So citing what "contemporary philosophers do" is a good argument against philosophy being ontological. Why? — Xtrix

Because if you exclude by definition most of the class of objects that are usually called X, what the hell should we call them? That's what's called making a persuasive definition. An anti-philosophical vice.

Philosophy is what contemporary philosophers do. This is essentially your response to my (and Heidegger's) statement that philosophy is ontological. — Xtrix

If you define philosophy as ontology (which I don't know if it's Heidegger's or your own invention) you leave out of philosophy most of today's philosophers, who don't talk about being as such, but about particular issues such as ethics, for example. I already told you that. I repeat it now. Your definition is exclusive, that is, a bad definition.

philosophy is ontological while science is ontical. That's not the same thing, no, but you can't do one without the other. — Xtrix

No science deals with the Being as a Being. Each science has its own particular field. If you think the opposite, give an example. Do you know of any scientific article published in a scientific journal dedicated to the Being as a Being?

Therefore, scientists who study a parcel of reality (I prefer to talk about reality than about the undefined Heideggerian Being) do not care at all about the "being as being". They work on atomic particles, allergies, nebulae or electric cars. And nothing else. If you want to say that at certain levels scientists are interested on questions traditionally attributed to philosophy, the concept of matter, of truth or the role of induction in science, this may be true. It is also true that these questions cannot be answered today without scientific knowledge. Philosophy of science is a meeting point. But this meeting point is as far from Heidegger's metaphysics as two different galaxies that get away more and more.

scientists who study a parcel of reality (...) do not care at all about the "being as being". — David Mo

“....it must still remain a scandal to philosophy and to the general human reason to be obliged to assume, as an article of mere belief, the existence of things external to ourselves (from which, yet,      we derive the whole material of cognition for the internal sense), and not to be able to offer a satisfactory proof to any one who may call it in question....”
(CPR Bxl)

Knowledge of what a thing is presupposes knowledge that a thing is, from which follows the study of the being of things in general is both redundant and superfluous. It is absurd to suppose the thing which indubitably affects human sensibility isn’t proven to exist by the affect that it has, otherwise we are met with the contradiction “...we should require to affirm the existence of an appearance, without something that appears...”

Philosophy and science are necessarily connected by the universal commonality of the human intellect that indulges in both. As such, both philosophy and science answer to that intellect, hence the ontological paradigm of theoretical speculation......

“....Reason must approach nature with the view, indeed, of receiving information from it, not, however, in the character of a pupil, who listens to all that his master chooses to tell him, but in that of a judge, who compels the witnesses to reply to those questions which he himself thinks fit to propose. To this single idea must the revolution be ascribed, by which, after groping in the dark for so many centuries, natural science was at length conducted into the path of certain progress....”
(Ibid Bxiii)

......, or, on the other hand, is it more the case that we actually are the “pupil” and must take what the “master” allows us to have, hence the ontic paradigm of absolute transcendent determinism? And while the speculative process contains no apodeictic certainty, it seems much the worse that the ontic process makes no allowance for the fundamental conditions of the human cognitive system, which is solely responsible for, not what we know, but rather, how it is possible to know anything.

All that to say this: I’m pretty sure scientists don’t care all that much about being qua being, and I’m almost positive Everydayman doesn’t give a damn about it at all.

Philosophy isn't a subject so much as an activity, in which muddled ways of saying things are exposed and analysed.
— Banno

Spot on.

To be more precise it is a mind activity. An activity of expressing your mind. The output of philosophical thought is information about the mind activity of the philosopher. — Pop

What Banno is presenting, if I had to pick a category, is similar to what's called "analytic philosophy," of which I imagine you're familiar. Personally, the traditions of materialism, empiricism, positivism, naturalism, analytical and perhaps "linguistic" philosophy and even what's called "scientism" (not meant pejoratively) seem to share many features in common, and are all incredibly powerful perspectives.

What you say is similar. There's an emphasis on concepts of "mind" and "information" (of which I assume you're using as a synonym for "knowledge", but correct me if I'm wrong), and you seem to agree about the muddled ways of "saying things" (which I read as "propositions") and the identifying, analyzing, and clarifying of those assertions being central to the mind activity we're calling "philosophy."

If I've got all that right, then I think this conception of philosophy is in that tradition and is a very important and very powerful interpretation.

Maybe this is all a matter of common sense. Don't be so dismissive of common sense, because even philosophers use it. — David Mo

The "come on" was perhaps too colloquial, but what I meant there is that we cannot only appeal to intuition when attempting to formulate a technical notion, which is partly how I see the question of this thread, namely "What is a good technical definition of philosophy?" Many have offered very interesting answers -- but like in science, while common sense notions may be important (in folk science, psychology, etc), within an explanatory theory, they cannot be the final word. I'm sure you agree with this.

So then we have to ask: what is your "theory" or perspective, in which you're defining a technical notion, like "philosophy" and "science" themselves?

If we're not asking ourselves that question, or we don't fully understand it (perhaps in part by ignoring history), then we turn that perspective into a matter of faith, as it's off limits to inquiry.

I've been clear from fairly early on from what perspective I approach these issues, and even put a label on myself: I approach all of this very much as a "Heideggerian" -- which I think is a very important and enriching perspective, but could also be completely wrong. Nevertheless, Heidegger is a central influence.

Since it is from within this framework that I start giving a definition of "philosophy" or "science," and both these and peripheral notions are defined very differently than yours, I think we're often talking past one another. You're coming at the same words from a very different tradition.

However, apart from the intuitive clarity with which one immediately sees that science and philosophy are not the same, according to the author of the text, I think I have given you plenty of reasons to justify that distinction. But you have preferred not to see them. Don't blame me. — David Mo

I have heard you loud and clear. You've said repeatedly that mathematicization and experimentation are key features of at least modern science. I myself gave a list of possible attributes of science, which you stated you thought were accurate. But I could have "intuitions" about things and make attempts at "defining" them as well -- like "energy" (how much stamina I have at any point) or "work" (somewhere you spend 40 hours a week) or "the meaning of life," etc. All the while giving perfectly sensible reasons. But that doesn't mean I'm using "energy" or "work" as it's used in physics. In fact, the guy next to me on the train could come up with a different definition based on his intuitions.

There is no rule for you to differentiate philosophy from science because when some more or less precise criteria are given - even by yourself - you turn a blind eye. — David Mo

Because I (1) don't believe any of those criteria are "precise," and (2) I see both philosophy and science as also similar in certain respects: like the use of abstraction, de-"worlding," assuming a subject/object dichotomy, assuming the "world as rational" or that we're the rational animal, and (most importantly) treating the world as a present-at-hand "fact" -- meaning privileging the present -- e.g., the "unchanging," the "permanent," the constant, the "persistent," etc. -- or, from the history of philosophy, the "idea," "substance" (ουσια), "God," "matter," etc.

To define science or philosophy is to do so already in a philosophical tradition (inheritance from history) -- we all have our influences and assumptions, we all use the words and concepts of the past. I feel like you're minimizing or ignoring this point, and so trying (like others on this thread) to offer a definition of philosophy (and science) without explaining the larger philosophical context in which you're giving said definition. Now if I were to guess -- based on your mention of Wittgenstein, your wanting to clearly separate science and philosophy, and your boredom with, or outright derision of, Heidegger -- I would imagine you yourself would acknowledge more affinity to the analytic philosophers -- perhaps Russell, Quine...maybe Tarski, Kripke, etc. Is that not so?

I think at this point it would do well to flush out that larger context, given that we've now written plenty of words about what we think science and philosophy are. Without that context, and the extra work it entails, one can define things any way one likes -- or even appeal to the dictionary. I don't think that's very interesting -- we'll run in circles.

Therefore, you try to cheat. You take some philosophers of the past who were also scientists-when science and philosophy were not clearly differentiated, as Pfhorrest told you- and put their books under the old name of "philosophia naturalis". Of course this is not a special subject of study. There is no faculty of Philosophia Naturalis in the world. No subject, no science. If you want to invent a name for this nothing I suggest "Totumlogy". or "Totum Revolutum". Because for the "science" of Being as Being there is already a name: Ontology. And it has nothing to do with Physics or Biology, but it is a particular branch of philosophy. Well differentiated, by the way. It is a name from the times when many priests disguised as philosophers were trying to say the scientists and free thinkers what they could think and what they couldn't. A timeworn name, it is clear. I think this is the main reason why today is not a very popular name among philosophers. — David Mo

I don't put their books under "natural philosophy," they do. If nothing else, is that not an interesting historical fact? Just take it as that alone. That doesn't mean I'm saying philosophy and science are the same thing. Philosophy and natural philosophy aren't the same thing either.

I don't understand what you mean by "there is no faculty of [natural philosophy] in the world." There's clearly a faculty of the human mind (call it the "science-forming capacity") that's conceiving an idea of "nature" and attempting to understand it in various domains, like "life" (biology), "stars and planets" (astronomy), "matter" (chemistry), "language" (linguistics), etc. All of these things scientists would say are part of nature -- unless they're "magic." So I don't see your point. Call it natural science if you want -- makes no difference.

As for ontology -- yes it is often viewed as another branch of philosophy. But what does philosophy really "think" if not existence, if not "being" in the broadest sense? How can philosophy not be ontological in that case? And if this isn't happening, and the focus is solely on a domain of beings -- then the pursuit is ontical. Natural philosophy (or natural science) is one such domain, along with all subdomains. But an interpretation of being pervades all of these fields regardless of whether it's questioned or thought about at all.

If I've made mistakes, you've certainly not demonstrated them in this discussion
— Xtrix
I could point out a few things you've written that an expert in philosophy would not have said. — David Mo

Well then please point them out -- I'm happy to learn.

You haven't studied philosophy in a faculty and it shows. It's not serious. — David Mo

You mean as part of a faculty? Or in a university? Yes, I'm not part of any university faculty, that's true. I did, however, study philosophy in college, but only as a minor concentration.

I don't see how this is relevant, though, until it's clear where I go astray. In fact, most of what I've said is quasi (if not at times verbatim) Martin Heidegger, who was a tenured professor (if that's important to you) and, in my opinion at least, a very important philosopher indeed. So it's not about my credentials, really. Yet I repeat: I don't see where my mistakes are.

I've read everything you've written in response to me, and carefully, and have responded in turn. I mentioned one clear error I can recall: writing "Aristarchus." I'm fairly confident that what you claim are mistakes are simply your misreadings (of which there are plenty of examples in this thread).

Otherwise my point stands. And again -- happy to stand corrected.

I'm not a philosopher by profession either, and this is not a forum for professionals. But I'm not trying to belittle amateurs like me. It's not humility. It's common sense. Because sometimes they can show me that I'm arguing about things that I don't master and if I've pretended before that I'm the wisest I'd be very embarrassed. It's a matter of self-esteem. — David Mo

Sure. But why do you associate this with me? If I've "belittled" anyone it wasn't intended, and I've never claimed to be the "wisest" person.

So citing what "contemporary philosophers do" is a good argument against philosophy being ontological. Why?
— Xtrix

Because if you exclude by definition most of the class of objects that are usually called X, what the hell should we call them? That's what's called making a persuasive definition. An anti-philosophical vice. — David Mo

Making a persuasive definition is an anti-philosophical vice? That's puzzling, if that's what you're saying.

But as far as the first sentence goes -- I'm not necessarily excluding anything. Whatever we call "x," we look to history, to etymology, to our own experiences, and see if the term has a broader meaning that includes X as a subset, whether it's being mis-labeled or misunderstood, how the meaning has evolved, etc.

When you do that with the word "philosophy," for example, you see how the meaning has changed in part by the influence of the sciences, in part by professionalization and specialization, university departments and majors, etc. Most of those we call "philosophers" of the past weren't professors of philosophy, after all -- with obvious exceptions (Kant, Hegel, etc). So who cares about professorships and Ph.D.s? If they're not saying anything new or interesting about the core of philosophy, or haven't at least thought the question of being through for themselves, then we may still label them as "doing" philosophy, but to me it's a pretty strange thing. It's the difference between teaching literature and writing.

So while we shouldn't exclude anything on the basis of what it has been in the past (as I think you believe I'm doing), we also shouldn't exclude what's past simply because it doesn't correspond to what's contemporaneous.

Philosophy is what contemporary philosophers do. This is essentially your response to my (and Heidegger's) statement that philosophy is ontological.
— Xtrix

If you define philosophy as ontology (which I don't know if it's Heidegger's or your own invention) — David Mo

It's Heidegger's.

you leave out of philosophy most of today's philosophers, who don't talk about being as such, but about particular issues such as ethics, for example. — David Mo

But if they're philosophers, then they don't study ethics or beauty or knowledge in a vacuum. If they do, then yes I wouldn't consider them philosophers at all. I'd call them perhaps "teachers" or even "scientists," concerned with whatever domain of beings they're interested in without any questioning of being.

An important clarification, though: The best philosophers (if I could make a value judgment) are not exclusively concerned with 'being,' of course -- in that case I'd be arguing that Plato and Aristotle aren't philosophers, since they engaged in political theory, ethics, aesthetics, etc. Is that what you think I'm arguing?

Your definition is exclusive, that is, a bad definition. — David Mo

I don't think I'm doing that in the sense you mean. One can certainly study mainly ethics, or optics, or aesthetics, or civil engineering, anything else one pleases and still be a philosopher. This is what I was referring to above.

But regardless: what definition doesn't exclude something? (Besides "being" perhaps.) If all definitions that exclude something are "bad," then nearly all definitions are bad. "Tree" is bad -- it excludes bushes. And rocks.

philosophy is ontological while science is ontical. That's not the same thing, no, but you can't do one without the other.
— Xtrix
No science deals with the Being as a Being. — David Mo

Right, because being isn't a being (an entity) at all.

Each science has its own particular field. If you think the opposite, give an example. — David Mo

I don't.

Do you know of any scientific article published in a scientific journal dedicated to the Being as a Being? — David Mo

No, because I have no idea what "the Being" would mean, nor why it's capitalized.

Therefore, scientists who study a parcel of reality (I prefer to talk about reality than about the undefined Heideggerian Being) do not care at all about the "being as being". They work on atomic particles, allergies, nebulae or electric cars. And nothing else. — David Mo

That's probably true in most cases, yes. Most scientists are really not interesting in philosophy. But I think that's a very unfortunate mistake.

It's also interesting you use "reality" -- Heidegger has a lot to say about that concept and its history as well.

If you want to say that at certain levels scientists are interested on questions traditionally attributed to philosophy, the concept of matter, of truth or the role of induction in science, this may be true. It is also true that these questions cannot be answered today without scientific knowledge. — David Mo

It's the last part that has me thinking you're more of a positivist. But of course it depends on what you mean by "scientific knowledge." If you mean objective truth, or finding mechanical or material causes, rules, principles, etc., then no -- science simply can't explain everything, given its ontology (for example, the being of the "ready-to-hand" -- our dealings with equipment, our concern, our purposes, etc). If by science we mean "trying to understand the world," then sure -- no questions can be answered without science.

All that to say this: I’m pretty sure scientists don’t care all that much about being qua being, and I’m almost positive Everydayman doesn’t give a damn about it at all. — Mww

And probably many whom we call "philosophers" today. I hope that's not true, but it may very well be. In school I encountered plenty of philosophy teachers, but for the most part they were interpreting and popularizing the great thinkers of the past and their texts, almost as part of a "history of philosophy," but with no clear indication that they ever thought "being" for themselves. I think that's a shame.

Because I (1) don't believe any of those criteria are "precise," and (2) I see both philosophy and science as also similar in certain respects:

1) They are so precise than you had been unable to put an example of a philosopher using this methods. 2) Don't change of subject. No one is speaking of some similarities (although your list includes some wrong similarities -is world rational???) We are speaking of many things that separate science from philosophy.
— Xtrix

But if they're philosophers, then they don't study ethics or beauty or knowledge in a vacuum. If they do, then yes I wouldn't consider them philosophers at all. I'd call them perhaps "teachers" or even "scientists," concerned with whatever domain of beings they're interested in without any questioning of being. — Xtrix

At this point one begins to get dizzy from your continuous changes of position. You did not define philosophy as being "concerned with some aspect of being", but as an occupation on the " Being qua Being", that is, what is universal in being. Obviously, all philosophers who have dedicated themselves to a specific philosophical specialty and not to metaphysical ontology, do not concern themselves with the being qua being and remain outside your definition.

Anyway, to say that philosophers deal with "being" is false or useless. If you specify a little, philosophers who deal with ethics, for example, do not deal with being, but with what should be. And the analytic philosophers do not deal with being but with language. Of course, if you put norms and language into being, everything is being and your definition is perfectly useless. Because the aim of a definition is clarity, but also distinction.

Well then please point them out -- I'm happy to learn. — Xtrix

I'm sorry I don't have time for the huge task of correcting your comments. I'm probably not qualified either. But if this is any indication: you did not understand (I think you still do not) the concept of intuition in Kantian philosophy and its consequences in contemporary philosophy. Nor did you know the importance of controlled experimentation in the emergence of the New Science. You claim to be Heideggerian, but you do not handle the concepts of the ontological and ontic as Heidegger does. Etc., etc., etc.

I find very interesting the study of ancient philosophy. It is a sensitive subject to me for family reasons. But if you don't understand that current philosophy is very different you are lost. And what I was trying is to speak of philosophy now. What philosophers do now?

It's the last part that has me thinking you're more of a positivist. — Xtrix

That's because you don't know what positivism is. (Make a note of that). If I were a positivist I would say that all possible knowledge comes down to science and that all human problems can be solved by science. That's not what I'm saying. I'm saying that all "objective" knowledge -about facts in the world- comes down to science. Which leaves the field open for other types of knowledge, including philosophy. What I agree with the positivists is that metaphysics, more specifically ontology, is a false science that has done much damage to the reputation of philosophy. But Kant already said this in his Critique of Pure Reason: a scandal. And he was not a positivist.

philosophy teachers, (...) but with no clear indication that they ever thought "being" for themselves. I think that's a shame. — Xtrix

Maybe it’s as simple as finding no profit in questioning the experience of our observations. Perception presupposes existence, therefore to question either makes for no progress in seeking knowledge. The same holds for possible experience, if it should be the case that, e.g., mathematics, and synthetic a priori cognitions in general, logically sustains that which humans presently conceive but may only eventually observe.

And those modern philosophers who don’t question being qua being, may still be guilty of radicalizing the bejesus out of concept, by theorizing different kinds of being, under different conditions, etc., which, of course, is anathema to pure philosophy. Even Feynman, a combined super-scientist and closet philosopher if there ever was one, posited that if we don’t know which path an electron took to arrive at some observable location, we are justified in supposing it to have taken every possible path (paraphrased sum over histories). But still, that is really nothing more than “...a lame appeal to a logical condition...”, meaning the fact the proposition is not self-contradictory doesn’t say anything worthwhile about its subject.
—————-

But what does philosophy really "think" if not existence, if not "being" in the broadest sense? — Xtrix

Relations? And if it is humans that are asking, then that which is asked about must ultimately reduce to a relation between it and humans. It follows that at least some fundamental genus of philosophy relates what is, to what we think of it.

Of course, if you put norms and language into being, everything is being and your definition is perfectly useless. — David Mo

I haven't attempted to define being in general. But every particular being or class of beings "is," including language and norms. A pre-theoretical understanding of being permeates everything we do and everything we think; philosophy thinks and interprets being. That shouldn't be controversial.

And because Aristotle wrote on ethics, logic, biology, etc., doesn't mean he's excluded from this definition.

Well then please point them out -- I'm happy to learn.
— Xtrix
I'm sorry I don't have time for the huge task of correcting your comments. I'm probably not qualified either. — David Mo

But qualified enough to recognize them.

But if this is any indication: you did not understand (I think you still do not) the concept of intuition in Kantian philosophy and its consequences in contemporary philosophy. — David Mo

I don't remember discussing the Kantian use of intuition in this thread. I don't see how I can be mistaken about something I've made no claims about.

Nor did you know the importance of controlled experimentation in the emergence of the New Science. — David Mo

Who doesn't know that? Where did I say that experimentation wasn't an important factor in science, or the beginning or modern science? Of course it's important. You're projecting a position on to me which I simply don't hold. I never said it wasn't important, I said that making it the basis for a "scientific method" which is supposed to separate science and philosophy is unconvincing, no matter how often it's repeated, and that there are plenty of exceptions in science -- i.e., where controlled experimentation isn't used or isn't possible.

That's not saying experimentation isn't important, whether in the 17th century or now.

You claim to be Heideggerian, but you do not handle the concepts of the ontological and ontic as Heidegger does. — David Mo

I do. You're simply wrong. I've explained the distinction a couple of times very clearly: the ontological concerns being as such, the ontical concerns beings.

Here's a quote from Heidegger himself, lengthy but helpful:

"We must be able to bring out clearly the difference between being and beings in order to make something like being the theme of inquiry. This distinction is not arbitrary; rather, it is the one by which the theme of ontology and thus of philosophy itself is first of all attained. It is a distinction which is first and foremost constitutive for ontology. We call it the ontological difference--the differentiation between being and beings. Only by making this distinction -- krinein in Greek -- not between being and another being but between being and beings do we first enter the field of philosophical research. Only by taking this critical stance do we keep our standing inside the field of philosophy. Therefore, in distinction from the sciences of the things that are, of beings, ontology, or philosophy in general, is the critical science, or the science of the inverted world. With this distinction between being and beings and the selection of being as theme we depart in principle from the domain of beings. We surmount it, transcend it." (Basic Problems of Phenomenology, p. 17)

I find very interesting the study of ancient philosophy. It is a sensitive subject to me for family reasons. But if you don't understand that current philosophy is very different you are lost. And what I was trying is to speak of philosophy now. What philosophers do now? — David Mo

Which is fine, but you know as well as I that we cannot understand what philosophers do now without a historical context as well. It's like studying the human being without any attempt to understand evolution, or growth and development.

It's the last part that has me thinking you're more of a positivist.
— Xtrix

That's because you don't know what positivism is. (Make a note of that). — David Mo

:roll: Okay...

If I were a positivist I would say that all possible knowledge comes down to science and that all human problems can be solved by science. — David Mo

Yes...

That's not what I'm saying. — David Mo

Fair enough. Notice I said "more of a positivist" -- meaning more in alignment with that tradition, not necessarily encapsulated by it. I still think that's accurate, but I see my ambiguity now.

I'm saying that all "objective" knowledge -about facts in the world- comes down to science. Which leaves the field open for other types of knowledge, including philosophy. What I agree with the positivists is that metaphysics, more specifically ontology, is a false science that has done much damage to the reputation of philosophy. But Kant already said this in his Critique of Pure Reason: a scandal. And he was not a positivist. — David Mo

Fine -- you're not a positivist. That's not the important point here -- I'm not interested in labeling anyone and being satisfied with that. But it's in part this area of agreement, towards ontology and metaphysics, that led me to associate your perspective more closely with this tradition than, say, what's called "continental" philosophy (I agree in advance: a pretty vacuous term, but I think you'll take my meaning). Maybe analytical philosophy would have been a more accurate term, who knows. But that misses the point entirely -- I only bring up these broad labels to demonstrate what very different perspectives we're approaching this issue ("What is philosophy?" "What is science?") with.

And of course I agree with you, and Kant, and Nietzsche in fact, that metaphysics and ontology (at least as commonly understood) have been both damaging and rife with confusions. Heidegger in fact agrees as well. This is not a shift in position -- it simply means that what started in the inception of Western philosophy, with the presocratics, Plato, and Aristotle, has gradually become more and more confused, and it's important to re-awaken the "question of being" again.

Maybe it’s as simple as finding no profit in questioning the experience of our observations. — Mww

No doubt there's much truth in that.

But what does philosophy really "think" if not existence, if not "being" in the broadest sense?
— Xtrix

Relations? And if it is humans that are asking, then that which is asked about must ultimately reduce to a relation between it and humans. It follows that at least some fundamental genus of philosophy relates what is, to what we think of it. — Mww

So you mean a kind of relation between "thinking" and "being," or more of a questioner in relation to what's questioned?

I would say "what is" and what we "think of it" does seem to be a very fundamental and important distinction. I also think perhaps here we may be entering back into the subject/object dichotomy.

we may be entering back into the subject/object dichotomy. — Xtrix

I submit it is altogether impossible to escape the subject/object dichotomy, or dualism. Can’t re-enter what’s never been vacated. Metaphysically speaking, of course.

we may be entering back into the subject/object dichotomy.
— Xtrix

I submit it is altogether impossible to escape the subject/object dichotomy, or dualism. Can’t re-enter what’s never been vacated. Metaphysically speaking, of course. — Mww

I think we can, metaphysically. The Cartesian ontology of "mind" and "nature" ("body" -- res extensa), while like I said is powerful and important, I don't think is the unmitigated foundation of all being, or even of all knowledge -- although almost ertainly for modern philosophy and science.

But even on a mundane, everyday level, it's not as if we're subjects contemplating objects -- we're not seeing ourselves that way. I don't think to myself "here I am as an individual engaged in this activity" -- in fact much of what I'm doing is often completely habitual and second-nature (mostly unconscious).

We can explain this type of thing using the subject/object distinction, but this assumes a lot of things -- like an "I," an "external world," an "inner and outer," etc. --in turn leading to problems that have been with us for a long time.

I think there are alternative analyses that get closer to the phenomena, are more accurate, more holistic, and (possibly) more useful. Again, here I mean Nietzsche, but especially Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and even Dreyfus and Kierkegaard perhaps. I'd include Pascal, but I still haven't got through all of the Pensees -- however I feel he'd shy away from the Cartesian ontology, from what I've read so far.

So as not to be mysterious: the "I think, therefore I am" should be inverted -- we start with (and "in") being (as human beings) and with (and "in") time. Thus we're thrown into a world and start with it -- i.e., with the "am", the "sum" of the Cogito ergo sum. I am, therefore I think (in the sense of not only abstract thought but conscious awareness generally).

it is altogether impossible to escape the subject/object dichotomy.....
— Mww

I think we can, metaphysically. — Xtrix

How would that be arranged, that escape?

ontology of "mind" and "nature" (....) I don't think is the unmitigated foundation of all being, or even of all knowledge -- although almost ertainly for modern philosophy and science. — Xtrix

Ontology of mind and body? The study of the origin and existence of mind and body?

If the mind/body dualism isn’t thought to be the foundation of all knowledge, but almost certainly the foundation of modern philosophic and scientific knowledge, suggests there is yet another kind of knowledge that isn’t grounded in philosophic or scientific principles. What form would such knowledge have?

Nevertheless, I agree the study of the mind/body dualism isn’t sufficient to ground knowledge of any kind; it merely serves to establish the theoretical conditions under which the possibility of it may be given.
—————-

I don't think to myself "here I am as an individual engaged in this activity" — Xtrix

Of course not, it is impossible. Human thoughts are always singular and successive; engagement in any activity, except pure reflex and sheer accident, requires thought, so I cannot think myself thinking. I can think myself possibly engaged, or I can think myself having been engaged, but never think myself simultaneously thinking with respect to a present engagement. In addition, humans do not have the ability to think more than one object at a time, so if I think while being engaged in an activity, the activity is the only permissible object for me to form a cognition about, which makes my thought of myself, as another object being thought, quite impossible. You may recognize this scenario as the fundamental ground of the map/territory dichotomy, insofar as the thinker can never think itself. Represent itself, sure, in speculative metaphysics, think of itself as a necessary condition for that which follows from it, but that’s nothing more than theoretical place holding.
——————-

the "I think, therefore I am" should be inverted — Xtrix

That can never fly as a philosophical principle, for such should then be the case that anything that is, thinks.

Ya know....poor ol’ Rene, sometimes so demonized. Given that the primary source for that infamous missive is “Principles of Philosophy”, 1, 7, one is well-advised to continue on through 8, in which he tells us what he means by “mind” from which we derive the “I”, and 9, in which he tells us what he means by “thought”. Taken as a whole, the only thing claimed to exist necessarily, is the “I” itself....not the body, not anything else. If that is the case, you have no warrant to claim being “thrown into a world and start with it” with the same absolute certainty as the existence of the thinking self demands.

we start with (and "in") being (as human beings) and with (and "in") time. — Xtrix

I dunno, man. We can only start with or in time, if it is possible to prove with apodeitic certainty we are not ourselves responsible for the creation of time as a mere conception. If we cannot do that, we can see it is impossible for us to be started with....to be initialized by.....that which wouldn’t even exist if not for us. The ol’ cart before the horse routine, doncha know.
—————-

We can explain this type of thing using the subject/object distinction, but this assumes a lot of things (....) leading to problems that have been with us for a long time. — Xtrix

No doubt; the dyed-in-the-wool physicalist won’t grant the time of day to “mind”, which is fine, there being no such real empirical thing. Which just makes philosophy that much more fun......how to close explanatory gaps by making sense out of something we can never put our fingers on.

If I've got all that right, then I think this conception of philosophy is in that tradition and is a very important and very powerful interpretation. — Xtrix

Thanks Xtrix, thats very kind and generous.

I arrived at this via a definition of art. Philosophy and art share the same problem in that the output is endlessly variable and open ended. The results of tomorrow can not be conceived of today. So a different approach was required.

Unfortunately the interpretation dose not send a warm shiver up my spine, but I think what the sentence says is that it is consciousness, not philosophy or art that is special. It is consciousness that gives rise to the work – not philosophy or art. Philosophy and art are in fact modes of expressing consciousness. Whilst consciousness is the special immaterial thing creating them. It is the thing that ought to be celebrated.

The whole area of mind, perception, consciousness, I feel, requires significant renovation. The way I understand consciousness is more in line with IIT theory and GW theory, where consciousness is an information entangling / creating / integrating mental facility. From this perspective Mind is pretty much obsolete. Whilst consciousness is pretty much everything.

I would like to think I found something new, but Yogic Logic arrived at something like this some 5000 years ago!

Thanks again.

it is altogether impossible to escape the subject/object dichotomy.....
— Mww

I think we can, metaphysically.
— Xtrix

How would that be arranged, that escape?

ontology of "mind" and "nature" (....) I don't think is the unmitigated foundation of all being, or even of all knowledge -- although almost ertainly for modern philosophy and science.
— Xtrix

Ontology of mind and body? The study of the origin and existence of mind and body?

If the mind/body dualism isn’t thought to be the foundation of all knowledge, but almost certainly the foundation of modern philosophic and scientific knowledge, suggests there is yet another kind of knowledge that isn’t grounded in philosophic or scientific principles. What form would such knowledge have?

Nevertheless, I agree the study of the mind/body dualism isn’t sufficient to ground knowledge of any kind; it merely serves to establish the theoretical conditions under which the possibility of it may be given. — Mww

I consider the "mind/body" dichotomy of Descartes a dualist substance ontology. The "res" is precisely that in Latin (or at least how it's often translated).

This being the foundation of modern philosophy and science just means this is the framework modern science and philosophy uses. There was thinking and philosophy before Descartes, of course. In fact, Descartes was heavily influenced by Scholasticism, as you know -- and so I don't think it's a suggestion of a kind of knowledge other than philosophical or scientific knowledge, but rather a different kind of philosophy, a different ontology.

I don't think to myself "here I am as an individual engaged in this activity"
— Xtrix

Of course not, it is impossible. Human thoughts are always singular and successive; engagement in any activity, except pure reflex and sheer accident, requires thought, so I cannot think myself thinking. I can think myself possibly engaged, or I can think myself having been engaged, but never think myself simultaneously thinking with respect to a present engagement. — Mww

That's interesting. I imagine you're right -- and so a different word for whatever is going on internally, while fully engaged in an activity, should probably be invoked here. I use "junk thought," but that has negative connotations. What's really happening is we're simply drifting on a kind of unfocused autopilot. But you're right, it's certainly not the kind of thing we have in mind when we use "thought" (as abstract, rational thinking).

the "I think, therefore I am" should be inverted
— Xtrix

That can never fly as a philosophical principle, for such should then be the case that anything that is, thinks. — Mww

Yes, I didn't mean that exactly. What I'm saying there is that the "sum" is even more primordial than "thought," and thus the Cogito should be inverted in that sense. I didn't mean to imply everything that "is" is a conscious, thinking being.

Ya know....poor ol’ Rene, sometimes so demonized. Given that the primary source for that infamous missive is “Principles of Philosophy”, 1, 7, one is well-advised to continue on through 8, in which he tells us what he means by “mind” from which we derive the “I”, and 9, in which he tells us what he means by “thought”. Taken as a whole, the only thing claimed to exist necessarily, is the “I” itself....not the body, not anything else. If that is the case, you have no warrant to claim being “thrown into a world and start with it” with the same absolute certainty as the existence of the thinking self demands. — Mww

Here I'm taking Descartes' use of "thinking" (cogitares) as what he mentions in the Principles: essentially conscious awareness. So "I am consciously aware, therefore I am" still privileges conscious awareness over being. It's not that we exist because we're conscious, we are able to think and perceive and sense because we "are," because we exist. Even an infant, prior to thought or language, exists. A zygote exists, etc.

As soon as you posit an "I" that thinks, or an "I" that is a conscious subject, you're only positing a certain conception of a being, and so presupposing the existence of some-thing that you're now labeling "I."

we start with (and "in") being (as human beings) and with (and "in") time.
— Xtrix

I dunno, man. We can only start with or in time, if it is possible to prove with apodeitic certainty we are not ourselves responsible for the creation of time as a mere conception. — Mww

That's interesting, but how would you go about "proving" it? I think it's clear we've invented a lot about "time" in terms of measurement -- seconds, minutes, predictable changes, etc -- but I think there's a more "existential" way to look at the basis for these measurements, and the ordinary conception of time. Aristotle's essay on time in the Physics is an important point to see where our concept of "time" comes from, in part.

By "existential way" I mean by looking at what we do as human beings. We do appear to be, any way you slice it, temporal beings. Phenomena changes all around us "in" time. I think that's why both Western and Eastern philosophies so often emphasize time as being fundamental. It's fundamental in science as well, but in a different way -- quantitatively. But Aristotle, Kant, Heidegger -- then in the East with Hinduism, Buddhism, Taoism, etc. All emphasize time and change.

If we cannot do that, we can see it is impossible for us to be started with....to be initialized by.....that which wouldn’t even exist if not for us. The ol’ cart before the horse routine, doncha know. — Mww

I see what you mean, yes. In that case I'd say that time is embedded in our existence -- we exist as temporality and interpret the world (and "being" and "time" itself) on this basis. This is why I used quotation marks when saying "in" time -- I don't believe time is a container of some kind, or an object, or some kind of clock in our heads.

This probably sounds absurd or confusing. Heidegger is much better at the analysis than I am, but I don't want to simply quote from an "authority." This is the best I can do!

We can explain this type of thing using the subject/object distinction, but this assumes a lot of things (....) leading to problems that have been with us for a long time.
— Xtrix

No doubt; the dyed-in-the-wool physicalist won’t grant the time of day to “mind”, which is fine, there being no such real empirical thing. Which just makes philosophy that much more fun......how to close explanatory gaps by making sense out of something we can never put our fingers on. — Mww

That's interesting as well. When you say "physicalist," I view that as almost synonymous with "naturalism" and "materialism" really. It all amounts to very similar concepts: what we can "know" with our senses, with empirical data, is all that can be known -- and that the world is made of substance, matter, "physical" particles (atoms, etc), and so on. This has to be true in some way. I'm no mystic. But on the other hand, perhaps we've gotten too complacent in our accepting of this approach.

the "I think, therefore I am" should be inverted. (...) What I'm saying there is that the "sum" is even more primordial than "thought," and thus the Cogito should be inverted in that sense. I didn't mean to imply everything that "is" is a conscious, thinking being. — Xtrix

Not sure Rene would go for that; it is my understanding that he intended the “I” of “...therefore I am” to be necessarily conditioned by the “cogito”. In other words, they are mutually dependent, same subject, different predicates kinda thing. The “I” that thinks is not the cause of the “I” that is, and the “I” that is is not an effect of the “I” that thinks. The “I” that thinks is the very same as the “I” that is. Somewhat lame, perhaps, even labeled “problematic idealism” by the former Esteemed Professor of Logic and Metaphysics at Königsberg, but the proof of the “I” is itself. So while it is true some physically real manifestation is certainly more primordial that thought, that particular kind of existence isn’t applicable to the “I” we know as representing the transcendental thinking subject.
—————

As soon as you posit an "I" that thinks, or an "I" that is a conscious subject, you're only positing a certain conception of a being, and so presupposing the existence of some-thing that you're now labeling "I." — Xtrix

In effect, yes, agreed. I would call it positing a certain representation, rather than a being; makes it simpler to recognize the kind of object it is and its contribution to syllogistic inference,.

what we can "know" with our senses, with empirical data, is all that can be known — Xtrix

Not an advocate of a priori knowledge, huh? Are we to maintain that it is impossible to know anything that isn’t first perceived?

the "I think, therefore I am" should be inverted. (...) What I'm saying there is that the "sum" is even more primordial than "thought," and thus the Cogito should be inverted in that sense. I didn't mean to imply everything that "is" is a conscious, thinking being.
— Xtrix

Not sure Rene would go for that; it is my understanding that he intended the “I” of “...therefore I am” to be necessarily conditioned by the “cogito”. In other words, they are mutually dependent, same subject, different predicates kinda thing. The “I” that thinks is not the cause of the “I” that is, and the “I” that is is not an effect of the “I” that thinks. The “I” that thinks is the very same as the “I” that is. — Mww

I'm sure Descartes wouldn't go for it, but I nonetheless think it's true. Remember, the "I" that thinks is nothing more than the conscious subject, in my reading. In fact when Descartes goes to clarify this in his Principles of Philosophy, he says by "thought" he means consciousness. So by saying "I am conscious, therefore I exist" would be more accurate. Even more accurate, and close to what I think you're saying: "I am conscious, I exist." The "therefore" isn't necessary.

But to me it's all like saying "I'm awake, therefore I'm alive." We all know that when we're asleep, we're still alive. Likewise, we're not always consciously aware, yet we exist. Existence seems a more primordial concept, then, and something out of which all other human activities emerge -- just like "life." Or at least it's the background upon which things like thinking and awareness take place -- existence is presupposed.

So, again, the inversion should read: "I exist, therefore I can be conscious of things, think, and even give this the 'I' label." The dead cannot think at all.

what we can "know" with our senses, with empirical data, is all that can be known
— Xtrix

Not an advocate of a priori knowledge, huh? Are we to maintain that it is impossible to know anything that isn’t first perceived? — Mww

I was speaking for the empiricists and most scientists here, not myself.

:cheer:

I'll repost this, but this was said by yours truly, though expounded on by me.

Many people really dislike this view, but I happen to think it's true. I understand philosophy as the study of mysteries, which is why the same questions keep popping up time and time again throughout history.

If philosophers manage to carve out some understanding of some aspect of reality, then it becomes a science and philosophers don't need to worry about it much anymore. Hence why it's called "the mother of the sciences"

Obviously this simplifies the situation a bit, discoveries in physics or biology or psychology can have consequences for philosophy, but these fields are now developed to the extent that they don't depend on philosophers anymore.

In this respect, philosophy is likely the broadest field of rational enquiry.

I think I mostly agree with that, except for the "don't depend on philosophers anymore" part. Maybe not contemporary philosophers, but certainly philosophy. The sciences don't simply detach from general human thought or basic philosophcial questions -- they're still very much grounded upon tentative answers to basic questions of philosophy, which also provides their fundamental concepts.

Sure. It varies to the extent that the scientist in question is interested in philosophy. Weinberg, for one, doesn't care for it - though he uses a form of no-nonsense positivism. It's derision for sure, but no one can escape it.

Carlo Rovelli on the other hand, does engage with philosophy quite a lot. As does Sean Carroll.

But this applies well beyond physics too.

At least you weren't bothered about the mysteries part, many people really don't like it. Of course, it's mysteries-for-us not mysteries for dogs or bats. But still, It kind of seems obvious to me.

I understand philosophy as the study of mysteries, which is why the same questions keep popping up time and time again throughout history. — Manuel

Philosophy? What you call "mysteries" I refer to as intractable perplexities (i.e. miseries); and OCD-like they keep recurring, like itching that needs, but cannot be relieved by, scratching.

In an if-then relationship, the antecedent is sufficient for the consequent, and the consequent is necessary for the antecedent. So when one says "if I am conscious then I exist" (implied by saying "I am conscious therefore I exist"), one is saying that existence is necessary for consciousness. If you were to reverse it, and say "I exist therefore I am conscious", you would be saying that consciousness is necessary for existence, and that existence is sufficient for consciousness, i.e. that everything that exists necessarily must ("first") be conscious. Which seems the opposite of what you're aiming for, and what Descartes was saying, i.e. that everything that is conscious necessarily must ("first") exist.