Something being uncaused means it is random... Great. That's a new one. Radioactive decay and other subatomic phenomena are uncaused... That too is a new one. — Agustino

Being uncaused means more than randomness. The Free Will Theorem goes into this in some detail, but basically Kochen and Conway demonstrate that randomness is not sufficient to explain their result.

Being uncaused means more than randomness — tom

Yes most definitely. There's also conceptual problems regarding how something that is uncaused can even be conceived to begin with. When most people think of uncaused, they think of a certain empty scene followed by the empty scene holding some object N which popped into existence there. But this train of imagination could equally describe a situation of something which popped there with an unknown cause, or something which popped there after having been transported there, or something which popped there after having been created there by something. How can such scenarios be differentiated? And if they can't, to what extent is it possible to even imagine something coming into being uncaused?

In Aristotelian science there is only one uncaused cause - the Prime Mover. And uncaused in this case simply means eternal and unchangeable. Not something which pops into being, but something which cannot be conceived as non-existent.

And interestingly enough, when theists say God exists, they don't really understand what God exists means - negative theology. What they really mean by God exists is that God cannot be conceived of as non-existent.

However, John has a point that, ultimately, according to the scientific worldview, biology and chemistry ultimately have to be reducible to physics, and hence to quantification and mathematical description. — Agustino

But I've just given an example of a fundamental theory, which is a theory of abstractions and emergence, that cannot be reduced - the hallmark of a FUNDAMENTAL theory.

I suspect that all fundamental theories of emergent properties of reality may be irreducible: theories of life, computation, information, knowledge, probability, ...

Reductionism has been an extremely successful method in physics (and science in general), and may indeed lead us to a "Theory of Everything", but we effectively already have that. There is no known phenomenon, despite the attempts of the LHC, that renders our physical theories problematic in any way. I am not aware of any research program trying to reduce Life to the Standard Model!

So, it seems to me that the claim that the "scientific world-view" is *essentially* reductionist, is a misrepresentation. There are just too many interesting autonomous emergent phenomena to explain!

Going a little beyond the "scientific world-view", to what I've just decided to call the "rational world-view", I'm not convinced that, given two theories which are logically related, it is logically possible to infer which one determines the other. Why can't the laws of biology determine the laws of physics?

There's also conceptual problems regarding how something that is uncaused can even be conceived to begin with. — Agustino

The Free Will Theorem falsifies the Principle of Sufficient Reason. The behaviour of the particles has no cause.

But I've just given an example of a fundamental theory, which is a theory of abstractions and emergence, that cannot be reduced - the hallmark of a FUNDAMENTAL theory — tom

It cannot yet be reduced, but according to the scientific worldview it is in principle reducible.

Why can't the laws of biology determine the laws of physics? — tom

Because physics studies the building blocks of the world. Physics was there before biology, and physics gave rise to biology. Thus causality must go from physics towards biology, not the other way around. Something that isn't in the cause cannot be in the effect.

The Free Will Theorem falsifies the Principle of Sufficient Reason. The behaviour of the particles has no cause. — tom

No it doesn't. You're making the same mistake of assuming that a cause has to be deterministic to be a cause at all. But what about non-deterministic causes? Are they not also causes? Is it not part of the particle's nature, and the nature of our measurements, that their behaviour cannot be predicted deterministically?

I should add that nothing in physics could ever falsify a metaphysical principle. Metaphysics is simply what has to be the case for ANY kind of physics to even be possible/coherent.

This doesn't follow because engineering isn't in the business of enhancing the material well-being of people. — Agustino

You are conflating its proper purpose with how it is actually (instrumentally) employed in most cases. My suggestion is that enhancing the material well-being of all people is the ideal for which all engineers should strive, from an ethical standpoint.

I spoke of pragmatic not necessarily in the philosophical sense, but in the practical one. — Agustino

I understood that - hence the smiley in my response.

You are conflating its proper purpose with how it is actually (instrumentally) employed in most cases. My suggestion is that enhancing the material well-being of all people is the ideal for which all engineers should strive, from an ethical standpoint. — aletheist

There is no question of purpose here. There is a question of what is its final cause - what is it directed towards. The question isn't what SHOULD it be directed towards, but what is it actually directed towards, in both the ethical and the unethical cases? Final causality is objective, not subjective.

You have diverted this into a side issue about Aristotle's understanding of causation. I never claimed that modern science's understanding of causation is the same as Aristotle's, so you're really not arguing with me, but with yourself.

The idea of efficient causation (and material cause) is the idea of 'how' it is concerned with the mechanisms of change. The ideas of formal and final cause are ideas of 'why'. Modern science does not concern itself with those kinds of questions, for modern science there is no 'why' in nature.

The ideas of formal and final cause are ideas of 'why'. Modern science does not concern itself with those kinds of questions, for modern science there is no 'why' in nature. — John

Wrong. Formal cause is still "how". The atom's structure is its formal cause, and it is part of the how with regards to radioactive decay. Your notions are very muddled up, as I've said before.

I took you to be referring to biological evolution.

You have diverted this into a side issue about Aristotle's understanding of causation. I never claimed that modern science's understanding of causation is the same as Aristotle's, so you're really not arguing with me, but with yourself. — John

Have you forgotten you wrote this?

The natural sciences and engineering are mostly modeled in terms of mechanistic (or in Aristotelian terms, efficient causation). — John

So science mostly models in terms of mechanistic [causes] (or in Aristotelian terms, efficient causation). This sentence means and implies that mechanistic [causes] = Aristotelian efficient causation

It cannot yet be reduced, but according to the scientific worldview it is in principle reducible. — Agustino

You claim that an abstract replicator will be reduced to the Standard Model, or perhaps String Theory given enough time. If that were possible in principle, it should be possible now to give an in-principle argument of how that reduction can be achieved. One thing is for sure - no new knowledge of fundamental particles is going to affect the argument in any way.

So how do you reduce a theory of abstract replicators undergoing variation and selection to a physical theory?

According to the "scientific world-view" (neo-)Darwinism is a fundamental theory with applications to Life, Culture and Quantum Mechanics.

Because physics studies the building blocks of the world. Physics was there before biology, and physics gave rise to biology. Thus causality must go from physics towards biology, not the other way around. Something that isn't in the cause cannot be in the effect. — Agustino

But there is no notion of causality in fundamental physics. Given the state of the universe at any time, the state at any other time may be calculated. Now, is as good as the Big-Bang for determining the past or the future.

But there is no notion of causality in fundamental physics. — tom

That's because you, like other physicists, are using muddled up notions of causality. I've explained for example, how radioactive decay, a phenomenon widely taken to be uncaused in physics is actually caused, and can be explained and understood perfectly by Aristotle's fourfold causality metaphysics.

So how do you reduce a theory of abstract replicators undergoing variation and selection to a physical theory? — tom

Ask a scientist.

According to the "scientific world-view" (neo-)Darwinism is a fundamental theory with applications to Life, Culture and Quantum Mechanics. — tom

Not according to Lawrence Krauss - for example.

Wrong. Formal cause is still "how". The atom's structure is its formal cause, and it is part of the how with regards to radioactive decay. Your notions are very muddled up, as I've said before. — Agustino

But spin 1 bosons, with no internal structure, exhibit uncaused interactions.

No it just means that modern people sometimes use the Aristotelian term (or more accurately the modern English translation of the Aristotelian term) when referring to physical causation general.

In other words you're misinterpreting what was intended by what I wrote and insisting upon your own interpretation as if you think you know better than I do what I meant; which is annoying to say the least. I'm not interested in discussing issues that you have fabricated and then insist on attributing to me; why would I? It seems just a waste of time.

But spin 1 bosons, with no internal structure, exhibit uncaused interactions. — tom

Give a specific example.

In other words you're misinterpreting what was intended by what I wrote and insisting upon your own interpretation as if you think you know better than I do what I meant; which is annoying to say the least. I'm not interested in discussing issues that you have fabricated and then insist on attributing to me; why would I? It seems just a waste of time. — John

Maybe you intended something different than you wrote, or maybe I don't know how to understand English expressions - doesn't really matter to be honest. Stop complaining so much :P

Atomic structure is probably better thought of as a material cause because it is understood to determine the different kinds of material or elements. But this is obviously beyond anything Aristotle intended, because he didn't entertain any modern microphysical conceptions. The ways form and material are now thought about is very different than the ancient ways and are still extremely equivocal. This one point could lead to an extensive and very ambivalent inquiry which would be way beyond the scope of the OP.

The salient point is that modern science does not concern itself with 'why'.

Atomic structure is probably better thought of as a material cause because it is understood to determine the different kinds of material or elements. — John

If atomic structure is the material cause, then what is the formal cause? Material cause is the raw element something is made of. Formal cause is the structure of the raw element, its form.

At bottom there does not seem to be any coherent and unequivocal distinction between form and matter. But, again, this question has really nothing to do with the OP.

Being uncaused means more than randomness — tom

It all depends on what you mean by 'random' I suppose. From Wikipedia:
Radioactive decay is a stochastic (i.e. random) process at the level of single atoms, in that, according to quantum theory, it is impossible to predict when a particular atom will decay,

At bottom there does not seem to be any coherent and unequivocal distinction between form and matter. — John

I think there is. In Plato/Aristotle, matter is the raw underlying material, and form is its structure, whether this structure is given by its shape, etc. So for an atom, the constituent parts - the protons, neutrons and electrons are its material cause (and each of these particles have certain properties which influence the behaviour of the atom, such as charge). Then there is the formal cause - the form of the atom - which are all the properties given by the specific association and number of protons/electrons/neutrons - which are the properties of the different substances, etc.

But, as far as I know, (and I don't know that much about quantum physics) the "particles" themselves are today considered to be energetic configurations (i.e. forms) of a field. Anyway it seems to me that there is no unambiguous way of talking about the relation between form, force and matter at fundamental levels. If you are sufficiently interested, why not start a thread and ask the question of those who are more physics-literate?

For example earlier you said this:

This is again false. The behaviour of gas isn't understood in atomistic ways, but rather the gas laws are statistic. Again you impose your own prejudices of the way science functions. — Agustino

which may be true enough from one perspective. But then how is the pressure of a gas in a container and the force it exerts on the container generally modeled? In terms of movements of particles, no?

But, as far as I know, (and I don't know that much about quantum physics) the "particles" themselves are today considered to be energetic configurations (i.e. forms) of a field. — John

Yes but in reference to different things. For example, in reference to radioactive decay, since the atom is the main actor, we take the constituents of the atom as material cause, and their structure as the formal cause. If we take the proton as main actor, instead of the atom, and talk about the proton and its behaviour, then we take the material cause as the up up down quarks and the formal cause as their structure/relationship with each other. It's all with regard to how deep the explanation needs to go. To explain radioactive decay for example, the fact that protons are made up of quarks is irrelevant. So protons can be treated as fundamentals for the purposes of such an explanation. Of course if one wants to be really exact and detailed, they would treat quarks, bosons and so forth as fundamentals and go with everything up from there. But such an analysis isn't required for an explanation, the same way that the genetic mechanism isn't required to explain evolution. The idea of evolution can be explained merely through the idea of inheritance, and natural selection.

But then how is the pressure of a gas in a container and the force it exerts on the container generally modeled? In terms of movements of particles, no? — John

Yes and no. The theory behind it is modelled as particles, but the behaviour of each individual particle isn't used to determine the behaviour of the whole gas. So the behaviour of the whole gas isn't mathematically modelled in terms of the behaviour of each individual particle. Rather the behaviour of the whole gas is determined with reference to temperature, volume, pressure, number of molecules and universal gas constant. So the behaviour of the gas in terms of particles isn't actually tractable. It's only the statistic behaviour of gas, as all the particles combined, that is tractable and modelled.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gas_laws

All these particle models assume conservation of kinetic energy (elastic collisions), conservation of momentum and transfer of forces along the line of impact. So the behaviour of gas that we know statistically is taken for granted to emerge out of the behaviour of the particles assuming those assumptions I listed. Recently in fact I've been playing around with some programming to model Brownian motion, and the assumptions used in that particle model are basically the same (so my program can model gas, just as well as Brownian motion - all that one has to do is keep the particles the same size/mass).

All that's fine, as far as it goes. But in science these days the dominant paradigm says that ultimately biology and geology, for example, are reducible to organic and inorganic chemistry which are reducible to physics. For example heat, friction, erosion and even growth, metabolism and digestion are all understand to consist, ultimately, in actions by particles on other particles. Certainly coherency of whole theories can be eroded by reduction to mechanistic explanations of action on micro-physical levels, but I think it's fair to say that it is generally presumed to be the case by modern scientists that macro processes are ultimately and exhaustively constituted by energetic, efficient microphysical processes, even if observable macrolevel interactions, for example fluctuations of animal populations in some ecosystem, cannot be coherently modeled in those terms

So the behaviour of the whole gas isn't mathematically modelled in terms of the behaviour of each individual particle. — Agustino

This is irrelevant because I never said it was. It is obviously modeled as the energetic interactions of all the particles, including the interactions of the gas particles with the particles that make up the container.

The point is it is understood in terms of energy, in terms of the directly efficient effects of particles upon one another. What is (purportedly) being understood is the mechanism of the effect of pressure the gas exerts on the container.

This is irrelevant because I never said it was. It is obviously modeled as the energetic interactions of all the particles, including the interactions of the gas particles with the particles that make up the container. — John

The gas laws model the behaviour of the gas as a whole. To model it as composed of particles is to be able to take into account what each particle does and what effect those actions have. But this is precisely what isn't done. Furthermore, interaction with the walls of the container is assumed to be equivalent to interaction with other particles (except that the wall is given infinite mass - so effectively the particle that hits the wall is deflected at the opposite angle it hits at, at the same velocity it hit - this wouldn't be the case with a particle hitting another particle, because then there would be transfer of velocities across the line of impact, taking into account the masses of the two particles). Same assumptions as I said in my previous comment.

However, it is difficult to go from individual particles to pressure for example. Pressure is something that arises out of the behaviour of all the particles together, not of one single particle. Technically and theoretically this is equivalent to adding effects from each individual particle, but this has never been tested :P Furthermore, the ideal gas law applies to all gases (or so they say), regardless of the particles which make up the gas. So theoretically, two gases which have different particles which compose them, but have the same number of particles, will behave the same. Practically obviously they don't, because some of the gases have more massive particles for example, and thus behave differently in the same conditions. (but the differences are slight)

Certainly coherency of whole theories can be eroded by reduction to mechanistic explanations of action on micro-physical levels, but I think it's fair to say that it is generally presumed to be the case by modern scientists that macro processes are ultimately and exhaustively constituted by energetic, efficient microphysical processes, even if observable macrolevel interactions, for example fluctuations of animal populations in some ecosystem, cannot be coherently modeled in those terms — John

True, but what I mean to say is that this "detailed analysis" is never actually done. It's always presupposed that it is possible to do it though. It's presupposed that it's possible to go from physics and develop out of it the whole of chemistry/biology and everything else. And there are reasons for holding onto such presuppositions, but they're never actually tested.

Again you're not disagreeing with what I said because I didn't claim that all the interactions of all the individual particles could be modeled. Obviously they cannot. But the behavior of the gas is understood to be the result of the interactions of the particles that constitute it.