Where is the flaw? — bizso09

Simple: You are not in the world as you are not there.

...there is something funny about de se reasoning that I think we haven't understood... — Snakes Alive

Well, reasoning requires language, and hence the other. Reasoning purely de se therefore involves a contradiction...

This seems to me the common error in ll arguments for solipsism.

Yes, but language clearly allows this kind of reasoning, and I think the question the child asks during its first existential crisis, 'Why am I this one, and not that one?' Not, 'Why is John John, but why am I John?' Something about the way we conceive of ourselves and personhood is not quite captured without understanding how this reasoning works. But logics have traditionally not taken de se reasoning all that seriously...though there was a boom with David Lewis' stuff.

'Why am I this one, and not that one?' Not, 'Why is John John, but why am I John?' — Snakes Alive

Is there a question here? Or is it a puzzling about "this one", "that one", or "John", overcome as the child learns how those words are used?

I think there is – and if we don't recognize it, thats our fault, not the question's (there are non-questions, but we shouldn't use that fact as a polemic to decide complacently that we know everything, and no unusual questions can touch us).

And no, I think the child wonders about these things often in language, often not – and being able to ask de se questions shows an ordinary mastery of language, not a confusion about it.

And so you can say 'if I were you...' But this does not mean 'if Snakes Alive were Banno....' nor does it mean 'If Snakes alive had the qualities of Banno, or were in the position of Banno...'

No, rather, it's I conditionally talk about what I would do it I were you. But it's puzzling, then, that it is coherent to reason in this way on most accounts. But I think that's so much the worse for them. Not that I think these questions can bolster an argument for solipsism.

I think there is — Snakes Alive

If there is, what is it?

Well, to be honest, I think nobody really knows how the world works, so if you're honest with yourself, you can admit it too.

Let's go back to the original framework:

You say

G. In a world, there is a distinct FPP that is not me.
H. Every statement is made by me.
I. G is a statement about distinct FPP.
J. Hence, me makes a statement about a distinct FPP.

I say,

31. To view something, is to form a minimal connection with something.
32. Hence, to make a statement about a thing, then has to view that thing.
33. In a world, me has to view something to make a statement about that thing.

34. In a world, me is one of FPP [D.]
35. In a world, an FPP cannot view other distinct FPP.
36. In a world, me cannot make a statement about other distinct FPP.

36 leads to contradiction with J. In particular, what was missing before is H.

Reasoning purely de se therefore involves a contradiction... — Banno

Ultimately, all reasoning is de se. Even for the de re sentence "Peter wants to get elected", the complete sentence is "I believe that Peter wants to get elected". A lot of language, when objectively describing the world, removes the "I", which is a mistake.

If you can't hear it, I can't tell you. But that's OK.

Then it's what I'd call shown, rather than said.

Ultimately, all reasoning is de se. Even for the de re sentence "Peter wants to get elected", the complete sentence is "I believe that Peter wants to get elected". A lot of language, when objectively describing the world, removes the "I", which is a mistake.

I am not sure you understand what de se reasoning actually is. If I state sincerely, "Peter wants to get elected" then that might be equivalent to stating sincerely "I believe that Peter wants to get elected", but in most cases, though not all, nothing is added or taken away by the choice that is made. If I were suffering from amnesia and was reading an account about what Peter had been doing I might also come to the conclusion that Peter wants to get elected, and I could say outright that I believe Peter wants to get elected, and be expressing the same thing. However, if my amnesia is cured, and I am Peter, I discover something new and express that discovery when I exclaim "I am Peter!". That is de se reasoning. I could also say "I believe I am Peter", but that would not add any extra de se characteristics to what I had already expressed. The puzzle some people see in de se reasoning is, on the one hand it seems that I have uncovered some substantive information when I discover that I am Peter, but on the other it is difficult to say anything more about what I have discovered other than that, quite simply, I am Peter.

31. To view something, is to form a minimal connection with something.
32. Hence, to make a statement about a thing, then has to view that thing.
33. In a world, me has to view something to make a statement about that thing.

34. In a world, me is one of FPP [D.]
35. In a world, an FPP cannot view other distinct FPP.
36. In a world, me cannot make a statement about other distinct FPP. — bizso09

I don't disagree with this, but my lack of knowledge does not imply absence of these other FFP.

You say things exist because they are observed by a first person perspective and that things do not exist when they are not observed. Additionally, you say that such first person perspective is the only perspective, and all that exists. If being observed is a requirement for existing, what observes that unique first person perspective?

I don't disagree with this, but my lack of knowledge does not imply absence of these other FFP. — Echarmion

Observation is not lack of knowledge. It's the possibility of any information flow whatsoever. Here's some more:

You say:

K. There is one Me
L. In a world, Me is one of FPPs.
M. Hence in a world, Me is FPP_1

I say,

37. In a world, there is one Me
38. In a world, Me is one of FPPs
39. Hence, in a world, Me is FPP_2

40. In a world, FPP_1 and FPP_2 are two distinct FPPs
41. Hence, in a world, both FPP_1 and FPP_2 are Me

It is clear to see that 40. contradicts with 41. There are a few possible ways to resolve this, but each of them leads to further contradictions:

42.a. FPP_1 and FPP_2 are the same
42.b. In a world, Me does not exist.
42.c. In a world, there are multiple Me.
42.d. FPP_1 and FPP_2 are in two distinct worlds

42.a is incorrect because Me has access to the FPP of bizso09 but not to that of Echarmion.
42.b is incorrect because Me has access to the FPP of bizso09. If Me did not exist, Me would have no access to this FPP.
42.c is incorrect, because Me is by definition singular.
42.d is incorrect because there is one world that includes everything in existence.

This leads us back to the point where

43. In a world, there is only one FPP. [10.]

The puzzle some people see in de se reasoning is, on the one hand it seems that I have uncovered some substantive information when I discover that I am Peter, but on the other it is difficult to say anything more about what I have discovered other than that, quite simply, I am Peter. — jkg20

That's totally correct. However, I'd say the difference is 1) I am a neutral God, narrating that "Peter wants to get elected" or 2) I am Peter and I want to get elected or 3) I am this person typing now and noting that "Peter wants to get elected". I know that the correct choice is 3), but with respect to the objective reality, there is no difference between 1) 2) or 3). So where does the information come from to select 3)?

If being observed is a requirement for existing, what observes that unique first person perspective? — Daniel

It observes itself. The reference point is like a coordinate system for existence. As an exercise, ask yourself how you know that you are you. Well, you do, because you simply are.

You say:

K. There is one Me
L. In a world, Me is one of FPPs.
M. Hence in a world, Me is FPP_1

I say,

37. In a world, there is one Me
38. In a world, Me is one of FPPs
39. Hence, in a world, Me is FPP_2

40. In a world, FPP_1 and FPP_2 are two distinct FPPs
41. Hence, in a world, both FPP_1 and FPP_2 are Me — bizso09

Let me correct this for you:


L. In a world, Echarmion is one of FPPs.
M. Hence in a world, Echarmion is FPP_1

I say,

37. In a world, there is one Biz
38. In a world, Biz is one of FPPs
39. Hence, in a world, Biz is FPP_2

40. In a world, FPP_1 and FPP_2 are two distinct FPPs
41. Hence, in a world, both FPP_1 and FPP_2 are Echarmion and Biz


If you conflate "me" and "you" and call it "me" you can put together some kind of argument for solipsism. But it's a simple - not to mention outlandish - mistake. It's obviously forced and sophistic.

It observes itself. — bizso09

Before being able to observe itself, it must exist. Don't you agree? The question is how can it exist before being subject to that first observation that you say is required for its existence?

If you conflate "me" and "you" and call it "me" you can put together some kind of argument for solipsism. But it's a simple - not to mention outlandish - mistake. It's obviously forced and sophistic. — ZzzoneiroCosm

I never conflated "me" and "you". Every statement correctly describes the world in its own right. It is impossible to make a statement without including who made that statement. No matter what I do, I cannot abstract myself away. Let me correct that for you, so it's accurate from your perspective:

In a world, there is one Me
In a world, Me is ZzzoneiroCosm,
In a world, there is one Biz,
In a world, there is one Echarmion

Even this is incorrect, because ultimately, I for a fact know that Me is Biz and not ZzzoneiroCosm. And while I'm reading all these statements on this forum, the Me has not jumped to Zzz or Ech. However, I'm unable to prove or communicate this, because in the physical world, nothing would have changed even if the Me had jumped. The Me is a non-physical entity that exists in the world. So the next best thing I can do is for you to derive the argument as if the Me was the person you are...

If you conflate "subjectivity" and "objectivity", and call it "objectivity" you can put together some kind of argument for realism. But it's a simple - not to mention outlandish - mistake. It's obviously forced and sophistic.

In my view, the whole thing, the world, and the perspective, just spontaneously jumps into existence out of nothing. I don't know how I got here, all I know is that I'm here, and everything else is. In addition, observation doesn't bring objects into existence. It's more like everything happens together.

I am just trying to show you that you are not the only thing that exists.

So where does the information come from to select 3)?

Have you considered the idea that there is no such information? There is a distinction between ability based knowledge and factual knowledge, between knowing how to play a guitar and knowing the answers to a history test. Whilst the concept of information might be useful in analysis of having the latter kind of knowledge, and in the analysis of acquiring the former kind, that alone does not entail that all knowledge just is possession of information. De se reasoning may not involve gaining new information. At least, you have yet to argue that it must.

Have you considered the idea that there is no such information? — jkg20

Having no such information would entail me existing in some kind of weird superposition of all 3 choices. Like being God, Peter and bizso09 at the same time. Or me not existing at all, in which case I have no idea who's writing this message right now. It's some dude called Biz, but that's about it, and I have no clue what he's on about. In fact, I don't even know what's happening since apparently I don't even exist?!

You can either take the Me for granted, but then you admit that your reality is the only possible world out there. Or you can assume an outside world, but then you need to account for the Me in it. What doesn't work is assuming an outside world and ignoring the Me, in which case you literally have no way to explain why you're seeing the FPP of the person that you are.

There is a distinction between ability based knowledge and factual knowledge, — jkg20

Ability or factual knowledge are just different encodings of information, but the information exists in both cases. Information in this case is like entropy and it should collapse uncertainty.

Having no such information would entail me existing in some kind of weird superposition of all 3 choices.

That needs arguing for, not just stating.

Ability or factual knowledge are just different encodings of information

That needs arguing for, not just stating.

You do not. Maybe our dreamworld is the one we live and leave it upon awakening. You can't proof wich one is real.

You can't know of others are conscious or just philosophic zombies.

What is the point of committing to solipsism when it is clear you require others (at least the pretence of others ) in order to survive? In other words, if there is no benefit to an idea what is the point in committing to it? This is where philosophers go wrong, they mistake "clever" arguments for usable knowledge and end up with their own heads firmly buried up their own arses.