affected what you believed. Now backing out of hypothetical-land, there was a real, not hypothetical, cup to the right of my mouse pad. Think of a way to find out what color it was.

I would have said that a proof needs to be sound, not just valid. But fine; minor disagreement. — Samuel Lacrampe

This is what you did say:

More seriously though, an "irrefutable argument" is also called a "proof", which gives truth with certainty. — Samuel Lacrampe

...I cannot see ever having such a proof. But I can easily see two people arguing with neither being capable of establishing soundness. And that's the real problem here:

Okay, but it is a premise we have accepted as true. — Samuel Lacrampe

But that doesn't mean it is true; only that we're treating it as if it were true for some purpose.

So if Banno's demonstration contradicts a true premise, then there is an error. — Samuel Lacrampe

Banno was questioning the premise. The only "error" here is that he did not as you requested accept the premise.

Why do you say "A manifesting excludes B"? B can still manifest later. — Samuel Lacrampe

B here is the alternate possibility you require; it is literally the AP in PAP. B "manifesting later" would require a choice later, which would be a different choice.

Are you perhaps conflating the terms "impossible" with "not actual"? E.g. Both options A and B are possible. Before I choose, A and B are non-actual (or in potential). Once I choose A, A becomes actual (what you call manifest), and B remains non-actual, but still possible. — Samuel Lacrampe

No. Since you apply PoSR to rule out randomness, let's presume that manifestation in this case is due to causality, and talk in those terms. If A happens at T2 (i.e., happens at all), then PoSR demands that A happens for a sufficient reason X. If X is a cause, that means (a) X caused A (the reason part), and (b) A must arise from X (the sufficient part). Since A must arise from X (due to sufficiency), and B is an alternative (supposed to be an alternate possibility), then B is not possible. I did not use PAP to come to the conclusion that B was not possible, nor did I presume that A happening means B isn't possible. I derived that B wasn't possible by applying PoSR. It's the sufficiency of the reason demanded to exist by PoSR that makes B impossible. PoSR itself suggests it's impossible. As I originally stated, the definition of PoSR is almost the definition of determinism from the get go; if you interpret PoSR in a causality sense, it is the definition of determinism.

I don't get your states 2b and 2c. — Samuel Lacrampe

Your possibility 1 was that A always leads to B; that is predictable, but it is always the same for state A. 2b is just predictable, but not the same. 2c is sometimes predictable, sometimes not. 2c isn't really that different than how you think of free will, except that you imagine that itself as a mechanic that comes whole cloth with a conscious entity.

But as you originally said this was only a minor objection, maybe we can just drop it? — Samuel Lacrampe

If you like, but shouldn't you be interested in all of the ways in which your assumptions can be wrong?

Justified means you have good reason to think a thing is true; having a justified belief doesn't guarantee truth. That's why we talk about knowledge as JTB's instead of just JB's. — InPitzotl

But how else can you determine if a thing is true, other than by using justification or reasoning?

Now backing out of hypothetical-land, there was a real, not hypothetical, cup to the right of my mouse pad. Think of a way to find out what color it was. — InPitzotl

You look at it, and based on the color you perceive, you conclude it is reasonable to believe the cup is the color you perceived, until given a reason to believe otherwise.

Banno was questioning the premise. The only "error" here is that he did not as you requested accept the premise. — InPitzotl

But if you and I both accepted the PoSR premise as true, then both you and I must conclude Banno made an error by contradicting the PoSR. We must accept the consequences of our assumptions.

[...] if you interpret PoSR in a causality sense, it is the definition of determinism. — InPitzotl

But B was possible before the choice was made. As so:
At time T1, both A and B are possible choices. At time T2, we make a choice which causes A to manifest, and not B. If free will necessitates choices, then it can exist during T1. And this makes sense: we choose to act before we act.

If you like, but shouldn't you be interested in all of the ways in which your assumptions can be wrong? — InPitzotl

I just don't think we are going to make progress on this one. I don't understand why we need to add the property of predictability, and how 2b can be always predictable even though cause A may lead to different effects, and in 2c, how a thing can be sometimes predictable and sometimes not. If a thing is not always predictable, then it must be unpredictable.

But how else can you determine if a thing is true, other than by using justification or reasoning? — Samuel Lacrampe

I'm not proposing that there's another method. I'm just highlighting that being justified does not imply being correct.

You look at it, and based on the color you perceive, you conclude it is reasonable to believe the cup is the color you perceived, until given a reason to believe otherwise.

Yes, that would work, if you could do that.

But if you and I both accepted the PoSR premise as true, then both you and I must conclude Banno made an error by contradicting the PoSR. We must accept the consequences of our assumptions. — Samuel Lacrampe

Nope; it's always possible our acceptance of PoSR is in error. What is its justification?

But B was possible before the choice was made. As so:
At time T1, both A and B are possible choices. At time T2, we make a choice which causes A to manifest, and not B. — Samuel Lacrampe

But that doesn't help; you're explaining the wrong thing. This is just an account of LFW; as such, there's no problem there. Your choice causes A to happen, but it didn't have to cause A; it could have caused B. But the problem isn't to make sense of LFW; the problem is to explain its compatibility with PoSR. This type of cause is not a sufficient reason. A sufficient reason for A must cause A; it cannot cause B (where B is an alternate). Choice of the nature you specify is incompatible with PoSR.

I don't understand why we need to — Samuel Lacrampe

...the need is simple; you're making an argument where you enumerate possibilities, rule some out, and have the rest "by default". You can't do this properly if your enumeration is incomplete.

If a thing is not always predictable, then it must be unpredictable. — Samuel Lacrampe

Semi-predictable is perfectly coherent, even useful; it's why your smart phone has a weather app on it.

Nope; it's always possible our acceptance of PoSR is in error. What is its justification? — InPitzotl

So it looks like you are changing the position you took here where you said you saw no problem with the PoSR.
Anyways, the PoSR is a self-evident principle, because asking for a justification is asking for a sufficient reason for it, which begs the question. This is similar to asking for a justification for the Law of Non-Contradiction.

This type of cause is not a sufficient reason. A sufficient reason for A must cause A; it cannot cause B (where B is an alternate) — InPitzotl

Why can't free will have sufficient power to cause A if it chooses A, and cause B if it chooses B?

the need is simple; you're making an argument where you enumerate possibilities, rule some out, and have the rest "by default". You can't do this properly if your enumeration is incomplete. — InPitzotl

Sure, but as previously stated, as both determined and undetermined things can be both predictable and unpredictable, then I don't see the point of adding the "predictable" property to the list.

Semi-predictable is perfectly coherent, even useful; it's why your smart phone has a weather app on it. — InPitzotl

Okay. So semi-predictability is like probability. Note that most systems that have a probable outcome are fully determined. The lack of full predictability does not come from random effects, but from our lack of knowledge of all the causes.

So it looks like you are changing the position you took here where you said you saw no problem with the PoSR. — Samuel Lacrampe

There's no change in my position; I think you may have misinterpreted something. Doubly so, because if you assume I would never question my own opinions, then you must have forgotten what I was doing when I first questioned your epistemic approach. It sounds like you're doubling down on being grandiose; so I'll quadruple down on anyone being susceptible to error; that applies just as well to you as it does to me. I kind of beat you to the punch, though, by being slow to opinion in the first place.

I've no opinions on PoSR. My opinions are about people who make opinions without justification. Speaking of which:

Anyways, the PoSR is a self-evident principle, because asking for a justification is asking for a sufficient reason for it, which begs the question. — Samuel Lacrampe

You make it sound like the only way to justify PoSR is to use PoSR. If that's the only reason you think it's justified, then it is begging the question. But calling that self-evident because it begs the question is literally rationalizing away begging the question.

This is similar to asking for a justification for the Law of Non-Contradiction. — Samuel Lacrampe

Not even close. If you start with traditional logic and deny the law of non-contradiction, you wind up with the principle of explosion; given PoE, you can prove 2=5 (though PoE could be avoided by using paraconsistent logics). If you deny PoSR, you simply wind up with not everything having a reason; you don't wind up with the PoE. These two things are not the same.

Why can't free will have sufficient power to cause A if it chooses A, and cause B if it chooses B? — Samuel Lacrampe

It's very simple. If your free will could lead to either then it's not a sufficient reason for either. Again, that's just what that word "sufficient" means. You're trying some weird convoluted way to promote "reason" to "sufficient reason" with some if it's this it's sufficient if it's that it's sufficient, but that's just meaningless word play. Sufficient is sufficient is sufficient. If alternate things can happen, it's not sufficient.

So semi-predictability is like probability. — Samuel Lacrampe

Not really. Probability is but one form of semi-predictability. Probability that changes over time is another. Of the latter, you can have probabilities that change unpredictably with stability of some sort (such as locally; like the weather), or probabilities that change based on particular circumstances (such as the sudden jump from completely unpredictable to absolutely known that occurs when you measure properties of one of a set of entangled particles in QM).

There's no change in my position; I think you may have misinterpreted something. Doubly so, because if you assume I would never question my own opinions [...] — InPitzotl

Position, opinion; same things. I am not saying it is a bad thing to change it. I just wanted to clarify this is what happened, so that I understand your new points.

But calling that self-evident because it begs the question is literally rationalizing away begging the question. — InPitzotl

Not if there is no other way to justify it. A claim is self-evident if (1) it cannot be evidenced (i.e. justified) by anything else, and (2) if everyone believes it to be true by default (to remove the possibility of its opposite also being self-evident). Now can you think of a way to justify the PoSR without begging the question?

If you start with traditional logic and deny the law of non-contradiction, you wind up with the principle of explosion; given PoE, you can prove 2=5 (though PoE could be avoided by using paraconsistent logics). — InPitzotl

So what? Why should we not believe in the PoE or that 2=5, if not because it violates the law of non-contradiction?

If your free will could lead to either then it's not a sufficient reason for either. — InPitzotl

This is not how I interpret sufficiency. E.g. Observing that a floor can support a 10 kg weight is sufficient to conclude that it can support 10 kg or less; but it could also support more. But maybe you can give me an example of what you mean by efficiency?