Good post. Made be go back and reappraise.

So I'll go back and set out what I'm claiming.

Firstly that beliefs can be understood as a relation between an agent and a proposition.

Since a proposition is involved, beliefs are stateable, but might be unstated.

The relation ibetween the agent and the proposition is such that the agent holds the proposition to be true.

Now if you prefer to think of a belief as a neural network, then you are not thinking of a belief as a relation between an agent and a proposition such that the agent holds the proposition to be true.

But that does not mean that you cannot think of beliefs as neural nets.

By way of summary, a relation between an agent and a proposition such that the agent holds the proposition to be true is not the same sort of thing as a neural network. Hence, there is no neural network that just is the relation between an agent and a proposition such that the agent holds the proposition to be true... they are not the same sort of thing, so this correspondence cannot occur.

Hence the cows and assets analogue. A cow can be an asset, but they are not the very same thing. A cow is an asset when considered in a certain way, and perhaps a neural network is a belief when considered in a certain way - your poor monkey - but they are not identical. I will stand by my assertion that there is no particular neural network that is the exact same thing as my cat's taking it that the floor is solid. What there might be is a neural network that, when removed, also removes the belief; as when removing the cow removes the asset.

Cheers.

I don't see how we can show you what we believe without showing you what the belief is about. — Sam26

Not us... Banno's cat.

Nonlinguistic beliefs are simply those beliefs shown in our actions. This is closely related to Witt's idea of showing vs saying. — Sam26

Ah! Cool.

There's much liability for confusion thereabouts. Does showing have a broader reach than saying - are there things that can be shown but not said?

"I love you more than words can say" says I love you, and in words!

And there are ways of understanding rules that are not found in stating the rule, but in following it.

It occurs to me now that this is not unlike an event horizon, not as a point of no return but as a place in which talk of language begins to curve back on itself so far as to prevent further expression.

But having said all that, words do change. Gravity, as a case in point, so that one does not forget the gravity of the situation.

Hence it might be that at some future time belief comes to refer usually to neural networks.

There's much liability for confusion thereabouts. Does showing have a broader reach than saying - are there things that can be shown but not said? — Banno

I think Witt believed that there are things can be shown but not said, because he believed there was or is a limit to language. I disagree with Witt on this point.

Ya, I do believe that showing has a broader reach than saying (at least it seems so), but that doesn't mean that we can't put it into words. Any belief portrayed in our actions, or in the actions of others can be put into words. However, the fact that a belief can be put into words, doesn't take away from the idea that it need not be put into words in order for it to be a belief. I can't make any sense out of the idea that before there was a language there were no beliefs. It's true that the concept belief didn't exist, but that doesn't mean the belief itself didn't exist. Again, the belief is in the showing, or the action apart from language.

Hence it might be that at some future time belief comes to refer usually to neural networks. — Banno

I don't see this being the case at all. It is similar to saying that meaning can be associated with neural networks. Beliefs and meaning both refer to things apart from the mind. In fact, they give evidence that we have a mind.

I can't make any sense out of the idea that before there was a language there were no beliefs. — Sam26

Neither can Banno.

It's the strongest evidence possible for rejecting the framework altogether.

:wink:

I don't think that such an eventuality would be a good thing.

Statements, propositions, assertions, taking 'X' to be the case, and other such predication based constructs will not cut it here, unless pre linguistic belief somehow consists of the same structure as ones expressed in language. But all that talk about structure is wrong minded. When we look at the structure of belief statements and expect prelinguistic belief to somehow have the same structure, we're thinking in the exact reverse fashion that evolutionary progression can possibly allow.

Prelinguistic belief, if it can be said to have a structure, would exist in it's entirety prior to language use. So, we ought expect statements of belief to have somehow evolved from the structure of prelinguistic belief... not the other way around!

Since a proposition is involved... — Banno

How is this so regarding your cat's belief?

Recognizing and/or attributing causality is primal in that it is something that all thinking and/or believing creatures do...

We can watch it occur, in controlled environments and in the wild... on cable news!

:wink:

There's a link! Hume be damned, because it does not require a pattern of the same events taking place in the same order over and over again!!!

How would Banno answer that question?

You should know by now.

I don;t think that such an eventuality would be a good thing. — Banno

It will not happen, because brains are not enough. Physiological sensory perception requires something to be perceived, and something capable of perceiving it. The brain is just part of what makes perception possible, and perception is just a part of what makes belief possible.

How would Banno answer that question?

You should know by now. — Banno

Humor me. You've offered different answers at different times.

How are propositions involved your cat's belief?

Jack believes that... then the proposition.

Jack takes it to be the case that the proposition is true?

:brow:

Yep. He shows that in his behaviour.

He shows that he believes the proposition is true?

His behaviour shows that he believes "the floor is solid" is true?

How can a language less creature believe that a proposition is true, unless - at the very least - that creature understands the proposition?

Cat's do not understand that "the floor is solid" is a proposition, let alone whether or not it is true.

How can a language less creature believe that a proposition is true, — creativesoul

What? He doesn't understand that "The floor is solid" is true. The would require language.

He understands that the floor is solid.

How can a language less creature believe that a proposition is true, unless - at the very least - that creature understands the proposition? — creativesoul

It would seem crows have neurons that can represent number of items, corresponding to evidence they can do simple counting.

An old story says that crows have the ability to count. Three hunters go into a blind situated near a field where watchful crows roam. They wait, but the crows refuse to move into shooting range. One hunter leaves the blind, but the crows won't appear. The second hunter leaves the blind, but the crows still won't budge. Only when the third hunter leaves, the crows realize that the coast is clear and resume their normal feeding activity.

Helen Ditz and Professor Andreas Nieder of the University of Tübingen found the neuronal basis of this numerical ability in crows. They trained crows to discriminate groups of dots. During performance, the team recorded the responses of individual neurons in an integrative area of the crow endbrain. This area also receives inputs from the visual system. The neurons ignore the dots' size, shape and arrangement and only extract their number. Each cell's response peaks at its respective preferred number. — https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2015/06/150608152002.htm

In the old story, it would seem the crows have a belief about how many hunters are behind the blind, suggesting that you don't need language to form the equivalent of propositional content. I don't know whether that old story is just a story, but their other documented cases where some animals could do simple arithmetic with a small number of items.

Another example would be the mirror test. Do animals act as if the reflect in the mirror is another animal? Do they come to believe it is themselves?

In the short BBC video below, they explain how dolphins behave differently toward a mirror than other dolphins or just in general. They behave as if they're using the mirror to look at part of their body they can't otherwise see.

By way of summary, a relation between an agent and a proposition such that the agent holds the proposition to be true is not the same sort of thing as a neural network. — Banno

OK, so can you elaborate further on what kind of thing this relation is? I'm something of a physicalist, so at some point I tend to ask the question of what anything we're discussing consist of, in terms of matter and energy.

If I get an answer in those terms I can build back up from there to a point were it's more useful to talk about the thing (it's impossible to talk about human relations in terms of their atoms - doesn't mean we're not just atoms, just that the relations can't be talked about that way).

If I get an answer in terms of more complicated physics I generally have to take that as fact on trust because I don't understand complicated physics.

If I get the answer that the thing we're talking about exists but not as a physical thing anywhere, I start to think I've probably nothing more to say in that conversation. I don't do God, Realms of Thought, Things which existed outside the universe, Mind Substances, or fairy dust.

But I'm quite happy that other people do, my enquiries are not intended to show these people up (unless they're espousing some position I think is harmful), I just want to know if the conversation has any interest for me.

I have yet to clarify, from your comments so far, what kind of thing you think 'belief' is. A 'relation' you say between a person/cat and a proposition. So if I may just ask for a bit more clarity;

Where is this relation, what kind of thing is it? For me, the 'relation' that houses are bigger than apples is in my brain (we can actually track down and manipulate this relation such that people are baffled when houses don't fit into apples). The proposition "houses are bigger than apples" is also in my brain (language centres, images drawn to the occipital cortex by the hippocampus in response to internally voicing those words...). The relation between that proposition and my actions is in my brain (intention, 3D image manipulation, option weighing all have their respective cortices and networks). But, whilst I understand you don't find it useful to talk of beliefs this way, I'm still a little unclear as to whether that's because you think they exist in some other realm, or whether you have them exist somewhere physical (the brain?) but just don't find it useful to talk about them that way (like talking about politics in terms of the interactions of atoms).

To summarise, are beliefs, for you, something non-physical (in some other realm of existence), or are they physically represented, but just not usefully (or perhaps even possibly) talked about that way?

Beliefs and meaning both refer to things apart from the mind. In fact, they give evidence that we have a mind. — Sam26

I might ask you the same question I asked Banno. If they refer to "things" what are these things, for you? Where are they, what do they consist of? How do they come into existence?

I might ask you the same question I asked Banno. If they refer to "things" what are these things, for you? Where are they, what do they consist of? How do they come into existence? — Isaac

I don't know how many times I have to answer this question, for the umteenth time, beliefs manifest themselves in our actions (nonlinguistic or linguistic, both are actions). So, if I open the door, then that act shows that I believe there is a door. Or, if I tell you my belief via language, then the act of telling you reveals what I believe. Meaning also is revealed in how we use words in social contexts. These are the "things" I'm referring too.

Also if a dolphin inspects itself in the mirror, that shows the dolphin believes it's seeing a reflection. But if a tiger attacks a mirror, that shows it believes the reflection is another cat. And if a gorilla changes its mind about the reflection, then that shows animals update their beliefs as they gain more information, like from continuing to interact with the mirror.

Who knows with Banno's cat, though.

Also if a dolphin inspects itself in the mirror, the shows the dolphin believes it's seeing a reflection. — Marchesk

I don't think the dolphin believes it's seeing a reflection, reflection involves concepts that the dolphin doesn't have. It believes it's seeing another dolphin, or some such thing.

I don't think the dolphin believes it's seeing a reflection, reflection involves concepts that the dolphin doesn't have. It believes it's seeing another dolphin, or some such thing. — Sam26

Is that a scientific opinion? Because the dolphins in the video I posted do behave as if they are inspecting themselves using the mirror.

Also, there is the mirror test with a red dot on the forehead where some animals have demonstrated an awareness of the dot being on their own head.

The idea that only humans have concepts because we're the only language users is a bit anthropomorphic. It's placing too much emphasis on language, and not enough on animals studies.

Also, it's not known for sure that we're the only language users. Dolphins being an obvious possible exception. Birds another.

open the door, then that act shows that I believe there is a door. Or, if I tell you my belief via language, then the act of telling you reveals what I believe. Meaning also is revealed in how we use words in social contexts. — Sam26

All of this tells me how these things are revealed. If someone asks "what does does a painting consist of?" the answer is not "a paintingis revealed when the artist pulls the covering cloth away". I'm not asking how we recognise the existence of beliefs, I'm asking what they are, for you. I'm a physicalist, so my answer would be that what they are, is some collection of neurons. Neurons are the physical manifestation.

I'm wondering if, for you, there's some realm of existence outside of the physical, were such things as beliefs exist, or if they exist physically but are just not neuron clusters but some other physical things.

I don't mind if the question just doesn't interest you, but it silly to suggest that explaining how we recognise something is the same as explaining what kind of thing it is.

My cat takes it to be the case that the floor is solid. He does not, for example, tentatively test the floor with his paw to check for solidity before walking on it. He takes it to be the case that the floor is solid, despite his not being able to articulate this in English. — Banno

I don't believe the cat "takes it to be the case that the floor is solid," it acts as if the floor is solid. Maybe it means the same thing to you, but for me it's a strange way to say it. It's probably not even aware that it's acting in such a way. The cat just does what it does.

It's probably not even aware that it's acting in such a way. The cat just does what it does. — Sam26

I find this hard to believe. A cat has a relatively sophisticated brain. It needs to survive in a complex environment as an ambush predator. And cats learned to adapt to humans. Why wouldn't a cat have all sorts of beliefs about the world?