by thinking alone; from the armchair, as it were (ex cathedra, literally). — Ciceronianus the White

This is very confusing. "Thinking alone", "armchair"... You mean philosophy doesn't do experiments? This would differentiate philosophy from the natural sciences, but not from many other branches of knowledge. Pure mathematics, for example.

Well, what makes object-discourse different from meta-discourse? suppositions different from presuppositions? judgments different from criteria? knowing different from understanding? :chin: — 180 Proof

Can you answer your own questions? Some of them are not very clear and I don't like to play riddles. :grin:

This is very confusing. "Thinking alone", "armchair"... You mean philosophy doesn't do experiments? This would differentiate philosophy from the natural sciences, but not from many other branches of knowledge. Pure mathematics, for example. — David Mo

You keep giving me perfect segues to introduce the next would-have-been-OP-of-that-thread-series-I-was-going-to-do, so I may as well quote you and make that clear this time.

Philosophy is not Math

I've previously concluded, following that philosophy is not religion, sophistry, science, or just ethics, that it provides the justification for appeals to a posteriori experiences (whether that means empirical experiences for physical sciences or hedonic experiences for ethical ones) while never itself appealing to either of them, instead dealing entirely with a priori reasoning. That in turn may raise the question of how philosophy is to be demarcated from mathematics, which also deals entirely with a priori logical reasoning without any appeal to a posteriori experience. Indeed in some ancient philosophy, such as that of Pythagoras, mathematics and philosophy bleed together in much the same way that what we now consider the separate field of science once did with philosophy as well. But today there is a clear distinction between them, in that while philosophy and mathematics share much in common in their application of logic, they differ in that mathematical proofs merely show that if certain axioms or definitions are taken as true, then certain conclusions follow, while philosophy both does that and asserts the truth of some axioms or definitions.

So while mathematics says things of the form "if [premise] then [conclusion]", philosophy says things of the form "[premise], therefore [conclusion]". Mathematics explores the abstract relations of ideas to each other without concern for the applicability of any of those ideas to any more practical matters (although applications for them are nevertheless frequently found), but philosophy is directly concerned with the practical application of the abstractions it deals with. It is not enough to merely define axiomatically some concept of "existence", "knowledge", "mind", etc, and validly expound upon the implications of that concept; it also matters if that is the correct, practically applicable concept of "existence", "knowledge", "mind", etc, that is useful for the purposes to which we want to employ that concept.

consider to be outside the domain of philosophy, in that they appeal to specific, contingent hedonic experiences in the same way the physical sciences appeal to specific, contingent empirical experiences. — Pfhorrest

Hedonism is only a theory within ethics. Where do you leave all its opponents?
One's own experiences are very different from scientific ones. These concern inter-communicable experience of external objects. They are or try to be objective. If you restrict philosophy to personal experience this would relegate it to subjective.

They say that it's a love of knowledge, but I suspect it's rather a love of articulation and pontification.

To wonder, to explore, to learn, and to capture that learning in a communicable (or at least memorable) format.

I don't think philosophy needs to be academic, but I think it ought be high quality. (else it's shitty philosophy).

Philosophy is more or less the oftentimes superfluous process of refining our learned understanding of things. How, what, and why depends on your given persuasions...

Hedonism is only a theory within ethics. Where do you leave all its opponents? — David Mo

As not actually philosophy at all, in the end, because they ultimately end up saying there is no way to tell what is good or bad. Leaving room only for religion or else sophistry with regards to ethics, which we have already established are not philosophy.

One's own experiences are very different from scientific ones. These concern inter-communicable experience of external objects. They are or try to be objective. If you restrict philosophy to personal experience this would relegate it to subjective. — David Mo

Objectivity is just the limit of inter-subjectivity. Every scientific observation is just a bunch of people confirming that they too also share that same subjective experience in those same circumstances -- or else figuring out what the differences are between them that account for why some do and some don't.

The same can be done with hedonic experiences.



With regards to opinions about reality, commensurablism boils down to forming initial opinions on the basis that something, loosely speaking, looks true (and not false), and then rejecting that and finding some other opinion to replace it with if someone should come across some circumstance wherein it looks false in some way. And, if two contrary things both look true or false in different ways or to different people or under different circumstances, commensurablism means taking into account all the different ways that things look to different people in different circumstances, and coming up with something new that looks true (and not false) to everyone in every way in every circumstance, at least those that we've considered so far. In the limit, if we could consider absolutely every way that absolutely everything looked to absolutely everyone in absolutely every circumstance, whatever still looked true across all of that would be the objective truth.

In short, the objective truth is the limit of what still seems true upon further and further investigation. We can't ever reach that limit, but that is the direction in which to improve our opinions about reality, towards more and more correct ones. Figuring out what can still be said to look true when more and more of that is accounted for may be increasingly difficult, but that is the task at hand if we care at all about the truth.

This commensurablist approach to reality may be called "critical empirical realism", as realism is the descriptive face of objectivism, empiricism is the descriptive face of phenomenalism, and what I would call a critical-liberal methodology is more commonly called just "critical" as applied to theories of knowledge.


On Morality, Goodness, and Justice

With regards to opinions about morality, commensurablism boils down to forming initial opinions on the basis that something, loosely speaking, feels good (and not bad), and then rejecting that and finding some other opinion to replace it with if someone should come across some circumstance wherein it feels bad in some way. And, if two contrary things both feel good or bad in different ways or to different people or under different circumstances, commensurablism means taking into account all the different ways that things feel to different people in different circumstances, and coming up with something new that feels good (and not bad) to everyone in every way in every circumstance, at least those that we've considered so far. In the limit, if we could consider absolutely every way that absolutely everything felt to absolutely everyone in absolutely every circumstance, whatever still felt good across all of that would be the objective good.

In short, the objective good is the limit of what still seems good upon further and further investigation. We can't ever reach that limit, but that is the direction in which to improve our opinions about morality, toward more and more correct ones. Figuring out what what can still be said to feel good when more and more of that is accounted for may be increasingly difficult, but that is the task at hand if we care at all about the good.

This commensurablist approach to morality may be called "liberal hedonic moralism", as moralism is the prescriptive face of objectivism, hedonism is the prescriptive face of phenomenalism, and what I would call a critical-liberal methodology is more commonly called just "liberal" as applied to theories of justice.
[/quote]

When it comes to tackling questions about reality, pursuing knowledge, we should not take some census or survey of people's beliefs or perceptions, and either try to figure out how all those could all be held at once without conflict, or else (because that likely will not be possible) just declare that whatever the majority, or some privileged authority, believes or perceives is true. Instead, we should appeal to everyone's direct sensations or observations, free from any interpretation into perceptions or beliefs yet, and compare and contrast the empirical experiences of different people in different circumstances to come to a common ground on what experiences there are that need satisfying in order for a belief to be true. Then we should devise models, or theories, that purport to satisfy all those experiences, and test them against further experiences, rejecting those that fail to satisfy any of them, and selecting the simplest, most efficient of those that remain as what we tentatively hold to be true. This entire process should be carried out in an organized, collaborative, but intrinsically non-authoritarian academic structure.

When it comes to tackling questions about morality, pursuing justice, we should not take some census or survey of people's intentions or desires, and either try to figure out how all those could all be held at once without conflict, or else (because that likely will not be possible) just declare that whatever the majority, or some privileged authority, intends or desires is good. Instead, we should appeal to everyone's direct appetites, free from any interpretation into desires or intentions yet, and compare and contrast the hedonic experiences of different people in different circumstances to come to a common ground on what experiences there are that need satisfying in order for an intention to be good. Then we should devise models, or strategies, that purport to satisfy all those experiences, and test them against further experiences, rejecting those that fail to satisfy any of them, and selecting the simplest, most efficient of those that remain as what we tentatively hold to be good. This entire process should be carried out in an organized, collaborative, but intrinsically non-authoritarian political structure.

Philosophy is more or less the oftentimes superfluous process of refining our learned understanding of things. How, what, and why depends on your given persuasions... — VagabondSpectre

That's a simple philosophical opinion. You should argue better to be a reasoned opinion. Because the characteristic of philosophy is that it reasons what it says. Not like in your case, where you just set your opinion down as the only reasonable one.

As not actually philosophy at all, in the end, because they ultimately end up saying there is no way to tell what is good or bad. — Pfhorrest

On the contrary. Different ethical theories think they know what good is, they just don't agree. For example, with hedonism. I don't agree with hedonism either, unless it is reformulated in such a way that it ceases to be evident.
For example: hedonism says that good is pleasure, but what pleasure? As soon as we begin to prioritize types of pleasure, unanimity ends and hedonism begins to resemble stoicism or eudemonism.
I would ask you not to write long paragraphs that I don't understand. It would be better to go in parts, don't you think?

Objectivity is just the limit of inter-subjectivity. Every scientific observation is just a bunch of people confirming that they too also share that same subjective experience i — Pfhorrest

But it is not the same to share an experience of the same phenomenon, as to share the experience of an event that only happens inside my head. The first, as much as there are variations, refers to something that we can designate with the finger. The second is impossible. There is no possibility of showing it with your finger. A big difference.

This commensurablist approach to morality may be called "liberal hedonic moralism", as moralism is the prescriptive face of objectivism, — The Codex Quarentis: Commensurablism

There's a fallacy here. The moral good cannot be elected by a majority like the government. A majority of Nazis will define the supreme Nazi good. A majority of cretins the most cretinous good. Even if the entire human species believed in the same good (????), there is no guarantee that it is the most rational good. So, with no way of knowing what the supreme good is by popular acclamation, there is no way of knowing whether we are approaching it or not. This commensurability stuff is an illusion.

That's a simple philosophical opinion. You should argue better to be a reasoned opinion. Because the characteristic of philosophy is that it reasons what it says. Not like in your case, where you just set your opinion down as the only reasonable one. — David Mo

And why have you not reasoned why philosophy reasons what it says? (I think you mean philosophy employs reason (i.e: it's logical.rational). However, there are lots of philosophies that don't reason what they say (and some that don't even bother trying); if we want to talk quality then we can deal in standards of reason and evidence (whatever your persuasion may be)).

Being reasonable doesn't have much to do with run of the mill "spiritual" and otherwise subjective corners of the philosophical world (I'm looking at you, Theology), so I wouldn't exactly say "reasons what it says" is a necessary characteristic of philosophy.

But is it sufficient? Is anything that reasons what it says therefore under the semantic umbrella of "philosophy"?...

I wonder...

Can an existing and accepted "philosophy" become ex-philosophy should we discover it un-reasoned?

Both of us seem to have a rather subjective definition for what we consider philosophy to be. Is philosophy decidedly not merely stating one's opinion? What about debating opinions? If I show logical inconsistencies or fallacious use of reason in your statements, does that make the discourse philosophical?

That's a simple philosophical opinion. — David Mo

Eh, this is a fallacious appeal to simplicity...

You should argue better to be a reasoned opinion. — David Mo

Why?

Because the characteristic of philosophy is that it reasons what it says. — David Mo

That's circular though isn't it? You should argue good because philosophy is good arguments? Aren't you just appealing to your own definition?

Not like in your case, where you just set your opinion down as the only reasonable one. — David Mo

I didn't actually set my opinion down as the only reasonable opinion :halo:

I specifically used the words "I think" to underline where I invoked opinion, and I'm quite open to being persuaded otherwise.

I went on to invoke quality ("else it's shitty philosophy")....

I even summated with a "more or less"...

Can you at least tell me if it's more or if it's less???

Are we just debating standards and etiquette?

Can philosophy just be a mere series of questions?

However, there are lots of philosophies that don't reason what they say (and some that don't even bother trying); — VagabondSpectre

Could you give some examples? Let's say ten. If there's a lot of them, it should be easy to do. Please give examples of "pontification", as you called it.

They say that it's a love of knowledge, but I suspect it's rather a love of articulation and pontification. — VagabondSpectre

Sorry, I didn't mean simple in a pejorative sense, but not argumentative. Not complex.

About your battery of questions: Which one do you want to start with? Because all at the same time I'm afraid I can't do it. I have my own time limits.

his is very confusing. "Thinking alone", "armchair"... You mean philosophy doesn't do experiments? This would differentiate philosophy from the natural sciences, but not from many other branches of knowledge. Pure mathematics, for example. — David Mo

I gladly acknowledge my ignorance of pure mathematics. Let's say natural sciences, practical mathematics, what we used to call the "social sciences"; any branch of knowledge which has as its subject matter the world in which we live and is based on our interaction with that world as living organisms. How's that?

any branch of knowledge which has as its subject matter the world in which we live and is based on our interaction with that world as living organisms — Ciceronianus the White

And do you think that Sartre's concept of anguish -for example- does not speak of the world and man's relationship to the world? Sartre would not be an "armchair" philosopher?

My response to your reply to Ciceronianus the White consists of rhetorical questions, not "riddles".

And do you think that Sartre's concept of anguish -for example- does not speak of the world and man's relationship to the world? Sartre would not be an "armchair" philosopher? — David Mo

I'm blissfully ignorant of Sartre's concept of anguish, and it is my daily prayer that I will remain so. In what sense does his concept constitute knowledge of the world in which we live, though, and how was it obtained? Those questions would seem to be pertinent.

On the contrary. Different ethical theories think they know what good is, they just don't agree. — David Mo

They say what they think is good, in a way that you either accept or don’t, like a religion. But they don’t provide a way of telling what is good for someone who doesn’t already know, the way that “the scientific method” provides a way of telling what is true for someone who doesn’t already know. Hedonism by itself doesn’t tell you what particular things are good, it just provides a criterion for assessing the goodness of things: does it feel good? Just like empiricism provides a criterion for assessing the truth: does it look true?

But it is not the same to share an experience of the same phenomenon, as to share the experience of an event that only happens inside my head. — David Mo

Nobody’s talking about things that are only in your head. We’re talking about whether we have the same hedonic experience in the same circumstances or not, in exactly the same way that we compare whether we have the same empirical experience in the same circumstances or not.

There's a fallacy here. The moral good cannot be elected by a majority like the government. — David Mo

I explicitly said that same thing in part of the quote you snipped.

Could you give some examples? Let's say ten. If there's a lot of them, it should be easy to do. — David Mo

List of religions and spiritual traditions.

Please give examples of "pontification", as you called it. — David Mo

(the Pope addresses US congress on the topic of Capital Punishment)

From Webster:

In ancient Rome, the pontifices were powerful priests who administered the part of civil law that regulated relationships with the deities recognized by the state. Their name, pontifex, derives from the Latin words pons, meaning "bridge," and facere, meaning "to make," and some think it may have developed because the group was associated with a sacred bridge over the river Tiber (although there is no proof of that). With the rise of Catholicism, the title "pontifex" was transferred to the Pope and to Catholic bishops. Pontificate derives from "pontifex," and in its earliest English uses it referred to things associated with such prelates. By the early 1800s, "pontificate" was also being used derisively for individuals who spoke as if they had the authority of an ecclesiastic.

About your battery of questions: Which one do you want to start with? Because all at the same time I'm afraid I can't do it. I have my own time limits. — David Mo

They're rhetorical questions. They're meant to stand unanswered as devices of persuasion. You need not answer them now, or ever; just thinking about them is enough...

With the rise of Catholicism, the title "pontifex" was transferred to the Pope and to Catholic bishops. — VagabondSpectre

Very sensibly, when the Republic transitioned into the Empire, the Emperors were granted (assumed, really) the title Pontifex Maximus, Highest Priest, thereby obtaining imperium over all those damn pontifices of the traditional Roman religion, not to mention the various priests of other temples and cults throughout the Empire. That title was assumed by the papacy, and so, if I ever have an audience with the Pope, I'll hail him by his true title: Salve, Pontifex Maximus!

https://www.google.com/imgres?imgurl=https%3A%2F%2Fcdn.shopify.com%2Fs%2Ffiles%2F1%2F0938%2F5674%2Fproducts%2Fd6cbba20541fba594eb4a4bf31daf348.jpg%3Fv%3D1475766819&imgrefurl=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.ebay.com%2Fitm%2F415014-France-Medal-Franciscus-Pontifex-Maximus-Religions-beliefs-%2F191989719709&tbnid=IRdLJcZNIwCOfM&vet=12ahUKEwib9pSiqsPpAhXFdK0KHdJBCdMQMygIegUIARCLAg..i&docid=mSTyPILTyuAiKM&w=1024&h=1024&q=pope%20pontifex%20maximus&ved=2ahUKEwib9pSiqsPpAhXFdK0KHdJBCdMQMygIegUIARCLAg

A face that only a Heavenly Father could love:

That's like saying light is "what we gaze upon or look for". I don't think so. Rather: we see, as Plato might say, by light - by seeing, so to speak - which is not "given", not "seen" as such. — 180 Proof

It's not what we gaze upon or look for per se, because it's often in the background -- but it can be understood, hence why we have a concept of "light." As an analogy, light is the basis on which anything becomes visible. It's against this background, often overlooked and never itself seen as light, that we're able to make out anything visible at all.

The analogy fails in the this respect: light, unlike being, is not a given -- some people are blind. It is, however, a given for anything visible.

Yes, being is presupposed -- it's what's thought and questioned.

By "presupposed" I understand, instead, conditions[...]which must obtain for 'thoughts and questions' to make sense, and not "what's thought and questioned" itself. Being is not a supposition - answer to the question "what is real?" (caveat: Heideggerian "what is" is a gnomic sentence-fragment, and not a question). — 180 Proof

Being is presupposed in that sense, yes -- as the condition of the possibility of understanding anything at all. It is embedded in our language as well, as in the copula. It's not a supposition or an answer to a question.

Philosophy doesn't appeal to empirical observation? What would be considered "evidence" in that case?
— Xtrix

A priori argument. — Pfhorrest

So philosophy, in your view, is restricted to the a priori. Since anything a priori does not rely on empirical observation or experimentation, it's quite a stretch to associate it with "evidence." If it's a priori, it needs no evidence.

You're taking epistemological positions for granted, though. — Pfhorrest

In the context of the meaning of being (which I argue is what philosophy thinks). But in that case the nature of ἐπιστήμη is not being used in the sense you're using it, nor is "truth."
— Xtrix

No, in the context of whether all philosophy starts with assumed axioms. — Pfhorrest

I don't recall saying all philosophy starts with axioms. Remember what I said:

There is no way around it -- you have to start somewhere. Any proposition in philosophy presupposes something, and in the end it does in fact come down to matters of belief. These core beliefs I call "axioms," but call it whatever you want. It's not that they're unquestionable -- it's that you have to accept them only in order to proceed. —

This includes your proposition about critical rationalism. There are plenty of suppositions there as well, namely about knowledge and truth. The point was made in the context of what "faith" means. Thus even the proposition of what constitutes "faith" is based on a number of suppositions, which if we keep questioning will eventually come down to matters we simply accept.

All of this is in the domain of abstract thought, however -- with its words, definitions, concepts, propositions, categories, syllogisms, etc. -- everything we consider rational, reasonable, logical. Within this "theoretical" domain arises these questions and propositions about knowledge, beauty, truth, etc. While we may claim this is the only way to truth, the fact that it is a particular mode of the human being, and an exceptional one at that, should tell you that a great deal gets left out of the picture. We know this is true in science, but it's true in traditional philosophy as well.

Whether or not there's an afterlife isn't relevant.
— Xtrix

We’re not talking about an afterlife, but about continuing in more of the same kind of life again. If all of one’s conscious existence ceased permanently at death, that would guarantee an end to dukkha. It’s only against the prospect of that going on indefinitely that any special escape is needed. — Pfhorrest

From my reading, there's no mention of any kind of "conscious existence" going on. Other people go on, the world goes on, conscious life in general goes on. True enough. But what matters is what you do in this life, not what happens after you die: the point is to remove suffering -- that's all. All other ideas about samsara, reincarnation, karma, etc., aren't necessary to achieve nirvana in the here and now. Things change (anicca), there is suffering (dukkha), and there is really no "self" (anatta), all of which can be recognized right here and now in experience, through meditation (part of the eightfold path to nirvana, to the cessation of craving and desire) -- open to everyone. There's no forcing, there's no asking for accepting any of these "truths" on faith, etc.

I've found the Buddha was wrong about very little. A lot gets translated poorly -- like "life is suffering," etc. I don't think that's true, nor do I see them as "against" all "wanting" whatsoever (what about the "want" or the "desire" to not be suffering?). Nietzsche considered Buddhism a decadent religion, like Christianity (albeit a more sophisticated and mature one) based on these translations. But I digress.

So philosophy, in your view, is restricted to the a priori. Since anything a priori does not rely on empirical observation or experimentation, it's quite a stretch to associate it with "evidence." If it's a priori, it needs no evidence. — Xtrix

The “evidence” part was just distinguishing it from religion. I said “reasons or evidence” then. Distinguishing it from science further narrows that down to basically “reason”.

This includes your proposition about critical rationalism. — Xtrix

Critical rationalism does not rely on you accepting critical rationalism to begin with. You can start out unsure of whether critical rationalism is true or not, and then find problems with assuming it’s not and so conclude that you should adopt critical rationalism — exactly in according with the principle of critical rationalism.

This, again, assumes a scientific method, and no one so far has demonstrated there is one -- as far as I can tell.
— Xtrix

That there are various scientific methods according to the various sciences and that they are the best way to present evidence about facts seems to me unquestionable. If you know of another method, I can reconsider my position. — David Mo

But you're not demonstrating that there is one, you're just taking it as a given that there is. I don't see it -- I don't see a special method that accounts for the success of the sciences or allows us to easily differentiate "it" from anything else, philosophy or otherwise. You can try, and many have, to formulate one, coming up with a list of factors -- observation, experimentation, predictability, peer review, data collection, hypothesis, theory, etc. -- and of course there are plenty of examples. But there are plenty of exceptions as well. Better to just think of this human activity we call "science" as all of the above -- a rational, reflective, thoughtful inquiry into the world -- which does not consciously follow any kind of "method" at all, other than perhaps attempting to understand the world sensibly.

That's not to say "science" isn't a useful concept, but simply that there's no "method" that distinguishes it from "non-science." Again I like to bring up Aristarchus -- was he doing "science"? Who knows.

To this day we're in the shadow of Aristotle
— Xtrix
You don't say. Did Wittgenstein believe in prime mover and prima materia? First news.
You're exaggerating a little. — David Mo

Not really. Many of Aristotle's particular claims have been shown to be incorrect, sure. So what? That's not quite what I mean by being "in the shadow" of this man, as you know.

In everyday life, it's certainly not the case that definitions "work in the background" -- or if they do, it's exceptional.
— Xtrix
The definition is only the use of the word. You may be aware of how you use it or not, but you cannot stop using it one way or another. That is its meaning. — David Mo

Context here is important:

Maybe we simply have to say "So much the worse for definitions," and leave it to intuition and specific situations.
— Xtrix

You can't avoid definitions. If you don't make them explicit, they will work in the background. And this is a source of pseudo-problems.
— David Mo

It depends on what you mean. In explicit, theoretical understanding -- that's certainly true. In everyday life, it's certainly not the case that definitions "work in the background" -- or if they do, it's exceptional. — Xtrix

Again, this is exactly right.

So you can indeed avoid definitions, because we're simply not thinking this way in most of our everyday lives. We can discuss "meaning," but that's a different and more complicated story in linguistics.

I don't see why "opposite." They're just different.
— Xtrix

Well, didn't you say they were the same? Are they the same or are they different? Because the same and different are opposites. Or aren't they? — David Mo

I never made a claim about St. Teresa and Plato -- you did. You said they inhabited opposite worlds, I'm saying they simply have different perspectives and hence make very different interpretations and, therefore, inhabit very different worlds. I don't see a justification for them being "opposite."

So philosophy, in your view, is restricted to the a priori. Since anything a priori does not rely on empirical observation or experimentation, it's quite a stretch to associate it with "evidence." If it's a priori, it needs no evidence.
— Xtrix

The “evidence” part was just distinguishing it from religion. I said “reasons or evidence” then. Distinguishing it from science further narrows that down to basically “reason”. — Pfhorrest

OK. So then philosophy is the use of reason, in the sense of the a priori, and science likewise uses reason but also observation, experimentation, etc?

Yes, with the additional differentiation from math already discussed earlier.

On the contrary, it is consciousness that we have, if we mean by this our lived world -- our experiences, our being
— Xtrix
You put a lot of things into your concept of consciousness. It is not the same to have perceptions as to capture the 'I'. Among other things because you do not grasp your "self" in the same way that you perceive a phenomenon. What is an empty abstraction is not the concept of consciousness, but the way you use it. It does not refer to anything concrete. The opposition between reason and consciousness that you make is meaningless. — David Mo

The lived world isn't "concrete"? Experience isn't concrete? On the contrary, it's the most "concrete" thing we have.

I disagree that I put a lot "into" the concept of consciousness -- which is not well defined in any sense: most of our decisions and our lives are probably un-conscious. So in that case I'm actually leaving a lot out when I say consciousness is our "lived world."

For the rest, it would be good for you to distinguish between discursive reason and reason. In your daily life you are constantly using reason. Even when you perceive things. You evaluate, compare, remember, draw conclusions... Making syllogisms is another thing. Of course. — David Mo

That's a common assumption, and in my view a common mistake. I don't believe we use "reason" either in the sense of syllogism or in the sense you're using it at all. That's just not what you see in everyday actions. We don't have to remember them, draw conclusions about them, or evaluate them at all -- we just do them. Take turning a doorknob, driving a car, walking, or the hundreds of habits and skills we use on a daily basis as examples. When you look at it, it's just a mistake to project "reason" on them. There's certainly a place for that -- and usually when something goes wrong, we have to concentrate and problem-solve, etc. Again, this is not so much my ideas as they are Heidegger's -- but the examples are mine (he uses "hammering").

Well your system is fine -- as long as we don't take it too seriously.

Also, I'm glad to have given you an outlet for your series Forrest. Very interesting indeed.

Thank you. One more thing that was going to be the last post in that series: Philosophy is not just Literature

Similarly, philosophy has many similarities to the arts, broadly construed as communicative works presented so as to evoke some reaction in some audience. Philosophy is likewise an evocative, more specifically persuasive, discipline, employing not just logic, as with mathematics, but also rhetoric, to convince its audience to accept some ideas. But philosophy is not simply a genre of literature. Whereas works of literature, like all works of art, are not the kinds of things that are capable of being correct or incorrect, in the way that scientific theories are, but rather they are only effective or ineffective at evoking their intended reactions, with works of philosophy correctness matters. It is not enough that a philosophical theory be beautiful or intriguing; a philosopher aims for their theories to be right.