I mistook your critique of indirect realism as a defense of direct realism, even though you briefly mentioned some correlationist stuff at the end. So if I understand you correctly, within a correlationist understanding of the empirical world, we do have direct awareness. But it's a relational one, because that's how perception works.

There isn't a veil of perception hiding us from the world, there is just the empirical world we all live in. The transcendental stuff outside of humans is another matter, and we can't use perceptual talk to reference it. — Marchesk

That's pretty much it, yes, but I want to say that this as a pretty strong realism. The talk of transcendental stuff could be misleading.

However, currently I don't know what my position is regarding realism vs correlationsim, given that there is some obvious conflict there.

I think jamalrob is arguing that how an object looks, tastes, feels only applies to perception. There's no such thing as what an object looks like without someone seeing it. The indirect realist goes wrong by assuming there is, and then proposing the additional mental intermediary. But there's no need for the intermediary if the act of seeing is what something looks like.

If that sort of argument works, then the debate is rendered moot. There's still a realist question of what objects are independent of perception, but they aren't like perceptions. — Marchesk

Aye I think that's roughly where I stand.

Aye I think that's roughly where I stand. — jamalrob

I was too focused on arguing against naive realism to realize that before. Hmmm, I might be convinced by your approach.

Knew I'd get through to you one day :grin:

I think jamalrob is arguing that how an object looks, tastes, feels only applies to perception. There's no such thing as what an object looks like without someone seeing it. The indirect realist goes wrong by assuming there is, and then proposing the additional mental intermediary. But there's no need for the intermediary if the act of seeing is what something looks like.

If that sort of argument works, then the debate is rendered moot. There's still a realist question of what objects are independent of perception, but they aren't like perceptions. — Marchesk


Aye I think that's roughly where I stand. — jamalrob

Really? That didn't come across at all from what I read (not your fault, I'm not well versed in all of the philosophical background).

If that's the case I think we probably agree. I'm in favour of what I think is called 'model-dependent realism'. The idea that there is a real world out there, but the objects in it and their properties are dependent on our models of them. Basically, as I've discussed at length here some time ago, I don't think there's support for even so much as drawing a line to mark the end of one object and the beginning of the next in the world 'out there'.

So how an object looks, tastes, feels only applies to perception. There's no such thing as what an object looks like without someone seeing it. Sums up how I see things too. Only I'd add that the very delineation of one object from another falls into the same realm.

Funny how difficult it can be sometimes to see common ground. Thanks @Marchesk for pointing the way.

I'm interested now if you think there's anything I've said here which doesn't fit into that view, or is my error only in mistaking your position.

The idea that there is a real world out there, but the objects in it and their properties are dependent on our models of them. B — Isaac

I think Michael has also supported this version of realism in past discussions, but I'm not sure I understand. How are real objects dependent on our models of them without it being anti-realist?

There's no such thing as what an object looks like without someone seeing it. — Isaac

The way I see it, this is just a truism. Maybe you're interpreting it more strongly. I'm not saying the cup in the cupboard doesn't look like anything because nobody can see it.

There is no mirroring going on. — jamalrob

And no photographing. No creation of internal representations from which further on or later on to extract information. Just learning to respond appropriately to stimuli.

What complicates, and creates the big myth of internal words and pictures, is skills of specifically conscious responding, which entail the skill of (less consciously) choosing among external words and pictures to point at the stimuli, and the skill of self-stimulating to choose external words and pictures to represent past or non-present stimuli. (Source, kind of, here and here.)

Calling even the most expert practice of such skills a 'photographic memory' would be misleading. Just because an embodied brain can remember perfectly well doesn't mean that it, like a camera or a pre-connectionist symbolic computer, creates or stores any internal symbols.

Any meaningful controversy about directness or realism or informativeness of representation needs lifting out of the head: it can be about actual words and pictures, instead of mythical mental ones.

How are real objects dependent on our models of them without it being anti-realist? — Marchesk

It's to do with what 'an object' is defined as. Imagine the world consists of just an heterogeneous soup. That's all there is, one object. Any object we define out of that soup is determined entirely by the arbitrary line we draw distinguish it. So whether something is black, or whether it's black-and-white depends entirely on where we draw the line around it. All of its properties depend on what we determine 'it' to be.

The way I see it, this is just a truism. Maybe you're interpreting it more strongly. — jamalrob

Does my reply to Marchesk help any?

Well, for my taste you put too much weight on the synthesizing of the manifold, and not enough on the environment. Too much about the perceiver and not enough about the perceived (or about the relation). I mean, it's not "arbitrary", as you said it was (uncharitable perhaps).

t's to do with what 'an object' is defined as. Imagine the world consists of just an heterogeneous soup. That's all there is, one object. — Isaac

So Parmenides, but a soup instead of a sphere. It's weird how philosophy eventually circles back around to its roots, in modern drab. Or maybe Thales? Soup is watery.

Well, for my taste you put too much weight on the synthesizing of the manifold, and not enough on the environment. — jamalrob

Do you know what the proper interpretation of Kant's view on this matter? Did he think the environment was structured in a way related to the manifold and how the perceiver categorizes it?

Too much about the perceiver and not enough about the perceived (or about the relation). I mean, it's not "arbitrary", as you said it was (uncharitable perhaps). — jamalrob

Yeah, I meant arbitrary relative to the world. @fdrake has made the same point to me before and he's right, I tend to ignore (in my simplification) the interaction caused by the fact that part of 'the world' is our thinking about it. So yes, I am guilty of perhaps focusing too heavily on arbitrariness.

What I mean by it is that we should be mindful of the effect our reification of objects has on their properties. It's important, I think, in issues like perception, physiological sensation issues, even the dreaded 'free will' debate (what is it that is free and free from what).

Sounds reasonable.

Off the top of my head, yes, so long as we're not talking about the environment as it is beyond a possible perception. I could try to work out a better answer but I don't want to go down that rabbit-hole right now.

So Parmenides, but a soup instead of a sphere. It's weird how philosophy eventually circles back around to its roots, in modern drab. Or maybe Thales? Soup is watery. — Marchesk

You never eat the same soup twice.

I think jamalrob is arguing that how an object looks, tastes, feels only applies to perception. There's no such thing as what an object looks like without someone seeing it. The indirect realist goes wrong by assuming there is, and then proposing the additional mental intermediary. But there's no need for the intermediary if the act of seeing is what something looks like.

If that sort of argument works, then the debate is rendered moot. There's still a realist question of what objects are independent of perception, but they aren't like perceptions. — Marchesk

But this is nothing new. I've said as much several times on this forum - that to ask what something looks like independent of looking is nonsensical. However, I don't see a problem for the indirect realist if we are to ask if how something looks is how something is. How something looks is a relationship between the looker and what is being looked upon. Take away the looker, then what is the object like?

Thinking that things are exactly how they appear is a problem because the information in the sensation about the object is mixed up with the information about the looker. Separating the two as if the sensation is information about only one or the other is the problem. Thinking that how things appear is a model of the relationship between the system looking and what is being looked at isn't. As a matter of fact it fits with quantum theory in that incorporating an additional "looker", or measuring device, changes the outcome of the double slit experiment.

You never eat the same soup twice. — jamalrob

Yes Heraclitus...

I think ultimately the point is to collapse the whole real world/apparent world distinction. Since the 'real world' or the thing in-itself is an unintelligible concept, the concept of an apparent (that is there only in contrast to that real world) also becomes meaningless... and you left only with the one world we perceive.

Kant -> (Schopenhauer) -> Nietzsche

Usually in context of illusions, you investigate further. If you walk five miles through the hot desert to the oasis and it isn't there, then you know your brain tricked you.
— Marchesk

I still don't understand this distinction between "you" and "your brain". How is it that the brain tricks something else that you identify as "you"? What is this "you" in relation to "your brain"?

Is "tricking" really the appropriate word? How about "misinterpreted" based on experiences presently stored in memory? "Learning" and "programming" might be other appropriate words to use when it comes to acclimating oneself with the correct interpretation. — Harry Hindu

Think about this scenario: Say "you" are remote controlling a robot on Mars that transmits it's video feed and information about the chemical composition of the rocks it "sniffs" to Earth. Where is the you in this process? It seems to me that "you" needs to be defined before we can determine what is direct or indirect and if the distinction really matters when it comes to knowledge.

You never eat the same soup twice. — jamalrob

But it reminds you of the ideal soup, which you can directly perceive if you just leave the cave of your manifold impressions for the unrefracted light of pure reason.

Just what I was thinking.

And if how things look equates to how things are, then why do we have a multitude of different senses?

What do we mean with 'how things are'?

:-)

Good question. What does Nagel mean when he says there is a how things are to be a bat? Is it the same thing?

Is "how things are" always a view from somewhere? What about a view from everywhere?

Why do we have multiple different types of senses? Is it to know different things about the object or event in question, or is there some level of fault tolerance involved which would be a means of minimizing unfounded assumptions - if we'd only interpret the various forms of sensations driven by our multitude of different senses as such.

Is the redness of the apple, the sweet taste, and the firmness of it's shape informing you that the apple is ripe? How does ripeness appear to different senses? Is the world less complex than we actually see it? Are we confusing the various forms that sensations from different senses take as different information about the object, when the difference has to do with the senses themselves, not the object being sensed? Different types of sensors can give you the same information in different forms, it depends on the type of sensor used. If the forms consistently occur together, then it is likely that they are providing fault tolerant information, not different information about the object.

Is "how things are" always a view from somewhere? What about a view from everywhere? — Harry Hindu

Yeah that is at least the conclusion that Nietzsche for example drew from it... that if the true world, or how things really are, is an incoherent notion, what you are left with is perspectives. Everything is a allways viewed from a perspective.

Because what would a view from everywhere mean? That you view all perspectives at once maybe, i.e. a table from all sides, the molecules it is made out of, the protons and electrons and the wavefunction etc etc. ?

It think we see at least parts of the only world we have access to with our senses. And maybe you can learn more about it by looking at it from different perspectives. But the fact that there are other possible perspectives still, doesn't render the perspective we do have false or obsolete.... certainly not for our purposes.

Yeah that is at least the conclusion that Nietzsche for example drew from it... that if the true world, or how things really are, is an incoherent notion, what you are left with is perspectives. Everything is a allways viewed from a perspective. — ChatteringMonkey

What about the perspective itself? From where is it viewed to say that there is a "how things are" for a perspective? It creates an infinite regress of needing perspectives as the structure for the subsequent perspectives (the infinite regress of homonculi).

Because what would a view from everywhere mean? That you view all perspectives at once maybe, i.e. a table from all sides, the molecules it is made out of, the protons and electrons and the wavefunction etc etc. ?

It think we see at least parts of the only world we have access to with our senses. And maybe you can learn more about it by looking at it from different perspectives. But the fact that there are other possible perspectives still, doesn't render the perspective we do have false or obsolete.... certainly not for our purposes. — ChatteringMonkey

Well, that was what I was saying when it comes to viewing the same thing with different senses. How something tastes as to how it appears is different, but is the difference a result of the difference in the senses, or different properties of the object? When we disagree, is our disagreement about the nature of the the thing, or the nature of our view of it?

Yeah that is at least the conclusion that Nietzsche for example drew from it... that if the true world, or how things really are, is an incoherent notion, what you are left with is perspectives. — ChatteringMonkey

Problem is that if it's an incoherent notion, then science is undermined when it comes to things like evolution and our origins. How did we come to exist if there is no way the world is? It didn't begin with us.

What about the perspective itself? From where is it viewed to say that there is a "how things are" for a perspective? It creates an infinite regress of needing perspectives as the structure for the subsequent perspectives. — Harry Hindu

I don't quite understand how get to the that infinite regress. But yes, you can be correct or wrong from a giving perspective, i'd say... which is to say, it doesn't have to lead to something like epistemological nihilism or relativism, or something like that.

Well, that was what I was saying when it comes to viewing the same thing with different senses. How something tastes as to how it appears is different, but is the difference a result of the difference in the senses, or different properties of the object? When we disagree, is our disagreement about the nature of the the thing, or the nature of our view of it? — Harry Hindu

It depends obviously, sometimes a difference will be due to having a different view on it, and you can be both 'correct' from a given perspective... but you can also, like I said, definitely be wrong about something.

This is what is often misunderstood about perspectivism. It's not the same as relativism or subjectivism, in the sense that every point of view is subjective and therefor equally valid or as correct as the next. It's just the acknowledgement that things are viewed from a certain perspective and that different perspectives are possible. And eventhough knowledge is allways partial in that sense, it nevertheless is 'objective' or 'about the nature of the thing', for lack of better words.

Problem is that if it's an incoherent notion, then science is undermined when it comes to things like evolution and our origins. How did we come to exist if there is no way the world is? It didn't begin with us. — Marchesk

It's not a question of ontology, I don't think, but of epistemology. The world exists without me, you or anybody observing it. But the notion of finding out how things really are outside any perspective is unintelligible I think.

There's not a whole lot to argue about in terms of sensory perception. Our brain only receives electrical signals. The occipital lobe builds the visual field, a 3D model, via electric signals it received. There is some nerve tissue in the area of the eye that may do some pre-processing.

We cannot determine where this input comes with 100% certainty. That is, unfalsifiable concepts like the brain in the vat, such as The Matrix type of scenario cannot be ruled out with test/experiment.

However, something is generating input that creates a very detailed model that we can navigate. I think most of us go about our day believing it's a 3D model of an outside physical world that all of us are navigating. Fair enough, we have no reason to behave otherwise.

But if it is a simulation, then... well something would have had to construct it and generate a very rich world regardless. In the end whether there are 3D dimensions, 11 dimensions (M-Theory), or 2 dimensions (The Holographic Principle), we're engaging in a rich and complex environment.