Philosophy ends when science establishes the facts. This has been the case since the time when science got a reliable method. Therefore, I do not include the philosophy of the past in my demarcation criteria. Aristotle is not Wittgenstein. — David Mo

This, again, assumes a scientific method, and no one so far has demonstrated there is one -- as far as I can tell. I'd be happy to be proven wrong.

Aristotle certainly is not Wittgenstein. The "philosophy of the past" has to be included in anything we discuss about philosophy. I see no way around it. To this day we're in the shadow of Aristotle -- including Wittgenstein. If we forget or disregard the "tradition," the development of Western thought, then we run into many risks indeed. And again, the best scientists are the ones who engage with this thought.

On spirituality: it is a vague word. It sounds like religion without god. I don't include spirituality as a kind of philosophy. — David Mo

"Religion" and "spirituality" are older than philosophy, certainly. But philosophy deals with the same questions. It's not always easy to decipher one from the other. Rather than defining things any way we like, it seems as if we know the difference when we see it in specific cases.

Maybe we simply have to say "So much the worse for definitions," and leave it to intuition and specific situations.
— Xtrix

You can't avoid definitions. If you don't make them explicit, they will work in the background. And this is a source of pseudo-problems. — David Mo

It depends on what you mean. In explicit, theoretical understanding -- that's certainly true. In everyday life, it's certainly not the case that definitions "work in the background" -- or if they do, it's exceptional.

Philosophy is the study of reality, knowledge, existence, beauty, and goodness, and most anything else, to the extent that can be achieved by thinking about them, sometimes really hard.

But insofar as "science" presupposes "being", "the science of being", at best, begs the question, no? — 180 Proof

Good point -- it does indeed. Why? Because before we even "do" philosophy or science, we're in a world, we exist in a world, and with a pre-theoretical understanding of ourselves (and everything else that exists). Since it's from here which we start to philosophize, it is a sort of turning on itself.

That's foundationalism, which is far from uncontroversial. — Pfhorrest

Foundationalism concerns knowledge, yes, which has a long history in epistemology. I'm not concerned with epistemology.

As I said, you can instead -- as critical rationalism would have it -- start with a survey of possibilities, reduce to absurdity some of them, and then proceed from whatever is left. — Pfhorrest

You're still starting as a human being interested in these questions, yes? So whether you start inductively or deductively doesn't much matter to me. Both presuppose a human being making an inquiry or attempting to understand the world somehow. Whether or not that's "belief" or "faith" is questionable perhaps, but in any case it's a given. We can challenge whether or not we exist, of course, but I've always considered that an absurdity.

Just believing something yourself without adequate reason isn’t faith. To quote myself elsewhere:

I also don't mean just holding some opinion "on faith", as in without sufficient reason; I don't think you need reasons simply to hold an opinion yourself. I am only against appeals to faith, by which I mean I am against assertions — statements not merely to the effect that one is of some opinion oneself, but that it is the correct opinion, that everyone should adopt — that are made arbitrarily; not for any reason, not "because of..." anything, but "just because"; assertions that some claim is true because it just is, with no further justification to back that claim up. — Pfhorrest

That's a little more specific, and I happen to agree with it. I don't see why the term need apply only to factual statements. In my tentative semantics, "faith" is belief without evidence (or reason), whether personal opinions or universal prescriptions. Hence a little more general, and in that case, having "faith" in the airplane pilot or a belief that human beings are essentially "good" are matters of faith.

As for Buddhism -- no Buddhist, that I'm aware of, asks you to accept the "wisdom of Siddhartha" on faith. Quite the opposite.
— Xtrix

I am not aware of any Buddhist arguing for Buddhist principles in a way meant to convince someone who doesn’t already believe them. It’s all meant to be taken as self-evident wisdom that just needed someone wise enough to point it out, and now that it’s been pointed out, you’ve just got to either accept it and find peace or go on suffering in your miserable unenlightened life. — Pfhorrest

That's not what Buddhists argue at all -- if they ever do argue. The 4 Noble Truths, for example, are indeed seen as "truths," but nowhere does Buddha or Buddha's adherents ever ask one to accept them on faith. Rather, you can see for yourself through meditation, which is experiential. You can accept or reject it on this basis alone.

The Buddhist ideas (in some traditions) of reincarnation really have nothing to do with the supernatural, any more than a cloud becoming rain is supernatural.
— Xtrix

The idea of any kind of self surviving death to live another miserable life of suffering is sort of a key motivating factor in Buddhism — Pfhorrest

Not "any kind of self." Buddhists don't believe your individual personality survives after death. They do believe in continuation and transformation, as a cloud to rain or a dead leaf into soil, etc. At least in the variations I'm familiar with. I know in parts of Thailand they practically worship Buddha as a god, his statues are everywhere, and so maybe you can find beliefs in an afterlife there -- but from what I've read in the Sutras, Buddha himself never discusses the 'self' surviving or anything spooky like that. In fact, non-self is a basic tenant (anatta).

I like all of that very much. So by "kind of medicine" you mean in the sense of what's indicated in those passages. In that case, that's surely true.

We have to be careful, though, not to equate philosophy with some kind of therapy. In some cases, philosophical thought aims simply at understanding the world or an aspect of the world, like a hammer or a tree, without any real thought of morality or health per se. It still comes out of the human mind, with a human desire to understand, but that's still very different from questions regarding a good or healthy or happy life.

They are not the same worlds but opposite worlds. — David Mo

I don't see why "opposite." They're just different. Not all differences are opposites.

This consciousness you speak of is nothing more than an abstraction.
So reason may be imperfect, but it's what we have and we should resign ourselves to it. Polishing it, perfecting it, handling it, but not inventing alternatives that are more lying than reason itself. — David Mo

On the contrary, it is consciousness that we have, if we mean by this our lived world -- our experiences, our being -- and reason in the sense of concepts, categories, words, and logic that is far more often "lying." If consciousness is an abstraction, so is reason itself.

When we're being the rational animal, we're leaving out how we mostly function in the world. It's like saying "thought" is only abstract thought. That's not the type of "thought" that goes through our heads 99% of the time when we're talking to ourselves and visualizing fragments of images. Likewise rationality, or reason, is one faculty of the human being -- and a very important one. But I think we should let go of seeing the human being as simply the animal with reason, especially if by reason we mean the above aspects.

I agree that the real (i.e. MEon, or other-than-being) is fundamental, not as an object of "science" (i.e. academic) but as the immanent horizon, or enabling-constraint, of struggle (i.e. existential). — 180 Proof

I think I agree with this, although I have no way of completely understanding your terminology here until it's further explained. Yes, "being" and "reality" I too would argue are not simply objects of science -- they're what we philosophize out of and about. In that case, being is a given.

It's the activity of interpreting being through theories and concepts.
Okay, better - "being" as presupposed by "theories and concepts" (Collingwood? Spinoza?) — 180 Proof

Glad you approve. :) Yes, being is presupposed -- it's what's thought and questioned.

or

"Philosophy is universal phenomenological ontology."

Agree? Disagree? Incoherent?

Incoherent. Seems (implicitly) 'epistemically anthropocentric', or idealist-essentialist (re: hypostatization). — 180 Proof

This one is harder, yes. It depends in this case on what I mean by "phenomenology" first and foremost. Phenomenology is a method, in this case the method for the science of being (ontology). The "universal" here indicates not some being (as in a particular being) or some group or class of beings (entities) like trees, dogs, planets, nature, beauty, mathematics -- but rather being itself.

Suffering of the soul is caused by believing lies. The task then of philosophy is to determine a process by which lies can be distinguished from truth. Admittedly no easy task. — A Seagull

Yes, indeed, no easy task! And not only for philosophy: Nearly all great literature grapples with the suffering of the human soul: Dostoevsky, Camus, Aeschylus, Sophocles, Shakespeare, Tolstoy.

Music, too, in very profound ways: J. S. Bach, Mahler, Beethoven, Shostakovitch, Gorecki, et al.

And the visual arts so powerfully: Munch, Picasso, Cimabue, Van Gogh, Kahlo, Grünewald, Goya.

Though many of these works may deal directly with believing lies, it strikes me that the cause(s) of human suffering may not be fully and adequately incorporated in the narrow concept of 'believing lies.'

We have to be careful, though, not to equate philosophy with some kind of therapy. — Xtrix

Yes, I agree, and in so doing reiterate what Martha Nussbaum said: “Like medicine, philosophy to them was a rigorous science aimed both at understanding and at producing the flourishing of human life.”

It seems to me that, like medicine, philosophy (at its best) is “a rigorous science”, and, like medicine, a practice that aims at “producing the flourishing of human life.”

I would add that, just as medicine has many roles, many ways to practice -- GPs, surgeons, researchers, etc. -- so does philosophy. Thanks much. I appreciate it.

Since we have gotten on to the relationship of philosophy to science, I may as well go ahead and post what was going to be the OP of the third thread in that series I was going to do: Philosophy is not Science:

What we today call "science" was once considered a sub-field of philosophy, "natural philosophy". This had been the case for thousands of years since at least the time of Aristotle, such that even Issac Newton's seminal work on physics, often considered the capstone of the Scientific Revolution, was titled "Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy". But increasingly since then, what was once considered a sub-field of philosophy is now considered separate from it. What remains still as philosophy is demarcated from science in that while philosophy relies only upon reason or evidence to reach its conclusions, rather than appeals to faith, as an activity it does not appeal to empirical observation either, even though within philosophy one may conclude that empirical observation is the correct way to reach conclusions about reality. It is precisely when one transitions from using empirical observation to support some conclusion, to reasoning about why or whether something like empirical observation (or faith, or so on) is the correct thing to appeal to at all, that one transitions from doing science to doing philosophy.

Foundationalism concerns knowledge, yes, which has a long history in epistemology. I'm not concerned with epistemology. — Xtrix

You're taking epistemological positions for granted, though.

So whether you start inductively or deductively doesn't much matter to me. — Xtrix

I'm not talking about induction at all. I'm talking about critical rationalism vs justificationism.

In my tentative semantics, "faith" is belief without evidence (or reason), whether personal opinions or universal prescriptions. Hence a little more general, and in that case, having "faith" in the airplane pilot or a belief that human beings are essentially "good" are matters of faith. — Xtrix

That then leaves no specificity to distinguish between faith in the sense I mean it and non-faith, unless you want to invent a word for the narrower thing I'm talking about. In my terminology I call the broader position you're talking about "liberalism" (as in feel free to hold an opinion without justification from the ground up, at least until it can be shown wrong, in a critical-rationalist way), and the narrower position I'm talking about "fideism" (hold some opinions beyond question).

That's not what Buddhists argue at all -- if they ever do argue. — Xtrix

That's my point. The principles are not argued for. They're just asserted. No reason to adopt them is given.

Not "any kind of self." Buddhists don't believe your individual personality survives after death. They do believe in continuation and transformation, as a cloud to rain or a dead leaf into soil, etc. At least in the variations I'm familiar with. I know in parts of Thailand they practically worship Buddha as a god, his statues are everywhere, and so maybe you can find beliefs in an afterlife there -- but from what I've read in the Sutras, Buddha himself never discusses the 'self' surviving or anything spooky like that. In fact, non-self is a basic tenant (anatta). — Xtrix

Anatta is the cure to samsara. If there was no samsara to worry about, there would be no need for a special path to anatta: everyone would get there inevitably when they died. If it were not thought possible to maintain some (however false) sense of self through the cycle of death and rebirth, and so to continue suffering beyond death, then the way to end suffering would be simple: just die. It's only against that background presumption of samsara that Buddhism makes any sense.

(I find it kind of tragically humorous, actually, that what was surely originally an assuaging religious belief, that life continues even after death, then became a source of further anxiety -- not even death offers release from suffering -- that further religious innovation needed to assuage. It reminds me of people who are afraid to live forever, because the boredom and existential ennui would be hell, and the consequent supposition that to people who've spent too long in heaven, actual death in the cease-to-exist sense would be a welcome release).

What remains still as philosophy is demarcated from science in that while philosophy relies only upon reason or evidence to reach its conclusions, rather than appeals to faith, as an activity it does not appeal to empirical observation either, even though within philosophy one may conclude that empirical observation is the correct way to reach conclusions about reality. — Pfhorrest

Philosophy doesn't appeal to empirical observation? What would be considered "evidence" in that case?

I just don't think it's this straightforward. If we decide we want to define philosophy in his way, I fail to see the motivation for it. You're quite right that science was natural philosophy, with "nature" as physics, and physics as a variation of the res extensa- substance that's extended in space. I don't see much reason for so rigidly separating the two, despite claims of a special method. It betrays a reaction to Christianity and has hints of scientism.

You're taking epistemological positions for granted, though. — Pfhorrest

In the context of the meaning of being (which I argue is what philosophy thinks). But in that case the nature of ἐπιστήμη is not being used in the sense you're using it, nor is "truth."

Anatta is the cure to samsara. If there was no samsara to worry about, there would be no need for a special path to anatta: everyone would get there inevitably when they died. If it were not thought possible to maintain some (however false) sense of self through the cycle of death and rebirth, and so to continue suffering beyond death, then the way to end suffering would be simple: just die. It's only against that background presumption of samsara that Buddhism makes any sense. — Pfhorrest

That's just not true. It's against the background of dukkha that Buddhism makes sense. It's clear in the teaching: there is suffering. This is the very first noble truth. The way out of suffering is the eightfold path, which is based around vipassana meditation (panja) and sila (ethical conduct). Whether or not there's an afterlife isn't relevant. Rather if you want to be happy, do this.

As an intensively reflective exercise, I practice philosophy more as a martial art (or public health regimen) than as a medicinal / psychological therapy (pace Nussbaum).

Yes, "being" and "reality" I too would argue are not simply objects of science -- they're what we philosophize out of and about. In that case, being is a given. — Xtrix

That's like saying light is "what we gaze upon or look for". I don't think so. Rather: we see, as Plato might say, by light - by seeing, so to speak - which is not "given", not "seen" as such.

Yes, being is presupposed -- it's what's thought and questioned.

By "presupposed" I understand, instead, conditions, or ontic commitments, which must obtain for 'thoughts and questions' to make sense, and not "what's thought and questioned" itself. Being is not a supposition - answer to the question "what is real?" (caveat: Heideggerian "what is" is a gnomic sentence-fragment, and not a question).

Philosophy doesn't appeal to empirical observation? What would be considered "evidence" in that case? — Xtrix

A priori argument.

I just don't think it's this straightforward. If we decide we want to define philosophy in his way, I fail to see the motivation for it. You're quite right that science was natural philosophy, with "nature" as physics, and physics as a variation of the res extensa- substance that's extended in space. I don't see much reason for so rigidly separating the two, despite claims of a special method. It betrays a reaction to Christianity and has hints of scientism. — Xtrix

I am firmly against scientism.

In the context of the meaning of being (which I argue is what philosophy thinks). But in that case the nature of ἐπιστήμη is not being used in the sense you're using it, nor is "truth." — Xtrix

No, in the context of whether all philosophy starts with assumed axioms.

Whether or not there's an afterlife isn't relevant. — Xtrix

We’re not talking about an afterlife, but about continuing in more of the same kind of life again. If all of one’s conscious existence ceased permanently at death, that would guarantee an end to dukkha. It’s only against the prospect of that going on indefinitely that any special escape is needed.

Though many of these works may deal directly with believing lies, it strikes me that the cause(s) of human suffering may not be fully and adequately incorporated in the narrow concept of 'believing lies.' — Statilius

Yes it may be a bit of a simplification.

I just think back to times long ago, when people lived in small tribes of hunter-gatherers. I imagine that people in those times did not experience suffering of the soul, albeit they would have experienced hardship of the body. I imagine they would not have suffered angst over strictures that they 'should' do this and 'should not' do that. Simpler times for the soul.

This, again, assumes a scientific method, and no one so far has demonstrated there is one -- as far as I can tell. — Xtrix

That there are various scientific methods according to the various sciences and that they are the best way to present evidence about facts seems to me unquestionable. If you know of another method, I can reconsider my position.

To this day we're in the shadow of Aristotle — Xtrix

You don't say. Did Wittgenstein believe in prime mover and prima materia? First news.
You're exaggerating a little.

In everyday life, it's certainly not the case that definitions "work in the background" -- or if they do, it's exceptional. — Xtrix

The definition is only the use of the word. You may be aware of how you use it or not, but you cannot stop using it one way or another. That is its meaning.

I don't see why "opposite." They're just different. — Xtrix

Well, didn't you say they were the same? Are they the same or are they different? Because the same and different are opposites. Or aren't they?

On the contrary, it is consciousness that we have, if we mean by this our lived world -- our experiences, our being — Xtrix

You put a lot of things into your concept of consciousness. It is not the same to have perceptions as to capture the 'I'. Among other things because you do not grasp your "self" in the same way that you perceive a phenomenon. What is an empty abstraction is not the concept of consciousness, but the way you use it. It does not refer to anything concrete. The opposition between reason and consciousness that you make is meaningless.

For the rest, it would be good for you to distinguish between discursive reason and reason. In your daily life you are constantly using reason. Even when you perceive things. You evaluate, compare, remember, draw conclusions... Making syllogisms is another thing. Of course.

Philosophy is the study of reality, knowledge, existence, beauty, and goodness, — Ciceronianus the White

All these things can be studied from other branches of knowledge that are not philosophy. What makes them different from philosophy?

Philosophy is wisdom of familiar(object, subject), or 'relative wisdom'. A Philosophy of Mind topic may be 'do we register information in packets or is the sense of an object of one dimension?' This is also a scientific question; philosophy also associates to it the things that don't fit with our model.

A Philosophy of Mind topic may be 'do we register information in packets or is the sense of an object of one dimension?' — remoku

In my opinion that's a subject for psychology, not philosophy. In any case, if it had a philosophical dimension, it would have to take into account the data provided by psychology.

All these things can be studied from other branches of knowledge that are not philosophy. What makes them different from philosophy? — David Mo

Unlike other branches of knowledge, philosophy purports to study them, and even to know them or something about them, by thinking alone; from the armchair, as it were (ex cathedra, literally). Not many branches of knowledge can make such a...boast?

I just think back to times long ago, when people lived in small tribes of hunter-gatherers. I imagine that people in those times did not experience suffering of the soul, albeit they would have experienced hardship of the body. I imagine they would not have suffered angst over strictures that they 'should' do this and 'should not' do that. Simpler times for the soul. — A Seagull

Thank you; I appreciate your comments.

I've been thinking about this comment and what you said earlier: “Suffering of the soul is caused by believing lies. The task then of philosophy is to determine a process by which lies can be distinguished from truth.Admittedly no easy task.” And, as I thought about both of your comments, I began to warm to the idea; I began to consider in my mind: What if this were true? What would follow from it? Perhaps there is something deeper here than I first saw? So I think I would like to start a discussion on just this topic. I think it could be fruitful. Would you be OK with that? --Best, Statilius

Philosophy is the study of reality, knowledge, existence, beauty, and goodness,
— Ciceronianus the White

All these things can be studied from other branches of knowledge that are not philosophy. What makes them different from philosophy? — David Mo

Well, what makes object-discourse different from meta-discourse? suppositions different from presuppositions? judgments different from criteria? knowing different from understanding? :chin:

So I think I would like to start a discussion on just this topic. I think it could be fruitful. Would you be OK with that? --Best, Statilius — Statilius

Yes of course. I would be happy to discuss it, I would be interested to know what others think on the topic.

Interested in hearing various interpretations. — Xtrix

- What is philosophy? There are several minds, which when considering themselves "certainties" take for themselves as fact that philosophy is neither formulas nor processes. And really, no, it is more than that, it is much more than any other concept or conviction, it is transcendental in its own idea. Philosophy is not something palpable, something to be bought or used on a daily basis, something mundane or inflationary, and for these and other reasons it is more tasty in the eyes of those who have never tasted it. For this reason, the only way that was “found” to project it to the world was through thoughts, questions, ideas, concepts, senses. However, there will always be those who intend to give it a body, a physical existence - seeking to limit it - through ways of formulating it. There is no such thing - and how could there be such a thing! -. Philosophy is not something logical - it can be used by logic, however, it does not arise from logical reasoning itself -, it is not something that could be built and placed in a physical encasement. Philosophy is nothing but the tired look of the ego that says: - Enough! To all the opinions of others, and that decides to build her own language, her precious and unique language so that it can understand itself in this way .... It is an incessant search for the answer to the whole, which in the end, always returns to the starting point . Itself. - What is philosophy? The simplest answer? - The question itself.

I like this response but found that the conclusion was as innaccurate as all of us. It is hard - you are forgiven.

I have theorized that the phenomena most relative to the universe are problems.

The universe is a problem; doesn't expansion mean that it is over flowing? If you can contest me here my premise is false in the following conclusion...

Philosophy is universe-familliar-sense. As a relative of the universe we think 'aww' about it sometimes. I have called it 'relative wisdom'. Questions have relative answers, "are you happy?", "yes", 'yes' equals some process that is relative. "I am happy thus I will stand and say yes" for ex.

Fourth post that was going to be in that series: Philosophy is not just Ethics

Given the previous account of how philosophy is neither religion, sophistry, nor science, one may be tempted to conclude that this means philosophy is entirely about prescriptive matters, rather than descriptive ones; that philosophy is all about using reason alone, without appeals to faith, to reach conclusions not about what is or isn't real, but about what one ought or ought not do, or broadly speaking, about morality. In other words, that philosophy is equivalent to the field of ethics. But philosophy does treat other topics concerning not just morality but also reality, at least the topics of how to go about an investigation of what is real. And while ethics is currently considered soundly within the field of philosophy, I contend that it properly should not be, for I hold that there are analogues to the physical sciences, what we might call the ethical sciences, that I consider to be outside the domain of philosophy, in that they appeal to specific, contingent hedonic experiences in the same way the physical sciences appeal to specific, contingent empirical experiences. I hold that philosophy bears the same kind of relation to both the physical and the ethical sciences, providing the justification for each to appeal to their respective kinds of a posteriori experiences, while never itself appealing to either of them, instead dealing entirely with a priori reasoning.