Yes, he is. His writings are not restricted to the history of science. — Xtrix

Well, I don't see any writings on history in his bibliography either. A historian who doesn't write history books is quite rare.

It appears "intuitively fairly clear," yes. — Xtrix

Science is "ontical" in that it studies various domains of beings: nature, matter, life, humans, etc

Philosophy, or metaphysics, is ontological in that it thinks being. — Xtrix

By the way, this is not a good distinction. Most contemporary philosophy does not deal with Being as Being, but with particular branches: philosophy of science, anthropology, philosophy of history, ethics, etc. You have an archaic concept of philosophy as the old metaphysics.

Experimentation is often involved in the natural sciences, but a great deal isn't. Controlled, careful observation is also important. I'd say the peer review process is also a very important one. Falsiability, predictive power, duplicability, the use of mathematics, and so on...all very important. — Xtrix

. It's only a vaguely defined word, — Xtrix

Let's get down to more serious business.

You're falling into an absolute contradiction. A clear distinction cannot be vague. Clear and vague are antonyms.
You give a good and clear list of characteristics that distinguish between philosophy and science. There is no science of the Being qua Being, but many philosophers (in the past) dealt with it. There is no philosopher (qua philosopher) who supports his philosophy with experimentation, who expresses his theories in a mathematical way or who makes precise predictions. If you know of a book on philosophy written in this way I would like to know about it.

The fact that some connection can be established between philosophy and the natural sciences (in the field of theoretical physics, or the interpretation of scientific theories, for example), that there is an undefinition in some special cases does not support your theory that science and philosophy are not clearly differentiated activities.

They are, and the obsession to erase all distinction lies in the hidden attempt to grant philosophy powers that it does not have.

If you know of a book on philosophy written in this way I would like to know about it.

Try 'The Pattern Paradigm'.

Philosophy, or metaphysics, is ontological in that it thinks being.
— Xtrix
By the way, this is not a good distinction. Most contemporary philosophy does not deal with Being as Being, but with particular branches: philosophy of science, anthropology, philosophy of history, ethics, etc. You have an archaic concept of philosophy as the old metaphysics. — David Mo

And this is not a good argument.

It's not "archaic" because no one has described philosophy that way -- besides Heidegger, perhaps. Is the 20th century archaic?

I'm not concerned with what "most contemporary philosophers" write about. I'm not convinced there are many philosophers, although there are plenty of philosophy scholars, historians, lecturers, etc. Regardless -- let them do what they want, much of it is decent work.

Experimentation is often involved in the natural sciences, but a great deal isn't. Controlled, careful observation is also important. I'd say the peer review process is also a very important one. Falsiability, predictive power, duplicability, the use of mathematics, and so on...all very important. — Xtrix

You're falling into an absolute contradiction. — David Mo

That doesn't sound too good for me.

A clear distinction cannot be vague. Clear and vague are antonyms. — David Mo

Really? I could have sworn they were synonyms.

But seriously - yes, of course you're right, but I don't recall saying that the distinction between philosophy and science is a clear one. It may appear clear, it may be "intuitively" clear -- we may feel it in our guts that a very clear distinction exists -- all that I agree with: it does feel that way. But is it in fact clear? No. Especially when a "method" is invoked that is supposed to account for this "clear distinction." On closer inspection, it's rather vague, rather fuzzy, the boundaries are blurred, and the motivation for wanting there to be a clear demarcation line is itself questionable.

All of the factors I mentioned above do indeed seem to be involved in what science "is."

There is no science of the Being qua Being, but many philosophers (in the past) dealt with it. — David Mo

There is: ontology - the science of being.

There is no philosopher (qua philosopher) who supports his philosophy with experimentation, who expresses his theories in a mathematical way or who makes precise predictions. If you know of a book on philosophy written in this way I would like to know about it. — David Mo

Principles of Philosophy, by Descartes. But it doesn't matter anyway, because the "qua philosopher" part is nonsense. You simply want to confine philosophy to speculations -- which we all can do if we choose to. But as I've repeatedly said, I think at best it's questionable to do so.

So in that case, anything Descartes or Liebniz or anyone else writes that's mathematical or experimental or predictive will simply not qualify as philosophy.

If I'm archaic, you're certainly taking the current university department organization too seriously. Modern physics is indeed different than modern philosophy -- but back in the 17th century what Newton was doing was considered natural philosophy. So pick your starting point -- are you talking about what "philosophers and scientists do NOW," as you stated at the beginning of this discussion, or about what they did in the 17th and 18th centuries? If the latter, then you won't have to go far looking for books. Unless of evaluate the writings using a 21st century criterion -- in which case you'll have to sort out Newton's "science" from his "philosophy," as well as Descartes' and Galileo's. But that's anachronistic, and no better than my claiming because their writings were considered natural philosophy then that it should be considered natural philosophy now -- as you alleged I was doing before. (And I do think there's something to it, but as long as we're ruling it out...)

I know you believe there was, at one time, a point where "philosophy" (all the soaring speculations that seem laughable today, like monads -- by your interpretation) and "science" (an activity characterized by a method involving experimentation and mathematics) parted ways. I believe this is a matter of definition mainly due to increased specialization, a division of labor within academia that, as I've said before, is fine for organizing college majors and departments, but really shouldn't be taken that seriously.

The fact that some connection can be established between philosophy and the natural sciences (in the field of theoretical physics, or the interpretation of scientific theories, for example), that there is an undefinition in some special cases does not support your theory that science and philosophy are not clearly differentiated activities. — David Mo

It does.

It certainly doesn't support your thesis. Because if they are so clearly distinct, why the confusion about which is which?

They are, and the obsession to erase all distinction lies in the hidden attempt to grant philosophy powers that it does not have. — David Mo

No obsession. Personally it's a minor issue. Since "philosophy" and "science" aren't clearly understood as practices anyway, there's little point in arguing about whether they're separate, interconnected, or the same. You have to know something about these subjects beforehand, and this means not only knowing the questions and problems about which they're concerned, but their history as well. I see little understanding of either, both in the general culture and on this very forum, so once again we're left with people throwing "definitions" around without a context, based solely on "intuitions" and maybe a few philosophy books.

"Natural philosophy" is still a fine way to think about it -- If it was good enough for Galileo and Newton, it's good enough for me. Science deals with nature, in a reflective, abstract way. Sometimes they perform experiments, sometimes they don't. Sometimes they simply cannot perform the obvious experiments (in studying the human language capacity, for example). The very term "nature" comes from philosophy, as a Latin translation of the Greek term for being, "phusis." Nature is now conceived as matter in motion, as atoms and molecules, acted on by forces.

It's not about giving philosophy more "power" -- this is exactly what underlies your intense desire for a clear distinction, a kind of fear of religious-like superstition and mysticism creeping into the "truth" and "facts" that science gives us.

So again, by all means define them any way you like. As far as making a compelling argument, I'm not at all convinced. But maybe I'm just archaic!

A clear distinction cannot be vague. Clear and vague are antonyms. — David Mo

I think that's wrong, in an interesting way. Antonyms are a good example of how two (or more) concepts can be vague in having fuzzy borders, but yet also be clearly distinct and mutually exclusive, because their fuzzy borders are kept a sufficient distance apart.

Thus, black and white may each have a vague border with grey, but in that way remain perfectly distinct from each other. More here.

Pardon my interjection. I doubt that anyone here is claiming science and philosophy to be mutually exclusive in any particular respect. :chin:

Try 'The Pattern Paradigm'. — A Seagull

I took a look at the sample pages in Google Books. At least in these I haven't found any example where the author starts from a mathematized hypothesis, establishes precise predictions and checks them in the experience. I think this is not an example of a philosopher using the scientific method.

I doubt that anyone here is claiming science and philosophy to be mutually exclusive in any particular respect. — bongo fury

As I said above, it is very difficult to find words without any vagueness, except for well-defined concepts in science. But giving a rude example, you know perfectly well the difference between black and white, although you probably won't be able to discern whether some greys are blacker than whites. Or you know exactly where a boundary is crossed even though you could not tell exactly whether a person is on one side of the line or the other.
Citing some confusing examples to invalidate a definition of a word would mean throwing away the dictionaries.

Principles of Philosophy, by Descartes. — Xtrix

You've chosen the worst example of all for your interests. Descartes was fully aware of the difference between his metaphysics and his treatise on optics. In the former his reasoning was philosophical-metaphysical, in the latter he boasted of having done a hundred experiments before affirming a thesis. According to your own definition you will not find in the Metaphysical Meditations -or the Principles of Philosophy if you like- any trace of falsiability, predictive power, duplicability, use of mathematics, and so on... which according to yourself are properly scientific activities. When Descartes proposes a universal method is not thinking in pure science, but a philosophy similar to science in rigor. Of course, he failed because he was thinking in deductive forms. He was not for nothing the clearest example of 17th century rationalism.

And the same for any book of philosophy that you can quote here. Two different methods two different branches of knowledge.

Because if they are so clearly distinct, why the confusion about which is which? — Xtrix

Just because France and Spain have relations does not mean that they are the same state. Ditto for philosophy and science.

The term intuitive in philosophy does not mean apparent as opposite to essential. Intuitive is immediate, without the need for supporting reasoning. Just as intuitively I see that black is not white. In any case you yourself contributed some characteristics which do not intuitively point out the difference between philosophy and science. Let's stick to them. I'm doing it and it seems like I'm creating some problems for you that you don't know how to solve. See your incorrect view of Descartes above.

You have to know something about these subjects beforehand, and this means not only knowing the questions and problems about which they're concerned, but their history as well. — Xtrix

Because of the mistakes you make, I don't see that you know so much about the history of philosophy in general and of that of the last centuries in particular to give lessons to others. This is a forum for philosophy amateurs and we all have our limits. To discuss it in depth, go to a postgraduate master's degree. You will see that things are quite different.

And this is not a good argument. — Xtrix

It's a very good argument that you only solve by getting rid of most of the contemporary philosophers. If you give a definition of philosophy that does not correspond to what philosophers do, you eliminate the philosophers and the definition fits you.

The dog is an animal that flies low when it rains.
Hey, dogs don't fly.
I'm not interested in dogs that don't fly.

That way it's easy to make "natural philosophy" dictionaries.

:ok:

You simply want to confine philosophy to speculations — Xtrix

I’m only partially following this conversation so I can’t speak for David, but I agree with him that there is a clear line between science and philosophy, and I don’t agree at all that philosophy is just about speculation. Speculative philosophy happens when philosophy tries to cross over into the domain of science, without “doing as the scientists do” when there. If your philosophy is making claims of the kind that science could possibly prove wrong, your philosophy is overstepping its bounds.

The relationship between philosophy and science is not one of two different approaches to the same questions. Rather, philosophy is (in part) about the questions that underlie science’s approach to its questions. Philosophy is (in part) meta-science: the study of how to do the things science is trying to do and why to do them that way instead of some other way.

You've chosen the worst example of all for your interests. Descartes was fully aware of the difference between his metaphysics and his treatise on optics. — David Mo

Yes, because there is a difference: one is concerned with beings and beings as such, one is part of natural philosophy, namely the questioning, theoretical and experimental attempt to understand light and vision. The latter has now been classified as "science," and the former to "philosophy" -- mainly in academia and mainly for practical purposes. But not because of an adherence to a mythical method. There are many methods in our attempts to understand the world -- theoretical methods, experimental methods, social methods, etc. To argue that Descartes stopped doing philosophy the moment he started experimenting with light is fine, but the fundamental beliefs, conceptual and theoretical aspects don't therefore disappear. So at best we can say he was doing natural philosophy, namely the science of optics. You can't do science without philosophy, even if defined by the aspects I mentioned.

Because if they are so clearly distinct, why the confusion about which is which?
— Xtrix
Just because France and Spain have relations does not mean that they are the same state. Ditto for philosophy and science. — David Mo

I'm not saying philosophy and science are the same.

You can define them any way you like, without evidence, and be satisfied with that. If you want them to be completely separate, that's fine. It says more about your psychology than anything about philosophy or science, though. As I said, personally I think it's a minor issue and rather silly. If it has any impact at all, I think it's a poor one -- namely that scientists are dismissive of the philosophical underpinnings of their technical work.

The term intuitive in philosophy does not mean apparent as opposite to essential. Intuitive is immediate, without the need for supporting reasoning. — David Mo

So we're now appealing to intuition and common sense? Come on. I prefer a historical perspective, with plenty of evidence.

In any case you yourself contributed some characteristics which do not intuitively point out the difference between philosophy and science. Let's stick to them. I'm doing it and it seems like I'm creating some problems for you that you don't know how to solve. — David Mo

Oh, is that what's happening? Too bad for me.

I don't see any unsolvable problems that you're presenting. The point stands exactly as it was at the beginning of this digression: philosophy and science do appear very different, but there's no rule or method to determine which is which -- nor should there be, in my view. If we in the 21st century want to take seriously the clear lines drawn by schools and believe this has some bearing on how human beings approach the world, that's fine. I don't take that seriously. Historically speaking, science has developed as different from philosophy for many reasons, but they can never be separated completely in my view -- even if we accept the inductive method. Unless of course we want to relegate philosophy to the realm of the superstitious.

Whatever Descartes was doing, or Galileo, or Newton, they themselves viewed as "natural philosophy." They're usually agreed to be the founders of modern science. We don't have to take this seriously, and things have certainly changed in the last 400 years, but I'm far more inclined to take them seriously when determining how to categorize human inquiry than I am the modern university curricula and the widespread scientism of our day.

You have to know something about these subjects beforehand, and this means not only knowing the questions and problems about which they're concerned, but their history as well.
— Xtrix
Because of the mistakes you make, I don't see that you know so much about the history of philosophy in general and of that of the last centuries in particular to give lessons to others. — David Mo

If I've made mistakes, you've certainly not demonstrated them in this discussion -- except perhaps writing "Aristarchus" instead of "Eratosthenes," which I conceded. The rest is your illusion, including the remarks about Descartes, which I anticipated immediately after giving that example and which you ignored.

You've repeatedly misunderstood what I've said, however, even after I clearly laid out what I was NOT saying to aid clarification.

Philosophy, or metaphysics, is ontological in that it thinks being.
— Xtrix
By the way, this is not a good distinction. Most contemporary philosophy does not deal with Being as Being, but with particular branches: philosophy of science, anthropology, philosophy of history, ethics, etc. You have an archaic concept of philosophy as the old metaphysics.
— David Mo

And this is not a good argument. — Xtrix

It's a very good argument that you only solve by getting rid of most of the contemporary philosophers. If you give a definition of philosophy that does not correspond to what philosophers do, you eliminate the philosophers and the definition fits you. — David Mo

So citing what "contemporary philosophers do" is a good argument against philosophy being ontological. Why? Who's to say they're doing philosophy anything? You? Academia? Degrees?

Regardless, I'm sure there's plenty of interest in ontology in contemporary scholarship, just as there is in the sciences. So what? This isn't even an argument, really -- it's just a fatuous remark.

The dog is an animal that flies low when it rains.
Hey, dogs don't fly.
I'm not interested in dogs that don't fly.

That way it's easy to make "natural philosophy" dictionaries. — David Mo

Philosophy is what contemporary philosophers do. This is essentially your response to my (and Heidegger's) statement that philosophy is ontological. If you can't see how this is, at best, irrelevant -- I won't bother explaining it.

Speculative philosophy happens when philosophy tries to cross over into the domain of science, without “doing as the scientists do” when there. If your philosophy is making claims of the kind that science could possibly prove wrong, your philosophy is overstepping its bounds. — Pfhorrest

If "speculative philosophy" is making claims about the world that can be proven wrong, it's natural philosophy. Science engages in speculations all the time -- in hypothesizing, in explanatory theories, etc. Sometimes it takes years to test these ideas. Is this all "speculative philosophy" until an experiment is conducted?

You claim there's a clear line, but I see little evidence for one. I see only a matter of definition, with questionable motivation: on this hand, fact, on the other, soaring speculation. Think that way if you must.

The relationship between philosophy and science is not one of two different approaches to the same questions. Rather, philosophy is (in part) about the questions that underlie science’s approach to its questions. Philosophy is (in part) meta-science: the study of how to do the things science is trying to do and why to do them that way instead of some other way. — Pfhorrest

OR -- philosophy is ontological while science is ontical. That's not the same thing, no, but you can't do one without the other.

If "speculative philosophy" is making claims about the world that can be proven wrong, it's natural philosophy. — Xtrix

In other words, science, which no longer falls under the umbrella of philosophy.

Science engages in speculations all the time -- in hypothesizing, in explanatory theories, etc. Sometimes it takes years to test these ideas. Is this all "speculative philosophy" until an experiment is conducted? — Xtrix

No, that’s just science, presuming they aim for the things they speculate about to be testable and eventually tested, and aren’t just armchair positing things to be so without respect for whether observation agrees or not.

on this hand, fact, on the other, soaring speculation — Xtrix

I think you missed my entire point, which is that philosophy done properly isn’t at all about speculating on the same subject matters that science investigates. Such speculation is either philosophy overstepping its bounds, or badly done attempts at science. That kind of baseless speculation is neither proper philosophy nor proper science. Science investigates the same subject matter in a better way. Philosophy investigates a different subject matter entirely: higher-order question about conducting such investigations.

No, that’s just science, presuming they aim for the things they speculate about to be testable and eventually tested, and aren’t just armchair positing things to be so without respect for whether observation agrees or not. — Pfhorrest

And the latter is what philosophers supposedly do?

on this hand, fact, on the other, soaring speculation
— Xtrix

I think you missed my entire point, which is that philosophy done properly isn’t at all about speculating on the same subject matters that science investigates. — Pfhorrest

Science investigates domains of beings in nature -- physics, chemistry, biology, anthropology. Hence branches of natural philosophy -- which is indeed different from "general" philosophy in the sense of dealing with being. The "natural" part indicates a difference: the investigating, thinking about, speculating about, hypothesizing about, etc -- "natural" beings, beings in "nature" (which in the modern sense means essentially matter in motion; from the same word we get "physics").

The subject matter of natural philosophy is indeed different, but in itself has a philosophical basis -- in this case, "nature."

Such speculation is either philosophy overstepping its bounds, or badly done attempts at science. That kind of baseless speculation is neither proper philosophy nor proper science. Science investigates the same subject matter in a better way. Philosophy investigates a different subject matter entirely: higher-order question about conducting such investigations. — Pfhorrest

Speculating about an indivisible unit which constitutes the world was what Democritus was doing -- I assume you don't call this science. Certainly testable, however. Turns out, centuries later, albeit very differently formulated, we have come around to a similar view. Both the same subject matter: what the world is made of. However you'd like to categorize it is irrelevant -- call what Democritus was doing "philosophy" or "speculation" or primitive science, or anything you like -- but they're not separate subjects.

And the latter is what philosophers supposedly do? — Xtrix

No. The entire reason I started posting here again was to day no to that. I don’t know how much clearer I can be.

Speculating about an indivisible unit which constitutes the world was what Democritus was doing — Xtrix

Democritus lived in a time before philosophy and science were clearly differentiated. Pythagoras did mathematics under the name of “philosophy” too. That doesn’t mean that, today, math is just a kind of philosophy.

OR -- philosophy is ontological while science is ontical. That's not the same thing, no, but you can't do one without the other. — Xtrix

Tangent, but; do you think there are interesting philosophical questions about the metaphysics of objects that don't strongly emphasize human interaction with the objects, or the fact that it's a human asking the question?

Speculating about an indivisible unit which constitutes the world was what Democritus was doing
— Xtrix

Democritus lived in a time before philosophy and science were clearly differentiated. — Pfhorrest

True, but this is completely irrelevant.

Pythagoras did mathematics under the name of “philosophy” too. That doesn’t mean that, today, math is just a kind of philosophy. — Pfhorrest

Well that's debatable too. Is logic a kind of philosophy? Many have tried to reduce mathematics, at least arithmetic, to logic.

Tangent, but; do you think there are interesting philosophical questions about the metaphysics of objects that don't strongly emphasize human interaction with the objects, or the fact that it's a human asking the question? — fdrake

Yes to both, if I'm understanding you correctly.

Fair enough. It is more of a philosophical synthesis from a mathematical foundation.

True, but this is completely irrelevant. — Xtrix

No, it’s completely relevant. Democritus was doing stuff under the name of “philosophy” that was both primitive science and primitive philosophy because neither was well defined yet at that time. Speculating about atoms was neither good science nor good philosophy, by today’s standards and best practices, because best practices for neither existed yet at the time. In general, that kind of baseless speculation is seen as fitting of neither science nor philosophy today.

Well that's debatable too. Is logic a kind of philosophy? Many have tried to reduce mathematics, at least arithmetic, to logic. — Xtrix

Logic is a tool of both mathematics and philosophy. That bit of overlap doesn’t mean the two are the same though. Pythagoras’ reasoning about triangles is not philosophy in the sense we now use the word, even though it formed part of his philosophy as they used the word back then.

Likewise Newton’s Principia is not a work of philosophy as we now use the word, even though it has “Natural Philosophy” in the title, because what was once called “natural philosophy” is now considered a different field outside of philosophy in today’s sense of the word: something we call “science” instead.

In general, that kind of baseless speculation is seen as fitting of neither science nor philosophy today. — Pfhorrest

I don't know why you say "baseless" -- it was speculation on what the world is made of based on at least some observation, experience, deduction. And however we classify it, it turned out to be very close to what we currently believe about matter.

Well that's debatable too. Is logic a kind of philosophy? Many have tried to reduce mathematics, at least arithmetic, to logic.
— Xtrix

Logic is a tool of both mathematics and philosophy. That bit of overlap doesn’t mean the two are the same though. — Pfhorrest

When have I said they're the same? I fully concede that mathematics and logic are different things, regardless of any reduction.

Likewise Newton’s Principia is not a work of philosophy as we now use the word, even though it has “Natural Philosophy” in the title, because what was once called “natural philosophy” is now considered a different field outside of philosophy in today’s sense of the word: something we call “science” instead. — Pfhorrest

But that's the point of this discussion, to find out what we mean by philosophy right now. I fully agree that how we think of philosophy now is different than in the past -- that doesn't make it correct.

I don't know why you say "baseless" -- it was speculation on what the world is made of based on at least some observation, experience, deduction. And however we classify it, it turned out to be very close to what we currently believe about matter. — Xtrix

“Baseless” is maybe a bit too harsh, but the point is that Democritus wasn’t presenting something that we today would call a scientific theory, with proposed observable consequences that could (dis)prove it. Nor was he engaging in a priori reasoning about abstract concepts. He was just saying “hey I think the world is like this”. That’s fine for his time, I don’t knock the guy, it’s just neither good science nor good philosophy by today standards.

“Baseless” is maybe a bit too harsh, but the point is that Democritus wasn’t presenting something that we today would call a scientific theory, with proposed observable consequences that could (dis)prove it. Nor was he engaging in a priori reasoning about abstract concepts. He was just saying “hey I think the world is like this”. That’s fine for his time, I don’t knock the guy, it’s just neither good science nor good philosophy by today standards. — Pfhorrest

Well I don't necessarily agree with that characterization, but I understand what you're getting at. Again I'd revert back to what I said before: appealing to common notions of what philosophy does now doesn't prove much and is in fact what we've all been trying to define. You notice there are multiple definitions, so it's not as if we're in total agreement even today.

"Science" wasn't even a word until I believe the 15th century. That doesn't prove much either.

Philosophy isn't a subject so much as an activity, in which muddled ways of saying things are exposed and analysed. — Banno

Spot on.

To be more precise it is a mind activity. An activity of expressing your mind. The output of philosophical thought is information about the mind activity of the philosopher.

So:

Philosophy is an expression of human consciousness ( mind activity ).
Philosophical work is information about the mind activity ( consciousness ) of the philosopher.

This I take to be self evident, but some people don't get it until they are asked to produce a philosophical work that is not an expression of the philosophers mind activity! - not logically possible.

The question becomes can philosophy produce more then an expression of mind activity?
In a related thread - what is certain in philosophy? - the outcome was - Cogito, ergo sum.

But: I think therefore I am is information about the mind activity of Descartes.
It is an expression of his consciousness!

To confound things a little.

Art is an expression of human consciousness.
Art work is information about the artist's consciousness.

tween science and philosophy, and I don’t agree at all that philosophy is just about speculation. Speculative philosophy happens when philosophy tries to cross over into the domain of science, without “doing as the scientists do” when there. — Pfhorrest

I totally agree. Thank you for your clarification.

Thank you for the opportunity.

On a slight tangent from this discussion, I've started sort of a sequel to this thread, on the subject of progress in philosophy, which I think is very closely related to the relationship between philosophy and science:

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/8432/does-philosophy-make-progress-if-so-how

I'm not saying philosophy and science are the same. — Xtrix

You can define them any way you like, without evidence, and be satisfied with that. If you want them to be completely separate, that's fine. — Xtrix

So we're now appealing to intuition and common sense? Come on. I prefer a historical perspective, with plenty of evidence. — Xtrix

The point stands exactly as it was at the beginning of this digression: philosophy and science do appear very different, but there's no rule or method to determine which is which - — Xtrix

Maybe this is all a matter of common sense. Don't be so dismissive of common sense, because even philosophers use it. Sometimes quite badly. But the intuition of which the text I quoted spoke was not that of common sense, but the old philosophical intuition, that of Kant or Descartes: the immediate grasp of something as evident in itself. Or do you have many reasons for distinguishing white from black? Do you not distinguish them immediately? It would be surprising.
However, apart from the intuitive clarity with which one immediately sees that science and philosophy are not the same, according to the author of the text, I think I have given you plenty of reasons to justify that distinction. But you have preferred not to see them. Don't blame me.

There is no rule for you to differentiate philosophy from science because when some more or less precise criteria are given - even by yourself - you turn a blind eye.
The debate would be quickly closed if you gave the example of a philosopher who supports his philosophy with experimentation, who expresses his theories in a mathematical way or who makes precise predictions. A book about this Being as Being preferably. Applying your own criteria to your own definition of science.

You can't do it. Therefore, you try to cheat. You take some philosophers of the past who were also scientists-when science and philosophy were not clearly differentiated, as Pfhorrest told you- and put their books under the old name of "philosophia naturalis". Of course this is not a special subject of study. There is no faculty of Philosophia Naturalis in the world. No subject, no science. If you want to invent a name for this nothing I suggest "Totumlogy". or "Totum Revolutum". Because for the "science" of Being as Being there is already a name: Ontology. And it has nothing to do with Physics or Biology, but it is a particular branch of philosophy. Well differentiated, by the way. It is a name from the times when many priests disguised as philosophers were trying to say the scientists and free thinkers what they could think and what they couldn't. A timeworn name, it is clear. I think this is the main reason why today is not a very popular name among philosophers.

If I've made mistakes, you've certainly not demonstrated them in this discussion — Xtrix

I could point out a few things you've written that an expert in philosophy would not have said. You haven't studied philosophy in a faculty and it shows. It's not serious. I'm not a philosopher by profession either, and this is not a forum for professionals. But I'm not trying to belittle amateurs like me. It's not humility. It's common sense. Because sometimes they can show me that I'm arguing about things that I don't master and if I've pretended before that I'm the wisest I'd be very embarrassed. It's a matter of self-esteem.